
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THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

EGYPTIANS,
CARTHAGINIANS,
ASSYRIANS,
BABYLONIANS,

MEDES AND PERSIANS,
MACEDONIANS,
AND
GRECIANS.

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BOOK THE EIGHTH.

THE HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER I.

Xerxes II

THIS chapter contains the history of thirteen years of the Peloponnesian war, to the nineteenth inclusively.

A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425.

SECT. I. THE VERY SHORT REIGNS OF XERXES II. AND SOGDIANUS. THEY ARE SUCCEEDED BY DARIUS NOTHUS. HE PUTS A STOP TO THE INSURRECTION OF EGYPT AND THAT OF MEDIA. HE BESTOWS ON CYRUS, HIS YOUNGEST SON, THE SUPREME COMMAND OF ALL ASIA MINOR.—[a] Artaxerxes died about the beginning of the forty-ninth year of his reign. Xerxes, who succeeded him, was the only son which the queen his wife brought him: but he had seventeen others by his concubines, among whom was Sogdianus, (who is called Secondianus by Ctesias,) Ochus, and Arsites. Sogdianus, in concert with Pharnacias, one of Xerxes's eunuchs, came insidiously, one festival day, to the new king, who, after drinking too immoderately, was retired to his chamber, in order to give the fumes of the wine he had drunk time to evaporate; where he killed him without any difficulty, after he had reigned but forty-five days; and was declared king in his stead.

A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424.

[a] Ctes. c. xlvii.—li. Diod. l. xii. p. 115.

He was scarce on the throne, when he put to death Bagorazus, the most faithful of all his father's eunuchs. It was he who had been appointed to superintend the funeral obsequies of Artaxerxes, and of the queen, Xerxes's mother, who died the same day as her husband. After having deposited the two bodies in the mausoleum, where the kings of Persia were interred, he found, at his return, Sogdianus on the throne, who did not receive him favourably, upon account of some difference with him during the lifetime of his father. But the new king did not stop here: not long after he took an opportunity to quarrel with him, on some trifling circumstance, relating to the obsequies of his father, and caused him to be stoned.

By these two murders, that of his brother Xerxes and of Bagorazus, he became the horror of the army and nobility, so that he did not think himself safe on a throne, to which he had forced his way by such enormous crimes. He suspected that his brothers harboured the like design; and Ochus, to whom his father had left the government of Hyrcania, was the chief object of his suspicion. Accordingly he sent for him, with the intention of getting him murdered as soon as he arrived. However, Ochus, who saw through his design, delayed coming, upon various pretences; which he continued till he advanced at the head of a strong army, which he openly declared he would employ, to revenge the death of his brother Xerxes. This declaration brought over to him a great number of the nobility, and several governors of the provinces, who were justly dissatisfied at Sogdianus's cruelty and ill-conduct. They put the tiara, which was the mark of regal dignity, on Ochus's head, and proclaimed him king. Sogdianus, seeing himself abandoned in this manner, was as mean and cowardly in the slight defence he made to maintain his crown, as he had before been unjust and barbarous in usurping it. Contrary to the advice of his best friends, and the wisest of those who still adhered to him, he concluded a treaty with his brother, who, getting him into his hands, caused him to be thrown into ashes, where he died a cruel death. [b] This was a kind of punishment peculiar to the Persians, and exercised only on great criminals.

[b] Val. Max. l. ix. c. 2. 2 Maccab. c. xiii.

One of the largest towers was filled to a certain height with ashes. The criminal then was thrown headlong from the top of the tower into them; after which, the ashes were by a wheel turned perpetually round him, till he was suffocated. Thus this wicked prince lost his life and empire, which he enjoyed only six months and fifteen days.

Ochus, by the death of Sogdianus, now saw himself possessed of the empire. As soon as he was well settled in it, he changed his name from Ochus to that of Darius. To distinguish him, historians add the epithet Νόθος, signifying bastard. He reigned nineteen years. Darius Nothus. A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423.

Arsites, seeing in what manner Sogdianus had supplanted Xerxes, and had himself been dethroned by Ochus, meditated to serve the latter in the same manner. Though he was his brother by the father's as well as the mother's side, he openly revolted against him, and was assisted in it by Artyphius, son of Megabyzus. Ochus, whom hereafter we shall always call Darius, sent Artasyras, one of his generals, against Artyphius; and himself, at the head of another army, marched against Arsites. Artyphius, with the Grecian troops in his pay, twice defeated the general sent against him. But engaging a third time, the Greeks were corrupted, and he himself was beaten, and forced to surrender, upon his being flattered with hopes that a pardon would be granted him. The king would have had him put to death, but was diverted from that resolution by queen Parysatis, Darius's sister and queen. She was also the daughter of Artaxerxes, but not by the same mother as Darius. She was an intriguing, artful woman, and the king her husband was governed by her on most occasions. The counsel she now gave was perfidious to the last degree. She advised him to exercise his clemency towards Artyphius, and show him kind usage, in order that his brother might hope, when he heard of his treating a rebellious servant with so much generosity, that he himself should meet, at least, with as mild treatment, and thereby be prompted to lay down his arms. She added, that when once he should have seized that prince, he might dispose of him and Artyphius as he pleased. Darius followed her counsel, which proved successful. Arsites being informed of

the gentle usage which Artyphius met with, concluded that, as he was the king's brother, he should consequently meet with still more indulgent treatment; and with this hope he concluded a treaty, and surrendered himself. Darius was very much inclined to save his life: but Parysatis, by inculcating to him, that it was necessary to punish this rebel, in order to secure himself, at last prevailed with him to put his brother to death, and accordingly he was suffocated in ashes with Artyphius. However, Darius had a violent struggle with himself, before he could consent to this sacrifice, having a very tender affection for his brother. He afterwards put some other persons to death, which executions did not procure him the tranquillity he had expected from them; for his reign was afterwards disturbed with such violent commotions, that he enjoyed but little repose.

[c] One of the most dangerous was occasioned by the rebellion of Pisuthnes, who, being governor of Lydia, wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Persian empire, and make himself king in his province. What flattered him with the hopes of succeeding in this attempt, was his having a considerable body of Grecian troops, which he had raised and enlisted in his service, under the command of Lycon the Athenian. Darius sent Tissaphernes against this rebel, and gave him, with a considerable army, the commission of governor of Lydia, of which he was to dispossess Pisuthnes. Tissaphernes, who was an artful man, and capable of acting in all characters, found means of tampering with the Greeks under Pisuthnes; and by dint of presents and promises, brought over the troops with their general to his party. Pisuthnes, who was too much weakened by this desertion, to carry on his designs, surrendered, upon his being flattered with the hopes of obtaining his pardon; but the instant he was brought before the king, he was sentenced to be suffocated in ashes, and met with the same fate as the rest of the rebels who had preceded him. But his death did not entirely put an end to all troubles; [d] for Amorges his son, with the remainder of his army, still made head against Tissaphernes; and for two years laid waste the maritime provinces of Asia Minor, till he at last was taken

A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414.

[c] Ctes. c. li.

[d] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 554—568.

by the Greeks of Peloponnesus, in Iasus, a city of Ionia, and delivered up by them to Tissaphernes, who put him to death.

[e] Darius was involved in fresh troubles by one of his eunuchs. This kind of officers had, for many years, acquired considerable power in the court of Persia; and we shall find, by the sequel of this history, that they always governed absolutely in it. [f] We may form an idea of their character, and the danger to which they expose princes, by the picture which Diocletian, after he had resigned the empire, and reduced himself to a private station of life, drew of freedmen, who had gained a like ascendant over the Roman emperors. 'Four or five persons,' says he, 'who are closely united, and resolutely determined to impose on a prince, may do it very easily. They never show things to him but in such a light as they are sure will please. They conceal whatever would contribute to enlighten him: and as they alone beset him continually, he cannot be informed of any thing but through their channel, and knows nothing but what they think fit to suggest to him. Hence it is, that he bestows employments on those whom he ought to exclude from them; and on the other side, removes from offices such persons as are most worthy of filling them. In a word, the best prince is often sold by these men, though he be ever so vigilant, and in despite of his distrust and suspicion of them.' *Quid multa? Ut Diocletianus ipse dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur imperator.*

In this manner was Darius's court governed. Three eunuchs had usurped all power in it; * an infallible mark that a government is bad, and the prince of little merit. But one of those three eunuchs, whose name was Artoxares, presided over and governed the rest. He had found Darius's weak side, by which he insinuated himself into his confidence. He had studied all his passions, in order to indulge them, and govern his prince by their means. He plunged him continually in pleasures and amusements, to engross his whole authority to himself. In fine, under the name and protection of queen Parysatis, to whose will and pleasure he was the most devoted of slaves, he disposed of all the affairs of the empire, and

[e] Ctes. c. lii. [f] Vopis. *in vit. Aurelian. Imper.*

* Scis præcipuum esse indicium non magni principis, magnos libertos. Plin. *ad Trajan.*

nothing was transacted but by his orders. Intoxicated by the supreme authority, which the favour of his sovereign gave him, he resolved to make himself king, instead of being prime minister; and accordingly formed a design to rid himself of Darius, and afterwards ascend the throne. However, his plot being discovered, he was seized and delivered up to Parysatis, who put him to a most ignominious and cruel death.

[g] But the greatest misfortune which happened to Darius during the whole course of his reign, was the revolt of the Egyptians. This terrible blow fell out the same year with Pisuthnes's rebellion. But Darius could not reduce Egypt as he had done that rebel. [h] The Egyptians, weary of the Persian government, flocked from all parts to Amyrtæus of Sais, who at last was come out of the fens, where he had defended himself, since the suppression of the revolt of Inarus. The Persians were driven out, and Amyrtæus proclaimed king of Egypt, where he reigned six years.

After having established himself securely on the throne, and entirely expelled the Persians out of Egypt, he prepared to pursue them as far as Phœnicia, and had already concerted measures with the Arabians, to attack them in that country. News of this being brought the king of Persia, he recalled the fleet which he had promised the Lacedæmonians, to employ it in the defence of his own dominions.

Whilst Darius was carrying on the war in Egypt and Arabia, the Medes rebelled; however, they were defeated, and reduced to their allegiance by force of arms. To punish them for this revolt, their yoke (till then easy enough) was made heavier: a fate that rebellious subjects always experience, when the government, which they endeavoured to throw off, gains the upper hand.

[i] Darius's arms seem to have had the like success against the Egyptians. Amyrtæus dying after he had reigned six years, (he probably was killed in a battle,) Herodotus observes, it was by the permission of the Persians that Pausiris his son succeeded him in the throne. To effect this, they must either have been masters of Egypt, or their party the strongest in that kingdom.

[g] Euseb. *in Chron.* [h] Thucyd. l. i. p. 72, 73. [i] Herod. l. iii. c. 15.

After having crushed the rebels in Media, and restored the affairs of Egypt to their former situation, Darius gave Cyrus, the youngest of his sons, the supreme command of all the provinces of Asia Minor: an important commission, by which he made all the provincial governors in that part of the empire dependent upon him. A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407.

I thought it necessary to anticipate events, and draw together the facts which relate to the kings of Persia; to prevent my being often obliged to interrupt the history of the Greeks, to which I now return.

SECT. II. THE ATHENIANS MAKE THEMSELVES MASTERS OF THE ISLAND OF CYTHERA. EXPEDITIONS OF BRASIDAS INTO THRACE. HE TAKES AMPHIPOLIS. THUCYDIDES THE HISTORIAN IS BANISHED. A BATTLE IS FOUGHT NEAR DELIUM, WHERE THE ATHENIANS ARE DEFEATED.—*The eighth Year of the War.*—The three or four campaigns which followed the reduction of the small island of Sphacteria, were distinguished by very few considerable events.

[k] The Athenians under Nicias took the island of Cythera, situated on the coast of Lacedæmonia, near Cape Malea, and from thence they infested the whole country. A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424.

[l] Brasidas, on the other side, marched towards Thrace. The Lacedæmonians were induced by more than one motive to undertake this expedition; imagining they should oblige the Athenians, who had fallen upon them in their country, to divide their forces. The inhabitants of it invited them thither, and offered to pay the army. In fine, they were extremely glad to embrace that opportunity, to rid themselves of the Helots, whom they expected to rise in rebellion, since the taking of Pylus. They had already made away with two thousand of them in a most horrid manner. Upon the specious pretence of rewarding merit even in slaves, but, in reality, to get rid of a body of men whose courage they dreaded, they caused proclamation to be made, that such of the Helots as had done the greatest service to the state in the last campaign,

[k] Thucyd. l. iv. p. 286.
[l] Ibid. p. 304—311. Diod. l. xii. p. 117, 118.

should enter their names in the public registers, in order to their being made free. Accordingly two thousand gave in their names. They were carried in procession through the temples, with chaplets of flowers on their heads, as if they were really to be set at liberty. After this ceremony, they all disappeared, and were never heard of more. We have here an instance, in what manner a suspicious policy and power, when filled with jealousy and distrust, excite men to the commission of the blackest crimes, without scrupling to make even religion itself, and the authority of the gods, subservient to their dark designs.

They therefore sent seven hundred Helots with Brasidas, whom they had appointed to head this enterprise. This general brought over several cities, either by force or secret understanding, and still more by his wisdom and moderation. The chief of these were Acanthus and Stagyra, which were two colonies from Andros. [m] He also marched afterwards towards Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, on the river Strymon. The inhabitants immediately despatched a messenger to * Thucydides the Athenian general, who was then in Thasus, a little island of the Ægæan Sea, half a day's journey from Amphipolis. He instantly set sail with seven ships that were near him, to secure the place before Brasidas could seize it; or, at worst, to get into Eion, which lay very near Amphipolis. Brasidas, who was afraid of Thucydides, from his great influence in all that country, where he was possessed of some gold-mines, made all the despatch imaginable, to get thither before him; and offered such advantageous conditions to the besieged, who did not expect succours so soon, that they surrendered. Thucydides arrived the same evening at Eion; and had he failed to come that day, Brasidas would have taken possession of it the next morning by daybreak. Although Thucydides had made all imaginable despatch, the Athenians however charged him with being the cause of the taking of Amphipolis, and accordingly banished him.

The Athenians were greatly afflicted at the loss of that city, as well because they drew great revenues from it, and timber

[m] Thucyd. l. iv. p. 320—324.

* The same who wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war.

to build their ships, as because it was a door for entering Thrace. They were afraid that all their allies in that neighbourhood would revolt; especially as Brasidas discovered great moderation and justice, and continually gave out, that he came with no other view than to free the country. He declared to the several nations, that at his leaving Sparta, he had taken an oath, in presence of the magistrates, to leave to all those the enjoyment of their liberties, who would conclude an alliance with him; and that he ought to be considered as the most abandoned of men, should he employ oaths to ensnare their credulity. 'For,' in his opinion, 'a fraud cloaked with a specious pretence, reflects infinitely greater dishonour on persons in high stations, than open violence; because the latter is the effect of the power which fortune has put into our hands; and the former is founded wholly on perfidy, which is the pest of society. Now I,' said he, 'should do a great disservice to my country, besides dishonouring it eternally, if, by procuring it some slight advantages, I should ruin the reputation it enjoys of being just and faithful to its promises; which renders it much more powerful than all its forces united together, because this acquires it the esteem and confidence of other states.' Upon such noble and equitable principles as these Brasidas always regulated his conduct; believing, that the strongest bulwark of a state is justice, moderation, integrity, and the firm persuasion which their neighbours and allies entertain, that they are incapable of harbouring a design to usurp their dominions, or deprive them of their liberty. By this conduct he brought over a great number of the enemy's allies.

[n] The Athenians, under the command of Demosthenes and Hippocrates, had entered Bœotia, expecting that several cities would join them the moment they should appear. The Thebans marched out to meet them near Delium. A considerable engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were defeated and put to flight. [o] Socrates was in this battle; and Laches, who accompanied that great man in it, gives the following testimony of him in Plato; that had the rest of the army behaved as gallantly as Socrates, the Athenians would not have sustained

[n] Thucyd. l. iv. p. 311—319.
[o] Plut. *in Lach.* p. 181. *In Conviv.* p. 221. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 195.

that loss before Delium. He was borne away by the crowds who fled, and was on foot; Alcibiades, who was on horseback, when he saw him, rode up to him, and did not stir from him, but defended him with the utmost bravery from the enemy who were pursuing him.

After the battle, the victors besieged the city. Among other engines employed by them to batter it, they used one of a very extraordinary kind. This was a long piece of timber, cut into two parts, and afterwards made hollow and joined again, so that its shape resembled very much that of a flute. At one of the ends was fixed a long iron tube, to which a caldron was hung; so that by blowing a large pair of bellows at the other end of the piece of timber, the wind being carried from thence into the tube, lighted a great fire, with pitch and brimstone, that lay in the caldron. This engine being carried on carts as far as the rampart, to that part where it was lined with stakes and fascines, threw out so great a flame, that the rampart being immediately abandoned, and the palisades burnt, the city was easily taken.

SECT. III. A TWELVE-MONTHS' TRUCE IS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO STATES. DEATH OF CLEON AND BRASIDAS. A TREATY OF PEACE FOR FIFTY YEARS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE ATHENIANS AND LACEDÆMONIANS. *Ninth, tenth, and eleventh Years of the War.*—[p] The losses and advantages on both sides had hitherto been pretty equal; and the two nations began to grow weary of a war, which put them to great expense, and did not procure them any real advantage. A truce, for a year, was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. The former resolved on it, in order to check the progress of Brasidas's conquests; to secure their cities and fortresses; and afterwards to conclude a general peace, in case they judged it would be of advantage to them. The latter were induced to it, in order that, by the sweets of repose, peace might become desirable to their enemy; and to get out of their hands such of their citizens as the Athenians had taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria; and which they could never expect to do,

A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423.

[p] Thucyd. l. iv. p. 328—333. Diod. l. xii. p. 120.

if Brasidas extended his conquests farther. The news of this accommodation sensibly afflicted Brasidas, as it stopped him in the midst of his career, and disconcerted all his projects. He could not even prevail with himself to abandon the city of Scione, which he had taken two days after the truce, but without knowing that it had been concluded. He went still farther; and did not scruple to take Mende, a little city not far from Scione, that surrendered to him as the former had done, which was a direct violation of the treaty: but Brasidas pretended he had other infractions to object to the Athenians.

It will naturally be supposed that the latter did not patiently endure this conduct of Brasidas. Cleon, in all public assemblies, was for ever inflaming the minds of the Athenians, and blowing up the fire of war. [q] His great success in the expedition against Sphacteria had infinitely raised his credit with the people: he now was grown insupportably proud, and his audaciousness was not to be restrained. He had a vehement, impetuous, and furious kind of eloquence, which prevailed over the minds of his auditors, not so much by the strength of his arguments, as by the boldness and fire of his style and declamation. It was Cleon who first set the example of bawling in assemblies, where the greatest decorum and moderation had till then been observed; of throwing his robe behind him, to give him the more liberty to display his arms; of striking his thigh; and of running up and down the hustings whilst he was making his speech. In a word, he first introduced among the orators, and all those who interfered in affairs of state, an ungovernable licentiousness, and a contempt of decency; a licentiousness and contempt, which soon introduced terrible irregularities and confusion in public affairs.

[r] Thus two men, each on his own side, opposed the tranquillity of Greece, and raised, but in a very different way, an invincible obstacle to its peace. These were Cleon and Brasidas; the former, because the war screened his vices and malversations; and the latter, because it added a new lustre to his virtues. And, indeed, it gave Cleon an opportunity of committing enormous oppressions, and Brasidas of performing

[q] Plut. *in vit. Niciæ*, p. 528. [r] Ibid.

great and noble actions. But their death, which happened about the same time, made way for a new accommodation.

A. M. 3582. Ant. J. C. 422. [a] The Athenians had appointed Cleon to command the troops which were to oppose Brasidas, and reduce those cities that had revolted from their allegiance. They were solicitous for none of them so much as Amphipolis; and Brasidas threw himself into that city, in order to defend it. Cleon had written to Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, and to the king of the Odomantes, to furnish him with as many troops as possible, and with the utmost expedition. He waited for them, and had resolved not to march immediately towards the enemy: but finding his soldiers, who had followed him involuntarily and with regret, grow weary of continuing so long inactive, and begin to compare his cowardice and inexperience with the ability and valour of Brasidas, he could no longer bear their contempt and murmurs; and imagining himself a great captain by his capture of Sphacteria, he now fancied the same good fortune would attend him at Amphipolis. He therefore approached it, merely, as he said, to take a view of the place, and till such time as all his forces should be come up; not that he thought he wanted them for carrying that city, or that he entertained any doubt of his success, (for he was persuaded that no one would dare to oppose him,) but only to enable him to invest the place on all sides, and afterwards to take it by storm. Accordingly he encamped before Amphipolis; viewing very leisurely its situation, and fondly supposing that it would be in his power to retire whenever he pleased, without drawing the sword: for not a man came out or appeared on the walls; and all the gates of the city were kept shut, so that Cleon began to repent his not having brought the engines, imagining that he wanted only these to make himself master of the city. Brasidas, who was perfectly well acquainted with Cleon's disposition and character, studiously affected an air of fear and reserve, as a bait to his temerity, and to increase the good opinion he had of himself: besides, he knew that Cleon had brought with him the flower of the Athenian forces, and the choicest troops of Lemnos and of Imbrus. Accordingly Cleon, despising an enemy who did not dare to

[a] Thucyd. l. iii. p. 342—351. Diod. l. xii. p. 121, 122.

appear before him, but shut himself up in a cowardly manner in the city, went boldly from place to place, without precaution or observing any discipline among his soldiers. Brasidas, whose intention was to attack him on a sudden before all his forces should be come up, thought this the critical juncture. He had concerted proper measures, and given the orders necessary. Accordingly, he made a sudden sally on the Athenians, which surprised and disconcerted them exceedingly. Immediately the left wing drew off from the main body and fled. Brasidas then turned the whole force of his arms against the right wing, which gave him a warm reception. Here he was wounded and disabled, upon which his soldiers carried him off, unperceived by the Athenians. As for Cleon, not having resolved to fight, he fled, and was killed by a soldier who happened to meet him. The troops he commanded defended themselves for some time, and sustained two or three attacks without giving ground, but at last they were universally broken and routed. Brasidas was then carried into the city, where he survived his victory but a few moments.

The whole army being returned from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and afterwards set up a trophy. After which all the allies under arms solemnized the funeral obsequies of Brasidas, in a public manner; and the inhabitants of Amphipolis celebrated funeral honours every year to his memory, as to a hero, with games, combats, and sacrifices. They considered him as their founder: and to secure this title the better to him, they demolished all the monuments of him * who had really been so; in order that they might not appear to owe their establishment to an Athenian, and at the same time make their court to the Lacedæmonians, on whom they depended wholly for their security. The Athenians, after having carried off, with the consent of the victors, their dead, returned to Athens, during which the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of Amphipolis.

[t] A saying is ascribed to the mother of Brasidas, which strongly marks the Spartan character. As some persons were applauding in her presence the fine qualities and exalted actions

[t] Diod. l. xii. p. 122.
* Agnon the Athenian.

of her son, and declaring him superior to all other generals: 'You are mistaken,' says she; 'my son was a valiant man, but Sparta has many citizens braver than he.' A mother's generosity, in thus preferring the glory of the state to that of her son, was admired, and did not go unrewarded; for the Ephori paid her public honours.

[u] After this last engagement, in which the two persons who were the greatest obstacles to peace lost their lives, both nations seemed more inclined to an accommodation, and the war was suspended in a manner on both sides. The Athenians, since the loss of the battles of Delium and Amphipolis, which had very much brought down their haughtiness, were undeceived with regard to the high opinion they had hitherto entertained of their own strength, that had made them refuse the advantageous offers of their enemies. Besides, they were apprehensive of the revolt of their allies, who, being discouraged by their losses, might thereby be induced to abandon them, as several had already done. These reflections made them strongly repent their not having concluded a treaty, after the advantages they had gained at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, no longer flattered themselves with the hopes of being able to ruin the Athenians by laying waste their country; and were besides dejected and terrified by their loss in the island, the greatest they had hitherto ever sustained. They also considered that their country was ravaged by the garrison of Pylus and Cythera; that their slaves deserted; that they had reason to dread a more considerable revolt; and that as the truce they had concluded with the inhabitants of Argos was near expiring, they had reason to be apprehensive of being abandoned by some of their allies of Peloponnesus, as in fact they were. These several motives, enforced by the desire they had of recovering the prisoners, the greatest part of whom were the most considerable citizens of Sparta, made them desire a peace.

Those who were most solicitous for having it concluded, and whose interest it was chiefly to wish it, were the chiefs of the two states, *viz.* Plistonax king of Lacedæmonia, and Nicias general of the Athenians. The former was lately returned

[u] Thucyd. l. v. p. 351—354.

from banishment, to which he had been sentenced on account of his being suspected to have received a bribe, in order to draw off his troops from the Athenian territories; and to this precipitate retreat were ascribed several misfortunes, which followed after it. He also was charged with having corrupted by gifts the priestess of Delphi, who had commanded the Spartans, in the name of the god, to recall him from his exile. Plistonax was therefore desirous of peace, in order to put an end to these reproaches, which, on account of the perpetual calamities of the war, were daily revived. As for Nicias, the most fortunate general of his age, he was afraid lest some unhappy accident should sully his glory; and he wished to enjoy the fruits of peace in ease and tranquillity, and to ensure the same happiness to his country.

[x] Both states began by agreeing to a suspension of arms for twelve months, during which, being every day together, and tasting the sweets of security and repose, and the pleasure of corresponding with their friends and with foreigners, they grew passionately desirous of leading an easy, undisturbed life, remote from the alarms of war, and the horrors of blood and slaughter. They heard with the utmost demonstrations of joy the choruses of their tragedies sing, 'May spiders henceforward weave their cobwebs on our lances and shields!' And they remembered with pleasure him who said, 'Those who sleep in the arms of peace, do not start from them at the sound of the trumpet; and nothing interrupts their slumbers but the peaceful crowing of the cock.'

[y] The whole winter was spent in conferences and interviews, in which each party proposed their claims and pretensions. At last, a peace was concluded, and ratified for fifty years; one of the chief articles of which was, that they should reciprocally restore the prisoners on each side. This treaty was concluded ten years and some days from the first declaration of the war. The Bœotians and Corinthians were exceedingly disgusted at it, and for that reason used their utmost endeavours to excite fresh troubles. [z] But Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to give

A. M. 3583. Ant. J. C. 421.

[x] Thucyd. l. v. p. 354. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 528, 529.
[y] Diod. l. xii. p. 122. [z] Thucyd. l. v. p. 358, 359

the last hand to this peace, by concluding an alliance offensive and defensive, which would render them more formidable to those who should desire to break with them, and more assured with regard to each other. The Athenians, in consequence of this treaty, at last restored the prisoners they had taken in the island of Sphacteria.

SECT. IV. ALCIBIADES BEGINS TO APPEAR IN PUBLIC. HIS CHARACTER. HE OPPOSES NICIAS IN EVERY THING, AND BREAKS THE TREATY HE HAD CONCLUDED. THE BANISHMENT OF HYPERBOLUS PUTS AN END TO THE OSTRACISM. *Twelfth Year of the War.*—[a] Alcibiades began now to advance himself in the state, and appear in the public assemblies. Socrates had attached himself to him for many years, and adorned his mind with a great variety of the noblest erudition.

The strict intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates is one of the most remarkable circumstances in his life. This philosopher observing excellent natural qualities in him, which were greatly heightened by the beauty of his person, bestowed incredible pains in cultivating so valuable a plant, lest, being neglected, it should wither as it grew, and absolutely degenerate. And, indeed, Alcibiades was exposed to numberless dangers; the nobility of his birth, his vast riches, the authority of his family, the influence of his guardians, his personal talents, his exquisite beauty, and, still more than these, the flattery and complaisance of all who approached him. One would have concluded, says Plutarch, that fortune had surrounded and invested him with all these pretended advantages, as with so many ramparts and bulwarks, to render him inaccessible and invulnerable to all the darts of philosophy; those salutary darts which strike to the very heart, and leave in it the strongest enticements to virtue and solid glory. But those very obstacles redoubled the zeal of Socrates.

Notwithstanding the endeavours that were used to divert this young Athenian from an intercourse which alone was capable of securing him from so many snares, he devoted himself entirely to it. As he had abundance of wit, he was fully sensible of Socrates's merit, and could not resist the charms of his

[a] Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 192, 194.

sweet and insinuating eloquence, which at that time had a greater ascendant over him than the allurements of pleasure. He was so zealous a disciple of that great master, that he followed him wherever he went, took the utmost delight in his conversation, was extremely well pleased with his principles, received his instructions and even his reprimands with wonderful docility, and would be so moved with his discourses, as even to shed tears and abhor himself; so weighty was the force of truth in the mouth of Socrates, and in so glaring a light did he expose the hideousness and deformity of the vices to which Alcibiades abandoned himself.

Alcibiades, in those moments when he listened to Socrates, differed so much from himself, that he appeared quite another man. However, his headstrong, fiery temper, and his natural fondness for pleasure, which was heightened and inflamed by the conversation of young people, soon plunged him into his former irregularities, and tore him, as it were, from his master; who was obliged to run after him as after a runaway slave. This vicissitude of flights and returns, of virtuous resolutions and relapses into vice, continued a long time; but still Socrates was not disheartened by his levity, and always flattered himself with the hope of bringing him back to his duty. And hence certainly arose the strong mixture of good and evil, that always appeared in his conduct; the instructions which his master had given him, sometimes prevailing; and at other times, the impetuosity of his passions hurrying him, in a manner against his own will, into actions of a quite opposite nature.

This intimacy, which continued as long as they lived, did not pass uncensured. But some persons* of great learning pretend, that these censures and suspicions, when duly examined, quite disappear; and that they ought to be considered as the effect of the malice of the enemies of both. Plato, in one of his dialogues, gives us a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, well calculated to display the genius and character of the latter, who henceforward will have a very great share and play a conspicuous part in the affairs of the republic of Athens. I shall make a very short extract from it in this place, which I hope will not displease my readers.

* Abbé Fraguier justifies Socrates in one of his dissertations. *Mem. of the Academy of Belles Lettres*, tom. iv. p. 372.

[b] In this dialogue Socrates is introduced conversing with Alcibiades, who at that time was under the guardianship of Pericles. He was then very young, and had been educated like the rest of the Athenians; that is, he had been taught polite literature, and to play on instruments; and had practised wrestling and other bodily exercises. It does not appear that Pericles had hitherto taken much pains in Alcibiades's education, (a fault too common in the greatest men,) since he had put him under the tuition of Zopyrus, a Thracian, a man far advanced in years, and who, of all Pericles's slaves, both from his turn of mind and age, was the least qualified to educate this young Athenian. And indeed Socrates told Alcibiades, that should he compare him with the youths of Lacedæmonia, who displayed a spirit of valour, a greatness of soul, a strong desire of glory, a love of labour, attended with gentleness, modesty, temperance, and a perfect obedience to the laws and discipline of Sparta, he would seem a mere child to them. Nevertheless, his high birth, his riches, the great families he was related to, and the authority of his guardian; all these things had conspired to make him exceedingly vain and haughty. He was full of esteem for himself, and of contempt for all others. He was preparing to enter upon the administration of public affairs, and, from his conversation it might be presumed, that he promised himself no less than to eclipse entirely the glory of Pericles, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne. Socrates seeing him going to mount the tribunal, in order to give the people some advice relating to the public affairs, demonstrates to him, by various questions, and by Alcibiades's answers, that he is quite ignorant of the affairs about which he is going to speak, as he had never studied them himself, nor been informed in them by others. After making Alcibiades himself confess this, he paints, in the strongest colours, the absurdity of his conduct, and makes him fully sensible of it. What, says Socrates, would Amestris (the mother of Artaxerxes, who then reigned in Persia) say, were she to hear, that there is a man now in Athens who is meditating war against her son, and even intends to dethrone him? She, doubtless, would suppose him to be some veteran general

[b] Plat. *in Alcib.* I.

a man of intrepid courage, of great wisdom, and consummate experience; that he is able to raise a mighty army, and march it wherever he pleases; and at the same time, that he has long before taken the proper measures for putting so vast a design in execution. But were she to hear that this is by no means the case, and that the person in question is not twenty years old; that he is utterly ignorant of public affairs; has not the least knowledge of war, nor any authority among the citizens or influence over the allies; would it be possible for her to refrain from laughing at the folly and extravagance of such an enterprise? This nevertheless, says Socrates, (directing himself to Alcibiades,) is your picture; and unhappily resembles most of those who thrust themselves into the public employments. Socrates however excepts Pericles on this occasion; his solid merit and exalted reputation being acquired by his close study, during a long course of years, of every thing capable of forming his mind, and of qualifying him for public employments. Alcibiades could not deny that this was his case; he was ashamed of his conduct, and blushing to see himself so void of merit, he asks how he must act in order to attain it. Socrates, being unwilling to discourage his pupil, tells him, that as he is so young, these evils might be remedied, and afterwards continually gave him the wisest counsels. He had full leisure to profit by them; as upwards of twenty years passed between this conversation and his engaging in public affairs.

Alcibiades was of a pliant and flexible disposition, that would take any impression which the difference of times and circumstances might require, still veering either to good or evil, with the same facility and ardour; and shifting almost in an instant from one extreme to its opposite, so that people applied to him what Homer observes of the land of Egypt, 'That it produces a great number of very excellent medicinal drugs, and at the same time as many poisons.' [c] It might be said of Alcibiades, that he was not one single man, but (if so bold an expression might be used) a compound of several men; either serious or gay; austere or affable: an imperious master, or a groveling slave; a friend to virtue and the virtuous,

[c] Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos. Juvenal.

or abandoned to vice and vicious men; capable of supporting the most painful fatigues and toils, or insatiably desirous of voluptuous delights.

[d] His irregularities and dissolute conduct were become the talk of the whole city; and Alcibiades would very willingly have put a stop to these reports, but without changing his course of life, as appears from a saying of his. He had a very handsome dog, of an uncommon size, which had cost him threescore and ten minæ,* or three thousand five hundred French livres. By this we find that a fondness for dogs is of great antiquity. Alcibiades caused his tail, which was the greatest beauty he had about him, to be cut off. His friends censured him very much on that account, and said, that the whole city blamed him very much for spoiling the beauty of so handsome a creature. 'This is the very thing I want,' replied Alcibiades with a smile. 'I would have the Athenians converse about what I have done to my dog, that they may not entertain themselves with saying worse things of me.'

[e] Among the various passions that were discovered in him, the strongest and most prevailing was a haughty turn of mind, which would force all things to submit to it, and could not bear a superior or even an equal. Although his birth and uncommon talents smoothed the way to his attaining the highest employments in the republic, there was nothing however to which he was so fond of owing the influence and authority he wanted to gain over the people, as to the force of his eloquence, and the persuasive grace of his orations. To this his intimacy with Socrates might have greatly conduced.

[f] Alcibiades, with the disposition we have here described, was not born for repose, and had set every engine at work to thwart the treaty lately concluded between the two states; but not succeeding in his attempt, he endeavoured to prevent its taking effect. He was disgusted at the Lacedæmonians, because they directed themselves only to Nicias, of whom they had a very high opinion; and, on the

A. M. 3584. Ant. J. C. 420.

[d] Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 195.

[e] Τὸ φιλόνικον, καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 195, 196.

[f] Thucyd. l. v. p. 368—378. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 197, 198.

* About 160*l.* sterling. The Attic mina was worth a hundred drachmas, and the drachma ten-pence, French money.

contrary, seemed to take no manner of notice of him, though the rights of hospitality had subsisted between his ancestors and them.

The first thing he did to infringe the peace was this: Having been informed that the people of Argos only wanted an opportunity to break with the Spartans, whom they equally hated and feared, he flattered them secretly with the hopes that the Athenians would succour them, by suggesting to them that they were ready to break a peace which was no way advantageous to them.

And indeed the Lacedæmonians were not very careful to observe the several conditions of it religiously, having concluded an alliance with the Bœotians, in direct opposition to the design and tenour of the treaty; and having surrendered up the fort of Panactus to the Athenians, not fortified and in the condition it was in at the concluding of the treaty, as they had stipulated to do, but quite dismantled. Alcibiades observing the Athenians to be extremely exasperated at this breach of faith, did his utmost to increase their disgust; and taking this opportunity to embarrass Nicias, he made him odious to the people, by causing them to entertain a suspicion of his being too strongly attached to the Lacedæmonians; and by charging him with crimes which were not altogether improbable, though they were absolutely false.

This new attack quite disconcerted Nicias; but happily for him there arrived, at that very instant, ambassadors from Lacedæmonia, who were invested with full powers to put an end to all the disputes. Being introduced into the council or senate, they set forth their complaints, and made their demands, which every one of the members thought very just and reasonable. The people were to give them audience the next day. Alcibiades, who was afraid they would succeed with them, used his utmost endeavours to engage the ambassadors in a conference with him. He represented to them, that the council always behaved with the utmost moderation and humanity towards those who addressed them, but that the people were haughty and extravagant in their pretensions; that should the ambassadors mention full powers, the people would not fail to take advantage of this circumstance, and

oblige them to agree to whatever they should take it into their heads to ask. He concluded with assuring them, that he would assist them with all his credit, in order to get Pylus restored to them, to prevent the alliance with the people of Argos, and to get that with them renewed: and he confirmed all these promises with an oath. The ambassadors were extremely well pleased with this conference, and greatly admired the profound policy and vast abilities of Alcibiades, whom they looked upon as an extraordinary man; and, indeed, they were not mistaken in their conjecture.

On the morrow, the people being assembled, the ambassadors were introduced. Alcibiades asked them, in the mildest terms, the subject of their embassy, and the purport of the powers with which they were invested. They immediately answered, that they were come to propose an accommodation, but were not empowered to conclude any thing. These words were no sooner spoken, than Alcibiades exclaims against them; declares them to be treacherous knaves; calls upon the council as witness to the speech they had made the night before; and desires the people not to believe or hear men who so impudently advanced falsehoods, and spoke and prevaricated so unaccountably, as to say one thing one day, and the very reverse on the next.

Words could never express the surprise and confusion with which the ambassadors were seized, who, gazing at one another, could not believe either their eyes or ears. Nicias, who did not know the treacherous stratagem of Alcibiades, could not conceive the motive of this change, and tortured his brain to no purpose to find out the reason of it. The people were that moment going to send for the ambassadors of Argos, in order to conclude the league with them; when a great earthquake came to the assistance of Nicias, and broke up the assembly. It was with the utmost difficulty he prevailed so far, in that which was held next day, as to have a stop put to the proceedings, till such time as ambassadors should be sent to Lacedæmon. Nicias was appointed to head them, but returned without having done the least good. The Athenians then repented very much their having delivered up, at his persuasion, the prisoners they had taken in the island, and who were related

to the greatest families in Sparta. However, though the people were highly exasperated at Nicias, they did not proceed to any excesses against him, but only appointed Alcibiades their general; made a league with the inhabitants of Mantinea and Elis, who had quitted the party of the Lacedæmonians, in which the Argives were included, and sent troops to Pylus, to lay waste Laconia. In this manner they again involved themselves in the war which they were so lately desirous of avoiding.

[g] Plutarch, after relating the intrigue of Alcibiades, adds: 'No one can approve the methods he employed to succeed in his design; however, it was a master-stroke, to disunite and shake almost every part of Peloponnesus in this manner, and raise up, in one day, so many enemies against the Lacedæmonians.' In my opinion, this is too mild a censure of so knavish and perfidious an action, which, how successful soever it might have been, was notwithstanding horrid in itself, and of a nature never to be sufficiently detested.

[h] There was in Athens a citizen, named Hyperbolus, a very wicked man, whom the comic poets generally made the object of their raillery and invectives. He was hardened in evil, and become insensible to infamy, by renouncing all sentiments of honour, which could only be the effect of a soul abandoned entirely to vice. Hyperbolus was not agreeable to any one; and yet the people made use of him to humble those in high stations, and involve them in difficulties. Two citizens, Nicias and Alcibiades, engrossed at that time all the authority in Athens. The dissolute life of the latter shocked the Athenians, who besides dreaded his audacity and haughtiness. On the other side, Nicias, by always opposing, without the least reserve, their unjust desires, and by obliging them to take the most useful measures, was become very odious to them. It might be expected, that as the people were thus alienated from both, they would not fail to put the ostracism in force against one of them. Of the two parties which prevailed at that time in the city, one, which consisted of the young men who were eager for war, the other of the old men who were desirous of peace; the former endeavoured to procure the banishment of Nicias, and the latter of Alcibiades. Hyperbolus, whose only merit

[g] *In Alcib.* p. 198. [h] Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 196, 197. *In Nic.* p. 530, 531.

was his impudence, in hopes of succeeding whichsoever of them should be removed, declared openly against them, and was eternally exasperating the people against both. However, the two factions uniting, he himself was banished, and by that put an end to the ostracism, which seemed to have been demeaned, in being employed against a man of so base a character; for hitherto there was a kind of honour and dignity annexed to this punishment. Hyperbolus was therefore the last who was sentenced by the ostracism, as Hipparchus, a near relation of Pisistratus the tyrant, had been the first.

SECT. V. ALCIBIADES ENGAGES THE ATHENIANS IN THE WAR OF SICILY.—*Sixteenth and seventeenth Years of the War.*—[1] I pass over several inconsiderable events, to hasten to the relation of that of the greatest importance, the expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were excited by Alcibiades especially. This is the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war.

A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416.

[k] Alcibiades had gained a surprising ascendant over the minds of the people, though they were perfectly well acquainted with his character. For his great qualities were united with still greater vices, which he did not take the least pains to conceal. He passed his life in such an excess of luxury and voluptuousness, as was a scandal to the city. Nothing was seen in his house but festivals, rejoicings, and parties of pleasure and debauchery. He showed very little regard to the customs of his country, and still less to religion and the gods. All persons of sense and judgment, besides the strong aversion they had for his irregularities, dreaded exceedingly the consequences of his audacity, profusion, and utter contempt of the laws, which they considered as so many steps by which Alcibiades would rise to tyrannical power.

Aristophanes, in one of his comedies,* shows admirably well, in a single verse, the disposition of the people towards him: 'They hate Alcibiades,' says he, 'and yet cannot do without him.' And, indeed, the prodigious sums he squandered on the people; the pompous games and shows he exhibited to

[1] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 350—409.
[k] Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 198—200. *In Nic.* p. 531.
* *The Frogs*, act v. scene 4.

please them; the magnificent and almost incredible presents which he made the city; the grace and beauty of his person; his eloquence, his bodily strength, joined to his courage and experience; in a word, this assemblage of great qualities made the Athenians wink at his faults, and bear them patiently, always endeavouring to lessen and screen them under soft and favourable names: for they called them frolics, polite pastimes, and indications of his humanity and good-nature.

Timon the man-hater, morose and savage as he was, formed a better judgment of this conduct of Alcibiades. Meeting him one day as he was coming out of the assembly, vastly pleased at his having been gratified in all his demands, and at seeing the greatest honours paid him by the people in general, who were attending him in crowds to his house; so far from shunning him as he did all other men, on the contrary ran to meet him, and stretching out his hand to him in a friendly way; 'Courage, my son,' says he, 'thou dost right in pushing thy fortune, for thy advancement will be the ruin of all these people.' The war of Sicily will show that Timon was not mistaken.

The Athenians, ever since the time of Pericles, had meditated the conquest of Sicily. However, that wise guide had always endeavoured to check this ambitious and wild project. He used frequently to inculcate to them, that by living in peace, by directing their attention to naval affairs, by contenting themselves with preserving the conquests they had already gained, and by not engaging in hazardous enterprises, they would raise their city to a flourishing condition, and be always superior to their enemies. The authority he had at that time over the people, kept them from invading Sicily, though it could not surmount the desire they had to conquer it, and their eyes were continually upon that island. [1] Some time after Pericles's death, the Leontines being attacked by the Syracusans, had sent a deputation to Athens, to demand aid. They were originally of Chalcis, an Athenian colony. The chief of the deputies was Gorgias, a famous rhetorician, who was reputed the most eloquent man of his time. His elegant and florid diction, heightened by shining figures which he first

[1] Diod. l. xii. p. 99.

employed, charmed the Athenians, who were prodigiously affected with the beauties and graces of eloquence. Accordingly the alliance was concluded, and they sent ships to Rhegium to the aid of the Leontines. The year following they sent a greater number. Two years after they sent a new fleet, something stronger than the former; but the Sicilians having put an end to all their divisions, by the advice of Hermocrates, the fleet was sent back; and the Athenians, not being able to prevail with themselves to pardon their generals for not conquering Sicily, sent two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, into banishment; and sentenced the third, Eurymedon, to pay a heavy fine; their prosperity having blinded them to so prodigious a degree, that they were persuaded no power was able to resist them. They made several attempts afterwards, and upon pretence of sending from time to time arms and soldiers to such cities as were unjustly treated or oppressed by the Syracusans, they by that means were preparing to invade them with a greater force.

But the person who most inflamed this ardour was Alcibiades, by feeding the people with splendid hopes, with which he himself was for ever filled, or rather intoxicated. He was every night, in his dreams, taking Carthage, subduing Africa, crossing from thence into Italy, and possessing himself of all Peloponnesus; looking upon Sicily not as the aim and the end of this war, but as the beginning and the first step of the exploits which he was revolving in his mind. All the citizens favoured his views, and, without inquiring seriously into matters, were enchanted with the mighty hopes he gave them. This expedition was the only topic of all conversations. The young men, in the places where the public exercises were performed, and the old men in their shops and elsewhere, were employed in nothing but in drawing the plan of Sicily; in discoursing on the nature and quality of the sea with which it is surrounded; on its good harbours, and flat shores towards Africa: for these people, infatuated by the speeches of Alcibiades, were (like him) persuaded that they should make Sicily only their place of arms and their arsenal, from whence they should set out for the conquest of Carthage, and make themselves

masters of all Africa and the sea, as far as the Pillars of Hercules.

[m] It is related that neither Socrates nor Meton the astronomer believed that this enterprise would be successful: the former, being inspired, as he insinuated, by his familiar spirit, who always warned him of the evils with which he was threatened; and the other, directed by his reason and good sense, which, pointing out what he had to apprehend in respect to the future, induced him to act the madman on this occasion; and to demand, in consideration of the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, that the Athenians would not force away his son, and would dispense with his carrying arms.

SECT. VI. ACCOUNT OF THE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO INHABITED SICILY.—Before I enter on the relation of the war of Sicily, it will not be improper to give a plan of the country, and of the nations who inhabited it: Thucydides begins in the same manner.

[n] It was first inhabited by the Lestrygones and the Cyclopes, of whom we know nothing but what we are told by the poets. The most ancient, after these, were the Sicani, who called themselves the original inhabitants of this country, though they are thought to have come into it from the neighbourhood of a river in Spain, called Sicanus, whose name they gave to the island, which before was called Trinacria: these people were afterwards confined to the western part of the island. Some Trojans, after the burning of their city, came and settled near them, and built Eryx and * Egesta, who all assumed the name of Elymæi; and were afterwards joined by some inhabitants of Phocis, at their return from the siege of Troy. Those who are properly called Sicilians came from Italy in very great numbers; and having gained a considerable victory over the Sicani, confined them to a corner of their island, about three hundred years before the arrival of the Greeks; and in Thucydides's time, they still inhabited the middle part of the island and the northern coast. From them the island was called Sicily. The Phœnicians also spread themselves along

[m] Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 199. *In Nic.* p. 532. [n] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 410—413.
* It is called Segesta by the Romans.

the coast, and in the little islands which border upon it, for the convenience of trade: but after the Greeks began to settle there, they retired into the country of the Elymæi, in order to be nearer Carthage, and abandoned the rest. It was in this manner the barbarians first settled in Sicily.

With regard to the Greeks, the first of them who crossed into Sicily were the Chalcidians of Eubœa, under Theocles who founded Naxos. The year after, which, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was the third of the seventeenth Olympiad, Archias the Corinthian laid the foundations of Syracuse. Seven years after, the Chalcidians founded Leontium and Catana, after having driven out the inhabitants of the country, who were Sicilians. Other Greeks, who came from Megara, a city of Achaia, about the same time, founded Megara, called Hyblæa, or simply Hybla, from Hyblon a Sicilian king, by whose permission they had settled in his dominions. It is well known that the Hyblæan honey was very famous among the ancients. A hundred years after, the inhabitants of that city built Selinus. Gela, built on a river of the same name, forty-five years after the founding of Syracuse, founded Agrigentum about a hundred and eight years after. Zancle, called afterwards Messana or Messene by Anaxilas tyrant of Rhegium, who was a native of Messene a city of Peloponnesus, had several founders, and at different periods. The Zanclians built the city of Himera; the Syracusans built Acra, Casmene, and Camarina. These are most of the nations, whether Greeks or barbarians, who settled in Sicily.

A. M. 3294. Ant. J. C. 710.

SECT. VII. The People of Egesta implore Aid of the Athenians. Nicias opposes, but to no Purpose, the War of Sicily. Alcibiades carries that Point. They both are appointed Generals with Lamachus.—[a] Athens was in the disposition above related, when ambassadors arrived from the people of Egesta, who, in quality of their allies, came to implore their aid against the inhabitants of Selinus, who were assisted by the Syracusans. It was the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. They

A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416.

[a] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 413—415. Diod. l. xii. p. 129, 130. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 200 *In Nic.* p. 531.

represented, among other things, that should they be abandoned, the Syracusans, after seizing their city as they had done that of Leontium, would possess themselves of all Sicily, and not fail to aid the Peloponnesians, who were their founders; and, that they might put them to as little charge as possible, they offered to pay the troops that should be sent to succour them. The Athenians, who had long waited for a favourable opportunity to declare themselves, sent deputies to Egesta to inquire into the state of affairs, and to see whether there was money enough in the treasury to defray the expense of so great a war. The inhabitants of that city had been so artful as to borrow from the neighbouring nations a great number of gold and silver vases, worth an immense sum of money; and of these they made a show when the Athenians arrived. The deputies returned with those of Egesta, who carried threescore talents in ingots, as a month's pay for the sixty galleys which they demanded; and a promise of larger sums, which, they said, were ready both in the public treasury and in the temples. The people, struck with these fair appearances, the truth of which they did not give themselves the leisure to examine; and seduced by the advantageous reports which their deputies made, with the view of pleasing them, immediately granted the Egestans their demand, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, to command the fleet, with full power, not only to succour Egesta, and restore the inhabitants of Leontium, to their city, but also to regulate the affairs of Sicily, in such a manner as might best suit the interests of the republic. A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415.

Nicias was appointed one of the generals, to his very great regret; for, besides other motives which made him dread that command, he shunned it, because Alcibiades was to be his colleague. But the Athenians promised themselves greater success from this war, should they not resign the whole conduct of it to Alcibiades, but temper his ardour and audacity with the coolness and wisdom of Nicias.

[p] Five days after, to hasten the execution of the decree, and make the necessary preparations, a second assembly was held. Nicias, who had had time enough to reflect deliberately on the

[p] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 415—428.

affair proposed, and was more and more convinced of the difficulties and dangers which would ensue from it, thought himself obliged to speak with some vehemence against a project, the consequences of which he foresaw might be very fatal to the republic. He said, 'That it was surprising so important an affair should have been determined almost as soon as it was taken into deliberation: that without once inquiring into matters, they had given credit to whatever was told them by foreigners, who were very lavish of the most splendid promises as costing them nothing; and whose interest it was to offer mighty things, in order to extricate themselves from their imminent danger. After all, what advantage (says he) can accrue from thence to the republic? Have we so few enemies at our doors, that we need go in search of others at a distance from us? Will you act wisely, to hazard your present possessions, on the vain hopes of an uncertain advantage? To meditate new conquests before you have secured your ancient ones? To study nothing but the aggrandizing of your state, and quite neglect your own safety? Can you place any dependence on a truce, which you yourselves know is very precarious; which you are sensible has been infringed more than once; and which the least defeat on our side may suddenly change into an open war? You are not ignorant how the Lacedæmonians have always been, and still continue, disposed towards us. They detest our government as different from theirs; it is with grief and disdain they see us possessed of the empire of Greece; they consider our glory as their shame and confusion; and there is nothing they would not attempt, to humble a power which excites their jealousy, and keeps them perpetually in fear. These are our real enemies, and these are they whom we ought to guard against. Will it be a proper time to make these reflections, when (after having divided our troops, and while our arms will be employed elsewhere, and we shall be unable to resist them) we shall be attacked at once by all the forces of Peloponnesus? We do but just begin to breathe, after the calamities in which war and the plague had plunged us; and we are now going without the least necessity to plunge ourselves into greater danger. If we are ambitious of carrying our arms into distant countries, would it not be more expedient to march and reduce the rebels

of Thrace, and other nations who are still wavering and unfixed in their allegiance, than to fly to the succour of the inhabitants of Egesta, about whose welfare we ought to be very indifferent? And will it suit our interest to attempt to revenge their injuries, at a time that we do not discover the least resentment for those we ourselves receive? Let us leave the Sicilians to themselves, and not engage in their quarrels, which it is their business to decide. As the inhabitants of Egesta undertook the war without us, let them extricate themselves from it without our interference. Should any of our generals advise you to this enterprise, from an ambitious or self-interested view; merely to make a vain parade of his splendid equipages, or to raise money to support his extravagance; be not guilty of so much imprudence as to sacrifice the interest of the republic to his, or permit him to involve it in the same ruin with himself. An enterprise of so much importance ought not to be committed wholly to the conduct of a young man. Remember it is prudence, not prejudice and passion, that gives success to affairs.' Nicias concluded with declaring it his opinion, that it would be proper to deliberate again on the affair, in order to prevent the fatal consequences with which their taking rash resolutions might be attended.

It was plain he had Alcibiades in view, and that his enormous luxury was the object of his censure. And indeed he carried it to an incredible height; and lavished prodigious sums of money on horses, equipages, and furniture; not to mention the delicacy and sumptuousness of his table. He disputed the prize in the Olympic games with seven sets of chariot horses, which no private man had ever done before him; and he was crowned more than once on that occasion. Extraordinary resources were necessary for supporting such luxury; and as avarice often serves as a resource to ambition, there were some grounds to believe, that Alcibiades was no less solicitous for the conquest of Sicily, and that of Carthage, (which he pretended would immediately follow,) to enrich his family, than to render it glorious. It is natural to suppose that Alcibiades did not let this speech of Nicias go unanswered.

'This,' says Alcibiades, 'is not the first time that merit has excited jealousy, and glory been made the object of envy.

That very thing which is imputed to me for a crime, reflects, I will presume to say it, honour on my country, and ought to gain me applause. The splendour in which I live; the great sums I expend, particularly in the public assemblies; besides their being just and lawful, at the same time give foreigners a greater idea of the glory of Athens, and show, that it is not in such want of money as our enemies imagine. But this is not our present business. Let the world form a judgment of me, not from passion and prejudice, but from my actions. Was it an inconsiderable service I did the republic, in bringing over (in one day) to its alliance, the people of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, that is, the chief strength of Peloponnesus? Make use, therefore, to aggrandize your empire, of Alcibiades's youth and folly, (since his enemies give it that name,) as well as of the wisdom and experience of Nicias; and do not repent, from vain and idle fears, your engaging in an enterprise publicly resolved upon, which may redound infinitely both to your glory and advantage. The cities of Sicily, weary of the unjust and cruel government of their princes, and still more of the tyrannical authority which Syracuse exercises over them, wait only for a favourable opportunity to declare themselves; and are ready to open their gates to any one who shall offer to break the yoke under which they have so long groaned. Though the citizens of Egesta, as being your allies, should not have a right to your protection; yet the glory of Athens ought to engage you to support them. States aggrandize themselves by succouring the oppressed, and not by continuing inactive. In the present state of your affairs, the only way to dispirit your enemies, and show that you are not afraid of them, will be, to harass one nation, to check the progress of another, to keep them all employed, and carry your arms into distant countries. Athens was not formed for ease; and it was not by inactivity that your ancestors raised it to the height in which we now see it. For the rest, what hazards will you run by engaging in the enterprise in question? If it should be crowned with success, you will then possess yourselves of all Greece; and should it not answer your expectations, your fleet will give you an opportunity of retiring whenever you please. The Lacedæmonians indeed may make an incursion into our

country; but, besides that it would not be in our power to prevent it, though we should not invade Sicily, we still shall preserve the empire of the sea, in spite of them; a circumstance which makes our enemies entirely despair of ever being able to conquer us. Be not therefore biassed by Nicias's reasons. The only tendency of them is to sow the seeds of discord between the old and young men, who can do nothing without one another; since it is wisdom and courage, counsel and execution, that give success to all enterprises: and this in which we are going to embark, cannot but turn to your glory and advantage.'

[q] The Athenians, flattered and pleased with Alcibiades's speech, persisted in their first opinion; Nicias, on the other side, did not depart from his: but at the same time did not dare to oppose Alcibiades any further. Nicias was naturally of a mild and timid disposition. He was not, like Pericles, master of that lively and vehement eloquence, which, like a torrent, bears down all things in its way. And indeed the latter, on several occasions and at several times, had never failed to check the impetuosity of the populace, who, even then, meditated the expedition into Sicily; because he was always inflexible, and never slackened the reins of that authority and kind of sovereignty which he had acquired over the minds of the people; whereas * Nicias, both by acting and speaking in an easy, gentle manner, so far from winning over the people, suffered himself to be forcibly and involuntarily carried away: and accordingly he at last yielded to the people, and accepted the command in a war which he plainly foresaw would be attended with the most fatal consequences.

Plutarch makes this reflection in his excellent treatise, where, speaking of the qualities requisite in a statesman, he shows how very necessary eloquence and inflexible constancy and perseverance are to him.

Nicias, not daring to oppose Alcibiades any longer openly, endeavoured to do it indirectly, by starting a great number of difficulties, drawn especially from the great expense requisite for this expedition. He declared, that since they were resolved

[q] Plut. *in præc. de ger. rep.* p. 802.

* Καθάπερ ἀμβλεῖ χαλινῷ τῷ λόγῳ πιεζόμενος ἀποστρέφειν τὸν δῆμον, οὐ κατίσχυε.

upon war, they ought to carry it on in such a manner as should be consistent with the exalted reputation to which Athens had attained: that a fleet was not sufficient to oppose so formidable a power as that of the Syracusans and their allies; that they must raise an army, composed of good horse and foot, if they desired to act in a manner worthy of so grand a design: that besides their fleet, which was to make them masters at sea, they must have a great number of transports, to carry provisions perpetually to the army, which otherwise could not possibly subsist in an enemy's country: that they must carry vast sums of money with them, without waiting for that promised them by the citizens of Egesta, who perhaps were ready in words only, and very probably might break their promise: that they ought to weigh and examine the disparity there was between themselves and their enemies with regard to the conveniences and wants of the army; the Syracusans being in their own country, in the midst of powerful allies, disposed by inclination, as well as engaged by interest, to assist them with men, arms, horses, and provisions; whereas the Athenians would carry on the war in a remote country possessed by their enemies, where, in the winter, news could not be brought them in less than four months' time; a country, where all things would oppose the Athenians, and nothing be procured but by force of arms: that it would reflect the greatest ignominy on the Athenians, should they be forced to abandon their enterprise, and thereby become the scorn and contempt of their enemies, by having neglected to take all the precautions which so important a design required: that as for himself, he was determined not to go, unless he was provided with all things necessary for the expedition, because the safety of the whole army depended on that circumstance; and he would not suffer it to depend upon the caprice, or the precarious engagements, of the allies.

[r] Nicias had flattered himself, that this speech would cool the ardour of the people, whereas it only enflamed it the more. Immediately the generals had full powers given them to raise as many troops, and fit out as many galleys, as they should judge necessary; and the levies were accordingly carried, on in Athens and other places, with inexpressible activity.

[r] Diod. l. xiii. p. 134.

SECT. VIII. THE ATHENIANS PREPARE TO SET SAIL. SINISTER OMENS. THE STATUES OF MERCURY ARE MUTILATED. ALCIBIADES IS ACCUSED, AND INSISTS UPON HIS BEING TRIED, BUT HIS REQUEST IS NOT GRANTED. TRIUMPHANT DEPARTURE OF THE FLEET.—[s] When all things were ready for their departure, and they were preparing to sail, there happened several bad omens, which filled the minds of the people with trouble and disquietude. The * women were at that time celebrating the festival of Adonis, during which the whole city was in mourning, and full of images representing dead persons and funeral processions; and every part echoed with the cries and groans of the women who followed those statues with lamentations. Whence it was feared, that this gay and magnificent armament would soon lose all its splendour, and † wither away like a flower.

A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415.

The general anxiety was increased by another accident. The statues of Mercury, which stood at the entrance of private houses and temples, were all mutilated in one night, and particularly in the face; and although a great reward was promised to any person who should discover the authors of so audacious a crime, no one was detected. The citizens could not forbear considering this uncommon event, not only as an unlucky omen, but as a contrivance of some factious men, who harboured very ill designs. Some young people had already been accused of committing a nearly similar crime in the midst of a drunken frolic, and particularly of having wantonly mimicked the mysteries of Ceres and Proserpine; with Alcibiades, who represented the high priest, at their head. 'It highly concerns all those in exalted stations, to be extremely careful of every step they take, and not to give the least opportunity to the most inveterate malice to censure them. They ought to call to mind, says Plutarch, that the eyes of all men are upon their conduct, and that they are ever eagle-eyed on these occasions;

[s] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 428. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 200, 201.

[t] Plut. *in præc. de ger. rep.* p. 800.

* This superstitious rite had extended even to God's people, 'And behold there sat women weeping for Tammuz,' Ezek. viii. 14. N. B. The Latin version of the Bible, which M. Rollin follows, says, 'weeping for Adonis;' which is the same as Tammuz, the Hebrews calling Adonis by that name.

† The historian alludes to the plants and flowers that were carried in that ceremony, and which went by the name of Adonis's gardens.

that not only their outward actions pass the most severe scrutiny, but that they penetrate to their most private apartments, and there take the strictest notice of their conversation, their diversions, and their most secret transactions. It was this dread of the piercing eye of the people, that kept Themistocles and Pericles perpetually on their guard, and obliged them to refrain from most of those pleasures in which others indulged themselves.

As for Alcibiades, he did not know what it was to lay himself under any restraints; and accordingly, as his character was so notorious, people were easily persuaded that he very probably had been concerned in what had happened. His luxury, libertinism, and irreligion, gave an air of probability to this charge, and the accuser was not afraid of mentioning his name. This attack staggered the constancy and resolution of Alcibiades; but hearing the soldiers and sailors declare they were induced to engage in this distant expedition beyond sea, by no other motive than their affection for Alcibiades; and that, should the least injury be done him, they would all immediately leave the service; he took heart, and appeared at his trial on the day appointed for that purpose. His enemies, upon pretence that it was necessary for the fleet to set sail, got the judgment postponed. It was to no purpose for Alcibiades to insist upon being tried in case he was guilty, without waiting for his absence in order to ruin him; and to represent that it would be the most shocking and barbarous injustice to oblige him to embark for so important an expedition, without first making due inquiry into the accusations and horrid slanders which were cast upon him, the bare thoughts of which would keep him in perpetual fear and anxiety. However, none of these remonstrances proved effectual, and the fleet was ordered to set out.

[a] They accordingly prepared to set sail, after having appointed Corcyra as the rendezvous for most of the allies, and such ships as were to carry the provisions and baggage. All the citizens, as well as foreigners in Athens, flocked by daybreak to the port of Piræus. The former attended their children, relations, friends, or companions, with a joy overcast

[a] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 430—432. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135.

with a little sorrow, upon their bidding adieu to persons that were as dear to them as life, who were setting out on a far distant and very dangerous expedition, from which it was uncertain whether they ever would return, though they flattered themselves with the hopes that the enterprise would be successful. The foreigners came thither to feed their eyes with a sight which was highly worthy their curiosity; for no single city in the world had ever fitted out so gallant a fleet. Those indeed which had been sent against Epidaurus and Potidæa, were as considerable with regard to the number of soldiers and ships; but then they were not equipped with so much magnificence, neither was their voyage so long, nor their enterprise so important. Here were seen a land and a naval army, equipped with the utmost care, and at the expense of private individuals as well as of the public, with all things necessary, on account of the length of the voyage, and the duration of the war. The city furnished a hundred empty galleys, that is, threescore light ones, and forty to transport the soldiers heavily armed. Every mariner received daily a drachma, or ten-pence (French) for his pay, exclusively of what the captains of ships individually gave the *rowers of the first bench. Add to this, the pomp and magnificence of the equipment; every one striving to eclipse the rest, and each captain endeavouring to make his ship the lightest, and at the same time the gayest of the whole fleet. I shall not take notice of the choice in the soldiers and seamen, who were the flower of the Athenians; nor of their emulation with regard to the beauty and neatness of their arms and equipage; any more than that of their officers, who had laid out considerable sums purely to distinguish themselves, and to give foreigners an advantageous idea of their persons and circumstances; so that this sight had the air of a tournament, in which the utmost magnificence is displayed, rather than of a warlike expedition. But the boldness and greatness of the design still exceeded its expense and splendour.

When the ships were loaded, and the troops got on board, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up for

* They were called θρανίται. They had longer oars than the rest, and consequently more trouble in rowing.

the success of the expedition; gold and silver cups were filling every where with wine, and the accustomed libations were poured out; the people who lined the shore shouting at the same time, and lifting up their hands to heaven, to wish their fellow-citizens a good voyage and success. And now, the hymn being sung, and the ceremonies ended, the ships sailed one after another out of the harbour; after which they strove to outsail one another, till the whole fleet met at Ægina. From thence it made for Corcyra, where the army of the allies was assembling with the rest of the fleet.

SECT. IX. SYRACUSE IS ALARMED. THE ATHENIAN FLEET ARRIVES IN SICILY.—[x] Advice of this expedition having been brought to Syracuse from all quarters, it was thought so improbable, that at first nobody would believe it. But as it was more and more confirmed every day, the Syracusans began to think seriously of making the necessary preparations; and sent deputations to every part of the island, to ask assistance of some, and send succours to others. They garrisoned all the castles and forts in the country; reviewed all the soldiers and horses; examined the arms in the magazines; and settled and prepared all things, as if the enemy had been in their country.

In the mean time the fleet sailed in three squadrons, each under the command of its particular general. It consisted of a hundred and thirty-six ships, a hundred whereof belonged to Athens, and the rest to the allies. On board these ships were five thousand heavy-armed soldiers, two thousand two hundred of whom were Athenian citizens, *viz.* fifteen hundred of those who had estates, and seven hundred* who had none, but were equally citizens; the rest consisted of allies. With regard to the light infantry, there were eighty archers of Crete, and four hundred of other countries; seven hundred Rhodian slingers, and a hundred and twenty exiles of Megara. There was but one company of horse, consisting of thirty troopers, who had embarked on board a vessel proper for transporting cavalry. Both the fleet and the land forces were afterwards

[x] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 432—445. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135, 136.
* These were called Θῆτες.

increased considerably. Thirty vessels carried the provisions and sutlers, with masons, carpenters, and their several tools; the whole followed by a hundred small vessels for the service, exclusive of merchant ships, of which there were great numbers. All this fleet had sailed together from Corcyra. Having met with but an indifferent reception from the people of Tarentum and Locris, they sailed with a favourable wind for Rhegium, where they made some stay. The Athenians were very urgent with the inhabitants of Rhegium to succour those of Leontium, who came originally from Chalcis as well as themselves: but these answered, that they were determined to stand neuter, and to undertake nothing but in concert with the rest of Italy. Here they debated on the manner in which it was necessary to carry on the war, and waited for the coming up of those ships that had been sent out to make discoveries of a proper place for landing, and to inquire whether the citizens of Egesta had got their money ready. Upon their return they brought advice that they had but thirty talents in the treasury. This Nicias had foreseen, but no regard had been paid to his salutary counsels.

[y] He did not fail, the instant this news was brought, to expatiate on the counsel he had given in Athens; to show the wrong step they had taken in engaging in this war; and to exaggerate the fatal consequences which might be expected from it: in all which he acted very imprudently. It was extremely judicious in Nicias to oppose it in the beginning, and to set every engine at work to crush if possible this ill-fated project. But as the expedition was resolved, and he himself had accepted of the command, he ought not to have been perpetually looking backward, nor to have repeated incessantly, that this war had been undertaken in opposition to all the maxims of prudence; and by that means to cool the ardour of his two colleagues in the command, to dispirit the soldiers, and blunt that edge of confidence and ardour, which assure the success of great enterprises. He ought, on the contrary, to have advanced boldly towards the enemy; should have attacked them with vigour, and have spread an universal terror, by a sudden and unexpected descent.

[y] Plut. *in Nic.* p. 532.

But Nicias acted in a quite different manner. His opinion, in the council of war, was, that they should sail for Selinus, which had been the first occasion of this expedition; and then, if the citizens of Egesta performed their promise, and gave a month's pay to the army, to proceed forward; or otherwise, to oblige them to furnish provisions for the sixty galleys they had demanded, and continue in that road till they should have concluded a peace with the citizens of Selinus, either by force of arms or some other way. He said, that they afterwards should return to Athens, after having thus made a parade of their forces, and the assistance they gave their allies; unless they should have an opportunity of making some attempt in favour of the Leontines, or of bringing over some city into their alliance.

Alcibiades answered, that it would be inglorious, after sailing out with so noble a fleet, to return without doing any thing; and that they should first endeavour to conclude an alliance with the Greeks and barbarians, in order to detach them from the Syracusans, and procure troops and provisions from them; and especially to send a deputation to Messina, which was as it were the key of Sicily, and its harbour capacious enough to hold all the fleet. He declared farther, that after seeing who were their friends and enemies, and strengthening themselves by the addition of a new reinforcement, they then should attack either Selinus or Syracuse; in case the one should refuse to conclude a peace with Egesta, and the other not permit the Leontines to return to their city.

Lamachus offered a third opinion, which perhaps was the most prudent; that was, to sail directly for Syracuse, before its citizens had time to recover from their surprise, or prepare for their defence. He observed, that the sudden arrival of an armed force always strikes the greatest terror; and that when enemies are allowed time to reflect and make preparations, it also revives their courage; whereas, when they are suddenly attacked, while still in confusion, they are generally overcome; that as they would be masters of the open country, they would not be in want of any thing, but, on the contrary, would oblige the Sicilians to declare for them: that at last they should settle in Megara, which was quite desert and a near neighbour

to Syracuse, and there lay up their fleet in safety. However, his counsel not being followed, he agreed to that of Alcibiades: accordingly they sailed for Sicily, where Alcibiades took Catana by surprise.

SECT. X. ALCIBIADES IS RECALLED. HE FLIES, AND IS SENTENCED TO DIE FOR CONTUMACY. HE RETIRES TO SPARTA. FLEXIBILITY OF HIS GENIUS AND DISPOSITION.—[z] This was the first and last exploit performed by Alcibiades in this expedition, he being immediately recalled by the Athenians, in order to be tried upon the accusation laid against him. For, since the departure of the fleet, his enemies, who had no regard to the welfare of their country; and who, under the specious pretence of religion, which is often made a cloak to cover the darkest designs, meditated nothing but satiating their hatred and revenge; his enemies, I say, taking advantage of his absence, had proceeded in the affair with greater rigour than ever. All those against whom informations were lodged, were thrown into prison, without so much as being suffered to be heard, and that too on the evidence of the most profligate and abandoned citizens; as if, says Thucydides, it was not as great a crime to punish the innocent, as to suffer the guilty to escape. One of the informers was proved to be perjured by his own words; having declared that he saw and knew one of the accused by moonlight; whereas it appeared, that there was no moon at that time. But notwithstanding this manifest perjury, the populace were as furious as ever. The remembrance of the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ made them apprehensive of a similar attempt; and strongly possessed with this fear, they would not give ear to any thing.

At last, they sent out the [*] Salaminian galley, ordering the captain not to carry off Alcibiades by force, for fear of raising a tumult in the army; but only to order him to return to Athens, to pacify the people by his presence. Alcibiades obeyed the order, and went immediately on board his galley; but the instant he was arrived at Thurium, and had got on shore, he disappeared, and eluded the pursuit of those who

[z] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 446—450. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 202.
[*] This was a sacred vessel appointed to fetch criminals.

sought after him. Being asked, whether he would not rely on his country, with regard to the judgment it might pass on him: 'I would not,' says he, 'rely on my mother, for fear she should inadvertently mistake a * black bean for a white one.' The galley of Salamis returned back without the commander, who was ashamed of his having suffered his prey to escape him in that manner. Alcibiades was sentenced to die for his contumacy. His whole estate was confiscated, and all the priests and priestesses were commanded to curse him. Among the latter was one, named Theano, who alone had the courage to oppose this decree, saying, † 'That she had been appointed priestess, not to curse but to bless.' Some time after, news being brought him that the Athenians had condemned him to die, 'I shall make them sensible,' said he, 'that I am alive.'

[a] Much about this time Diagoras the Melian was prosecuted at Athens. He had settled himself in that city, where he taught atheism, and was brought to a trial for his poisonous doctrine. [b] Diagoras escaped the punishment which would have been inflicted on him, by flying from the city; but he could not wipe off the ignominy of the sentence which condemned him to death. The Athenians had so great an abhorrence for the impious principles inculcated by him, that they even set a price upon his head, and promised a reward of a talent to any man who should deliver him up dead or alive.

[c] About twenty years before a similar process had been instituted against Protagoras, for having only treated the same question by way of problem. He had said in the beginning of one of his books: 'Whether the gods do or do not exist, is a question which I know not whether I ought to affirm or deny: for our understandings are too much clouded, and the life of man is too short, for the solution of so nice and difficult a point.' But the Athenians could not bear to have a subject of this nature made a doubt; and for this reason, they ordered proclamation to be made by the public crier, for all persons who had any copies of this book, to bring them to the magis-

[a] Joseph. *contr. App.* [b] Diod. l. xiii. p. 137.
[c] Diod. Laert. *in Protag.* Joseph. *contr. App.* Cic. l. i. *de nat. deor.* n. 62.
* The judges made use of beans in giving their suffrages, and the black bean denoted condemnation.
† *Φάσκουσα ἐυχῶν οὐ καταρῶν ἱέρειαν γεγονέναι.*

trates: after which they were burnt as infamous and impious pieces, and the author was banished for ever, from all the territories of the Athenians.

Diagoras and Protagoras had been the disciples of Democritus, who first invented the philosophy of atoms.

[d] Since the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias had possessed the whole authority: for Lamachus his colleague, though a man of bravery and experience, possessed little influence, because of his extreme poverty, for which he was despised by the soldiers. But the Athenians were not always of this way of thinking: for we have seen that Aristides, poor as he was, was not less esteemed and respected on that account: but in this last expedition, the people in general had imbibed a passion for luxury and magnificence; the natural consequence of which is, a love of riches. As Nicias, therefore, governed solely, all his actions were of the same cast with his disposition, that is, timid and dilatory: he suffered every thing to languish, sometimes either by lying still and undertaking nothing, sometimes by only sailing along the coast, or losing time in consulting and deliberating; all which soon suppressed, on one side, the ardour and confidence the troops expressed at first; and on the other, the fear and terror with which the enemy had been seized, at the sight of so formidable an armament. He besieged Hybla; and though it was but a small city, he was however obliged to raise the siege some days after, which brought him into the highest contempt. He retired at last to Catana, after having performed but one exploit, *viz.* the ruining of Hyccara, a small town inhabited by barbarians, from which place, it is said, that Lais the courtesan, at that time very young, was sold with the rest of the captives, and carried to Peloponnesus.

[e] In the mean time, Alcibiades having left Thurium, arrived at Argos; and as he quite despaired of ever being recalled home, he sent a messenger to the Spartans, desiring leave to reside among them, under their guard and protection. He promised in the most solemn manner that if they would consider him as their friend, he would render greater services to

[d] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 452, 453. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 533.
[e] Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 230.

their state, than he before had done injuries to it. The Spartans received him with open arms; and soon after his arrival in their city he gained the love and esteem of all its inhabitants. He charmed, and even enchanted them, by his conforming in all respects to their way of living. Such people as saw Alcibiades shave himself to the skin, bathe in cold water, eat of the coarse, heavy cakes which were their usual food, and be so well satisfied with their black broth, could not persuade themselves, that a man, who submitted so cheerfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace; had used essences and perfumes; had worn the fine stuffs of Miletus; in a word, had hitherto lived in the midst of voluptuousness and profusion. But flexibility was the characteristic that chiefly distinguished Alcibiades. Chameleon-like, he could assume all shapes and colours, to win the favour of those among whom he resided. He immediately assumed their manners, and adapted himself to their taste, as if they had been natural in him; and though he inwardly had an aversion to them, he could however cover his disgust with an easy, simple, and unconstrained air. With some he had all the graces and vivacity of the gayest youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta he was laborious, frugal, and austere; in Ionia, enjoyment, idleness, and pleasure, made up his whole life: in Thrace, he was always on horseback or carousing; and when he resided with Tissaphernes, the satrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Persians in luxury and profusion.

But he was not barely satisfied with gaining the esteem of the Lacedæmonians. He insinuated himself so far into the affection of Timæa, the wife of king Agis, that he had a son by her, who, in public, went by the name of Leotychides; though his mother, in private, and among her women and female friends, did not blush to call him Alcibiades; so violent was her passion for that Athenian. Agis was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refused to own Leotychides for his son; for which reason he was afterwards excluded the throne

Sect. XI. Description of Syracuse.—As the siege of Syracuse is one of the most considerable in the Grecian history; the particular circumstances of which I thought proper to

A PLAN OF THE CITY OF SYRACUSE.
Besieged by the Athenians.

References to the Fortifications of the Athenians and Syracusans.

1. *The fortified Camp of the Athenians.*
2. *The Wall that faces Epipolæ in its whole extent built by the Syracusans to surround Temenos.*
3. *Contravallation which the Athenians attempted to carry from the Foot of Epipolæ along the Northern Wall of Tyche as far as Tregilus.*
4. *The traverse Wall drawn by the Syracusans to cut the Contravallation of the Athenians.*
5. *Western Contravallation of the Athenians from the hills of Epipolæ downwards. called the Single Wall.*
6. *Continuation of the western Contravallation of the Athenians from the Plain to the great Harbour called the Double Wall.*
7. *The Foss lined with Palisades, made by the Syracusans to cut the Contravallation through the Fens.*
8. *The Wall carried on by the Syracusans going upward from the City towards Epipolæ against the single Wall, built by the Athenians.*

J. Pye Sculp.

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relate for that reason, in order to give my readers an idea of the manner in which the ancients formed the siege of a place; I judge it necessary, before I enter into that detail, to give the reader a description and plan of the city of Syracuse; in which he will also find the different fortifications, both of the Athenians and Syracusans, mentioned in this siege.

[f] Syracuse stood on the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, its advantageous situation, the conveniency of its double harbour, its fortifications built with the utmost care and labour, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greatest, the most beautiful, and most powerful among the Grecian cities. * We are told, its air was so pure and serene, that there was no day in the year, how cloudy soever it might be, in which the sun did not display its beams.

[g] It was built by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the same coast. A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709.

When the Athenians besieged this city, it was divided into three parts, *viz.* the Island, Achradina, and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only these three divisions. Two more, *viz.* Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added.

The ISLAND, situated to the south, was called Νῆσος (Nasos) signifying, in Greek, an island, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge. [h] It was in this island that the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace for their kings. This quarter of the city was of very great importance, because it might render those who possessed it, master of the two ports which surround it. It was for this reason that the Romans, when they took Syracuse, would not suffer any Syracusan to inhabit the island.

[i] There was in this island a very famous fountain, called Arethusa. The ancients, or rather the poets, from reasons which have not the least shadow of probability, supposed that the Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponnesus, rolled its waters

[f] Cic. *Verr.* 6. n. 117—119. [g] Strab. l. vi. p. 269. [h] Cic. *Verr.* 7. n. 97.
[i] Strab. l. vi. p. 270. Senec. *Nat. Quæst.* l. iii. c. 26.
* Urbem Syracusas elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cœlique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magnâ turbulentâque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent. Cic. *Verr.* 7. n. 26.

either through or under the waves of the sea, without ever mixing with them, as far as the fountain of Arethusa. It was this fiction which gave occasion to the following lines of Virgil:—

Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi concede laborem.——
Sic tibi, cùm fluctus subter labêre Sicanos,
Doris amara suam non intermisceat undam. VIRG. *Eclog.* 10.

Thy sacred succour, Arethusa, bring,
To crown my labour: 'tis the last I sing.——
So may thy silver streams beneath the tide,
Unmix'd with briny seas, securely glide. DRYDEN.

Achradina, situated entirely on the sea-side towards the east, was the most spacious, the most beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city.

TYCHE, so called from the temple of Fortune (Τύχη) which embellished that part of the city, extended along Achradina westward from the north towards the south, and was very well inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was situated to the north of the city.

EPIPOLÆ was a hill without the city, which it commanded. It was situated between Hexapylum and the point of Euryelus, towards the north and west. It was exceedingly steep in several places, and for that reason of very difficult access. At the time of the siege in question, it was not surrounded with walls; and the Syracusans defended it with a body of troops, against the attacks of the enemy. Euryelus was the pass or entrance which led to Epipolæ. On the same hill of Epipolæ was a fort called Labdalon, or Labdalum.

It was not till long after (under Dionysius the tyrant) that Epipolæ was surrounded with walls, and enclosed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth division had been added before, called NEAPOLIS, that is, the New City, which covered Tyche.

[k] The river Anapus ran at almost half a league distance from the city. The space between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two fens, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the Lysimelia. This river emptied itself into the great harbour. Near its mouth, southward, was

[k] Plut. *in Dionys. vit.* p. 970.

a kind of castle called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius standing there, and in which were great riches. It was five hundred paces from the city.

Syracuse had two harbours, very near one another, and separated only by the isle, *viz.* the great harbour, and the small one, called otherwise Laccus. According to the * description which the Roman orator gives of them, both were surrounded with the buildings of the city.

The great harbour was a little above † five thousand paces, or two leagues in circumference. It had a gulf called Dascon. The entrance of this port was but five hundred paces wide. It was formed, on one side, by the point of the island Ortygia; and on the other, by the little island and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a castle of the same name.

Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbour of Trogilus.

SECT. XII. NICIAS, AFTER SOME ENGAGEMENTS, BESIEGES SYRACUSE. LAMACHUS IS KILLED IN A BATTLE. THE CITY IS REDUCED TO THE GREATEST EXTREMITIES. *Eighteenth Year of the War.*—[1] At the end of the summer, news was brought Nicias that the Syracusans, having resumed courage, intended to march against him. Already their cavalry advanced with an air of insolence to insult him even in his camp; and asked with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to settle in Catana. These severe reproaches roused him a little, so that he resolved to sail for Syracuse. The enterprise was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmost hazard, attempt to land in presence of an enemy who waited for him with the greatest resolution; and would not fail to charge him, the instant he should offer to make a descent. Nor was it safer for him to march his troops by land, because, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracusans, which was very numerous, upon the first advice they should have of his march, would fall upon him, and overpower him by the superiority of forces.

[1] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 453—461. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 533, 534. Diod. l. xiii. p. 137, 138.

* Portus habet propè in ædificatione aspectuque urbis inclusos. Cic. *Verr.* 6. n. 117.

† According to Strabo, it is eighty stadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent; a plain proof that this passage of Strabo is corrupt. Cluver. p. 167

To extricate himself from this perplexity, and enable himself to seize without opposition upon an advantageous post, which a Syracusan exile had discovered to him, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. He caused a false piece of information to be given to the enemy, *viz.* that by means of a conspiracy, which was to take effect on a certain day, they might seize on his camp, and possess themselves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracusans, on this assurance, marched towards Catana, and pitched their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition; and in the evening steered for Syracuse. They arrived by daybreak in the great harbour; landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themselves. The enemy finding themselves shamefully overreached, returned immediately to Syracuse; and, in the greatest rage, drew up in battle array, some days after, before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful, but a very heavy shower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, coming unexpectedly, the Syracusans, who were inexperienced, the greatest part of them having never carried arms before, were frighted at the tempest, whilst their enemies laughed at it, as the mere effect of the season; and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the storm. The Syracusans, after making a long and vigorous resistance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not pursue them far, because their horse, which was still in a body, and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracusans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia to prevent its being plundered.

This temple stood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very desirous of taking it, because it abounded with gold and silver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had consecrated. Nicias having delayed sending troops to seize it, lost the opportunity, and gave the Syracusans time to throw into it, as was before observed, a detachment for its defence. It was thought he did this on purpose, and out of reverence to the gods; because, had the soldiers plundered this

temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himself alone would have been accused of the sacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a condition to attack Syracuse, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana, to winter there, with design to return in the beginning of the next spring, and lay siege to the city. For this they wanted money, provisions, and particularly horse, of which they were absolutely destitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of these succours from the people of Sicily, who they supposed would join them, the instant they should hear of their victory; and at the same time they sent an express to Athens, to solicit the like aid. They also addressed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and sent deputies to some cities of Italy, situated on the coast of the Tuscan sea, which had promised to assist them.

The Syracusans were far from desponding. Hermocrates, who, of all their leaders, was most distinguished for his valour, his judgment, and experience, represented to them, in order to raise their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage, but in conduct; that the enemies, though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune rather than to their merit; that the having a multitude of leaders, (they were fifteen in number,) from which confusion and disobedience are inseparable, had done them prejudice; that it would be absolutely necessary for them to choose experienced generals, to keep the rest in their duty, and exercise their forces continually during the winter season. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they sent deputies to Corinth and Lacedæmon to renew the alliance, and at the same time to engage them to make a diversion, in order to oblige, if possible, the Athenians to recall their troops out of Sicily, or at least to prevent their sending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuse was the chief object of their care. Accordingly they took into the city, by a wall, all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche, descending westward towards the quarter of the city called afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater distance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger

extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected, because it seemed to be sufficiently defended by its rugged and steep situation. They also garrisoned Megara and Olympia, and drove stakes into all those parts of the sea-shore, where the enemy might easily make a descent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waste the adjacent country.

[m] The ambassadors of Syracuse being arrived among the Corinthians, asked succour of them as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and at the same time they sent an embassy to the Lacedæmonians, to invite them to declare in their favour. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, to which his resentment against Athens added new vigour. He advised and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and send him into Sicily; and at the same time to invade the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diversion. In the third place, he induced them to fortify Decelia in Attica, which quite completed the ruin of the city of Athens, it not being able ever to recover that blow: for by this fort, the Lacedæmonians made themselves masters of the country, by which the Athenians were deprived of their silver mines of Laurium, and of the revenues of their lands; nor could they be succoured by their neighbours, Decelia becoming the asylum of all the malecontents and partisans of Sparta.

Nicias had received some succours from Athens. These consisted of two hundred and fifty troopers, who the Athenians supposed would be furnished with horses in Sicily, (the troops bringing only the furniture,) and of thirty horse-archers, with three hundred talents, that is, three hundred thousand French crowns.* Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accused of often letting slip opportunities, by his losing time in deliberating, arguing, and concerting measures; however, when once he entered upon action, he was as bold and vigorous in execution, as he before

A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414.

[m] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 471—482. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 203. *In Nic.* p. 534, 535. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138

* About 67,000*l.* sterling.

had been slow and timorous in undertaking, as he showed on the present occasion.

The Syracusans hearing that the Athenians had received a reinforcement of cavalry, and would soon march and lay siege to the city; and knowing they could not possibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unless they should possess themselves of the heights of Epipolæ, which commanded Syracuse, they resolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only pass by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inaccessible. Marching therefore down into the meadow, bordered by the river Anapus, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed seven hundred foot, under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important post; with orders to repair to it, at the first signal which should be given for that purpose. But Nicias conducted his design with so much prudence, expedition, and secrecy, that they had not time to do this. He sailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the least suspicion of his design. Being arrived at the port of Trogilus near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league (six or seven furlongs) from Epipolæ, he put his land forces on shore, after which he retired with his fleet to Thapsus, a small peninsula near Syracuse, the entrance to which he shut up with a staccado.

The land forces marched with the utmost expedition to seize on Epipolæ, by the pass of Euryelus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapus at above a league's distance, had the least notice of their arrival. At the first news of this, the seven hundred soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced forward in confusion, but were easily defeated; and three hundred of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the summit of Epipolæ, in order to secure their baggage and most valuable effects in it, whenever they should be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after, the inhabitants of Egesta sent the Athenians three hundred horse, to which some of their Sicilian allies added a hundred more, which with the two hundred and fifty sent before by the Athenians, and who had furnished themselves

with horses in Sicily, made a body of six hundred and fifty horse.

The plan laid down by Nicias for taking Syracuse, was, to surround all the city on the land side with a strong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes, no doubt, that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succours or provisions by sea.

Having left a garrison in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to shut up the city northward from Tyche as far as Trogilus, situate on the sea-side. This work was carried on with such a rapidity, as terrified the Syracusans. They thought it absolutely necessary to prevent the carrying on of this work, and accordingly made some sallies and attacks, but always with disadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation (northward) was continued by part of the army, during which the rest carried stones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finish it.

The besieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it advisable not to venture a second battle with the Athenians; and only endeavoured to put a stop to their works, or at least to render them useless, by raising a wall to cut the line of that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in case they should be suffered to complete their wall, it would be impossible for the Athenians to make any farther progress in their work: or that, should they endeavour to prevent it, it would be sufficient for the Syracusans to oppose them with a part of their forces, after having shut up such avenues as were most accessible with strong palisades: and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to send for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

Accordingly they came out of their city, and working with inexpressible ardour, they began to raise a wall; and, in order to carry it on with less molestation, they covered it with strong palisades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper distances, to defend it. The Athenians suffered the Syracusans

to carry on their works undisturbed, because, had they marched only part of their troops against them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then must have been obliged to discontinue their works, which they had resolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracusans left a body of troops to defend the palisade and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and observing that the Syracusan soldiers, who had been left to guard the wall, were very negligent in their duty; some returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the rest not keeping a proper guard; they detached three hundred chosen soldiers, and some light infantry, to attack this post; during which the rest of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any succours from coming out of it. Accordingly, the three hundred soldiers having forced the palisade, pursued those who guarded it as far as that part of the city wall which covered Temenites, where pouring in indiscriminately with them, they were repulsed by the inhabitants with loss. The whole army afterwards demolished the wall, pulled up the palisades of the intrenchment, and carried them off.

After this success, whereby the Athenians were masters of the northern parts, they began, the very next day, a still more important work, and which would quite finish their enclosure of the city; *viz.* to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ, westward, through the plain and the fens as far as the great harbour. To prevent this, the besieged, beginning the same kind of work as they had carried on on the other side, ran a trench, lined with palisades, from the city through the fens, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallation as far as the sea. But the latter, after finishing the first part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, resolved to attack this new work. For this purpose, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus to the great harbour of Syracuse; for it had hitherto continued in that road; and the besieged had always the sea open to them, by which the besiegers were obliged to get their provisions from Thapsus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain, before daybreak; when throwing planks

and beams in that part where the fen was only slimy and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greatest part of the fossé lined with palisades, and then the rest, after having beaten the Syracusans, who gave way and retired; such as were on the right, towards the city, and the rest towards the river. Three hundred chosen Athenians having attempted to cut off the passage of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greatest part of which were drawn up in battle, repulsed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and put the first battalions into disorder. Lamachus perceiving this from the left wing, where he commanded, ran thither with the Argives and some archers; but having passed a trench, and being abandoned by his soldiers, he was killed with five or six who had followed him. The enemy immediately passed the river, and seeing the rest of the army come up, they retired.

At the same time their right wing, which had returned towards the city, resumed courage from this success, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached some troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipolæ, which served as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an intrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias saved it. He had remained in this fort, in consequence of illness, and was at that time in his bed, with only his domestics about him. Animated by the danger and the presence of the enemy, he struggles with his indisposition; rises up, and commands his servants to set fire immediately to all the timber, lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. This unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that general. At the same time, the fleet was seen sailing into the great harbour, according to the orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they should be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the troops which were about to land, retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fossé lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the

enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the sea.

In the mean time the Athenians, who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea; *viz.* a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and another of circumvallation against those Syracusan troops which were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who was now sole general, conceived great hopes; for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters vessels laden with provisions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard, on his passage, the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward nevertheless; not with the view of defending Sicily, but only of preserving to the nations of Italy such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared, in all places, that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island; and were headed by a general, whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself, now (contrary to his natural disposition) confiding in his own strength, and elate from his success; persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate; did not regard Gylippus's approach, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy, in any manner, of his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance upon

account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose Gylippus's landing, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair had been ended.

SECT. XIII. THE SYRACUSANS RESOLVE TO CAPITULATE, BUT GYLIPPUS'S ARRIVAL CHANGES THE FACE OF AFFAIRS. NICIAS IS FORCED BY HIS COLLEAGUES TO ENGAGE IN A SEA-FIGHT, AND IS OVERCOME. HIS LAND FORCES ARE ALSO DEFEATED. *Nineteenth Year of the War.*—[n] The fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed; and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogilus, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly, a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion, that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.

It was at that very instant, and in the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongylus by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked round him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which were coming to their aid. The Syracusans, astonished, or rather stupified, as it were, with this news, could scarce believe what they heard. Whilst they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a * fort in his way, marched in order of battle directly for Epipolæ; and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done, he prepared to attack them from without, whilst the Syracusans should charge them, on their side, with the forces of

[n] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 485—489. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 535, 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138, 139.
* Jeges.

Syracuse and his. The Athenians exceedingly surprised at his arrival, drew up hastily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make the least answer to this proposal; and some of his soldiers bursting out a laughing, asked the herald, 'Whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian cloak, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the present state of the city?' Both sides therefore prepared for battle.

Gylippus stormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The same day an Athenian galley was taken, as it sailed into the harbour. The besieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut (about the extremity of it) the single wall of the Athenians; and to deprive them of all communication with the troops that were posted in the intrenchments which surrounded the city on the north side towards Tyche and Trogilus. The Athenians, after having finished the wall, which extended as far as the sea towards the great harbour, were returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the single wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, one part that was weaker and lower than the rest, marched thither in the night with his troops; but being discovered by the Athenians, who were encamped without, he was forced to retire, upon seeing them advance directly towards him. They raised the wall higher, and themselves undertook the guard of it; after having fixed their allies in the several posts of the remainder of the intrenchment.

Nicias, on the other side, thought proper to fortify the cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the sea, straitened the mouth of the great harbour; and his design thereby was, to procure provisions, and all other things he might want, the more easily; because the Athenians, by possessing themselves of that post, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval forces of the Syracusans, and were the better able to observe their various motions; and that besides, by having the sea open, they would not be forced to have all their provisions from the bottom of the great harbour; as they must have been,

should the enemy, by seizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep close in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, since the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left but from the side next the sea. Sending therefore his fleet and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, sheltered by which the ships were enabled to lie at anchor; he also secured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet suffered very much; for, as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were surrounded by the enemy's horse, the third part of which were posted at Olympia, to prevent the garrison of Plemmyrium from sallying, and were masters of the open country. Advice being brought to Nicias, that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he sent twenty galleys against it; ordering them to observe the enemy towards Locris, Rhegium, and the rest of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time Gylippus, employing those very stones which the Athenians had got together for their own use, went on with the wall which the Syracusans had begun to carry through Epipolæ; and drew up daily in battle array before it, as did the Athenians. When he saw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the spot lying between the two walls. The narrowness of it having rendered his cavalry and archers useless, he came off with loss, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his soldiers by doing them justice, had the courage to reproach himself for the ill success they had met with; and to declare publicly, that he, not they, had occasioned the late defeat; because he had made them fight in too confined a spot of ground. However, he promised to give them soon an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his; and accordingly, the very next day, he led them against the enemy, after having exhorted them, in the strongest terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving, that though he should not desire to come to a battle, it would however be absolutely necessary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their wall beyond the wall of contravallation, to which they were already very near, (because otherwise this would be granting them a certain victory;) he therefore marched against the Syracusans.

Gylippus brought up his troops beyond the spot where the walls terminated on both sides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle; when charging the enemy's left wing with his horse, he put it to flight, and soon after defeated the right. We see here what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing: for Gylippus, with the same men, the same arms, the same horses, and the same ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night, the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to surround them.

[o] After this success, the Syracusans, to whose aid the Corinthian fleet was arrived unperceived by that of the Athenians, resumed courage, armed several galleys; and marching into the plains with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of prisoners. They sent deputies to Lacedæmonia and Corinth, to desire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in person through all the cities of Sicily, to solicit them to join him; and brought over the greatest part of them, who accordingly sent him powerful succours. Nicias, finding his troops lessen, and those of the enemy increase daily, began to be discouraged; and not only sent expresses to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the situation of affairs, but likewise wrote to them in the strongest terms. I shall repeat his whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the state of things at that time in Syracuse, and may serve as a model for such kind of relations.

'Athenians: I have already informed you, by several expresses, of what was passing here: but it is necessary you should know the present situation of affairs, that you may resolve accordingly. After we had been victorious in several engagements, and had almost completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuse with a body of Lacedæmonian and Sicilian troops; and, having been defeated the first time, he was victorious the second, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are in consequence shut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, and unable to

[o] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 490—494. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 139.

complete our works, through the superiority of the enemy's forces; for part of our soldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and consequently we have not an opportunity of employing all our forces in battle. Besides, as the Syracusans have cut our lines, by a wall, in that part where they were not complete, it will no longer be possible for us to surround the city, unless we should force their intrenchments; so that instead of besieging, we ourselves are besieged, and dare not stir out, for fear of their horse.

'Not contented with these advantages, they are bringing new succours from Peloponnesus, and have sent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Sicily to declare for them; and the rest to furnish them with men and ships, to attack us both by sea and land. I say by sea, which, though very surprising, is however but too true. For our fleet, which before was considerable, from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in those very circumstances, and prodigiously weakened.

'Our galleys leak every where; because we cannot draw them on shore to careen them, for fear, lest those of the enemy, which are more numerous, and in better condition than ours, should attack us on a sudden, which they seem to threaten every moment. Besides, we are under a necessity of sending many backwards and forwards to guard the convoys which we are forced to fetch from a great distance, and bring along in sight of the enemy; so that should we be ever so little negligent in this point, our army would be starved.

'With regard to the ships' crews, they decrease sensibly every day; for, as great numbers of them disperse to maraud, or to fetch wood and water, they are often cut to pieces by the enemy's horse. Our slaves, allured by the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, desert very fast to it. The foreigners whom we forced into the service, disband daily; and such as have been raised with money who came for plunder, rather than fighting, finding themselves balked, go over to the enemy, who are so near us, or else hide themselves in Sicily, which they may easily do, in so large an island. A great number of citizens, though long used to, and well skilled in working of ships, by bribing the captains, have put others in their room, who are

wholly unexperienced, and incapable of serving, and by that means have quite subverted all discipline. I am now writing to men perfectly well versed in naval affairs; and who are very sensible, that, when order is neglected, every thing grows worse and worse, and a fleet must inevitably be ruined.

'But the most unhappy circumstance is, that, though I am invested with the authority of general, I cannot put a stop to these disorders. For (Athenians) you are very sensible, that such is your disposition, that you do not easily brook restraint; besides, I do not know where to furnish myself with seamen, whilst the enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and should the cities of Italy, from whence we have our provisions, (hearing the extremity to which we are reduced, and that you do not take the least care to send us any succour,) join the Syracusans, we are undone; and the enemy will have no occasion to fight us.

'I could write of things which would be more agreeable, but of none that could be more proper to give you a just idea of the subjects on which you are to deliberate. I am sensible that you love to have such advices only sent you as are pleasing; but then I know on the other side, that when affairs turn out otherwise than you expected and hoped for, you accuse those who deceived you; which has induced me to give you a sincere and genuine account of things, without concealing a single circumstance. By the way, I am to inform you, that no complaints can be justly made either against the officers or common soldiers, both having done their duty very well.

'But now that the Sicilians are joining all their forces against us, and expect a new army from Peloponnesus; you may lay this down as the foundation for your deliberations, that our present troops are not sufficient; and, therefore, we either must be recalled, or else a land and naval force, equal to the first, must be sent us, with money in proportion. You must also think of appointing a person to succeed me; it being impossible for me, through my nephritic disorder, to sustain any longer the weight of the command. I imagine that I deserve this favour at your hands, on account of the services I have done you, in the several commands conferred upon me, so long as my health would permit me to act.

'To conclude: whatever resolution you may come to, the request I have to make, is, that you would execute it speedily, and in the very beginning of the spring. The succours which our enemies meet with in Sicily are all ready; but those which they expect from Peloponnesus may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you do not exert yourselves, the Lacedæmonians will not fail, as they have already done, to be beforehand with you.'

The Athenians were strongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impression on them as Nicias expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a successor; and only nominated two officers who were under him, *viz.* Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys, and some money,* about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succour should be sent him; during which, the latter was raising troops and contributions, in order to sail early in the spring.

[p] The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, being supported by the Corinthians, were very industrious in preparing reinforcements to send into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from sailing to that island. Accordingly they entered Attica early, under the command of king Agis; and after having laid waste the country, they fortified Decelia; having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater despatch. This post is about a hundred and twenty furlongs from Athens, that is, about six French leagues, and the same distance from Bœotia. Alcibiades was perpetually soliciting the Lacedæmonians; and could not be easy, till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians most of all: for as hitherto the enemy had been accustomed to retire after they had laid waste the Athenian territories, the latter were unmolested all the rest of the year; but since the fortifying of Decelia, the garrison left in it was continually making incursions, and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become

A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413.

[p] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 494—496, and 502—504. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140.
* 120 talents

a kind of frontier town; for, in the day-time, a guard was mounted at all the gates; and in the night, all the citizens were either on the walls, or under arms. Such vessels as brought provisions from the island of Eubœa, and which before had a much shorter passage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium; by which means provisions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer. To heighten the calamity, upwards of twenty thousand slaves, the greatest part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme misery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Most of the horses were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waste in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which arose from the produce of their lands, there was a prodigious scarcity of money; so that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to supply their usual subsidies.

[q] In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned with as many men as he could raise in the whole island; and prevailed with the Syracusans to fit out the strongest fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at sea, upon the presumption that the success would answer the greatness of the enterprise. This advice was strongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracusans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the seas. He observed, that the Athenians themselves had not received it from their ancestors, nor been always possessed of it: that the Persian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithstanding two great obstacles, their natural disposition, and the situation of their city, which stood at a considerable distance from the sea: that they had made themselves formidable to other nations, not so much by their real strength, as by their courage and intrepidity; that they ought to copy them; and since they had to do with enemies who were so enterprising, it was fit they should be daring.

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land forces in the night-time, to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five

[q] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 497—500. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 536. Diod. p. 140.

Syracusan galleys which were in the great harbour, and forty-five in the lesser, where was an arsenal for ships, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to amaze the Athenians, who would see themselves attacked both by sea and land at the same time. The Athenians, at this news, went on board also; and, with twenty-five ships, sailed to fight the thirty-five Syracusan vessels which were sailing out against them from the great harbour; and opposed thirty-five more to the forty-five of the enemy, which were come out of the little port. A sharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbour; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Those who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the shore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by daybreak; and having carried the greatest of them by storm, the soldiers who defended the other two were so terrified, that they abandoned them in a moment.

After this advantage the Syracusans sustained a considerable loss: for such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of the harbour (after having forced the Athenians) ran foul of one another with much violence as they entered it in disorder; and by this means transferred the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing, but also gave chase to those who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and great numbers of the sailors in them killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewise lost three, and after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy in a little island that lay before Plemmyrium, and retired to the shelter of their camp.

The Syracusans also raised three trophies for their taking of the three forts; and after razing one of the smaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garrisons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made prisoners there; and great sums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, besides a large quantity of ammunition; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewise lost the stores and rigging of forty galleys, with three ships that lay in the dock. But a more considerable circumstance was,

Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting provisions and ammunition so easily; for, whilst the latter was possessed of Plemmyrium, these were procured securely and expeditiously; whereas, after that place was lost, it was equally difficult and hazardous, because they could not bring in any thing without fighting; the enemy lying at anchor just off their fort. Thus the Athenians could have no provisions but from the point of their swords; which dispirited the soldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great consternation.

[r] There afterwards was a little skirmish in defending a staccado which the inhabitants had made in the sea, at the entrance of the old harbour, to secure the shipping. The Athenians having raised towers and parapets on a large ship, made it advance as near as possible to the staccado, in order that it might serve as a bulwark to some ships which carried military engines, with which they drew up the stakes by the help of pulleys and ropes, exclusive of those which the divers sawed in two; the besieged defending themselves from their harbour, and the enemies from their tower. Such stakes as had been driven in, level with the surface of the water, in order to strand those vessels that should come near them, were the hardest to force away. The divers, however, being induced by large sums of money, succeeded in removing these also, and most of the stakes were torn up; but then others were immediately driven in their places. The utmost efforts were used on both sides, in the attack as well as the defence.

[s] One circumstance which the besieged considered of the greatest importance, was to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land, before the fleet, and other succours sent by the Athenians, should arrive. They had concerted fresh measures for a battle at sea, profiting by the errors they had committed in the last engagement. The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now shorter, and at the same time stronger and more solid than before. For this purpose, they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward, on each side of the prows: and to these pieces they joined beams by way of props. These beams extended to the length of six

[r] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 500, 501.
[s] Ibid. p. 509—513. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 536. Diod. p. 140, 141.

cubits on each side of the vessel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, because of the weakness of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention, that should the battle be fought in the harbour, they would not have room to spread themselves, nor to pass between two galleys, in which lay their greatest art; nor to tack about, after they should have been repulsed, in order to return to the charge; whereas the Syracusans, by their being masters of the whole extent of the harbour, would have all these advantages, and might reciprocally assist one another. On these circumstances the latter founded their hopes of victory.

Gylippus therefore first drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advanced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city; whilst the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their galleys set sail.

Nicias was unwilling to venture a second battle, saying, that as he expected a fresh fleet every moment, and a strong reinforcement under Demosthenes, it would betray the greatest want of judgment should he, as his troops were inferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had just before been appointed to share the command with Nicias till the arrival of Demosthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of those generals, were eager to perform some great exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and, if possible, eclipse that of the other. The pretence they alleged on this occasion was, the fame and reputation of Athens; and they asserted with so much vehemence, that it would be entirely destroyed should they shun the battle, as the Syracusans offered it them, that they at last forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had seventy-five galleys, and the Syracusans eighty.

The first day the fleets continued in sight of each other, in the great harbour, without engaging; and only a few skirmishes passed, after which both parties retired; and it was just the same with the land forces The Syracusans did not make the least movement the second day. Nicias, taking

advantage of this inactivity, caused the transports to draw up in a line, at some distance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them with safety, in case of a defeat. On the morrow, the Syracusans came up sooner than usual, when a great part of the day was spent in skirmishing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not suppose they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly: but having refreshed themselves with great diligence, and returning on board their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter being now forced to return immediately on board their ships, they entered them in great disorder, so that they had not time to draw them up in a line of battle, and most of the sailors were fasting. Victory did not long continue in suspense. The Athenians, after making a short and slight resistance, retired behind their line of transports. The enemy pursued them thither, and were stopped by the sailyards of those ships, to which were fixed * dolphins of lead, which, being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have sunk them at once. The Athenians lost seven galleys in this engagement, and a great number of soldiers were either killed or taken prisoners.

[t] This loss threw Nicias into the utmost consternation. All the misfortunes he had met with, ever since the time he had first enjoyed the supreme command, came into his mind; and he now is involved in a greater than any of them, by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. Whilst he was revolving these gloomy ideas, Demosthenes's fleet was seen coming forward in great pomp, and with such an air as must fill the enemy with dread: it was now the day after the battle. This fleet consisted of seventy-three galleys, on board of which were five thousand fighting men, and about three thousand archers, slingers, and bowmen. All these galleys were richly trimmed; their prows being adorned with shining streamers, manned with stout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the sound of clarions and trumpets; Demosthenes

[t] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 513—518. Plut. in Nic. p. 537. Diod. p. 141, 142.

* This engine, so violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold.

having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purposely to strike terror into the enemy.

This gallant sight alarmed them indeed beyond expression. They did not see any end, or even the least suspension, of their calamities: all they had hitherto done or suffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, since, though a hostile camp was intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to send a second army into Sicily, as considerable as the former; and their power, as well as their courage, seemed, notwithstanding all their losses, instead of diminishing, to increase daily?

Demosthenes having made an exact inquiry into the state of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to lose time as Nicias had done, who, having spread an universal terror at his first arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for having wintered in Catana, instead of going directly to Syracuse; and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himself with the hopes, that he should be able to carry the city at the first attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would spread in every part of it, and by that means should immediately put an end to the war: otherwise he intended to raise the siege, and no longer harass and lessen the troops by fighting battles never decisive; nor quite exhaust the city of Athens, by employing its treasures in needless expenses.

Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate resolution of Demosthenes, conjured him not to be so hasty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cause to repent of what he should do. He observed to him, that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their provisions as well as money were entirely exhausted; that their allies were going to abandon them; that they must soon be reduced to such extremity, for want of provisions, as would force them to surrender, as they had before resolved: for there were certain persons in Syracuse who held a secret correspondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient,

because the Syracusans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and that should the necessity to which they were reduced be ever so little increased, they would surrender at discretion.

As Nicias did not explain himself clearly, and would not declare in express terms, that sure and certain advices were sent him of whatever was transacted in the city, his remonstrances were considered as an effect of the timidity and slowness with which he had always been reproached. 'Such,' said they, 'are his usual protraction, delays, distrusts, and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all the vivacity, and extinguished all the ardour of the troops, in not marching them immediately against the enemy; but, on the contrary, by deferring to attack them, till his own forces were weakened and despised.' This made the rest of the generals and all the officers come over to Demosthenes's opinion, and Nicias himself was at last forced to acquiesce with it.

Demosthenes, after having attacked to no purpose the wall which cut the contravallation of the besiegers, confined himself to the attack of Epipolæ, from a supposition that should he once be master of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He therefore took provisions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing necessary for him to defend that post after he should possess himself of it. As there was no going up to it in the daytime undiscovered, he marched thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander; Nicias staying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryelus, as before, unperceived by the sentinels; attack the first intrenchment, and storm it, after killing part of those who defended it. Demosthenes, not satisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardour of his soldiers from cooling, and not delay the execution of his design, marches forward. During this interval, the forces of the city sustained by Gylippus, march under arms out of the intrenchments. Being seized with astonishment, which the darkness of the night increased, they were immediately repulsed and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to force whatever might resist their arms, lest the enemy might rally again, should time be allowed them to

breathe and recover from their surprise, they are stopped on a sudden by the Bœotians, who make a vigorous stand, and marching against the Athenians with their pikes presented, repulse them with great shouts, and make a dreadful slaughter. This spreads an universal terror through the rest of the army. Those who fled either force along such as were advancing to their assistance, or else, mistaking them for enemies, turn their arms against them. They now were all mixed indiscriminately, it being impossible to discriminate objects in the horrors of a night, which was not so gloomy as entirely to make them imperceptible, nor yet light enough to distinguish those which were seen. The Athenians sought for one another to no purpose; and from their often asking the *word*, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard, which occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because by their being together and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it. In the mean time, those who were pursued, threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and many were dashed to pieces by the fall; and as most of those who had escaped, straggled from one another up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horse, who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain in this engagement, and a great number of arms were taken; those who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices.

SECT. XIV. THE CONSTERNATION WITH WHICH THE ATHENIANS ARE SEIZED. THEY AGAIN HAZARD A SEA-FIGHT, AND ARE DEFEATED. THEY RESOLVE TO RETIRE BY LAND. BEING CLOSE PURSUED BY THE SYRACUSANS, THEY SURRENDER. NICIAS AND DEMOSTHENES ARE SENTENCED TO DIE, AND EXECUTED. THE EFFECT WHICH THE NEWS OF THE DEFEAT OF THE ARMY PRODUCES IN ATHENS.—[u] The Athenian generals, after sustaining so great a loss, were greatly perplexed, and did not know how to act in the present discouragement and despair of the troops, who died daily, either by the diseases of the

[u] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 518—520. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 538—542. Diod. p. 142.

autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near which they were encamped. Demosthenes was of opinion that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, since they had been unsuccessful in so important an enterprise; especially as the season was not too far advanced for sailing; and that they had ships enough to force a passage, in case the enemy should dispute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raise their blockade of Athens, than for them to continue that of Syracuse, by which they exhausted themselves to no purpose; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.

Nicias was sensible that the arguments his colleague used were very just, and he himself was of his opinion: but at the same time he was afraid, lest so public a confession of the weak condition to which they were reduced, and their resolution to leave Sicily, (the report of which would certainly reach the enemy,) should complete the ruin of their affairs, and perhaps make them unable to execute their resolution when they should attempt it. Besides, they had some little hopes left that the besieged, being themselves reduced to great extremity by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honourable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated, that he would not quit Sicily till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose; as he well knew that otherwise they would be highly displeased: that as those who were to judge them had not been eye-witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion; and, at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them: that most of those men, who now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege: that knowing so well as he did, the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens.

These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were not

yet able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion, that the only good choice they could make would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former project, he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to accede to that of Nicias, from imagining, with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay.

[x] Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sickness; and they now began to repent their not having raised the siege, especially as the besieged were preparing to attack them both by sea and land. Besides, Nicias no longer opposed this resolution, and only desired to have it kept secret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as possible, for the fleet to prepare for setting sail with the utmost expedition.

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to set sail, (wholly unsuspected by the enemy, who were far from surmising they would leave Sicily so soon,) the moon was suddenly eclipsed in the middle of the night, and lost all its splendour; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and superstition, were astonished at so sudden a change, the causes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the consequences of it. They then consulted the soothsayers, who being equally unacquainted with the reasons of this phenomenon, only augmented their consternation. It was the custom, after such accidents had happened, to suspend their enterprise but for three days. The soothsayers pronounced, that he must not sail till three times nine days were past, (these are Thucydides's words,) which doubtless was a mysterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias, scrupulous to a fault, and full of a mistaken veneration for these blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon, and not return till the same day of the next month; as if he had not seen the planet very clearly, the instant it had emerged from that part which was darkened by the interposition of the earth's body.

[x] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 521—548. Plut. *in Nic.* p. 538. Diod. l. xiii. p. 142—161.

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being soon spread over the city, a resolution was taken to attack the besiegers both by sea and land. The Syracusans began the first day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a slight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a second attack; and at the same time sailed, with seventy-six galleys, against eighty-six of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having spread along the shore to surround them, this movement proved fatal to him: for as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracusans, after forcing the centre, attacked him; drove him vigorously into the gulf called Dascon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon lost his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chase to the rest of the galleys, and ran them on shore. Gylippus, who commanded the land army, seeing the Athenian galleys were forced aground, and not able to return into their staccado, came down with part of his troops, in order to charge the soldiers, in case they should be forced to run ashore; and to give his friends the more room to tow such galleys as they should have taken. However, he was repulsed by the Tyrrhenians, who were posted on that side; and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to sustain them, to retire with some loss as far as the marsh called Lysimelia, which lay near it. The latter saved most of their ships, eighteen excepted, which were taken by the Syracusans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, resolving to burn the rest, they filled an old vessel with combustible materials; and having set fire to it, they drove it by the help of the wind against the Athenians, who nevertheless extinguished the fire, and drove off the ship.

Each side erected trophies: the Syracusans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before; and the Athenians, for their having driven part of the enemy into the marsh, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently disposed. The Syracusans, who had been thrown into the utmost consternation at the arrival of Demosthenes with his fleet, seeing themselves victorious in a naval engagement, resumed fresh hope, and assured themselves of a complete victory over their

enemies. The Athenians, on the contrary, frustrated of their only resource, and overcome by sea, so contrary to their expectations, entirely lost courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

The enemy, to deprive them of all resource, and prevent their escaping, shut the mouth of the great harbour, which was about five hundred paces wide, with galleys placed across, and other vessels fixed with anchors and iron chains, and at the same time made the requisite preparation for the battle, in case they should have courage to engage again. When the Athenians saw themselves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers assembled, in order to deliberate on the present state of affairs. They were in absolute want of provisions, which was owing to their having forbidden the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire; and they could not procure any from other places, unless they were masters of the sea. This made them resolve to venture a sea-fight. With this view, they determined to leave their old camp and their walls, which extended to the temple of Hercules; and to entrench themselves on the shore, near their ships, in the smallest compass possible. Their design was, to leave some forces in that place to guard their baggage and the sick; and to fight with the rest on board all the ships they had remaining. They intended to retire to Catana, in case they should be victorious; otherwise, to set fire to their ships, and to march by land to the nearest city belonging to their allies.

This resolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled a hundred and ten galleys (the others having lost their oars) with the flower of his infantry; and drew up the rest of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on the shore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracusan galleys, Nicias had provided harping-irons to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to close fight, as on shore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper part of their galleys with leather, to prevent their being so easily laid hold of. The commanders on both sides had employed all their rhetoric to animate their men; and none could ever have been

prompted from stronger motives; for the battle which was going to be fought, was to determine, not only their lives and liberties, but also the fate of their country.

The battle was very obstinate and bloody. The Athenians being arrived at the mouth of the port, easily took those ships which defended the entrance of it; but, when they attempted to break the chain of the rest to widen the passage, the enemy's came up from all quarters. As near two hundred galleys came rushing on each side, towards one narrow place, there must necessarily be a very great confusion; and the vessels could not easily advance forward, or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the galleys, for this reason, did very little execution; but there were very furious and frequent discharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed with a shower of stones, which always did execution from what place soever they were thrown; whereas they defended themselves only by shooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ships, from the agitation of the sea, could not be well aimed, and by that means the greatest part of them did little execution. Ariston the pilot had given the Syracusans this counsel. These discharges being over, the soldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ships in order to fight hand to hand: and it often happened, that whilst they were climbing up one side, their own ships were entered on the other; and two or three ships would be grappled to one, which occasioned a great perplexity and confusion. Farther, the noise of the ships that dashed one against the other, together with the different cries of the victors and vanquished, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a passage, whatever might be the consequence, to secure their return into their own country; and this the enemy employed their utmost efforts to prevent, in order that they might gain a more complete and more glorious victory. The two land armies which were drawn up on the highest part of the shore, and the inhabitants of the city who were there, ran to the walls; whilst the rest kneeling in the temples were imploring Heaven to give success to their citizens; all these saw clearly, because of their little distance from the fleets, every thing that passed; and contemplated the battle as from an amphitheatre, but not

without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and shuddering at, every movement, and the several changes which happened, they discovered the interest they took in the battle, by their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries and different gestures; stretching out their hands, sometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times towards heaven, to implore the succour and protection of the gods. At last, the Athenian fleet, after sustaining a long battle and a vigorous resistance, was put to flight, and driven against the shore. The Syracusans, who were spectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by an universal shout, the news of this victory. The victors, now masters of the sea, and sailing with a favourable wind towards Syracuse, erected a trophy; whilst the Athenians, who were quite dejected and overpowered, did not so much as request that their dead soldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last sad duty to their remains.

There now remained but two methods for them to choose; either to attempt the passage a second time, for which they had ships and soldiers sufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demosthenes proposed the former; but the sailors, in the deepest affliction, refused to obey, fully persuaded that it would be impossible for them to sustain a second engagement. The second method was therefore resolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to set out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who suspected their design, was very sensible that it was of the utmost importance not to suffer so great a body of forces to escape; since they otherwise might fortify themselves in some corner of the island, and renew the war. The Syracusans were at that time in the midst of their festivity and rejoicings; and thinking of nothing but how they might best divert themselves, after the toils they had sustained in fight. They were then solemnizing the festival of Hercules, which happened on that very day. To desire the Syracusans to take up arms again, in order to pursue the enemy, and to attempt to draw them from their diversions either by force or persuasion, would have been to no purpose; for which reason

another expedient was employed. Hermocrates sent out a few horsemen, who were to pass for friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud: 'Tell Nicias not to retire till daylight; for the Syracusans lie in ambush for him, and have seized on the passes.' This false advice stopped Nicias at once; and he did not even set out the next day, in order that the soldiers might have more time to prepare for their departure; and carry off whatever might be necessary for their subsistence, and abandon the rest.

The enemy had time enough for seizing the avenues. The next morning early they possessed themselves of the most difficult passes, fortified those places where the rivers were fordable, broke down the bridges, and spread detachments of horse up and down the plain; so that there was not one place through which the Athenians could pass without fighting. They set out upon their march the third day after the battle, with design to retire to Catana. The whole army was in an inexpressible consternation, at the sight of the dead or dying, some of whom were left exposed to wild beasts, and the rest to the cruelty of the enemy. Those who were sick and wounded conjured them with tears, to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going; or else, dragging themselves after them, followed them as far as their strength would permit; and, when this failed, they had recourse to tears, sighs, imprecations; and sending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, whilst every place echoed with lamentations.

The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were seized with the deepest melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguish, when they represented to themselves the greatness from which they were fallen, the extreme misery to which they were reduced, and the still greater evils from which they foresaw it would be impossible for them to escape. They could not bear the comparison, for ever present in their thoughts, of the triumphant state in which they had left Athens, in the midst of the good wishes and acclamations of the people: with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated

by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens.

But the most melancholy part of the spectacle, and that which most deserved compassion, was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illness; deprived of the most necessary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them most; pierced, not only with his private grief, but still more with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart; this great man, superior to all his misfortunes, thought of nothing but how he might best comfort his soldiers, and revive their courage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet desperate, and that other armies had escaped from greater dangers; that they ought not to accuse themselves, or grieve immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occasioned; that if they had offended some god, his vengeance must be satiated by this time; that fortune, after having so long favoured the enemy, would at last be tired of persecuting them; that their bravery and their numbers made them still formidable, (being still near forty thousand strong;) that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they might think proper; that they had no more to do, but to take care severally of themselves, and march in good order; that by a prudent and courageous retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx; the first being commanded by Nicias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the centre. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced the passage, and afterwards were attacked by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who discharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during several days' march; every one of the passes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy were unwilling to hazard a battle against an army which despair alone might render invincible; and the instant the Athenians presented the Syracusans battle, the latter retired: but, when-

ever the former proceeded on their march, they advanced and charged them in their retreat.

Demosthenes and Nicias, seeing the miserable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of provisions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it advisable to retire towards the sea, by a quite contrary way to that in which they then marched, and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, instead of proceeding to Catana, as they first intended. They set out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confusion and disorder, as generally happens to great armies during the gloomy horrors of the night, especially when the enemy is not far off. However, the van-guard, commanded by Nicias, went forward in good order; but above half the rear-guard, with Demosthenes at their head, quitted the main body, and lost their way. On the next day the Syracusans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with extraordinary diligence, came up with him about noon; and having surrounded him with their horse, they drove him into a narrow place enclosed with a wall, where his soldiers fought like lions. Perceiving, at the close of the day, that they were oppressed with fatigue, and covered with wounds, they gave the islanders leave to retire, which some of them accepted; and afterwards spared the lives of the rest, who surrendered at discretion with Demosthenes, after having stipulated, that they should not be put to death, nor sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. About six thousand soldiers surrendered on these conditions.

Nicias arrived on the same evening at the river Erineus, and passing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and summoned him to surrender at discretion, as Demosthenes had done. Nicias could not persuade himself at first, that what they told him concerning that general was true, and therefore desired leave to send some horse for information. Upon their returning with the news that Demosthenes had really surrendered in that manner, Nicias offered to pay the expenses of the war, upon condition that they would permit him to leave the country with his forces, and to give as many Athenians for hostages, as he should be obliged to pay talents. But the enemy rejected this proposal

with disdain and insolence, and renewed the attack. Nicias, though in absolute want of all things, nevertheless sustained the charge the whole night, and marched towards the river Asinarus. When they were got to the banks of it, the Syracusans coming up with them, drove most of them into the stream; the rest having already plunged voluntarily into it to quench their thirst. Here the greatest and most bloody carnage was made, the poor wretches being butchered without the least pity as they were drinking. Nicias, finding all lost, and unable to bear this dismal spectacle, surrendered at discretion; upon condition that Gylippus should discontinue the fight, and spare the rest of his army. A great number were killed, and more taken prisoners, so that all Sicily was filled with them. [y] The Athenians seem to have been displeased with their general, for surrendering in this manner at discretion; and for this reason his name was omitted in a public monument, on which were engraved the names of those commanders who had lost their lives in fighting for their country.

The victors adorned, with the arms taken from the prisoners, the finest and largest trees on the banks of the river, and made a kind of trophies of those trees, and crowning themselves with chaplets of flowers, dressing their horses in the richest caparisons, and cropping the manes of those of their enemies, they entered triumphantly into Syracuse, after having happily terminated the most considerable war in which they had ever been engaged with the Greeks; and won, by their strength and valour, a most signal and most complete victory. The next day a council was held, to deliberate on what was to be done with the prisoners. Diocles, one of the leaders of greatest authority among the people, proposed, that all the Athenians who were born of free parents, and all such Sicilians as had joined with them, should be imprisoned in the quarries, and only two measures of flour, and one of water, given them daily; that the slaves and all the allies should be publicly sold; and, that the two Athenian generals should be first scourged with rods, and afterwards put to death.

[z] This last article was exceedingly disliked by all wise and

[y] Pausan. l. i. p. 56. [z] Diod. l. xiii. p. 149—161.

moderate Syracusans. Hermocrates, who was very famous for his probity and justice, attempted to make some remonstrances to the people, but they would not hear him; and the shouts which echoed on all sides, prevented him from continuing his speech. At that instant an * ancient man, venerable for his great age and gravity, who, in this war, had lost two sons, the only heirs to his name and estate, made his servants carry him to the tribunal, and the instant he appeared a profound silence ensued. 'You here behold,' says he, 'an unfortunate father, who has felt, more than any other Syracusan, the fatal effects of this war by the death of two sons, who formed all the consolation, and were the only supports of my old age. I cannot indeed forbear admiring their courage and felicity, in sacrificing to their country's welfare, a life of which they would one day have been deprived by the common course of nature; but then I cannot but be strongly affected with the cruel wound which their death has made in my heart; nor forbear hating and detesting the Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the murderers of my children. But, however, I cannot conceal one circumstance, which is, that I am less sensible to my private affliction, than to the honour of my country: and I see it ready to expose itself to eternal infamy, by the barbarous advice which is now given you. The Athenians indeed merit the worst treatment, and every kind of punishment that can be inflicted on them, for so unjustly declaring war against us; but have not the gods, the just avengers of crimes, punished them and revenged us sufficiently? When their generals laid down their arms, and surrendered, did they not do this in the hopes of having their lives spared? And, if we put them to death, will it be possible for us to avoid the just reproach, of our having violated the law of nations, and dishonoured our victory by the most barbarous cruelty? What! will you suffer your glory to be thus sullied in the face of the whole world; and have it said, that a nation, who first dedicated a temple in their city to Clemency, found not any in yours? Surely victories and triumphs do not give immortal glory to a city; but the exercising mercy towards a vanquished enemy, the using moderation in the greatest prosperity, and fearing to

* Nicolaus.

offend the gods by a haughty and insolent pride. You doubtless have not forgotten that this Nicias, whose fate you are going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded your cause in the assembly of the Athenians; and employed all his credit, and the whole power of his eloquence, to dissuade his country from embarking in this war. Should you therefore pronounce sentence of death on this worthy general, would it be a just reward for the zeal he showed for your interest? With regard to myself, death would be less grievous to me, than the sight of so horrid an injustice, committed by my countrymen and fellow-citizens.'

The people seemed moved to compassion at this speech, especially as, when this venerable old man first ascended the tribunal, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on those who had brought all his calamities upon him, instead of suing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians having expatiated, with vehemence, on the unheard-of cruelties which their republic had exercised on several cities belonging to their enemies, and even to their ancient allies; the inveteracy which their commanders had shown against Syracuse, and the evils they would have made it suffer had they been victorious; the afflictions and groans of infinite numbers of Syracusans, who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whose manes could be appeased no other way than by the blood of their murderers; on these representations, the people returned to their sanguinary resolution, and followed Diocles's advice in every respect. Gylippus used his utmost endeavours, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demosthenes given up to him, (especially as he had taken them,) in order to carry them to Lacedæmon. But his demand was rejected with a haughty scorn, and the two generals were put to death.

All wise and moderate men could not forbear shedding tears, at the tragical fate of these two illustrious personages; and particularly for Nicias, who, of all men of his time, seemed least to merit so ignominious and untimely an end. When people recollected the speeches and remonstrances he had made, to prevent this war; and, on the other side, when they considered how high a regard he had always retained for things relating to religion; the greatest part of them were tempted to

exclaim against Providence, when they saw a man, who had ever shown the highest reverence for the gods, and had always exerted himself to the utmost for their honour and worship, so ill rewarded by them, and meeting with no better fate than the most abandoned wretches. But it is no wonder that the calamities of good men should inspire the heathens with such thoughts, and make them murmur and despond; since they did not know the holiness of the Divine Being, nor the corruption of human nature.

The prisoners were shut up in the quarries, (the public prisons of Syracuse;) where, crowded one upon the other, they suffered incredible torments for eight months. Here they were for ever exposed to the inclemencies of the weather; scorched in the daytime, by the burning rays of the sun, or frozen in the night, by the colds of autumn; poisoned by the stench of their own excrements, by the carcasses of those who died of their wounds and of sickness; in fine, worn out by hunger and thirst, for the daily allowance to each was but a small measure of water, and two of meal. Those who were taken out of this place two months after, in order to be sold as slaves, (many of whom were citizens who had concealed their condition,) found a less rigorous fate. Their wisdom, their patience, and a certain air of probity and modesty, were of great advantage to them; for they were either soon restored to their liberty, or met with the kindest and most generous treatment from their masters. Several of them even owed the good usage they met with to Euripides, the finest scenes of whose tragedies they repeated to the Sicilians, who were extremely fond of them; so that when they returned to their own country, they went and saluted that poet as their deliverer; and informed him of the admirable effect wrought in their favour by his verses.

[a] The news of the defeat being carried to Athens, the citizens would not believe it at first; and were so far from giving credit to it, that they sentenced that man to death who had first published it. But when it was confirmed, all the Athenians were seized with the utmost consternation; and, as if themselves had not decreed the war, they vented their rage and

[a] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 551—553. Plut. *de Garrulit.* p. 509.

resentment against the orators who had promoted the enterprise, as well as against the soothsayers, who, by their oracles or fictitious prodigies, had flattered them with the hopes of success. They had never been reduced to so deplorable a condition as at present, having neither horse, foot, money, galleys, nor mariners; in a word, they were in the deepest despair, expecting every moment that the enemy, elate with so great a victory, and strengthened by the revolt of the allies, would come and invade Athens, both by sea and land, with all the forces of Peloponnesus. Cicero had reason to observe, * speaking of the battles in the harbour of Syracuse, that it was there that the troops of Athens, as well as their galleys, were ruined and sunk; and that, in this harbour, the power and glory of the Athenians were miserably shipwrecked.

The Athenians however did not suffer themselves to be wholly dejected, and resumed courage. They now resolved to raise money on all sides, and to import timber for building of ships, in order to awe the allies, and particularly the inhabitants of the island of Eubœa. They retrenched all superfluous expenses, and established a new council of ancient men, who were to weigh and examine all affairs before they should be proposed to the people. In fine, they omitted nothing which might be of service in the present conjuncture; the alarm in which they were, and their common danger, obliging every individual to be attentive to the necessities of the state, and docile to all advice that might promote its interests.

CHAPTER II.

SECT. I. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY. REVOLT OF THE ALLIES. ALCIBIADES GROWS INTO GREAT POWER WITH TISSAPHERNES. *Nineteenth and twentieth Years of the War.*—[b] The defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse was the cause of great movements throughout all Greece. The states,

A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413.

[b] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 553.

* Hæc primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt: in hoc portu Atheniensium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur. Cic. *in Verr.* 7. n. 97.

who had not yet joined either side, and waited to be determined by the event, resolved to declare against them. The allies of the Lacedæmonians believed, that the time was come to deliver them for ever from the expenses of a war, which lay very heavy upon them, by the speedy and final ruin of Athens. Those of the Athenians, who followed them only out of constraint, seeing no appearance of any future resource for that republic, after the dreadful blow it had received, thought it best to take advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for throwing off the yoke of dependence, and resuming their liberty. Dispositions of this kind inspired the Lacedæmonians with great views, which were supported by the hopes they had conceived, that their Sicilian allies would join them in the spring with a naval army, augmented by the ruins of the Athenian fleet.

[c] In fact, the people of Eubœa, Chio, and Lesbos, with several others, gave the Lacedæmonians to understand, that they were ready to quit the party of the Athenians if they would take them under their protection. At the same time came deputies from Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus. The first was governor of Lydia and Ionia, the other of the Hellespont. Those viceroys of Darius wanted neither application nor zeal for the interest of their master. Tissaphernes, promising to furnish the Lacedæmonians with all the necessary expenses for their troops, pressed them to arm directly, and to join him; because the Athenian fleet prevented him from levying the usual contributions in his province; and had put it out of his power to remit those of preceding years to the king. He hoped besides with that powerful aid to get into his hands with more ease a certain nobleman who had revolted in Caria, and whom he had the king's orders to send to him dead or alive. This was Amorges, a bastard of Pissuthnes. Pharnabasus at the same time demanded ships to draw off the cities of the Hellespont from their subjection to the Athenians; who prevented him also from levying the tributes of his government.

The Lacedæmonians thought it proper to begin by satisfying Tissaphernes; and the influence of Alcibiades contributed very much to the taking that resolution. He embarked with

[c] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 555—558.

Chalcidæus for Chio, which took up arms upon their arrival, and declared for the Lacedæmonians. Upon the news of this revolt, the Athenians resolved to take the * thousand talents out of the treasury, which had been deposited there from the beginning of the war, after having repealed the decree which prohibited it. Miletus also revolted soon after. Tissaphernes, having joined his troops with those of Sparta, attacked and took the city of Iasus, in which [d] Amorges had shut himself up, who was taken alive and sent into Persia. That governor gave a month's pay to the whole army, at a drachma or tenpence a day to each soldier, observing that he had orders to give them only half that sum for the future.

[e] It was at this time that Chalcidæus made a treaty with Tissaphernes in the name of the Lacedæmonians, of which one of the principal articles was, that all the country which had been subject to the king or his predecessors, should remain in his hands. It was renewed some time after by Theramenes, another general of the Lacedæmonians, with some small alterations. But when this treaty came to be examined at Sparta, it was found, that too great concessions had been made to the king of Persia, in giving up all the places held by himself or his ancestors, as this was to make him master of the greatest part of Greece, of Thessaly, Locris, and the whole country as far as Bœotia, without mentioning the Islands; from whence the Lacedæmonians would appear rather to have enslaved Greece, than reestablished its liberty. It was therefore necessary to make farther alterations in it, with which Tissaphernes and the other governors made great difficulties to comply. A new treaty was however concluded, as we shall see in the sequel.

In the mean time, several cities of Ionia declared for Lacedæmon, to which Alcibiades contributed very much. [f] Agis, who was already his enemy in consequence of the injury he had received from him, could not endure the glory he had acquired: for nothing was done without the advice of Alcibiades, and it was generally said, that the success of all enter-

[d] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 568. [e] Ibid. p. 561—571, 572—576. Ibid. p. 577—579. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 204. Diod. p. 164, 165.
* Three millions of livres.

prises was owing to him. The most powerful and ambitious of the Spartans, from the same sentiments of jealousy, looked upon him with an evil eye, and at length, by their intrigues, obliged the principal magistrates to send orders into Ionia for putting him to death. Alcibiades being secretly apprized of this order, did not discontinue his services to the Lacedæmonians, but kept himself so well upon his guard, that he avoided all the snares which were laid for him.

For his better security he threw himself into the protection of Tissaphernes, the great king's governor at Sardis, and was not long without seeing himself in the highest degree of credit and authority in the court of the barbarian. For this Persian, who was full of fraud and artifice, a great friend to knaves and bad men, and set no value upon simplicity and integrity, infinitely admired the versatility of Alcibiades, the ease with which he assumed all kind of manners and characters, and his great ability in the conduct of affairs. And indeed there was no heart so hard, or temper so untractable, as to hold out against the graces and charms of his conversation and intimacy. Even those, who feared and envied him most, enchanted in a manner by his affable air and engaging behaviour, could not dissemble the infinite satisfaction they felt in seeing and conversing with him. A. M. 3593. Ant. J. C. 411.

Tissaphernes therefore, though otherwise very haughty and brutal, and the man who of all the Persians most hated the Greeks, was so much taken with the complaisance and insinuations of Alcibiades, that he gave himself wholly up to him, and flattered him more than he was flattered by him: insomuch that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the finest and most delightful of his gardens, as well as from the abundance of its fountains and canals, and the verdure of its groves, as the surprising beauty of its retreats and solitudes, which art and nature seemed to vie with each other in embellishing, and wherein a more than royal magnificence was displayed.

Alcibiades, who found there was no longer any safety for him in the party of the Spartans, and who always apprehended the resentment of Agis, began to do them ill offices with Tissaphernes, to prevent his aiding them with all his forces, and ruining the Athenians entirely. He had no difficulty in bringing

the Persian into his views, which were conformable to his master's interests, and to the orders he had received from him. For ever since the famous treaty concluded under Cimon, the kings of Persia, not daring to attack the Greeks with open force, took other measures to ruin them. They endeavoured covertly to excite divisions amongst them, and to foment troubles by considerable sums of money, which they found means to convey sometimes to Athens, and sometimes to Sparta. They applied themselves so successfully to keep up a balance of power between those two republics, that the one could never entirely reduce the other. They granted them only slight aids, that could effect nothing decisive, in order to undermine them insensibly, and exhaust both parties gradually, by weakening them by the means of one another.

It is in this kind of conduct, that policy makes the ability of ministers consist; who from the recess of their cabinets, without noise or commotion, without any great expenses, or setting numerous armies on foot, succeed in weakening the states whose power gives them umbrage, either by sowing domestic divisions amongst them, or by promoting the jealousy of their neighbours, in order to set them at variance with each other.

We must confess, however, that this kind of policy gives us no very favourable idea of the kings of Persia. To reduce themselves, powerful as they were, to such mean, obscure, and indirect measures, was to confess their weakness, and their inability, as they believed, to attack their enemies with open force, and to reduce them by honourable means. Besides, is it consistent with justice to employ such methods towards states, against whom there is no foundation of complaint, who live in peace under the faith of treaties, and whose sole crime is the apprehension of their being one day in a condition to do hurt? Is it lawful by secret bribes to lay snares for the fidelity of subjects, and to be the accomplice of their treasons, by putting arms into their hands against their native country?

What glory and renown would not the kings of Persia have acquired, if, content with the vast and rich dominions which Providence had given them, they had employed their good offices, power, and even treasures, to reconcile the neighbouring states with each other; to remove their jealousies, to

prevent injustice and oppression; and if, feared and honoured by them all, they had made themselves the mediators of their differences, the security of their peace, and the guarantee of their treaties? Can any conquest, however great, be compared with such glory?

Tissaphernes acted upon other principles, and had no thought but of preventing the Greeks from being in a condition to attack the Persians, their common enemy. He therefore entered freely into the views of Alcibiades, and at the same time that he declared himself openly for the Lacedæmonians, did not fail to assist the Athenians underhand, and by a thousand secret methods; deferring the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, and retarding the arrival of the Phœnician ships, of which he had long kept them in hopes. He omitted no occasion of giving Alcibiades new marks of his friendship and esteem, which rendered that general equally considerable to both parties. The Athenians, who had sadly experienced the effects of having drawn his anger upon them, were not now to repent their passing sentence of condemnation upon him. Alcibiades also on his side, extremely sorry to see the Athenians in so mournful a situation, began to fear that if the city of Athens were to be entirely ruined, he might fall into the hands of the Spartans, who mortally hated him.

SECT. II. THE RETURN OF ALCIBIADES TO ATHENS NEGOTIATED, UPON CONDITION OF ESTABLISHING THE ARISTOCRATICAL, IN THE ROOM OF THE DEMOCRATICAL, GOVERNMENT. TISSAPHERNES CONCLUDES A NEW TREATY WITH THE LACEDÆMONIANS.—[5] The Athenians were intent upon nothing so much as Samos, where they had all their forces. From thence with their fleet they reduced all the cities that had abandoned them under their obedience, kept the rest in their duty, and found themselves still in a condition to make head against their enemies, over whom they had obtained several advantages. But they were afraid of Tissaphernes, and the hundred and fifty Phœnician ships which he hourly expected; and rightly perceived, that if so powerful a fleet should join the enemy, there was no longer any safety for their city. Alcibiades, who

[5] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 579—587. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 204—206.

was well informed of all that passed among the Athenians, sent secretly to the principal of them at Samos, to sound their sentiments, and to let them know, that he was not averse to returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic were put into the hands of the great and powerful, and not left to the populace, who had expelled him. Some of the principal officers went from Samos, with design to concert with him the proper measures for the success of that undertaking. He promised to procure the Athenians not only the favour of Tissaphernes, but of the king himself, upon condition they would abolish the democracy or popular government; because the king would place more confidence in the engagements of the nobility, than upon those of the inconstant and capricious multitude.

The deputies lent a willing ear to these proposals, and conceived great hopes of exonerating themselves from part of the public impositions, because as they were the richest of the people, the burden lay heaviest upon them, and of making their country triumph after having possessed themselves of the government. At their return, they began by bringing over such as were most proper to share in their design; after which they caused a report to be spread amongst the troops, that the king was inclined to declare in favour of the Athenians, and to pay the army, upon condition that Alcibiades were reinstated, and the popular government abolished. That proposal surprised the soldiers, and was generally rejected at first; but the charm of gain, and the hope of a change to their advantage, soon softened what was harsh and offensive in it, and even made them ardently desire the recall of Alcibiades.

Phrynicus, one of their generals, rightly judging that Alcibiades cared as little for an oligarchy as he did for the democracy, and that in decrying the people's conduct, he had no other view than to acquire the favour and confidence of the nobility for his own reestablishment, had the boldness to oppose the resolutions, which were about to take place. He represented, that the change they meditated might very probably excite a civil war to the ruin of the state; that it was very unlikely that the king of Persia would prefer the alliance of the Athenians to that of the Spartans, which was so much

more advantageous to him; that this change would not retain the allies in their duty, nor bring over those who had renounced it, as they would persist in preferring their liberty; that the government of a small number of rich and powerful persons would not be more favourable to either the citizens or allies, than that of the people, because ambition was the great cause of all misfortunes in a republic, and the rich were the sole promoters of all troubles for the aggrandizing of themselves; that a state suffered more oppressions and violences under the rule of the nobility, than under that of the people, whose authority kept the former within due bounds, and was the asylum of such as they desired to oppress; that the allies were too well acquainted with these truths from their own experience, to want any lessons upon the subject.

These remonstrances, wise as they were, had no effect. Pisander was sent to Athens with some of the same faction, to propose the return of Alcibiades, an alliance with Tissaphernes, and the abolition of the democracy. They represented, that by changing the government, and recalling Alcibiades, Athens might obtain a powerful aid from the king of Persia, which would be a certain means to triumph over Sparta. Upon this proposal great numbers exclaimed against it, and especially the enemies of Alcibiades. They alleged, amongst other reasons, the imprecations denounced by the priests, and all the other ministers of religion, against him, and even against such as should propose to recall him. But Pisander, advancing into the midst of the assembly, demanded whether they knew any other means to save the republic in the deplorable condition to which it was reduced: and as it was admitted there were none, he added, that the preservation of the state was the question, and not the authority of the laws, which might be provided for in the sequel; but at present there was no other method for the attainment of the king's friendship and that of Tissaphernes. Though this change was very offensive to the people, they gave their consent to it at length, with the hope of reestablishing the democracy hereafter, as Pisander had promised; and they decreed that he should go with ten more deputies to treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, and that in the mean time Phrynicus should be

recalled, and another general appointed to command the fleet in his stead.

The deputies did not find Tissaphernes in so good a disposition as they had been made to hope. He was afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but was unwilling to render the Athenians too powerful. It was his policy, by the advice of Alcibiades, to leave the two parties always at war, in order to weaken and consume them by each other. He therefore made great difficulties. He demanded at first, that the Athenians should abandon all Ionia to him, and afterwards insisted upon their adding the neighbouring islands. Those demands being complied with, he further required, in a third interview, permission to fit out a fleet, and to cruise in the Grecian seas; which had been expressly provided against in the celebrated treaty concluded with Artaxerxes. The deputies thereupon broke up the conferences with indignation, and perceived that Alcibiades had imposed upon them.

Tissaphernes, without loss of time, concluded a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians; in which, what had displeased in the two preceding treaties was retrenched. The article, which yielded to Persia the countries in general, that had been in the actual possession of the reigning king, Darius, or his predecessors, was limited to the provinces of Asia. The king engaged to defray all expenses of the Lacedæmonian fleet, in the condition it then was, till the arrival of that of Persia; after which they were to support it themselves; unless they should choose that the king should pay it, to be reimbursed after the conclusion of the war. It was further agreed, that they should unite their forces, and continue the war, or make peace, by common consent. Tissaphernes, to keep his promise, sent for the fleet of Phœnicia. This treaty was made in the eleventh year of Darius, and the twentieth of the Peloponnesian war.

SECT. III. THE WHOLE AUTHORITY OF THE ATHENIAN GOVERNMENT HAVING BEEN VESTED IN FOUR HUNDRED PERSONS, THEY MAKE A TYRANNICAL ABUSE OF THEIR POWER, AND ARE DEPOSED. ALCIBIADES IS RECALLED. AFTER VARIOUS ACCIDENTS, AND SEVERAL CONSIDERABLE VICTORIES, HE RETURNS IN TRIUMPH TO ATHENS, AND IS APPOINTED

GENERALISSIMO. HE CAUSES THE GREAT MYSTERIES TO BE CELEBRATED, AND DEPARTS WITH THE FLEET.—*From the twenty-first to the twenty-fifth Year of the War.*—[h] Pisander, at his return to Athens, found the change he had proposed at his setting out much forwarded, to which he soon after put the last hand. To give a form to this new government, he caused ten commissioners with absolute power to be appointed, who were however at a certain fixed time to give the people an account of what they had done. At the expiration of that term, the general assembly was summoned, wherein their first resolution was, that every one should be admitted to make such proposals as he thought fit, without being liable to any accusation of infringing the law, or to any penalty in consequence. It was afterwards decreed, that a new council should be formed, with full power to administer the public affairs, and to elect new magistrates. For this purpose five presidents were established, who nominated a hundred persons, including themselves. Each of these chose and associated three more at his own pleasure, which made in all four hundred, in whom an absolute power was lodged. But to amuse the people, and to console them with a shadow of popular government, whilst they instituted a real oligarchy, it was said that the four hundred should call a council of five thousand citizens, to assist them when they should judge it necessary. The council and assemblies of the people were held as usual; nothing was done however but by the order of the four hundred. The people of Athens were deprived in this manner of their liberty, which they had enjoyed almost a hundred years, after having abolished the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.

This decree being passed without opposition, after the separation of the assembly, the four hundred armed with daggers, and attended by a hundred and twenty young men, whom they made use of when any execution required it, entered the senate, and compelled the senators to retire, after having paid them the arrears due upon their salaries. They elected new magistrates out of their own body, observing the usual ceremonies upon such occasions. They did not think proper to recall those who were banished, lest they should be obliged to

[h] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 590, 594. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 205.

authorize the return of Alcibiades, of whose uncontrollable spirit they were apprehensive, and who would soon have made himself master of the people. Abusing their power in a tyrannical manner, some they put to death, others they banished, confiscating their estates with impunity. All who ventured to oppose this change, or even to complain of it, were butchered upon false pretexts; and those would have met with a bad reception, who demanded justice of the murderers. The four hundred, soon after their establishment, sent ten deputies to Samos to gain the concurrence of the army.

[1] All that had passed at Athens was already known there, and the news had enraged the soldiers to the highest degree. They deposed immediately several of their chiefs, whom they suspected, and put others into their places, of whom Thrasylus and Thrasybulus were the principal, and in highest credit. Alcibiades was recalled, and chosen generalissimo by the whole army. They were desirous to sail directly for the Piræus to attack the tyrants. But he opposed it, representing that it was necessary he should first have an interview with Tissaphernes, and that as they had chosen him general, they might rely upon him for the care of the war. He set out immediately for Miletus. His principal design was to show himself to that governor with all the power with which he had been invested, and to let him see that he was in a condition to do him much good or much harm. The consequence of which was, that as he had kept the Athenians in awe by Tissaphernes, he now awed Tissaphernes no less by the Athenians; and we shall see in the sequel that this interview was not unnecessary.

Alcibiades, upon his return to Samos, found the army more inflamed than at first. The deputies of the four hundred had arrived there during his absence, and had endeavoured in vain to justify the alteration made at Athens to the soldiery. Their discourses, which were often interrupted by tumultuous cries, served only to exasperate them more; and they earnestly demanded to be led against the tyrants directly. Alcibiades did not act on this occasion, as every body else would have done in consequence of having been raised to so high a dignity by the favour of the people: for he did not think

[1] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 595—604. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 205. Diod. p. 165.

himself obliged to an absolute and implicit compliance with their inclinations in every thing, though, from an exile and a fugitive, they had made him general of so great a fleet, and so numerous and formidable an army: but, as a statesman and great politician, he believed it his duty to oppose the blind fury that hurried them on into evident danger, and to prevent them from committing a fault, which must have been attended with their utter ruin. This wise steadiness preserved the city of Athens. For had they sailed thither at first, the enemy would have made themselves masters of Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands, without resistance; whilst the Athenians, by carrying the war into their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. He prevented the deputies from being ill-treated, and dismissed them; saying, that he did not object to the five thousand citizens having the supreme authority in the republic, but that it was necessary to depose the four hundred, and to reestablish the senate.

[k] During these commotions, the Phœnician fleet, which the Lacedæmonians impatiently expected, approached, and news came that it was arrived at * Aspendus. Tissaphernes went to meet it; nobody being able to divine the true cause of that journey. He had sent for that fleet at first to flatter the Lacedæmonians with the hopes of so powerful an aid, and to put a stop to their progress, by making them wait its arrival. It was believed that his journey had the same motive; to prevent their doing any thing in his absence, and that their soldiers and mariners might disband for want of pay. However this might be, he did not bring the fleet with him, from the view, no doubt, of keeping the balance equal, which was the king of Persia's interest, and of exhausting both parties by the length of the war. For it would have been very easy for him to put an end to it by the assistance of this additional fleet, as the Lacedæmonians alone were already as strong at sea as the Athenians. His frivolous excuse, of its not being complete, which he alleged as the reason for not bringing it with him, sufficiently shows that he had other motives for his conduct.

[k] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 604, 606.
* A city of Pamphylia.

[1] The return of the deputies without success, who had been sent to Samos, and the answer of Alcibiades, excited new troubles in the city, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the four hundred. The tumult increased exceedingly when news was brought, that the enemy, after having beaten the fleet, which had been sent by the four hundred to the aid of Eubœa, had made themselves masters of the island. Athens was in the highest terror and consternation on this account. For neither the defeat in Sicily, nor any other preceding it, were of such importance as the loss of this island, from whence the city received considerable supplies, and almost all its provisions. If in the confusion in which Athens was at that time between two factions, the victorious fleet had fallen upon the port, as it might have done, the army of Samos would have been indispensably obliged to have flown to the defence of their country: and then the republic would have had only the city of Athens remaining of all its dominions. For the Hellespont, Ionia, and all the islands, seeing themselves abandoned, would have been reduced to choose a side, and go over to the Peloponnesians. But the enemy were not capable of such great designs; and this was not the first time that the Lacedæmonians had been observed to have lost their advantages by their natural slowness and procrastination.

Athens without delay deposed the four hundred, as the authors of all the troubles and divisions under which they groaned. Alcibiades was recalled by unanimous consent, and earnestly solicited to make all possible haste to the assistance of the city. But judging, that if he returned immediately to Athens, he should owe his recall to the compassion and favour of the people, he resolved to render his return glorious and triumphant, and to deserve it by some considerable exploit.

A. M. 3595. Ant. J. C. 409. For this purpose, leaving Samos with a small number of ships, he cruised about the islands of Cos and Cnidos; and having learnt that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, was sailing towards the Hellespont with his whole fleet, and that the Athenians were in pursuit of him, he steered that way with the utmost diligence to support them, and arrived happily with his eighteen vessels, at the time that the fleets

[1] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 607—614. Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 206—210. Diod. p. 171, 172. 175—177 189—192.

were engaged near Abydos in a battle, which lasted till night, without any advantage on either side. His arrival gave the Spartans new courage at first, who believed him still their friend, and dispirited the Athenians. But Alcibiades, hanging out the Athenian flag in the admiral's galley, fell upon the Lacedæmonians, who were strongest, and were vigorously pursuing the Athenians, put them to flight, drove them ashore; and animated by his success, sunk their vessels, and made a great slaughter of the soldiers, who had thrown themselves into the sea to save themselves by swimming; though Pharnabasus spared no pains to assist them, and had advanced at the head of his troops to the coast, to favour their flight, and to save their ships. The Athenians, after having taking thirty of their galleys, and retaken those they had lost, erected a trophy.

Alcibiades, vain of his success, had the ambition to desire to appear before Tissaphernes, in this triumphant equipage, and to make him rich presents, as well in his own, as in the name of the people of Athens. He went to him therefore with a magnificent retinue, worthy of the general of the Athenians. But he did not meet with the favourable reception he expected. For Tissaphernes, who knew he was accused by the Lacedæmonians, and feared that the king would punish him at length for not having executed his orders, found Alcibiades's presenting himself very opportune, and caused him to be seized and sent prisoner to Sardis; to shelter himself by that injustice from the representations of the Lacedæmonians. A. M. 3596. Ant. J. C. 408.

Thirty days after, Alcibiades, having found means to get a horse, escaped from his guards, and fled to Clazomenæ, where, to revenge himself on Tissaphernes, he gave out, that he had set him at liberty. From Clazomenæ, he repaired to the Athenian fleet, where he was joined by Theramenes with twenty ships from Macedonia, and by Thrasybulus with twenty more from Thasos. He sailed from thence to Parium in the Propontis. All those ships, to the number of fourscore and six, being come thither, he left that place in the night, and arrived the next morning at Proconnesus, a small isle near Cyzicum. He heard there, that Mindarus was at Cyzicum with Pharnabasus and his land-army. He rested that whole

day at Proconnesus. On the morrow he harangued his soldiers, and represented to them the necessity there was for attacking the enemy by sea and land, and for making themselves masters of Cyzicum; demonstrating, at the same time, that without a complete and absolute victory, they could have neither provisions nor money. He had taken great care that the enemy should not be apprized of his approach. Fortunately for him, a great storm of rain and thunder, followed by a thick gloom, helped him to conceal his enterprise so successfully, that not only the enemy were prevented from perceiving that he advanced, but the Athenians themselves, whom he had caused to embark with precipitation, did not know that he had weighed anchor and put to sea.

When the gloom was dispersed, the Lacedæmonian fleet appeared exercising at some distance before the port. Alcibiades, who was apprehensive that the enemy, upon the sight of so great a number of ships, would make for the harbour, ordered the captains to keep back a little, and to follow him at a good distance; and taking only forty vessels, he advanced towards the enemy, to offer them battle. The enemy, deceived by this stratagem, and despising his small number, advanced against him, and began the fight. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian fleet come up, they immediately lost courage, and fled. Alcibiades, with twenty of his best ships, pursued them to the shore, landed, and killed a great number of them in the flight. Mindarus and Pharnabasus opposed his efforts in vain; the first, who fought with astonishing valour, he killed, and put the other to flight.

The Athenians by this victory, which made them masters of the slain, the arms, spoils, and whole fleet of the enemy, and by the taking of Cyzicum, not only possessed themselves of the Hellespont, but drove the Spartans entirely out of that sea. Letters were intercepted, in which the latter, with a conciseness truly laconic, informed the Ephori of the blow they had received, in terms to this effect: 'The flower of your army is cut off; Mindarus is dead; the rest of the troops are dying with hunger; and we neither know what to do, nor what will become of us.'

The news of this victory occasioned no less joy at Athens

than consternation at Sparta. [m] They despatched ambassadors immediately to demand, that an end should be put to a war equally destructive to both people, and that a peace should be concluded upon reasonable conditions, for the reestablishment of their ancient concord and amity, of which they had for many years experienced the salutary effects. The wisest and most judicious of the citizens of Athens were unanimously of opinion, that it was proper to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for the concluding of a treaty, which might put an end to all jealousies, appease all animosities, and remove all distrusts. But those who found their advantage in the troubles of the state, prevented so happy a disposition from taking effect. [n] Cleophon, amongst others, the orator in greatest repute at that time, animated the people from the tribunal, by a violent and seditious discourse, insinuating, that their interests were betrayed by some who kept up a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, which aimed at depriving them of all the advantages of the important victory they had lately gained, and at making them lose for ever the opportunity of being fully avenged for all the wrongs and misfortunes Sparta had caused them to suffer. This Cleophon was a worthless fellow, a musical-instrument maker. It was reported also that he had been a slave, and had got himself fraudulently enrolled in the register of the citizens. He carried his audacity and fury so far, as to threaten to plunge his dagger into the throat of any one who should talk of peace. The Athenians, puffed up with their present prosperity, forgetting their past misfortunes, and promising themselves all things from the valour and good fortune of Alcibiades, haughtily rejected all proposals of accommodation, without reflecting, that there is nothing so fluctuating and precarious as the success of war. The ambassadors retired without being able to effect any thing. Such infatuation and irrational pride are generally the forerunners of some great misfortune.

Alcibiades knew well how to take advantage of the victory he had gained, and presently after besieged Chalcedon, which had revolted from the Athenians and received a Lacedæmonian garrison. During this siege, he took another town, called

[m] Diod. l. xiii. p. 177—179. [n] Æsch. *in Orat. de fals. legat.*

Selymbria. Pharnabasus, terrified by the rapidity of his conquests, made a treaty with the Athenians to this effect; 'That Pharnabasus should pay them a certain sum of money; that the Chalcedonians should return to their obedience and dependence upon the Athenians, and pay them tribute; and that the Athenians should commit no hostilities in the province of Pharnabasus, who engaged for the safe-conduct of their ambassadors to the great king.' Byzantium and several other cities submitted to the Athenians.

A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407. Alcibiades, who desired with the utmost passion to see his country again, or rather to be seen by his country, after so many victories over their enemies, set out for Athens. The sides of his ships were covered with bucklers and all sorts of spoils, in form of trophies; and causing a great number of vessels to be towed after him by way of triumph, he displayed also the ensigns and ornaments of those he had burnt, which were more in number than the others; the whole amounting to about two hundred ships. It is said, that reflecting on what had been done against him, upon approaching the port, he was struck with some terror, and was afraid to quit his vessel till he saw from the deck a great number of his friends and relations, who were come to the shore to receive him, and earnestly entreated him to land.

The people came out of the city in crowds to meet him, and at his appearance set up incredible shouts of joy. In the midst of an infinite number of officers and soldiers, all eyes were fixed solely on him, whom they considered as Victory itself, descended from the skies: all thronging around him, caressed, blessed, and crowned him in emulation of each other. Those, who could not approach him, were never tired with contemplating him at a distance, whilst the old men showed him to their children. They repeated with the highest praises all the great actions he had done for his country; nor could they refuse their admiration even to those which he had done against it during his banishment, of which they imputed the fault to themselves alone. This public joy was mingled with tears and regret, from the remembrance of past misfortunes, which they could not avoid comparing with their present

felicity. 'We could not have failed,' said they, 'of the conquest of Sicily; our other hopes could never have proved abortive, if we had intrusted all our affairs and forces to the disposal of Alcibiades alone. In what a condition was Athens when he took upon him our protection and defence! We had not only almost entirely lost our power at sea, but were scarce possessed of the suburbs of our city, and, to add to our misfortunes, were torn to pieces by a horrid civil war. He notwithstanding has raised the republic from its ruins; and not content with having reinstated it in the possession of the sovereignty of the sea, has rendered it universally victorious by land; as if the fate of Athens had been in his hands alone, either to ruin or restore it, and victory was annexed to his person, and obeyed his orders.'

This favourable reception of Alcibiades did not prevent his demanding an assembly of the people, in order to his justification before them; well knowing how necessary it was for his safety to be absolved in due form. He appeared therefore; and after having deplored his misfortunes, which he imputed very little to the people, and entirely ascribed to his ill fortune, and some demon envious of his prosperity, he represented to them the designs of the enemy, and exhorted them not to conceive other than great hopes. The Athenians, transported with hearing him speak, decreed him crowns of gold, appointed him general by sea and land with unlimited power, restored him all his fortunes, and ordered the * Eumolpidæ and Ceryces to absolve him from the curses they had pronounced against him by the order of the people; doing their utmost to make him amends for the injury and shame of his banishment by the glory of his recall, and to efface the remembrance of the imprecations themselves had decreed, by the vows and prayers which they made in his favour. Whilst all the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces were employed in revoking those imprecations, Theodorus, the principal of them, had the courage to say: 'As for me, I have not cursed him, if he has done no evil to his

* The Eumolpidæ and Ceryces were two families at Athens who had different functions in the mysteries of Ceres. They took their names from Eumolpus and Ceryx, the first who had exercised those offices. Perhaps the employment of the latter had some relation to that of heralds, Κήρυκες.

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country;' insinuating by that bold expression, that the maledictions, being conditional, could not fall upon the head of the innocent, nor be averted from the guilty.

In the midst of this glory and shining prosperity of Alcibiades, the majority of the people could not help being concerned, when they considered the time of his return. For it happened precisely upon the day when the Athenians celebrated a festival in honour of Minerva, adored under the name of Agraulis. The priests took off all the ornaments from the goddess's statue to wash it, from whence that feast was called Πλυντήρια, and afterwards covered it; and that day was accounted one of the most ominous and unfortunate. It was the 25th of the month Thargelion, which answers to the 2d of July. This circumstance displeased that superstitious people, because it seemed to imply, that the goddess, patroness and protectress of Athens, did not receive Alcibiades agreeably, and with a benign aspect, since she covered and concealed herself, as if she would keep him off, and remove him from her.

° All things having however succeeded according to his wish, and the hundred ships he was to command being ready, he deferred his departure out of a laudable ambition to celebrate the great mysteries; for from the time the Lacedæmonians had fortified Decelia, and taken possession of all the ways from Athens to Eleusis, the feast had not been solemnized in all its pomp, and the procession had been obliged to go by sea. The particular ceremonies of this solemnity may be seen in the preface to the first volume.

Alcibiades believed it would be a most glorious action, and draw down upon him the blessings of the gods, and the praises of men, if he restored all its lustre and solemnity to this feast, in making the procession go by land escorted by his troops, to defend it against the attacks of the enemy. For either Agis would suffer it to pass quietly, notwithstanding the numerous troops he had at Decelia, which would considerably lessen the reputation of that king, and sully his glory; or if he should choose to attack it, and oppose the march, he should then have the satisfaction to fight a sacred battle; a battle grateful to the gods, for the greatest and most venerable of all their

° Plut. *in Alcib.* p. 210.

mysteries, in the sight of his country and citizens, who would be witnesses of his valour and regard for religion. It is very likely, that by this public and ostentatious act of piety, which struck the people's view in so sensible a manner, and was so extremely to their taste, Alcibiades's principal design was to efface entirely from their minds the suspicions of impiety, to which the mutilation of the statues, and profanation of the mysteries, had given birth.

Having taken that resolution, he gave notice to the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces to hold themselves in readiness, posted sentinels upon the hills, sent out scouts at the break of day, and taking with him the priests, the initiated, and the probationers, with those who initiated them, he covered them with his army, and conducted the whole pomp with wonderful order, and profound silence. Never was show, says Plutarch, more august, nor more worthy the majesty of the gods, than this warlike procession, and religious expedition; in which even those, who envied the glory of Alcibiades, were obliged to own, that he was no less happy in discharging the functions of a high priest, than those of a general. No enemy dared to appear, or disturb that pompous march and Alcibiades reconducted the sacred troop to Athens with entire safety. This success gave him new courage, and raised the valour and boldness of his army to such a degree, that they looked upon themselves as invincible, whilst he commanded them.

He acquired the affection of the poor, and the lower sort of people, so much that they most ardently desired to have him for their king. Many of them openly declared themselves to that effect; and there were some who addressed themselves to him, and exhorted him to set himself above envy, and not to trouble himself about laws, decrees, or suffrages; to put down those wordy impertinent orators that disturbed the state with their vain harangues, to make himself absolute master of affairs, and to govern with entire authority without fearing accusers. For him, what his thoughts of the tyranny and his designs were, are unknown; but the most powerful citizens, apprehending the breaking out of a fire, of which they already saw the sparks, pressed him to depart without delay; granting whatever he demanded, and giving him for colleagues the

generals most agreeable to him. He set sail accordingly with a hundred ships, and steered for the island of Andros, that had revolted. His high reputation, and the good fortune which had attended him in all his enterprises, made nothing but what was great and extraordinary to be expected from him.

SECT. IV. THE LACEDÆMONIANS APPOINT LYSANDER ADMIRAL. HE ACQUIRES GREAT INFLUENCE WITH THE YOUNGER CYRUS, WHO COMMANDED IN ASIA. HE BEATS THE ATHENIAN FLEET NEAR EPHESUS IN THE ABSENCE OF ALCIBIADES, WHO IS DEPRIVED OF THE COMMAND. TEN GENERALS ARE CHOSEN IN HIS STEAD. CALLICRATIDAS SUCCEEDS LYSANDER. *Twenty-sixth Year of the War.*—[p] The Lacedæmonians, justly alarmed at the return and success of Alcibiades, sufficiently perceived that such an enemy required to be opposed by an able general, capable of making head against him. For this reason they made choice of Lysander, and gave him the command of the fleet. When he arrived at Ephesus, he found the city very well disposed towards himself, and well affected to Sparta; but otherwise in a very unhappy situation. For it was in danger of becoming barbarous, by assuming the manners and customs of the Persians, who had great intercourse with it, as well from the neighbourhood of Lydia, as because the king's generals commonly took up their winter quarters there. An idle and voluptuous life, filled up with luxury and empty show, could not fail of disgusting infinitely a man like Lysander, who had been bred from his birth in the simplicity, poverty, and severe discipline of Sparta. Having brought his army to Ephesus, he gave orders for assembling ships of burden there from all parts, erected an arsenal for building of galleys, made the ports free for merchants, gave up the squares and public places to artificers, put all arts in motion, and held them in honour; and by these means filled the city with riches, and laid the foundations of that grandeur and magnificence, to which it afterwards attained. So great a change can the application and ability of a single person occasion in a state!

Whilst he was making these dispositions, he received advice,

[p] Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. i. p. 440—442. Plut. *in Lysand.* p. 434, 435. Diod. l. xiii. p. 192—197.

that Cyrus, the king's youngest son, was arrived at Sardis. That prince could not be above sixteen years old at that time, being born after his father's accession to the crown, who was now in the seventeenth year of his reign. Parysatis, his mother, loved him to idolatry, and she had the entire ascendant over her husband. It was she that occasioned his having the command in chief of all the provinces of Asia Minor given him; a command that subjected all the provincial governors of the most important part of the empire to his authority. The view of Parysatis was, without doubt, to put this young prince into a condition to dispute the throne with his brother after the king's death; as we shall see he actually did. One of the principal instructions, given him by his father upon sending him to his government, was to give effectual aid to the Lacedæmonians against Athens; an order very contrary to the measures observed till then by Tissaphernes, and the other governors of those provinces. It had always been their maxim, sometimes to assist one party, sometimes the other, in order to hold their power in such a balance, that the one might never be able to crush the other entirely: from whence it followed, that both parties were kept weak by the war, and neither were in a condition to form any enterprises against the Persian empire.

Upon Lysander's being apprized, therefore, of the arrival of Cyrus at Sardis, he set out from Ephesus to make him a visit, and to complain of the delays and breach of faith of Tissaphernes, who, notwithstanding the orders he had received to support the Lacedæmonians, and to drive the Athenians from the sea, had always covertly favoured the latter, out of regard for Alcibiades, to whom he was entirely devoted, and had been the sole cause of the loss of the fleet, by not supplying it with the necessary quantity of provisions. This discourse pleased Cyrus, who looked upon Tissaphernes as a very bad man, and his particular enemy. And he answered, that the king had given him orders to support the Lacedæmonians powerfully, and that he had received five hundred talents* for that purpose. Lysander, contrary to the common character of the Spartans, was submissive and condescending, full of complai-

* Five hundred thousand crowns, about 112,500*l.* sterling.

sance to the great, always ready to pay his court to them, and supporting, for the good of the service, all the weight of their haughtiness and vanity with incredible patience; in which behaviour some people make the chief address and principal merit of a courtier to consist.

He did not forget himself on this occasion, and setting at work all that the industry and art of a complete courtier could suggest of flattery and insinuation, he perfectly gained the young prince's favour and good opinion. After having praised his generosity, magnificence, and zeal for the Lacedæmonians, he desired him to give each soldier and mariner a drachma* per day; in order to corrupt those of the enemy by that means, and thereby terminate the war the sooner. Cyrus very much approved the project; but said, that he could make no change in the king's order, and that the treaty with them expressly settled only half a talent † to be paid monthly for each galley. The prince, however, at the end of a banquet, which he gave him before his departure, drinking to his health, and pressing him to ask something of him, Lysander desired that an ‡ obolus a day might be added to the seamen's pay. This was granted, and he gave them four oboli, instead of three, which they received before, and paid them all the arrears due to them, with a month's advance; giving Lysander ten thousand § dariclks for that purpose; that is, a hundred thousand livres, or about five thousand pounds sterling.

This largess filled the whole fleet with ardour and alacrity, and almost unmanned the enemy's galleys; the greatest part of the mariners deserting to that side where the pay was best. The Athenians, in despair upon receiving this news, endeavoured to conciliate Cyrus by the interposition of Tissaphernes; but he would not hearken to them, notwithstanding that satrap represented, that it was not for the king's interest to aggrandize the Lacedæmonians, but to balance the power of one side with that of the other, in order to perpetuate the war, and to ruin both by their own divisions.

* Ten-pence.

† One thousand five hundred livres, about 112*l.* sterling.

‡ The drachma was six oboli, or ten-pence French; each obolus being something above three halfpence; so that the four oboli was six-pence halfpenny a day, instead of five-pence, or three oboli.

§ A darick is about a pistole.

Though Lysander had considerably weakened the enemy by augmenting the mariner's pay, and thereby very much hurt their naval power, he dared not however hazard a battle with them, particularly dreading Alcibiades, who was a man of execution, had the greater number of ships, and had never been overthrown in any battle either by sea or land. But after Alcibiades had left Samos to go into Phocæa and Ionia, to raise money, of which he was in want, for the payment of his troops, and had given the command of his fleet to Antiochus, with express order not to fight or attack the enemy in his absence; the new commander, to make a show of his courage, and to brave Lysander, entered the port of Ephesus with two galleys, and after having made a great noise, retired with loud laughter, and an air of contempt and insult. Lysander, enraged at that affront, immediately detached some galleys, and went himself in pursuit of him. But as the Athenians advanced to support Antiochus, he ordered other galleys of his side to come on, till the whole fleet arrived by little and little, and the engagement became general on both sides. Lysander gained the victory, and having taken fifteen of the Athenian galleys, he erected a trophy. Alcibiades, on his return to Samos, sailed even into the port to offer him battle; but Lysander was contented with his victory, and did not think proper to accept it; so that he retired without doing any thing.

Thrasybulus at the same time, the most dangerous enemy he had in his army, left the camp, and went to Athens to accuse him. To inflame his enemies in the city the more, he told the people in a full assembly, that Alcibiades had entirely ruined their affairs, and the navy, by the license he had introduced; that he had given himself up to the most * notorious debauchees and drunkards, who, from having been common seamen, were now the only persons in credit about him; that he abandoned his whole authority to them, to be at leisure to enrich himself in the provinces, and to plunge himself there into intemperance and

A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406.

* Antiochus is pointed at in this place, a mean, debauched man, who had acquired the favour of Alcibiades by catching a quail for him, which he had let fly.

all other infamous excesses, to the disgrace of Athens, whilst his fleet was left neglected in the face of that of the enemy.

Another article of accusation against him was taken from the forts he had built near the city of Byzantium, for an asylum and retreat for himself; as neither being able nor willing to return any more to his country. The Athenians, a capricious, inconstant people, gave credit to all these imputations. The loss of the last battle, and his little success since his departure from Athens, instead of the great and wonderful actions expected from him, entirely sunk him in their opinions; and his own glory and reputation may be said to have occasioned his ruin. For he was suspected of not having been desirous to do what was not done, which they could not believe out of his power, because they were fully persuaded, that nothing he desired to do was impossible to him. They made it a crime in Alcibiades that the rapidity of his conquests did not correspond with that of their imaginations; not considering, that he made war without money upon a people who had the great king for their treasurer, and that he was often obliged to quit his camp, to go in quest of what was necessary for the payment and subsistence of his troops. However, Alcibiades was deposed, and ten generals nominated in his stead: of which when he received advice, he retired in his galley to some castles which he had in the Thracian Chersonesus.

[q] About this time died Plistonax, one of the kings of Lacedæmonia, and was succeeded by Pausanias, who reigned fourteen years. The latter made a fine answer to one who asked, why it was not permitted to make any change in the ancient customs of Sparta: * 'Because,' says he, 'at Sparta the laws command men, and not men the laws.'

[r] Lysander, who intended to establish the government of the nobility in all the cities in the dependence of Sparta, that the governors of his choosing might be always at his disposal, from his having rendered them independent of their people, caused such persons as he knew to be the boldest, and most

[q] Diod. p. 196.

[r] Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. i. p. 442—444. Plut. *in Lysand.* p. 435, 436. Diod. p. 197, 198.

* Ὅτι τοὺς νόμους τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ τοὺς ἄνδρας τῶν νόμων κυρίους εἶναι δεῖ. Plut. *in Apoph.* p. 230.

enterprising and ambitious among the principal men of the cities, to come to Ephesus. These he placed at the head of affairs, promoted to the greatest honours, and raised to the first employments of the army; thereby rendering himself, says Plutarch, the accomplice of all the crimes and oppressions they committed to advance and enrich themselves. For this reason they were always extremely attached to him, and regretted him infinitely, when Callicratidas came to succeed him, and took upon him the command of the fleet. He was not inferior to Lysander either in valour or military knowledge, and was infinitely above him in point of moral virtue. Alike severe to himself and others, inaccessible to flattery and sloth, the declared enemy of luxury, he retained the modesty, temperance, and austerity of the ancient Spartans; virtues that began to distinguish him particularly, as they were not too common in his time. His probity and justice were proof against all things; his simplicity and integrity abhorred all falsehood and fraud, to which were joined a truly Spartan nobleness and grandeur of soul. The great and powerful could not refrain from admiring his virtue; but they were better pleased with the affability and condescension of his predecessor, who was blind to the injustice and violence of their actions.

It was not without mortification and jealousy, that Lysander saw him arrive at Ephesus to take upon him the command, and out of a criminal baseness and treachery, not uncommon with those who hearken more to their private ambition than the good of the public, he did him all the ill offices in his power. Of the ten thousand daricks, which Cyrus had given him for the augmentation of the mariners' pay, he returned the remainder to that prince; telling Callicratidas, that he might apply to the king for the money, and that it depended on him to find means for the subsistence of his army. This conduct gave him great trouble, and distressed him exceedingly. For he had brought no money with him from Sparta, and could not resolve to extort any from the cities, as he found them sufficiently rifled already.

[s] In this urgent necessity, a person having offered him fifty talents (that is to say, fifty thousand crowns) to obtain a favour

[s] Plut. *in Apoph*, p. 222.

which he could not grant with justice, he refused them. Upon which Cleander, one of his officers, said, 'I would accept them, were I in your place.' 'And so would I,' replied the general, 'were I in yours.'

He had no other resource therefore than to go, as Lysander had done, to ask money at the gates of the king's generals and lieutenants, for which he was the least proper of all mankind. Nurtured and educated in the love of liberty, full of great and noble sentiments, and infinitely remote from all flattery and baseness, he was convinced at heart, that it was a less evil and dishonour for Greeks to be overcome by Greeks, than infamously to make their court, and beg at the gates of barbarians, whose only merit consisted in their gold and silver. The whole nation were indeed disgraced by so mean a prostitution.

Cicero, in his *Offices*, draws two very different characters of persons employed in the administration of government, and makes the application of them to the two generals, of whom we speak. The one, says he, * zealous lovers of truth, and declared enemies of all fraud, pique themselves upon their simplicity and candour, and do not believe that it can ever be consistent with honour to lay snares, or use artifice. The others, prepared to do or suffer every thing, and not ashamed of the meanest actions, provided from those unworthy methods they have reason to expect the success of their designs. Cicero places Callicratidas amongst the former, and Lysander amongst the latter, to whom he gives two epithets not much to his honour, and hardly consistent with the Spartan character, when he calls him 'very artful, and very patient,' or rather 'very complaisant.'

Callicratidas however, forced by necessity, went to Lydia, and repaired immediately to the palace of Cyrus, where he desired that prince might be told, that the admiral of the Grecian fleet was come to speak with him. He was answered, that Cyrus was then at table, engaged in a † party

* Sunt his alii multùm dispares, simplices et aperti; qui nihil ex occulto, nihil ex insidiis agendum putant; veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici: itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedæmonium Lysandrum accepimus, contráque Callicratidam. *Offic.* l. i. n. 109.

† The Greek says literally that he was drinking, πίνω. The Persians valued

of pleasure; to which he replied with a modest tone and air, that he was in no haste, and would wait till the prince came forth. The guards set up a laugh, wondering at the honest stranger's simplicity, who seemed so little acquainted with the world; and he was obliged to retire. He came thither the second time, and was again denied admittance. Upon which he returned to Ephesus, loading those with curses and imprecations, who had first made their court to barbarians, and by their flattery and submissions had taught them to make their riches a title and pretence for insulting the rest of mankind. Addressing himself at the same time to those about him, he swore, that as soon as he returned to Sparta, he would use his utmost endeavours to reconcile the Greeks amongst themselves, that for the future they might become formidable to the barbarians, and have no further occasion for their aid to invade and ruin each other. But that generous Spartan, whose thoughts were so noble, and so worthy the Lacedæmonian name, and whose justice, magnanimity, and valour, might rank him with all that Greece had ever produced of the most excellent and most consummate, had not the good fortune to return to his country, nor to apply himself to a work so great, and so worthy of him.

SECT. V. CALLICRATIDAS IS DEFEATED BY THE ATHENIANS NEAR THE ARGINUSÆ. THE ATHENIANS PASS SENTENCE OF DEATH UPON SEVERAL OF THEIR GENERALS FOR NOT HAVING BROUGHT OFF THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO HAD BEEN SLAIN IN BATTLE. SOCRATES ALONE HAS THE COURAGE TO OPPOSE SO UNJUST A SENTENCE.—[t] Callicratidas, after having gained several victories over the Athenians, had at last pursued Conon, one of their generals, into the port of Mitylene, where he kept him blocked up. This was in the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. Conon seeing himself besieged by sea and land, without hope of aid, and in want of provisions, found means to apprize Athens of the extreme danger he was in. Extraordinary efforts were made to relieve him, and in less than a month's time a fleet of a hundred and ten sail were

themselves upon drinking a great deal, as an instance of their merit, as we shall see in Cyrus's letter to the Lacedæmonians.

[t] Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. i. p. 444—452. Diod. l. xiii. p. 198, 201, 217—222.

fitted out, on board of which were embarked all that were capable of bearing arms, as well slaves as freemen, with some horse. At Samos they were joined by the allies with forty galleys, and the collected armament steered for the Arginusæ, islands situate between Cumæ and Mitylene. Callicratidas, being informed of their course, left Eteonicus to continue the siege with fifty ships, and put to sea with a hundred and twenty sail, with design to face the enemy, and prevent their relieving Conon. The right wing of the Athenians was commanded by Protomachus and Thrasylus, who had each fifteen galleys. They were supported by a second line with a like number of ships, commanded by Lysias and Aristogenes. The left wing, like the other, drawn up in two lines, was under Aristocrates and Diomedon, supported by Erasinides and Pericles.* The main body, consisting of near thirty galleys, amongst which were the three Athenian admirals, was disposed in one line. They had strengthened each of their wings with a second line; because their galleys were neither so swift, nor so easy to manage, as those of the enemy; so that there was reason to fear their getting between two, and being charged on both sides at the same time. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, who perceived they were inferior in number to the enemy, contented themselves with drawing up in one line, in order to equal their front, and for the greater facility of running between the Athenian galleys, and turning nimbly round them. Callicratidas's pilot, daunted at the inequality, advised him not to hazard the battle, and to retire: but he replied, that he could not fly without shame, and that his death was of small importance to the republic. 'Sparta,' said he, 'does not depend upon one man.' He commanded the right wing, and Thrasondas the Theban the left.

It was a grand and awful sight to behold the sea covered with three hundred galleys ready to engage. Never had more numerous naval armies of the Greeks fought against each other before. The ability, experience, and valour of the generals who commanded, left nothing to desire; so that there was reason to believe this battle would decide the fate of both people, and put an end to a war that had endured so long.

* He was the son of the great Pericles.

When the signals were given, the two armies raised great shouts, and began the fight. Callicratidas, who, from the answer of the augurs, expected to fall in the battle, did amazing actions of valour. He attacked the enemy with incredible courage and boldness, sunk some of their ships, disabled others by breaking their oars and piercing their sides with the prow or beak of his galley. At length he attacked that of Pericles, and made a thousand holes in it; but the latter having hooked him fast with a grappling iron, he found it impossible to disengage himself, and was surrounded in an instant by several of the Athenian vessels. His own was immediately filled with the enemy, and after a dreadful slaughter, he fell dead, rather overwhelmed by their numbers than vanquished. The right wing which he commanded, having lost its admiral, was put to flight. The left, composed of Bœotians and Eubœans, still made a long and vigorous resistance, from the urgent concern they were in, lest they should fall into the hands of the Athenians, against whom they had revolted; but they were at length obliged to give way, and retire in disorder. The Athenians erected a trophy in the Arginusæ. They lost twenty-five galleys in this battle, and the enemy more than seventy, of which number were nine of the ten furnished by the Lacedæmonians.

[u] Plutarch equals Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, for his justice, valour, and magnanimity, with all who had ever rendered themselves most worthy of admiration amongst the Greeks.

[x] He blames him however exceedingly for hazarding the battle at the Arginusæ, and observes, that to avoid the reproach of having retired out of fear, he had, through a mistaken sense of honour, failed in the essential duty of his function. For, says Plutarch, if (to use the comparison of [*] Iphicrates) the light-armed infantry resemble the hands, the horse the feet, the main body the breast, and the general the head; the general, who abandons himself rashly to the impetuosity of his valour, does not so much neglect or expose his own life, as the lives of those whose safety depends upon his. Our Lacedæmonian

[u] Plut. *in Lysand.* p. 436. [x] Plut. *in Pelop.* p. 278.

[*] He was a famous general of the Athenians.

chief was therefore in the wrong, continues Plutarch, to answer the pilot, who advised him to retire, 'Sparta does not depend upon one man.' For though it be true, that Callicratidas, fighting under the orders of another by sea or land, 'was no more than one man,' yet, when commanding an army, all that obeyed his orders were collected in his person; and he, in whom so many thousands might be lost, 'was no longer one man.' * Cicero had passed the same judgment upon him before Plutarch. After having said, that there were many persons to be found, who were ready to sacrifice their fortunes, and even lives, for their country, but who, out of a false delicacy in point of glory, would not hazard their reputation for it in the least; he cites the example of Callicratidas, who answered those that advised him to retreat from the Arginusæ, 'That Sparta could fit out another fleet if this were lost; but for himself, he could not fly before the enemy without shame and infamy.'

I return to the sequel of the battle near the Arginusæ. The Athenian generals ordered Theramenes, Thrasybulus, and some other officers, to return with about fifty galleys to take up the wrecks and dead bodies, in order to their interment, whilst they sailed on with the rest against Eteonicus, who kept Conon besieged before Mitylene. But a violent tempest came on suddenly, and prevented the execution of this order. Eteonicus having received news of the defeat, and fearing it might occasion alarm and terror amongst the troops, sent back those who brought it, with orders to return with wreaths of flowers upon their heads, and to give out, that Callicratidas had gained the victory, and destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. Upon their return he offered sacrifices of thanksgiving, and having made his troops take some refreshment, he sent the galleys away directly, the wind being fair, and marched off the land army to Methymna, after having burnt the camp. Conon

* Inventi multi sunt, qui non modò pecuniam; sed vitam etiam, profundere pro patriâ parati essent, iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republicâ quidem postulante: ut Callicratidas, qui, cùm Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multaque fecisset egregiè, vertit ad extremum omnia, cùm consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam, nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit, Lacedæmonios, classe illâ amissâ, aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. *Offic.* i. i. n. 48.

being delivered in this manner from the blockade, joined the victorious fleet, which returned forthwith to Samos. However, when it was known at Athens, that the dead bodies had been left without interment, the people were highly enraged, and caused the whole weight of their resentment to fall upon those whom they deemed guilty of that crime. The ancients held it a great one not to provide sepulture for the dead; and we may observe, that after all their battles, the first care of the conquered, notwithstanding the sense of their misfortune, and their great affliction for a bloody defeat, was to demand a suspension of arms from the victor, in order to pay the last duties to those who had fallen in battle; upon which they believed their happiness in another life depended. They had little or no idea of the resurrection of the body; but however, the Pagans, by the soul's concern for the body after death, the religious regard paid to it, and the zeal with which they rendered solemn honours to the dead, showed that they had some confused notion of a resurrection, which subsisted amongst all nations, and descended from the most ancient tradition, though they could not clearly distinguish it.

Hence arose the fury of the people of Athens. They immediately nominated new generals, retaining only Conon of the old ones, to whom they gave Adimantus and Philocles for colleagues. Of the eight others, two had withdrawn themselves, and only six returned to Athens. Theramenes, the tenth general, who returned before the rest of the fleet, accused the other chiefs before the people, making them responsible for not bringing off the dead after the battle; and to clear himself, read the letter they had written to the senate and the people, wherein they excused themselves from the violence of the storm, without charging any body. There was something detestably vile in this calumny, as it was making an unjust use of their reserve in not mentioning him in their letter, and in not laying a fault to his charge, of which he might have appeared the most guilty. The generals, at their return, not being able to prevail in obtaining the time necessary for making their defence, contented themselves with representing in few words the state of the affair, and appealed for the truth of what they said to the pilots, and all present when it happened.

The people seemed to receive their excuse favourably, and several persons offered themselves for their sureties; but it was thought proper to adjourn the assembly, because of the night, and it being the people's custom to give their suffrages by lifting up of hands, their resolution could not be known; besides which the council were first to give their opinion upon the question to be proposed to the people.

The feast of Apaturia coming on, in which it was the custom to assemble by families, the relations of Theramenes posted several persons in mourning habits, with their heads shaved, in proper places, who said they were the kindred of those who had been slain in battle, and obliged Callixenes to accuse the generals in the senate. It was decreed in consequence, that as the accusation and defence had been heard in the last assembly, the people, by their respective tribes, should give their voices, and if the accused were found guilty, they should be punished with death, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to the * goddess. Some senators opposed this decree as unjust, and contrary to the laws: but as the people, at the instigation of Callixenes, threatened to include the opposers in the same cause and crime with the generals, they were so mean as to desist from their opposition, and to sacrifice the innocent generals to their own safety, by consenting to the decree. Socrates (the celebrated philosopher) was the only one of the senators that stood firm, and persisted obstinately in opposing a decree so notoriously unjust, and so contrary to all laws. The orator, who mounted the tribunal in defence of the generals, showed, 'That they had failed in no part of their duty, as they had given orders that the dead bodies should be taken up: that if any one were guilty, it was he, who, being charged with these orders, had neglected to put them in execution; but that he accused nobody: and that the tempest, which came on unexpectedly at the very instant, was an unanswerable apology, and entirely discharged the accused from all guilt. He demanded, that a whole day should be allowed them to make their defence, a favour not denied to the most criminal, and that they should be tried separately. He represented, that they were not in the least

* Minerva.

obliged to precipitate a sentence, wherein the lives of the most illustrious of the citizens were concerned; that it was in some measure attacking the gods to make * men responsible for the winds and weather; and that they could not, without the most flagrant ingratitude and injustice, put the conquerors to death, to whom they ought to decree crowns and honours, or give up the defenders of their country to the rage of those who envied them; and if they did so, their unjust judgment would be followed with a sudden but vain repentance, which would leave in their hearts the sharpest remorse, and cover them with eternal shame and infamy.' The people seemed at first to be moved with these reasons; but, being animated by the accusers, they pronounced sentence of death against the eight generals; and six of them, who were present, were seized in order to their being carried to execution. One of them, Diomedon, a person of great reputation for his valour and probity, demanded to be heard. 'Athenians,' said he, 'I wish the sentence you have passed upon us may not prove the misfortune of the republic; but I have one favour to ask of you in behalf of my colleagues and myself, which is, to acquit us before the gods of the vows we made to them for you and ourselves, as we are not in a condition to discharge them; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, we acknowledge that we are indebted for the victory gained by us over the enemy.' There was not one good citizen that did not melt into tears at this discourse so full of mildness and religion, and admire with surprise the moderation of a person, who, seeing himself unjustly condemned, did not however vent the least harsh expression, or even complaint, against his judges, but was solely intent (in favour of an ungrateful country, which had doomed them to perish) upon what it owed the gods in common with them for the victory they had lately obtained.

The six generals were hardly executed when the people opened their eyes, and perceived all the horror of that sentence; but their repentance could not restore the dead to life. Callixenes, their accuser, was put in prison, and was not allowed

* Quem adeo iniquum, ut sceleri assignet, quod venti et fluctus deliquerint? Tacit. *Annal.* l. xiv. c. 3.

to be heard. Having found means to make his escape, he fled to Decelia to the enemy, from whence he returned some time after to Athens, where he died of hunger, universally detested and abhorred by all the world, as all false accusers and slanderers ought to be. Diodorus remarks, that the people themselves were justly punished for their crime by the gods, who abandoned them soon after, not to a single master, but to thirty tyrants, that treated them with the utmost rigour and cruelty.

[y] The disposition of the populace is recognised in this account; and Plato, upon the same event, draws in few words their character with much spirit and resemblance. The [*] populace, says he, is an unconstant, ungrateful, cruel, suspicious animal, incapable of submitting to the government of reason; and this is no wonder, adds he, as it is commonly composed of the dregs of a city, and is a monstrous assemblage, without form or order, of all that is worst in it.

The same relation shows what effect fear can have upon the minds of men even upon those who pass for the wisest, and how few there are, who are capable of supporting inflexibly the view of present danger and disgrace. Though the justness of the accused generals' cause was perfectly known in the senate, at least by the greater part of it; as soon as the people's rage was mentioned, and the terrible menaces they murmured, those grave senators, most of whom had commanded armies, and who all had frequently exposed themselves to the greatest dangers of war, instantly changed sides, and came over to the most notorious calumny, and flagrant injustice, that ever had being. An evident proof, that there is a courage, though very rare, which infinitely transcends that valour, which induces so many thousands of men every day to confront the most terrible dangers in battle.

Amongst all the judges, one alone, truly worthy of his reputation, the great Socrates, in this general treason and perfidy, stood firm and immovable; and, though he knew his suffrage and unaided voice would be of little or no consequence to the

[y] Plat. *in Axioch.* p. 368, 369.

[*] Δῆμος ἀχάριστον, ἀψίκορον, ὠμὸν, βάσκανον, ἀπαίδευτον.

accused, he thought these an homage due to oppressed innocence, and that it was * unworthy an honest man to suffer himself, through a base fear, to be hurried away by the fury of a blind and frantic people. We see in this instance how far the cause of justice may be abandoned. We may conclude it was not better defended before the people. Of more than three thousand citizens, who composed the assembly, two only took upon them the defence of their generals, Eurïptolemus and Axiochus. Plato has preserved their names, and given that of the latter to the dialogue, from whence part of these reflections are taken.

The same year that the battle of the Arginusæ was fought, Dionysius possessed himself of the tyranny in Sicily. I defer speaking of him till I shall relate the history of the tyrants of Syracuse at large. A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406.

SECT. VI. LYSANDER COMMANDS THE LACEDÆMONIAN FLEET. CYRUS IS RECALLED TO COURT BY HIS FATHER. LYSANDER GAINS A CELEBRATED VICTORY OVER THE ATHENIANS AT ÆGOSPOTAMOS.—[z] After the defeat at the Arginusæ, the affairs of the Peloponnesians declining, the allies, supported by the credit of Cyrus, sent an embassy to Sparta, to demand that the command of the fleet should again be given to Lysander, with the promise of serving with more affection and courage if their request were granted. As it was contrary to the laws of Sparta that the same person should be twice admiral, the Lacedæmonians, to gratify the allies, gave the title of admiral to one Aracus, and sent Lysander with him, whom in appearance they commissioned only as vice-admiral, though in effect they invested him with all the authority of the supreme command. A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405.

All those who had the greatest share in the government of the cities, and possessed the most authority in them, saw him arrive with extreme joy; promising themselves, from his influence, the final subversion of the democratic power. His character of complaisance towards his friends, and indulgence

[z] Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. ii. p. 454. Plut. *in Lys.* l. ix. p. 436, 437. Diod. l. xiii. p. 223.

* Οὐ γὰρ ἐφαίνετο μοι σεμνὸν δήμῳ μαινομένῳ συνιζάρχειν.

to all their faults, suited much better their ambitious and injurious views, than the austere equity of Callicratidas. For Lysander was a man of the most corrupt heart, and gloried in having no principles on the score of virtue or the most sacred duties. He made no scruple to employ artifice and deceit upon all occasions, and esteemed justice only as far as it served his measures. When it did not promote them, he never failed to prefer the useful, which with him was alone the laudable and excellent; from a persuasion that truth had in its own nature no advantage over falsehood, and that the value of both one and the other was to be appreciated by the convenience resulting from them. And as to those who represented to him, that it was unworthy the descendants of Hercules to make use of fraud and treachery, he laughed at them; 'For,' said he, 'where the lion's skin is not long enough, it is necessary to tack the fox's tail to it.'

An expression ascribed to him sufficiently denotes how small an account he made of perjury. He used to say, * 'Children are amused with baubles, and men with oaths;' showing by so professed a want of religion, that he cared less for the gods than his enemies. For he who deceives with a false oath, plainly declares in so doing, that he fears his enemies, but that he despises God.

[a] Here ends the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian War. In this year it was, that the younger Cyrus, dazzled with the splendour of supreme authority, to which he had been little accustomed, and jealous of the least omission in point of ceremonial homage, discovered by a remarkable action the secret of his heart. Brought up from his infancy among the reigning family, nurtured under the shade of the throne, amidst the submissions and prostrations of the courtiers, entertained long, by the discourses of an ambitious mother that idolized him, in the desire and hope of empire, he began already to exert the rights of sovereignty, and to exact the honours paid to it with surprising haughtiness and rigour. Two Persians of

[a] Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. ii. p. 454.

* The Greek text admits of another sense, which is perhaps equally good: 'Children may use art, and cheat one another in their games, and men in their oaths.' Ἐκέλευε τοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἀστραγάλοις τοὺς δ' ἄνδρας ὅρκοις ἐξαπατᾶν.

the royal family, his cousin-germans by their mother, sister of his father Darius, had omitted to cover their hands with their sleeves in his presence, according to a ceremonial observed only towards the kings of Persia. Cyrus, resenting that neglect as a capital crime, condemned them both to die, and caused them to be executed at Sardis without mercy. Darius, at whose feet their relations threw themselves to demand justice, was very much affected with the tragical end of his two nephews, and looked upon this action of his son's as an attempt upon himself, to whom alone that honour was due. He resolved therefore to take his government from him, and ordered him to court upon the pretext of being sick, and having a desire to see him

Cyrus before his departure sent for Lysander to Sardis, and put into his hands great sums of money for the payment of his fleet, promising him still more for the future. And, with the ostentation of a young man, to let him see how much he desired to oblige him, he assured him, that though the king his father should cease to afford him any supplies, he would furnish him the more willingly out of his own coffers, and that rather than he should want the necessary provisions, he would even cause the throne of massy gold and silver, upon which he sat to administer justice, to be melted down. At length, when he was upon the point of setting out, he empowered him to receive the tributes and revenues of the cities, confided the government of his provinces to him, and embracing him conjured him not to give battle in his absence, unless superior in force; because the king neither wanted the will nor the power to give him that superiority over the enemy; promising at the same time, with the strongest assurances of affection, to bring him a great number of ships from Phœnicia and Cilicia.

[b] After that prince's departure, Lysander sailed towards the Hellespont, and laid siege to Lampsacus. Thorax, having marched thither with his land forces at the same time, assaulted the city on his side. [c] The place was carried by storm, and abandoned by Lysander to the soldiers. The Athenians, who followed him close, came to an anchor in the port of Eleontum

[b] Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. ii. p. 455—458.

[c] Plut. *in Lys.* p. 437, 440. Id. *in Alcib.* p. 212. Diod. l. xiii. p. 225, 226.

in the Chersonesus, with a hundred and fourscore galleys. But upon the news of the taking of Lampsacus, they immediately steered for Sestos, and after having taken in provisions, they stood away from thence, sailing along the coast to a place called * Ægospotamos, where they halted over-against the enemy, who were then at anchor before Lampsacus. The Hellespont is not above two thousand paces broad in that place. The two armies, seeing themselves so near each other, expected only to rest that day, and were in hopes of coming to a battle on the next.

But Lysander had another design in view. He commanded the seamen and pilots to go on board their galleys, as if they were in reality to fight the next morning at break of day, to hold themselves in readiness, and to wait his orders with profound silence. He ordered the land army in like manner to draw up in battle upon the coast, and to wait the day without any noise. On the morrow, as soon as the sun was risen, the Athenians began to row towards them with their whole fleet in one line, and to bid them defiance. Lysander, though his ships were ranged in order of battle, with their heads towards the enemy, lay still without making any movement. In the evening, when the Athenians withdrew, he did not suffer his soldiers to go ashore, till two or three galleys, which he had sent out to observe them, were returned with advice, that they had seen the enemy land. The next day passed in the same manner, as did the third and fourth. Such a conduct, which argued reserve and apprehension, extremely augmented the security and boldness of the Athenians, and inspired them with a sovereign contempt for an army, which fear, in their opinion, prevented from showing themselves, and attempting any thing.

Whilst this passed, Alcibiades, who was near the fleet, took horse, and came to the Athenian generals; to whom he represented, that they kept upon a very disadvantageous coast, where there were neither ports nor cities in the neighbourhood; that they were obliged to bring their provisions from Sestos with great danger and difficulty; and that they were very much in the wrong to suffer the soldiers and mariners of

* The River of the Goat.

the fleet, as soon as they were ashore, to straggle and disperse themselves wherever they pleased, whilst they saw an enemy's fleet facing them, accustomed to execute the orders of their general with instant obedience, and upon the slightest signal. He offered also to attack the enemy by land with a strong body of Thracian troops, and to force them to a battle. The generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, jealous of their command, did not content themselves with refusing his offers, from the opinion, that if the event proved unfortunate, the whole blame would fall on them, and if favourable, that Alcibiades would engross the honour of it; but rejected also with insult his wise and salutary counsel, as if a man in disgrace lost his sense and abilities with the favour of the commonwealth. Alcibiades withdrew.

The fifth day the Athenians presented themselves again, and offered him battle; retiring in the evening according to custom with more insulting airs than the days before. Lysander, as usual, detached some galleys to observe them, with orders to return with the utmost diligence, as soon as they saw the Athenians landed, and to put a brazen buckler at each ship's head as soon as they reached the middle of the channel. Himself in the mean time ran through the whole line in his galley, exhorting the pilots and officers to hold the seamen and soldiers in readiness to row and fight on the first signal.

As soon as the bucklers were put up in the ships' heads, and the admiral galley had given the signal by the sound of trumpet, the whole fleet set forwards in good order. The land army at the same time made all possible haste to the top of the promontory to see the battle. The strait that separates the two continents in this place, is about fifteen stadia,* or three quarters of a league in breadth, which space was presently cleared through the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the Athenian general, was the first who perceived, from shore, the enemy's fleet advancing in good order to attack him; upon which he immediately cried out for the troops to embark. In the height of sorrow and perplexity, some he called to by their names, some he conjured, and others he forced to go on board their galleys; but all his endeavours and emotion were

* 1875 paces.

ineffectual, the soldiers being dispersed on all sides. For they were no sooner come on shore, than some ran to the sutlers, some to walk in the country, some to sleep in their tents, and others had begun to dress their suppers. This proceeded from the want of vigilance and experience in their generals, who, not suspecting the least danger, indulged themselves in taking their repose, and gave their soldiers the same liberty.

The enemy had already fallen on with loud cries and a great noise of their oars, when Conon, disengaging himself with nine galleys, of which number was the sacred ship called the *Paralian*, stood away for Cyprus, where he took refuge with Evagoras. The Peloponnesians, falling upon the rest of the fleet, took immediately the galleys which were empty, and disabled and destroyed such as began to fill with men. The soldiers, who ran without order or arms to their relief, were either killed in the endeavour to get on board, or flying on shore were cut to pieces by the enemy, who landed in pursuit of them. Lysander took three thousand prisoners, with all the generals and the whole fleet. After having plundered the camp, and fastened the enemy's galleys to the sterns of his own, he returned to Lampsacus, amidst the sounds of flutes and songs of triumph. He had the glory of achieving one of the greatest military exploits recorded in history, with little or no loss, and of terminating in the small space of an hour, a war which had already lasted seven and twenty years, and which perhaps, without him, would have been of much longer continuance. Lysander immediately sent despatches with this agreeable news to Sparta.

The three thousand prisoners, taken in this battle, having been condemned to die, Lysander called upon Philocles, one of the Athenian generals, who had caused all the prisoners taken in two galleys, the one of Andros, the other of Corinth, to be thrown from the top of a precipice, and had formerly persuaded the people of Athens to make a decree for cutting off the thumb of the right hand of all the prisoners of war, in order to disable them for handling the pike, and that they might be fit only to serve at the oar. Lysander therefore caused him to be brought forth, and asked him, what sentence he would pass upon himself, for having induced his city to

pass that cruel decree. Philocles, without departing from his haughtiness in the least, notwithstanding the extreme danger he was in, made answer, 'Accuse not people of crimes who have no judges; but as you are victor, use your right, and do by us as we would have done by you, if we had conquered.' At the same instant he went into a bath, put on afterwards a magnificent robe, and marched foremost to the execution. All the prisoners were put to the sword, except Adimantus, who had opposed the decree.

After this expedition, Lysander went with his fleet to all the maritime cities, and gave orders for all Athenians in them to withdraw as soon as possible to Athens, without permitting them to take any other route; declaring, that after a certain time fixed, all such should be punished with death, as should be found out of Athens. This he did as an able politician, to reduce the city by famine the more easily, and to render it incapable of sustaining a long siege. He afterwards busied himself in subverting democracy, and all other forms of government throughout the cities; leaving in each of them a Lacedæmonian governor, called *harmostes*, and ten archons or magistrates, whom he chose out of the societies he had established in them. He thereby in some measure secured to himself universal authority, and a kind of sovereignty over all Greece; putting none into power but such as were entirely devoted to his service.

SECT. VII. ATHENS, BESIEGED BY LYSANDER, CAPITULATES AND SURRENDERS. LYSANDER CHANGES THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT, AND ESTABLISHES THIRTY COMMANDERS IN IT. HE SENDS GYLIPPUS BEFORE HIM TO SPARTA WITH ALL THE GOLD AND SILVER TAKEN FROM THE ENEMY. DECREE OF SPARTA UPON THE USE TO BE MADE OF IT. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ENDS IN THIS MANNER. DEATH OF DARIUS NOTHUS.—[d] When the news of the entire defeat of the army came to Athens by a ship, which arrived in the night at the Piræus, the city was in universal consternation. Nothing was heard but cries of sorrow and despair in every part of it. They imagined the enemy already at their gates.

A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

[d] Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. ii. p. 458—462. Plut. *in Lysand.* p. 440, 441.

They represented to themselves the miseries of a long siege, a cruel famine, the ruin and burning of their city, the insolence of a proud victor, and the shameful slavery they were upon the point of experiencing, more afflicting and insupportable to them than the most severe punishments and death itself. The next day the assembly was summoned, wherein it was resolved to shut up all the ports, one only excepted; to repair the breaches in the walls; and mount guard to prepare against a siege.

In fact, Agis and Pausanias, the two kings of Sparta, advanced towards Athens with all their troops. Lysander soon after arrived at the Piræus with a hundred and fifty sail, and prevented all ships from going in or coming out. The Athenians, besieged by sea and land, without provisions, ships, hope of relief, or any resource, reinstated all persons who had been attainted by any decree, without however speaking of a capitulation, though many already died of the famine. But when their corn was entirely consumed, they sent deputies to Agis, to propose a treaty with Sparta, upon condition of abandoning all their possessions, the city and port only excepted. He referred the deputies to Lacedæmon, as not being empowered to treat with them. When they arrived at Selasia, upon the frontier of Sparta, and had made known their commission to the Ephori, they were ordered to retire, and to come with other proposals if they expected peace. The Ephori had demanded, that twelve hundred paces of the wall on each side of the Piræus should be demolished: but an Athenian, for venturing to advise a compliance, was sent to prison, and prohibition made against proposing any thing of that kind for the future.

In this deplorable condition Theramenes declared in the assembly, that if he were sent to Lysander, he would know, whether the proposal made by the Lacedæmonians for dismantling the city, was intended to facilitate its ruin, or to prevent a revolt. The Athenians having deputed him accordingly, he was more than three months absent; no doubt with the view of reducing them by famine to accept any conditions that should be offered. On his return he told them, that Lysander had detained him all that time, and that at last he had given him to understand, that he might apply to the Ephori. He

was therefore sent back with nine others to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a treaty. When they arrived there, the Ephori gave them audience in the general assembly, where the Corinthians and several other allies, especially the Thebans, insisted that it was absolutely necessary to destroy the city without hearkening any farther to a treaty. But the Lacedæmonians, preferring the glory and safety of Greece to their own grandeur, made answer, that they would never be reproached with having destroyed a city that had rendered such great services to all Greece; the remembrance of which ought to have much greater weight with the allies than the resentment of private injuries received from it. The peace was therefore concluded upon these conditions: 'That the fortifications of the Piræus, with the long wall that joined that port to the city, should be demolished; that the Athenians should deliver up all their galleys, twelve only excepted; that they should abandon all the cities they had seized, and content themselves with their own lands and country; that they should recall their exiles, and make a league offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians, under whom they should march wherever they thought fit to lead them.'

The deputies on their return were surrounded with an innumerable throng of people, who were apprehensive that nothing had been concluded, for they were not able to hold out any longer, such multitudes dying every day of famine. The next day they reported the success of their negotiation; the treaty was ratified, notwithstanding the opposition of some persons; and Lysander, followed by the exiles, entered the port. It was upon the very day that the Athenians had formerly gained the famous naval battle of Salamis. He caused the walls to be demolished to the sound of flutes and trumpets, and with all the exterior marks of triumph and rejoicing, as if all Greece had that day regained its liberty. Thus ended the Peloponnesian war, after having continued during the space of twenty-seven years.

Lysander, without giving the Athenians time to look about them, changed the form of their government entirely, established thirty archons, or rather tyrants, over the city, put a strong garrison into the citadel, and left the Spartan Callibius

harmostes, or governor. Agis dismissed his troops. Lysander, before he disbanded his, advanced against Samos, which he pressed so warmly, that it was at last obliged to capitulate. After having established its ancient inhabitants in it, he proposed to return to Sparta with the Lacedæmonian galleys, those of the Piræus, and the beaks of those he had taken.

He had sent Gylippus, who had commanded the army in Sicily, before him, to carry the money and spoils, which were the fruit of his glorious campaigns, to Lacedæmon. The money, without reckoning the innumerable crowns of gold given him by the cities, amounted to fifteen hundred talents that is to say, fifteen hundred thousand crowns.* Gylippus, who carried this considerable sum, could not resist the temptation of converting some part of it to his own use. The bags were sealed up carefully, and did not seem to leave any room for theft. He unsewed them at the bottom; and after having taken out of each of them what money he thought fit, to the amount of three hundred talents, he sewed them up again very neatly, and thought himself perfectly safe. But when he arrived at Sparta, the accounts, which had been put up in each bag, discovered him. To avoid punishment, he banished himself from his country, carrying along with him in all places the disgrace of having sullied, by so base and sordid an avarice, the glory of all his great actions.

From this unhappy example, the wisest and most judicious of the Spartans, apprehending the all-powerful effects of money, which enslaved not only the vulgar but even the greatest of men, extremely blamed Lysander, for having acted so contradictorily to the fundamental laws of Sparta, and warmly represented to the Ephori, how incumbent it was upon them to † banish all that gold and silver from the republic, and to lay the heaviest of curses and imprecations upon it, as the fatal bane of all other states, introduced only to corrupt the wholesome constitution of the Spartan government, which had supported itself for so many ages with vigour and prosperity. The Ephori immediately passed a decree to proscribe that money, and ordained that none should be current, except

* About 337,000*l.* sterling.

† Ἀποδιαπομπεῖσθαι πᾶν τὸ ἀργύριον καὶ τὸ χρυσίον, ὥσπερ νῆσος ἐπαγωγιμόν.

the usual iron coin. But Lysander's friends opposed this decree, and sparing no pains to retain the gold and silver in Sparta, the affair was referred to farther deliberation. There naturally seemed only two plans to be proposed; which were, either to make the gold and silver coin current, or to cry them down and prohibit them absolutely. The men of address and policy found out a third expedient, which, in their opinion, reconciled both the others with great success: this was wisely to choose the mean betwixt the vicious extremes of too much rigour and too much remissness. It was therefore resolved, that the new coin of gold and silver should be solely employed by the public treasury; that it should only pass in the occasions and uses of the state; and that every private person, in whose possession it should be found, should be immediately put to death.

A strange expedient! says Plutarch; as if Lycurgus had feared the specie of gold and silver, and not the avarice they occasion: an avarice less to be extinguished by prohibiting individuals from possessing it, than inflamed by permitting the state to amass and make use of it for the service of the public. For it was impossible, whilst that money was held in honour and esteem with the public, that it should be despised in private as useless, and that people should look upon that as of no value in their domestic affairs, which the state prized, and was so anxious to have for its occasions; bad usages, authorized by the practice and example of the public, being a thousand times more dangerous to individuals than the vices of individuals to the public. The Lacedæmonians therefore, continues Plutarch, in punishing those with death who should make use of the new money in private, were so blind and imprudent as to imagine, that the placing of the law, and the terror of punishment, as a guard at the door, was sufficient to prevent gold and silver from entering the house: whilst they left the hearts of their citizens open to the desire and admiration of riches, and introduced themselves a violent passion for amassing treasure, in causing it to be deemed a great and honourable thing to become rich.

It was about the end of the Peloponnesian war, that Darius Nothus king of Persia died, after a reign of nineteen years.

Cyrus had arrived at the court before his death, and Parysatis, his mother, whose idol he was, not contented with having made his peace, notwithstanding the faults he had committed in his government, pressed the old king to declare him his successor also, after the example of Darius the first, who gave Xerxes the preference before all his brothers, because he had been born, as Cyrus was, after his father's succession to the throne. But Darius did not carry his complaisance for her so far. He gave the crown to Arsaces, his eldest son by Parysatis also, whom Plutarch calls Arsicas, and bequeathed to Cyrus only the provinces he had already.

A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

BOOK THE NINTH.

THE HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS;

CONTINUED

DURING THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE REIGN OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON.

CHAPTER I.

SECT. I. CORONATION OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON. CYRUS ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE HIS BROTHER, AND IS SENT INTO ASIA MINOR. CRUEL REVENGE OF STATIRA, WIFE OF ARTAXERXES, UPON THE AUTHORS AND ACCOMPLICES IN THE MURDER OF HER BROTHER. DEATH OF ALCIBIADES. HIS CHARACTER.—Arsaces, upon ascending the throne, assumed the name of Artaxerxes: he it is to whom the Greeks gave the surname of *MNEMON, from his prodigious memory. [a] Being near his father's bed when he was dying, he asked him, a few moments before he expired, what had been the rule of his conduct during so long and happy a reign as his, that he might make it his example. 'It has been,' replied he, 'to do always what justice and religion required of me:' memorable words, and well worthy of being set up in letters of gold in the palaces of kings, to keep them perpetually in mind of what ought to be the guide

Artax. Mnemon. A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

[a] Athen. l. xii. p. 548.

* Which word signifies in the Greek, one of a good memory.

and rule of all their actions. It is not uncommon for princes to give excellent instructions to their children on their death-beds, which would be more efficacious, if preceded by their own example and practice; without which they are as weak and impotent as the sick man who gives them, and seldom survive him long.

[b] Soon after Darius's death, the new king set out from his capital for the city of * Pasargada, in order to his coronation, according to custom, by the priests of Persia. There was in that city a temple of the goddess who presided over war, in which the coronation of their kings was solemnized. It was attended with very singular ceremonies, which no doubt had some mysterious sense; though Plutarch does not explain it. The prince at his consecration took off his robe in the temple, and put on that worn by the ancient Cyrus before he came to the throne, which was preserved in that place with great veneration. After that he ate a dry fig, chewed some leaves of the turpentine tree, and drank a draught composed of milk and vinegar. Was this to signify, that the sweets of sovereign power are mingled with the bitterness of care and disquiet, and that, if the throne be surrounded with pleasures and honours, it is also attended with pains and anxieties? It seems sufficiently evident, that the design in putting the robes of Cyrus upon the new king, was to make him understand, that he should also clothe his mind with the great qualities and exalted virtues of that prince.

Young Cyrus, corroded by ambition, was in despair upon being for ever frustrated in his hopes of ascending a throne with which his mother had inspired him, and on seeing the sceptre, which he thought his right, transferred into the hands of his brother. The blackest crimes cost the ambitious nothing. Cyrus resolved to assassinate Artaxerxes in the temple itself, and in the presence of the whole court, just when he was about to take off his own robe, to put on that of Cyrus. Artaxerxes was apprized of this design by the priest himself, who had educated his brother, to whom he had imparted it. Cyrus was seized and condemned to die, when his mother

[b] Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1012.
* A city of Persia built by Cyrus the Great.

Parysatis almost out of her senses, flew to the place, clasped him in her arms, tied herself to him with the tresses of her hair, fastened her neck to his, and by her shrieks, and tears, and prayers, prevailed so far as to obtain his pardon, and that he should be sent back to his government of the maritime provinces. He carried thither with him an ambition no less ardent than before, and animated besides with resentment of the disgrace he had received, and the warm desire of revenge, and armed with an absolute unbounded power. Artaxerxes upon this occasion acted contrary to the most common rules of policy, which do not admit * the nourishing and inflaming, by extraordinary honours, the pride and haughtiness of a bold and enterprising young prince like Cyrus, who had carried his personal enmity to his brother so far, as to have resolved to assassinate him with his own hand, and whose ambition for empire was so great, as to employ the most criminal methods for the attainment of its end.

[c] Artaxerxes had espoused Statira. Scarce had her husband ascended the throne, when she employed the power her beauty gave her over him, to avenge the death of her brother Teriteuchmes. History has not a more tragical scene, nor a more monstrous complication of adultery, incest, and murder; which, after having occasioned great disorders in the royal family, terminated at length in the most fatal manner to all who had any share in it. But it is necessary for the reader's knowledge of the fact to trace it from the beginning.

Hidarnes, Statira's father, a Persian of very high quality, was governor of one of the principal provinces of the empire. Statira was a lady of extraordinary beauty, which induced Artaxerxes to marry her: he was then called Arsaces. At the same time Teriteuchmes, Statira's brother, married Hamestris, Arsaces's sister, one of the daughters of Darius and Parysatis; in favour of which marriage Teriteuchmes, upon his father's death, had his government given him. There was at the same time another sister in this family, named Roxana, no less beautiful than Statira, and who besides excelled in the

[c] Ctes. c. li. lv.

* Ne quis mobiles adolescentium animos præmaturis honoribus ad superbiam extolleret. Tacit. *Annal.* l. iv. c. 17.

arts of shooting with the bow, and throwing the dart. Teriteuchmes her brother conceived a criminal passion for her, and to gratify it resolved to set himself at liberty by killing Hamestris, whom he had espoused. Darius, having been informed of this project, by the force of presents and promises engaged Udiastes, Teriteuchmes's intimate friend and confidant, to prevent so black a design, by assassinating him. He obeyed, and had for his reward the government of him he had put to death with his own hands.

Amongst Teriteuchmes's guards was a son of Udiastes, called Mithridates, very much attached to his master. The young gentleman, upon hearing that his father had committed this murder in person, uttered all manner of imprecations against him, and full of horror for so infamous and vile an action, seized on the city of Zaris, and openly revolting, declared for the establishment of Teriteuchmes's son. But that young man could not hold out long against Darius. He was blocked up in the place with the son of Teriteuchmes, whom he had with him; and all the rest of the family of Hidarnes were put in prison, and delivered to Parysatis, to do with them as that mother, exasperated to the last excess by the treatment either done or intended against her daughter Hamestris, should think fit. That cruel princess began by causing Roxana, whose beauty had been the occasion of all this evil, to be sawed in two, and ordered all the rest to be put to death, except Statira, whose life she granted to the tears and the most tender and ardent solicitations of Arsaces; whose love for his wife made him spare no pains for her preservation, though Darius, his father, believed it necessary, even for his own good, that she should share the same fate with the rest of her family. Such was the state of the affair at the death of Darius.

Statira, as soon as her husband was upon the throne, causes Udiastes to be delivered into her hands. She ordered his tongue to be torn out, and made him die in the most exquisite torments she could invent, to punish the crime which had occasioned the ruin of her family. She gave his government to Mithridates, in recompense for his attachment to the interests of her family. Parysatis on her side took her revenge on

the son of Teriteuchmes, whom she caused to be poisoned; and we shall see that Statira's turn was not very remote.

We see here the terrible effects of female revenge, and in general of what excesses they are capable, who find themselves above all laws, and have no other rule for their actions than their will and passions.

Cyrus, having resolved to dethrone his brother, employed Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general, to raise a body of Grecian troops, under pretence of a war, which that Spartan proposed to carry into Thrace. A. M. 3601. Ant. J. C. 403. I shall defer speaking of this famous expedition, and also of the death of Socrates, which happened about the same time; as I intend to treat those two great events in all the extent they deserve. [d] It was without doubt with the same view, that Cyrus presented to Lysander a galley of two cubits in length made of ivory and gold, to congratulate him upon his naval victory. That galley was consecrated to Apollo in the temple of Delphi. Lysander went soon after to Sardis, charged with magnificent presents for Cyrus from the allies.

[e] It was upon that occasion Cyrus had the celebrated conversation with Lysander related by Xenophon, and which Cicero after him has applied so beautifully. That young * prince, who piqued himself more upon his affability and politeness than nobility and grandeur, pleased himself with conducting in person so illustrious a guest through his gardens, and with making him observe the various beauties of them. Lysander, struck with so fine a prospect, admired the manner in which the several parts were laid out, the height of the trees, the neatness and disposition of the walks; the abundance of

[d] Plut. *in Lys.* p. 443. [e] Xenoph. *Œcon.* p. 830.

* Narrat Socrates in eo libro Cyrum minorem, regem Persarum, præstantem ingenio atque imperii gloriâ, cùm Lysander Lacedæmonius, vir summæ virtutis, venisset ad eum Sardes, eique dona à sociis attulisset, et cæteris in rebus comem erga Lysandrum atque humanum fuisse, et ei quemdam conseptum agrum diligenter consitum ostendisse. Cùm autem admiraretur Lysander et proceritates arborum, et directos in quincuncem ordines, et humum subactam atque puram, et suavitatem odorum qui efflarentur è floribus; tum eum dixisse, mirari se non modò diligentiam, sed etiam solertiam ejus, à quo essent illa dimensa atque descripta. Et ei Cyrum respondisse: Atqui ego ista sum dimensus, mei sunt ordines, mea descriptio, multæ etiam istarum arborum meâ manu sunt satæ. Tum Lysandrum, intuentem ejus purpuram et nitorem corporis, ornatumque Persicum multo auro multisque gemmis, dixisse: Rectè verò te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta est. Cic. *de Senec.* n. 59.

fruit-trees, planted checker-wise, with an art which had known how to unite the useful with the agreeable; the beauty of the parterres, and the glowing variety of flowers, exhaling odours universally throughout the delightful scene. 'Every thing charms and transports me in this place,' said Lysander, addressing himself to Cyrus; 'but what strikes me most, is the exquisite taste and elegant industry of the person, who drew the plan of the several parts of this garden, and gave it the fine order, wonderful disposition, and happiness of symmetry, which I cannot sufficiently admire.' Cyrus, infinitely pleased with this discourse, replied, 'It was I that drew the plan, and entirely marked it out; and many of the trees, which you see, were planted with my own hands.' 'What!' replied Lysander, considering him from head to foot, 'is it possible with these purple robes and splendid vestments, those strings of jewels and bracelets of gold, those buskins so richly embroidered, that you could play the gardener, and employ your royal hands in planting trees!' 'Does that surprise you?' said Cyrus; 'I swear by the god * Mithras, that when my health admits, I never sit down to table without having made myself sweat with some fatigue or other, either in military exercise, rural labour, or some other toilsome employment, to which I apply with pleasure, and without sparing myself.' Lysander was amazed at this discourse, and pressing him by the hand, † 'Cyrus,' said he, 'you are truly happy, and deserve your high fortune; because in you it is united with virtue.'

Alcibiades without any trouble discovered the mystery of the levies made by Cyrus, and went into the province of Pharnabasus, with design to proceed to the court of Persia, and to apprize Artaxerxes of the scheme laid against him. Had he arrived there, a discovery of such importance would have infallibly procured him the favour of that prince, and the assistance he wanted for the reestablishment of his country. But the Lacedæmonian partisans at Athens, that is to say, the thirty tyrants, apprehended the intrigues of so superior a genius as his, and represented to their masters, that they were inevi-

* The Persians adored the sun under that name, who was their principal god.

† Δικαίως, ὦ Κῦρε, εὐδαιμονεῖς· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὢν εὐδαιμονεῖς. Rectè verò te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta est.

tably ruined if they did not find means to rid themselves of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians thereupon wrote to Pharnabasus, and with an abject meanness not to be excused, and which showed how much Sparta had degenerated from her ancient manners, pressed him with great earnestness, to deliver them at any rate from so formidable an enemy. The satrap complied with their wish. Alcibiades was then in a small town of Phrygia, where he lived with his concubine * Timandra. Those who were sent to kill him, not daring to enter his house, contented themselves with surrounding and setting it on fire. Alcibiades, having quitted it through the flames sword in hand, the barbarians were afraid to stay to come to blows with him, but flying and retreating as he advanced, they poured their darts and arrows upon him, and he fell dead upon the spot. Timandra took up his body, and having adorned and covered it with the finest robes she had, she made as magnificent a funeral for it as her present condition would admit.

Such was the end of Alcibiades, whose great virtues were stifled and suppressed by still greater vices. † It is not easy to say, whether his good or bad qualities were most pernicious to his country; for with the one he deceived, and with the other he oppressed it. In him distinguished valour was united with nobility of blood. His person was beautiful and finely made; he was eloquent, of great ability in business, insinuating, and formed for charming all mankind. He loved glory; but without prejudice to his inclination for pleasure; nor was he so fond of pleasure, as to neglect his glory for it. He knew how to give into, or abstract himself from it, according to the situation of his affairs. Never was there ductility of genius equal to his. He metamorphosed himself with incredible facility, like a Proteus, into the most contrary forms, and supported them all with as much ease and grace, as if each had been natural to him.

This convertibility of character, according as circumstances, the customs of countries, and his own interests required, discovers a heart void of principles, without either truth or

* It was said that Lais the famous courtezan, called the Corinthian, was the daughter of this Timandra.

† Cujus nescio utrùm bona an vitia patriæ perniciosiora fuerint: illis enim cives suos decepit, his afflixit. Val. Max l. iii. c. 1.

justice. He did not confine himself either to religion, virtue, laws, duties, or his country. His sole rule of action was his private ambition, to which he referred every thing. His aim was to please, to dazzle, and be beloved; but at the same time to subject those he soothed. He favoured them only as they served his purposes; and made his correspondence and society a means for engrossing every thing to himself.

His life was a perpetual mixture of good and evil. His sallies into virtue were ill sustained, and quickly degenerated into vices and crimes, very little to the honour of the instructions of that great philosopher, who took no small pains to cultivate him into a man of worth. His actions were glorious; but without rule or principle. His character was elevated and grand; but without connection and consistency. He was successively the support and terror of the Lacedæmonians and Persians. He was either the misfortune or refuge of his own country, according as he declared for or against it. In fine, he was the author of a destructive war through the whole of Greece, from the sole motive of commanding, by inducing the Athenians to besiege Syracuse; much less from the hope of conquering Sicily, and afterwards Africa, than with the design of keeping Athens in dependence upon himself; convinced, that having to deal with an inconstant, suspicious, ungrateful, jealous people, averse to those that governed, it was necessary to engage them continually in some great affair, in order to make his services always necessary to them, and that they might not be at leisure to examine, censure, and condemn his conduct.

He had the fate generally experienced by persons of his character, and of which they cannot reasonably complain. He never loved any one, himself being his sole motive; nor ever found a friend. He made it his merit and glory to cajole all men, and consequently nobody confided in, or adhered to him. His sole view was to live with splendour, and to domineer universally; and he perished miserably, abandoned by the whole world, and obliged at his death to the feeble services and impotent zeal of one only woman for the last honours rendered to his remains.

About this time died Democritus the philosopher.

SECT. II. THE THIRTY EXERCISE THE MOST HORRID CRUELTIES AT ATHENS. THEY PUT THERAMENES, ONE OF THEIR COLLEAGUES, TO DEATH. SOCRATES TAKES HIS DEFENCE UPON HIMSELF. THRASYBULUS ATTACKS THE TYRANTS, MAKES HIMSELF MASTER OF ATHENS, AND RESTORES ITS LIBERTY.—The council of Thirty, established at Athens by Lysander, committed the most execrable cruelties. Upon pretence of restraining the multitude within their duty, and of preventing seditions, they had caused guards to be assigned them, and armed three thousand of the citizens for that service, and at the same time disarmed all the rest. The whole city was in the utmost terror and dismay. Whoever opposed their injustice and violence, became the victims of them. Riches were a crime, that never failed of drawing a sentence upon their owners, always followed with death, and the confiscation of estates; which the thirty tyrants divided amongst themselves. They put more people to death, says Xenophon, in eight months of peace, than the enemies had done in a war of thirty years.

The two most considerable persons of the Thirty were Critias and Theramenes, who at first lived in great union, and always acted in concert with each other. The latter had some honour, and loved his country. When he saw with what an excess of violence and cruelty his colleagues behaved, he declared openly against them, and thereby drew their resentment upon him. Critias became his most mortal enemy, and acted as informer against him before the senate, accusing him of disturbing the tranquillity of the state, and of designing to subvert the present government. As he perceived, that the defence of Theramenes was heard with silence and approbation, he was afraid, that if the affair was left to the decision of the senate, they would acquit him. Having therefore caused a band of young men, whom he had armed with poniards, to advance to the bar, he said that he thought it the duty of a supreme magistrate to prevent justice from being abused, and that he should act conformably upon this occasion. 'But,' continued he, 'as the law does not permit, that any of

Xenoph. *Hist.* l. ii. p. 462—479. Diod. l. xiv. p. 235—238. Justin, l. v. c. 8, 10.

the three thousand should be put to death without the consent of the senate, I exclude Theramenes from that number, and condemn him to die in virtue of my own and my colleagues' authority.' Theramenes at these words, leaping upon the altar; 'I demand,' said he, 'Athenians, that I may be tried according to the laws; which cannot be refused me without manifest injustice. Not that I imagine, that the goodness of my cause will avail me any thing, or the sanction of altars protect me, but I would show at least, that my enemies respect neither the gods nor men. What most astonishes me is, that persons of your wisdom do not see, that your own names may as easily be struck out of the list of the citizens, as that of Theramenes.' Critias upon this ordered the officers of justice to pull him down from the altar. An universal silence and terror ensued upon the sight of the armed soldiers, that surrounded the senate. Of all the senators, Socrates alone, whose disciple Theramenes had been, took upon him his defence, and opposed the officers of justice. But his weak endeavours could not deliver Theramenes, who was led to the place of execution, notwithstanding all he could do, through crowds of the citizens, who saw with tears, in the fate of a man equally considerable for his love of liberty and the great services he had done his country, what they had to fear for themselves. When they presented him the hemlock, that is, the poison, (which was the manner of putting the citizens at Athens to death,) he took it with an intrepid air, and after having drank it, he poured the bottom upon the table, after the usual manner observed in feasts or public rejoicings, saying, 'This for the noble Critias.' Xenophon relates this circumstance, inconsiderable in itself, to show, says he, the tranquillity of Theramenes in his last moments.

The tyrants delivered from a colleague, whose presence alone was a continued reproach to them, no longer observed any measures. Nothing passed throughout the city but imprisonments and murders. * Every body trembled for themselves.

* Poteratne civitas illa conquiescere, in quâ tot tyranni erant, quot satellites essent? Ne spes quidem ulla recipiendæ libertatis animis poterat offerri, nec ulli remedio locus apparebat contra tantam vim malorum. Unde enim miseræ civitati tot Harmodios? Socrates tamen in medio erat, et lugentes patres consolabatur, et desperantes de republicâ exhortabatur—et imitari volentibus magnum circumferebat

or their friends. The general desolation had no remedy, nor was there any hope of regaining their liberty. Where had they then as many * Harmodiuses as they had tyrants? Terror had taken entire possession of their minds, whilst the whole city deplored in secret their loss of liberty, without having one amongst them generous enough to attempt the breaking its chains. The Athenian people seemed to have lost that valour, which till then had made them awful and terrible to their neighbours and enemies. They seemed to have lost the very use of speech; not daring to vent the least complaint, lest it should be made a capital crime in them. Socrates alone continued intrepid. He consoled the afflicted senate, animated the desponding citizens, and set all men an admirable example of courage and resolution; preserving his liberty, and sustaining his port in the midst of thirty tyrants, who made all else tremble, but could never shake the constancy of Socrates with their menaces. [g] Critias, who had been his pupil, was the first to declare most openly against him, taking offence at the free and bold discourses which he held against the government of the Thirty. He went so far as to prohibit his instructing the youth; but Socrates, who neither acknowledged his authority, nor feared the violent effects of it, paid no regard to so unjust an order.

All the citizens of any consideration in Athens, and who still retained a love of liberty, quitted a place reduced to so harsh and shameful a slavery, and sought elsewhere an asylum and retreat, where they might live in safety. At the head of these was Thrasybulus, a person of extraordinary merit, who beheld with the most lively affliction the miseries of his country. The Lacedæmonians had the inhumanity to endeavour to deprive those unhappy fugitives of this last resource. They published an edict to prohibit the cities of Greece from giving them refuge, decreed that they should be delivered up to the thirty tyrants, and condemned all such as should contravene the execution of this edict, to pay a fine of five

exemplar, cùm inter triginta dominos liber incederet. Senec. *de tranquil. anim.* c. iii.

[g] Xenoph. *memorab.* l. i. p. 716, 717.

* Harmodius formed a conspiracy for the deliverance of Athens from the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.

talents. Only two cities rejected with disdain so unjust an ordinance, Megara and Thebes; the latter of which made a decree to punish all persons whatsoever, that should see an Athenian attacked by his enemies without doing his utmost to assist him. Lysias, an orator of Syracuse, who had been banished by the Thirty, * raised five hundred soldiers at his own expense, and sent them to the aid of the common country of eloquence.

Thrasybulus lost no time. After having taken Phyla, a small fort in Attica, he marched to the Piræus, of which he made himself master. The Thirty flew thither with their troops, and a warm battle ensued. But as the soldiers on one side fought with valour and vigour for their liberty, and on the other with indolence and indifference for the power of others, the success was not doubtful, but followed the better cause. The tyrants were overthrown. Critias was killed upon the spot. And as the rest of the army were taking to flight, Thrasybulus cried out; 'Wherefore do you fly from me as from a victor, rather than assist me as the avenger of your liberty? We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; nor have we declared war against the city, but against the thirty tyrants.' He bade them remember, that they had the same origin, country, laws, and religion; he exhorted them to compassionate their exiled brethren, to restore their country to them, and resume their liberty themselves. This discourse made a due impression. The army, upon their return to Athens, expelled the Thirty, and substituted ten persons to govern in their room, whose conduct proved no better than that of the former.

It is a matter of surprise, that so sudden, so universal, so tenacious, and so uniform a conspiracy against the public good, should always actuate the several bodies of persons established in the administration of this government. This we have seen in the Four Hundred formerly chosen at Athens; again in the Thirty; and now in the Ten. And what augments our wonder is, that this passion for tyranny should so immediately possess republicans, born in the bosom of liberty,

* Quingentos milites, stipendio suo instructos, in auxilium patriæ communis eloquentiæ misit. Justin, l. v. c. 9.

accustomed to an equality of condition on which it is founded, and nurtured from their earliest infancy in an abhorrence of all subjection and dependency. [h] There must be, on the one side, in power and authority some violent impulse, to actuate in this manner so many persons, of whom many, no doubt, were not without sentiments of virtue and honour; and to banish so suddenly the principles and manners natural to them; and on the other an excessive propensity in the mind of man to subject his equals, and to rule over them imperiously, to carry him on to the last extremes of oppression and cruelty, and to make him forget at once all the laws of nature and religion.

The Thirty being fallen from their power and hopes, sent deputies to Lacedæmon to demand aid. It was not Lysander's fault, who was sent to them with troops, that the tyrants were not reestablished. But king Pausanias, who likewise marched against Athens, moved with compassion for the deplorable condition to which a city, once so flourishing, was reduced, had the generosity to favour the Athenians in secret, and at length obtained a peace for them. It was sealed with the blood of the tyrants, who, having taken arms to reinstate themselves in the government, and being present at a parley for that purpose, were all put to the sword, and left Athens in the full possession of its liberty. All the exiles were recalled. Thrasybulus at that time proposed the celebrated amnesty, by which the citizens engaged upon oath that all past transactions should be buried in oblivion. The government was reestablished upon its ancient foundation, the laws restored to their pristine vigour, and magistrates elected with the usual forms.

I cannot forbear observing in this place the wisdom and moderation of Thrasybulus, so salutary and essential after so long a continuance of domestic troubles. This is one of the finest events in ancient history, worthy of the Athenian lenity and benevolence, and has served as a model to successive ages in good governments.

Never had tyranny been more cruel and bloody than that which the Athenians had just thrown off. Every house was in

[h] Vi dominationis convulsus. Tacit.

mourning; every family bewailed the loss of some relation. It had been a series of public robbery and rapine, in which license and impunity had authorized all manner of crimes. Private individuals seemed to have a right to demand the blood of all accomplices in such notorious malversations, and even the interest of the state appeared to authorize such a claim, that by exemplary severities such enormous crimes might be prevented for the future. But Thrasybulus rising above those sentiments, from the superiority of his more extensive genius, and the views of a more discerning and profound policy, foresaw, that by acquiescing in the punishment of the guilty, eternal seeds of discord and enmity would remain, to weaken, by domestic divisions, the strength of the republic, which it was necessary to unite against the common enemy, and occasion the loss to the state of a great number of citizens, who might render it important services with the very view of making amends for past misbehaviour.

Such a conduct, after great troubles in a state, has always seemed, to the ablest politicians, the most certain and ready means to restore the public peace and tranquillity. * Cicero, when Rome was divided into two factions upon the occasion of Cæsar's death, who had been killed by the conspirators, calling to mind this celebrated amnesty, proposed, after the example of the Athenians, to bury all that had passed in eternal oblivion. [1] Cardinal Mazarin observed to Don Lewis de Haro, prime minister of Spain, that this gentle and humane conduct in France had prevented the troubles and revolts of that kingdom from having any fatal consequences, and 'that the king had not lost a foot of land by them to that day;' whereas, the inflexible severity of the Spaniards 'was the occasion, that the subjects of that monarchy, whenever they threw off the mask, never returned to their obedience but by the force of arms; which sufficiently appears (says he) in the example

[1] Let. xv. of Card. Maz.

* In ædem Telluris convocati sumus; in quo templo, quantum in me fuit, jeci fundamentum pacis; Atheniensiumque renovavi vetus exemplum, Græcum etiam † verbum usurpavi, quod tum in sedandis discordiis usurpaverat civitas illa; atque omnem memoriam discordiarum oblivione sempiternâ delendam censui. Philip. i. n. 1.

† Some believe that word was ἀμνηστία; but as it is not found in the historians who have treated this fact, it is more likely, that it was μὴ μνησικακήσειν, which has the same sense, and is used by them all.

of the Hollanders, who are in the peaceable possession of many provinces, that not an age ago were the patrimony of the king of Spain.'

[k] Diodorus Siculus takes occasion from the thirty tyrants of Athens, whose immoderate ambition induced them to treat their country with the most excessive cruelties, to observe how unfortunate it is for * persons in power to want a sense of honour, and to disregard either the present opinion, or the judgment which posterity will form of their conduct: for from the contempt of reputation the transition is too common to that of virtue itself. They may perhaps, by the dread of their power, suppress for some time the public voice, and impose a forced silence upon censure; but the more constraint they lay upon it during their lives, the more liberal will it be after their deaths of complaints and reproaches, and the more infamy and imputation will be affixed to their memories. The power of the Thirty, says he, was of a very short duration, but their infamy will be immortal; their memory will be held in abhorrence throughout all ages, whilst their names will be recorded in history only to render them odious, and to make their crimes detestable. He applies the same reflection to the Lacedæmonians; who, after having made themselves masters of Greece by a wise and moderate conduct, fell from that glory, through the severity, haughtiness, and injustice, with which they treated their allies. There is doubtless no reader, whom their abject and cruel jealousy in regard to Athens enslaved and humbled, has not prejudiced against them; nor do we recognise in such behaviour the greatness of mind and noble generosity of ancient Sparta; so much power have the lust of dominion and prosperity over even virtuous men.' Diodorus concludes his reflection with a maxim very true, though very little known: 'The greatness and majesty of princes,' says he, (and the same may be said of all persons in high authority,) 'can be supported only by humanity and justice with regard to their subjects; as, on the contrary, they are ruined and destroyed by a cruel

[k] Diod. l. xiv. p. 234.

* Cætera principibus statim adesse: unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam; nam contemptâ famâ, contemni virtutes—Quo magis socordiam eorum inridere libet, qui præsenti potentiâ credunt extingui posse etiam sequentis ævi memoriam—suum cuique decus posteritas rependit. Tacit. *Annal.* l. iv. c. 30, 35.

and oppressive government, which never fails to draw upon them the hatred of their people.'

SECT. III. LYSANDER ABUSES HIS POWER IN AN EXTRAORDINARY MANNER. HE IS RECALLED TO SPARTA UPON THE COMPLAINT OF PHARNABASUS.—[1] As Lysander had had the greatest share in the celebrated exploits, which had raised the glory of the Lacedæmonians to so high a pitch, so had he acquired a degree of power and authority of which there had been no example before in Sparta; but he suffered himself to be carried away by a presumption and vanity still greater than his power. He permitted the Grecian cities to dedicate altars to him as to a god, and to offer sacrifices, and sing hymns and odes in honour of him. The Samians ordained by a public decree, that the feasts celebrated in honour of Juno, and which bore the name of that goddess, should be called 'the feasts of Lysander.' He had always a crowd of poets about him, (who are often a tribe of venal flatterers,) that vied with each other in singing his great exploits, for which they were magnificently paid. Praise is undoubtedly due to noble deeds; but it diminishes their lustre when either extravagant or purchased.

This sort of vanity and ambition, had he stopped there, would have hurt only himself, by exposing him to envy and contempt; but a natural consequence of it was, that through his arrogance and pride, in conjunction with the incessant flatteries of those around him, he carried the spirit of command and authority to an insupportable excess, and observed no longer any measures either in rewarding or punishing. The absolute government of cities with tyrannic power were the fruits of his friendship, or of the ties of hospitality with him; and only the death of those he hated, could put an end to his resentment and displeasure, without its being possible to escape his vengeance. What Sylla caused to be inscribed upon his tomb, might with equal propriety have been engraved upon Lysander's: that no man had ever surpassed him in doing good to his friends, or evil to his enemies.

Treachery and perjury cost him nothing whenever they promoted his designs; nor was he less cruel than revengeful;

[1] Plut. *in Lys.* p. 443—445.

of which what he did at Miletus was a sufficient proof. Apprehending that the leaders of the popular party would escape him, he swore not to do them any hurt. Those unfortunate persons gave credit to his oath, and no sooner appeared in public, than they were put to the sword with his consent by the nobility, who killed them all, though no less than eight hundred. The number of those on the side of the people, whom he caused to be massacred in the other cities, is incredible; for he did not only destroy to satiate his own individual resentments, but to serve in all places the enmity, malice, and avarice of his friends, whom he supported in gratifying their passions by the death of their enemies.

There was no kind of injustice and violence which the people did not suffer under the government of Lysander; whilst the Lacedæmonians, who were sufficiently informed of his conduct, gave themselves no trouble to correct it. It is too common for those in power to be little affected with the vexations and oppressions laid upon persons of low condition and credit, and to turn a deaf ear to their just complaints, though authority is principally confided to them for the defence of the weak and poor, who have no other protectors. But if such remonstrances are made by a great or powerful person, from whom they may have any thing to hope or fear, the same authority that was slow and drowsy becomes immediately active and officious; a certain proof that it is not the love of justice that actuates it: this appears here in the conduct of the Lacedæmonian magistrates. Pharnabasus, weary of Lysander's repeated enormities, who ravaged and pillaged the provinces under his command, having sent ambassadors to Sparta, to complain of the wrongs he had received from that general, the Ephori recalled him. Lysander was at that time in the Hellespont. The letter of the Ephori threw him into great consternation. As he principally feared the complaints and accusations of Pharnabasus, he made all the haste he could to come to an explanation with him, from the hope of softening him, and making his peace. He went for that purpose to him, and desired that he would write another letter to the Ephori, intimating that he was satisfied with his conduct. But Lysander, says Plutarch, in such an application to Pharnabasus,

forgot the * proverb, 'Set a thief to catch a thief.' The satrap promised all he desired, and accordingly wrote such a letter in Lysander's presence as he had requested, but he had prepared another to a quite different effect. When he was to seal it, as both letters were of the same size and form, he dexterously put that he had written in secret into the place of the other, without being observed, which he sealed, and gave him.

Lysander departed well satisfied, and being arrived at Sparta, alighted at the palace where the senate was assembled, and delivered Pharnabasus's letter to the Ephori. But he was strangely surprised when he heard the contents, and withdrew in extreme confusion and disorder. Some days after he returned to the senate, and told the Ephori that he was obliged to go to the temple of Ammon to acquit himself of the sacrifices he had vowed to that god before his battles. That pilgrimage was no more than a pretence to conceal the pain it gave him to live as a private person in Sparta, and to submit to the yoke of obeying; he who, till then, had always governed. Accustomed long to commanding armies, and to the flattering distinctions of a kind of sovereignty exercised by him in Asia, he could not endure that mortifying equality which put him on a level with the multitude, nor reduce himself to the simplicity of a private life. Having obtained permission, not without great difficulties, he embarked.

As soon as he was gone, the kings, reflecting that he held all the cities in dependence upon himself, by the means of the governors and magistrates who had been established by him, and who were also indebted to him for their unlimited authority, and that he was thereby effectually lord and master of all Greece, applied themselves vigorously to restore the government of the people, and to depose all his creatures and friends from any share in it. This alteration occasioned great tumults at first. About the same time, Lysander, being apprized of the design of Thrasybulus to reestablish the liberty of his country, returned with the utmost diligence to Sparta, and endeavoured to engage the Lacedæmonians to support the party of the nobility at Athens. We have before observed, that Pausanias,

* The Greek proverb is, *Cretan against Cretan*, as the people of Crete passed for the greatest cheats and liars in the world.

E U X I N E
BITHYNIA
PAPHLAGONIA
LYDIA
PHRYGIA
CAPPADOCIA
ARMENIA
PISIDIA
LYCAONIA
PAMPHYLIA
CILICIA
SYRIA
MEDITERRANEAN
CYPRUS
PHENICIA
ARABIA
The
EXPEDITION OF
CYRUS THE YOUNGER,
and the Return of the Ten Thousand
GREEKS,
according to XENOPHON.
Drawn for Rollins's Ancient History
By M. D'ANVILLE.

from a more noble spirit of equity and generosity, gave peace to Athens, and by that means, says Plutarch, clipped the wings of Lysander's ambition.

CHAPTER II. THE YOUNGER CYRUS, WITH THE AID OF THE GRECIAN TROOPS, ENDEAVOURS TO DETHRONE HIS BROTHER ARTAXERXES. HE IS KILLED IN BATTLE. FAMOUS RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND.

ANTIQUITY has few events so memorable as those I am about to relate in this place. We see on one side a young prince, in other respects abounding with excellent qualities, but abandoned to his violent ambition, carrying war from a distance against his brother and sovereign, and going to attack him almost in his own palace, with the view of depriving him at once of his crown and life; we see him, I say, fall dead in the battle at the feet of that brother, and terminate by so unhappy a fate, an enterprise equally glaring and criminal. On the other hand, the Greeks who follow him,* destitute of all succour, after the loss of their chiefs, without allies, provisions, money, cavalry, or archers, reduced to less than ten thousand men, with no resource but in their own persons and valour, supported solely by the ardent desire of preserving their liberty, and of returning to their native countries; these Greeks, with bold and intrepid resolution, make their retreat before a victorious army of a million of men, traverse five or six hundred leagues, notwithstanding vast rivers and innumerable defiles, and arrive at last in their own country through a thousand fierce and barbarous nations, victorious over all obstacles in their way, and over all the dangers which either concealed fraud or open force reduce them to undergo.

This retreat, in the opinion of the best judges and most experienced military men, is the boldest and best conducted exploit to be found in ancient history, and is deemed a perfect

* Post mortem Cyri, neque armis à tanto exercitu vinci, neque dolo capi potuerunt; revertentesque inter tot indomitas nationes et barbaras gentes, per tanta itineris spatia, virtute se usque terminos patriæ defenderunt. Justin, l. v. c. 11.

model in its kind. Happily for us it is described with the utmost minuteness by an historian, who was not only eye-witness of the facts he relates, but the first mover, the soul of this great enterprise. I shall only abridge his history, and abstract its most material circumstances: but I cannot omit advising young persons who make arms their profession, to consult the original, of which there is a good translation extant, though far short of the admirable beauties of the text. It is very difficult to meet with a more able master than Xenophon in the art of war, to whom may be well applied here what Homer says of Phœnix the governor of Achilles, [m] 'That he was equally capable of forming his pupil for eloquence or arms.'

Μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι, πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.

SECT. I. CYRUS RAISES TROOPS SECRETLY AGAINST HIS BROTHER ARTAXERXES. THIRTEEN THOUSAND GREEKS JOIN HIM. HE SETS OUT FROM SARDIS, AND ARRIVES AT BABYLONIA AFTER A MARCH OF MORE THAN SIX MONTHS.—[n] We have already said, that young Cyrus, son of Darius Nothus and Parysatis, saw with pain his elder brother Artaxerxes upon the throne, and that at the very time the latter was taking possession of it, he had attempted to deprive him of his crown and life together. Artaxerxes was not insensible of what he had to fear from a brother of his enterprising and ambitious spirit, but could not refuse pardoning him to the prayers and tears of his mother Parysatis, who doted upon this youngest son. He sent him therefore into Asia to his government; confiding to him, contrary to all the rules of policy, an absolute authority over the provinces left him by the will of the king his father.

A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

As soon as he arrived there, his thoughts were solely intent upon revenging the affront he supposed he had received from his brother, and to dethrone him. He received all that came from the court with great favour and affability, to induce them insensibly to quit the

A. M. 3601. Ant. J. C. 403.

[m] *Iliad.* i. ver. 443.

[n] Diod. l. xiv. p. 243—249, 252. Justin, l. v. c. 11. Xenoph. *de Cyri Exped.* l. i. p. 243—248.

king's party and adhere to him. He gained also the hearts of the barbarians under his government; familiarizing himself with them, and mingling with the common soldiery, though without forgetting the dignity of the general; and these he formed by various exercises for service in war. He applied particularly to raise secretly in several places, and upon different pretexts, a body of Grecian troops, upon whom he relied much more than upon those of the barbarians.[*] Clearchus retired to his court after having been banished from Sparta, and was of great service to him, being an able, experienced, and valiant captain. At the same time several cities in the provinces under the government of Tissaphernes revolted from their obedience, and placed themselves under the jurisdiction of Cyrus. This incident, which was not an effect of chance, but of the secret intrigues of that prince, gave birth to a war between them. Cyrus, under the pretence of arming against Tissaphernes, assembled troops with less reserve; and to amuse the court the more speciously, sent grievous complaints to the king against that governor, demanding his protection and aid in the most submissive manner. Artaxerxes was deceived by these appearances, and believed that all Cyrus's preparations were directed against Tissaphernes alone, and continued quiet, from the assurance of having nothing to apprehend for himself.

A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402.

[*] Cyrus knew well how to take advantage of the imprudent security and indolence of his brother, which some people conceived the effect of his goodness and humanity. And indeed in the beginning of his reign he seemed to imitate the virtues of the first Artaxerxes, whose name he bore. For he demeaned himself with great mildness and affability to such as approached him; he honoured and rewarded magnificently all those whose services had merited favour; when he passed sentence of punishment, it was without either outrage or insult; and when he made presents, it was with a gracious air, and such engaging manners, as infinitely exalted their value, and implied, that he was never better pleased than when he had an opportunity of doing good to his subjects. To all these excellent qualities he ought to have added one no less royal, and which would have

[*] Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1013.

put him upon his guard against the enterprises of a brother, whose character he ought to have known; I mean a wise foresight, that penetrates the future, and renders a prince attentive to prevent or frustrate whatever may disturb the tranquillity of the state.

The emissaries of Cyrus at the court were perpetually dispersing reports and opinions amongst the people, to prepare their minds for the intended change and revolt. They said that the state required a king of Cyrus's character; a king, magnificent, liberal, who loved war, and showered his favours upon those that served him; and that it was necessary for the grandeur of the empire to have a prince upon the throne fired with ambition and valour, for the support and augmentation of its glory.

The young prince lost no time on his side, and hastened the execution of his great design. He was then only twenty-three years old at most. After the important services he had done the Lacedæmonians, without which they had never obtained the victories that had made them masters of Greece, he thought he might safely open himself to them. He therefore imparted to them the present situation of his affairs, and the end he had in view; convinced that such a confidence could not but incline them the more in his favour.

A. M. 3603. Ant. J. C. 401.

In the letter he wrote them, he spoke of himself in very magnificent terms. He told them he had a greater and more royal heart than his brother; that he was better versed in philosophy and the * knowledge of the Magi, and that he could drink more wine without being disordered in his senses; a very meritorious quality amongst the barbarians, but not so proper to recommend him to the good opinion of those to whom he was writing. The Lacedæmonians sent orders to their fleet to join that of the prince immediately, and to obey the commands of Tamos his admiral in all things, but without the least mention of Artaxerxes, or seeming in any manner privy to his design. They thought that precaution †

* By the knowledge of the Magi, amongst the Persians, was meant the science of religion and government.

† Quærentes apud Cyrum gratiam; et apud Artaxerxem, si vicisset, veniæ patrocinia, cùm nihil adversùs eum apertè decrevissent. Justin, l. v. c. 11.

necessary for their justification with Artaxerxes, in case affairs should happen to terminate in his favour.

The troops of Cyrus, according to the review afterwards made, consisted of thirteen thousand Greeks, which were the flower and chief force of his army, and of a hundred thousand regular troops of the barbarous nations. Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponnesian troops, except the Achæans, who had Socrates of Achaia for their leader. The Bœotians were under Proxenus the Theban, and the Thessalians under Menon. [p] The barbarians had Persian generals, of whom the chief was Ariæus. The fleet consisted of thirty-five ships under Pythagoras the Lacedæmonian, and twenty-five commanded by Tamos the Ægyptian, admiral of the whole fleet. It followed the land army, coasting along near the shore.

Cyrus had opened his design to Clearchus alone of all the Greeks, foreseeing aright that the length and boldness of the enterprise could not fail of discouraging and dismaying the officers, as well as soldiers. He made it his sole application to gain their affections during the march, by treating them with kindness and humanity, conversing freely with them, and giving effectual orders that they should want for nothing. Proxenus, between whose family and Xenophon's an ancient friendship subsisted, presented that young Athenian to Cyrus,[q] who received him very favourably, and gave him an employment in his army amongst the Greeks. He set out from Sardis at length, and marched towards the upper provinces of Asia. The troops knew neither the occasion of the war, nor into what countries they were going. Cyrus had only caused it to be given out, that he was carrying his arms against the Pisidians, who had infested his province by their incursions.

[r] Tissaphernes, rightly judging that all these preparations were too great for so insignificant an enterprise as against Pisidia, had set out post from Miletus to give the king an account of them. This news occasioned great trouble at court. Parysatis, the mother of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, was looked upon as the principal cause of this war; and all persons

[p] Xenoph. *Cyri Exped.* l. i. p. 252.
[q] Xenoph. l. iii. p. 294.
[r] Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1014.

in her service and interest were suspected of holding intelligence with Cyrus. Statira especially, the reigning queen, reproached her incessantly in the most violent terms. 'Where is now,' said she to her, 'that faith you have so often engaged for your son's behaviour? Where those ardent prayers you employed to preserve from death that conspirator against his king and brother? It is your unhappy fondness that has kindled this war, and plunged us into an abyss of misfortunes.' The antipathy and hatred of the two queens for each other were already very great, and were still more inflamed by such warm reproaches. We shall see what the consequences were. Artaxerxes assembled a numerous army to receive his brother.

[s] Cyrus advanced continually by long marches. What troubled him most on the way was the pass of Cilicia, which was a narrow defile between very high and steep mountains, that would admit no more than one carriage to pass at a time. Syennesis, king of the country, was preparing to dispute this pass with him, and would infallibly have succeeded, but for the diversion made by Tamos with his fleet, in conjunction with that of the Lacedæmonians. To defend the coasts against the insults of the fleet, Syennesis abandoned that important post, which a small body of troops might have made good against the greatest army.

When they arrived at Tarsus, the Greeks refused to advance any farther, rightly suspecting that they were marching against the king, and loudly exclaiming that they had not entered into the service upon that condition. Clearchus, who commanded them, had occasion for all his address and ability to stifle this commotion in its birth. At first he made use of authority and force, but with very ill success, and desisted therefore from an open opposition to their sentiments: he even affected to enter into their views, and to support them with his approbation and influence. He declared publicly, that he would not separate himself from them, and advised them to depute persons to the prince, to know from his own mouth against whom they were to be led, that they might follow him voluntarily if they approved his measures; if not, that they might demand his permission to withdraw. By this artful evasion he appeased

[s] Xenoph. l. i. p. 248—261.

the tumult, and made them easy, and they chose him and some other officers for their deputies. Cyrus, whom he had secretly apprized of every thing, made answer, that he was going to attack * Abrocomas his enemy, who was encamped at twelve days' march from thence upon the Euphrates. When this answer was repeated to them, though they plainly saw against whom they were going, they resolved to proceed, and only demanded an augmentation of their pay. Cyrus, instead of one † darick a month to each soldier, promised to give them one and a half.

Some time after, Cyrus was informed that two of the principal officers, upon account of a private quarrel with Clearchus, had deserted with part of their equipage on board a merchant ship. Many were of opinion, that it was proper to send some galleys after them; which might be done with great ease; and that when they were brought back, they should be made an example, by suffering death in sight of the whole army. Cyrus, convinced that favour ‡ was the most certain means to obtain affection, and that punishments, like violent remedies, ought never to be used but in extreme necessity, declared publicly that he would not suffer it to be said, that he had detained any one in his service by force, and added, that he would send them their wives and children, whom they had left as hostages in his hands.

An answer displaying so much wisdom and generosity had a surprising effect; and made even those his firm adherents, who were before inclined to retire. This is an excellent lesson for all who govern. There is in the mind of man a fund of natural generosity, which it is necessary to know and to put in play. Threats exasperate them, and chastisement makes them revolt, when endeavours are used to force them to do their duty against their will. § They desire a certain degree of confidence in their honour, and that the glory of discharging

* It is not said where he commanded. It appears to be upon the Euphrates. He marched with three hundred thousand men to join the king's army, but did not arrive till after the battle.

† The darick was worth ten livres.

‡ Beneficiis potiùs quam remediis ingenia experiri placuit. Plin. *in Traj.*

§ Nescio an plus moribus conferet princeps, qui bonos esse patitur, quàm qui cogit. Plin. ibid.

Plerumque habita fides ipsam obligat fidem. Liv.

their duty through choice be left in their power: to show that you believe men faithful, is often the best means to make them so.

Cyrus soon after declared, that he was marching against Artaxerxes. Upon which some murmuring was heard at first, but it soon gave place to the expressions of joy and satisfaction, occasioned by that prince's magnificent promises to the army.

[t] As Cyrus advanced by long marches, he was informed from all parts, that the king did not intend to come directly to a battle, but had resolved to wait in the heart of Persia till all his forces were assembled; and that to stop his enemies, he had ordered to be dug in the plains of Babylonia, a ditch of five fathoms broad, and three deep, extending the space of twelve * parasangas or leagues, from the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the fossé a way had been left of twenty feet in breadth, by which Cyrus passed with his whole army, which he had reviewed the day before. The king had neglected to dispute this pass with him, and suffered him to continue his march towards Babylon. It was Tiribasus, who made him resolve not to fly in such a manner before an enemy, over whom he had infinite advantages, as well from the number of his troops as the valour of his generals. He resolved therefore to advance against the enemy.

SECT. II. THE BATTLE OF CUNAXA. THE GREEKS ARE VICTORIOUS ON THEIR SIDE, ARTAXERXES ON HIS. CYRUS IS KILLED.—[u] The place where the battle was fought was called Cunaxa, about † twenty-five leagues from Babylon. The army of Cyrus consisted of thirteen thousand Greeks, a hundred thousand barbarians, and twenty chariots armed with scythes. That of the enemy in horse and foot might amount to about twelve hundred thousand under four generals, Tissaphernes, Gobryas, Arbaces, and Abrocomas, without including

[t] Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1014. Xenoph. l. i. p. 261—266.

[u] Xenoph. *in Exped. Cyr.* l. i. p. 263—266. Diod. l. xiv. p. 253, 254. Plut. p. 1014—1017.

* The parasanga is a road measure peculiar to the Persians. It was commonly thirty stadia, which make about a league and a half French. Some were from twenty to sixty stadia. In the march of Cyrus's army I suppose the parasanga only twenty stadia, or one league, for reasons I shall give hereafter.

† Five hundred stadia.

six thousand chosen horse, that fought where the king was present, and never quitted his person. But Abrocomas, who had the command of three hundred thousand men, did not arrive till five days after the battle. In the king's army were only a hundred and fifty chariots armed with scythes.

Cyrus believed, from the enemy's not having defended the pass at the fossé, that there would be no battle; so that the next day the army marched with great negligence. But on the third, Cyrus being in his chariot, with few soldiers in their ranks before him, and the rest marching without any order, or having their arms carried for them, a horseman came in full speed, crying out as he passed, that the enemy were approaching in order of battle. Upon this, great confusion ensued, from the apprehension that they should not have time to draw up the army. Cyrus, leaping from his chariot, put on his arms immediately, and getting on horseback with his javelin in his hand, he gave orders universally to the troops to stand to their arms, and fall into their ranks; which was executed with so much expedition, that the troops had not time to refresh themselves.

Cyrus posted upon his right a thousand Paphlagonian horse, supported by the Euphrates, and the light-armed infantry of the Greeks; and next them, Clearchus, Proxenus, and the rest of the general officers to Menon, at the head of their several corps. The left wing, composed of Lydians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic nations, was commanded by Ariæus, who had a thousand horse. Cyrus placed himself in the centre, where the chosen troops of the Persians and other barbarians were posted. He had around him six hundred horsemen, armed at all points, as were their horses, with frontlets and breastplates. The prince's head was uncovered, as were those of all the Persians, whose custom it was to give battle in that manner; the arms of all his people were red, and those of Artaxerxes were white.

A little before the onset, Clearchus advised Cyrus not to charge in person, but to cover himself in the rear of the Grecian battalions. 'What is it you say?' replied Cyrus. 'At the time I am endeavouring to make myself king, would you have me show myself unworthy of being so?' That wise

and generous answer proves, that he knew the duty of a general, especially on a day of battle. Had he withdrawn when his presence was most necessary, it would have argued his want of courage, and intimidated others. It is necessary always however, preserving the due distinction between the leader and the troops, that their danger should be common, and no one exempt from it; lest the latter should be alarmed by a different conduct. Courage in an army depends upon example, upon the desire of being distinguished, the fear of dishonour, the incapacity of doing otherwise than the rest, and the equality of the danger. If Cyrus had retired, it would have either ruined, or greatly weakened, all these potent motives, by discouraging the officers as well as soldiers of his army. He thought, that being their general, it was incumbent upon him to discharge all the functions of that office, and to show himself worthy to be the leader and soul of such a number of valiant men, ready to shed their blood for his service.

It was now noon, and the enemy did not yet appear. But about three of the clock a great dust like a white cloud arose, followed soon after with a blackness that overspread the whole plain; after which was seen the glittering of armour, lances, and standards. Tissaphernes commanded the left, which consisted of cavalry armed with white cuirasses, and of light-armed infantry; in the centre was the heavy-armed foot, a great part of which had bucklers made of wood, which covered the soldier entirely, (these were Egyptians.) The rest of the light-armed infantry and of the horse formed the right wing. The foot were drawn up by nations, with as much depth as front, and in that order composed square battalions. The king had posted himself in the main body with the flower of the whole army, and had six thousand horse for his guard, commanded by Artagerses. Though he was in the centre, he was beyond the left wing of Cyrus's army, so much did the front of his own exceed that of the enemy in extent. A hundred and fifty chariots armed with scythes were placed in the front of the army at some distance from one another. The scythes were fixed to the axle downwards and aslant, so as to cut down, and overthrow all before them.

As Cyrus relied very much upon the valour and experience of the Greeks, he bade Clearchus, as soon as he had beaten the enemies in his front, to take care to incline to his left, and fall upon the centre, where the king was posted; the success of the battle depending upon that attack. But Clearchus, finding it very difficult to make his way through so great a body of troops, replied, that he need be in no pain, and that he would take care to do what was necessary.

The enemy in the mean time advanced slowly in good order. Cyrus marched in the space between the two armies, though nearest to his own, and considered both of them with great attention. Xenophon, perceiving him, spurred directly up to him, to know whether he had any further orders to give. He called out to him, that the sacrifices were favourable, and that he should tell the troops so. He then hastened through the ranks to give his orders, and showed himself to the soldiers with such a joy and serenity in his countenance, as inspired them with new courage, and at the same time with an air of kindness and familiarity, that excited their zeal and affection. It is not easy to comprehend, what great effects are produced by a word, a kind air, or a look of a general, upon a day of action; and with what ardour a common man will rush into danger, when he believes himself not unknown to his general, and thinks his valour will oblige him.

Artaxerxes moved on continually, though with a slow pace, and without noise and confusion. That good order and exact discipline extremely surprised the Greeks, who expected to see much hurry and tumult in so great a multitude, and to hear confused cries, as Cyrus had foretold them.

The armies were not distant above four or five hundred paces, when the Greeks began to sing the hymn of battle, and to march on, slowly at first, and with silence. When they came near the enemy, they set up great cries, striking their darts upon their shields to frighten the horse, and then moving all together, they sprung forwards upon the barbarians with all their force, who did not wait their charge, but took to their heels, and fled universally; except Tissaphernes, who stood his ground with a small part of his troops.

Cyrus saw with pleasure the enemy routed by the Greeks,

and was proclaimed king by those around him. But he did not give himself up to a vain joy, nor as yet reckon himself victor. He perceived, that Artaxerxes was wheeling his right to attack him in flank, and marched directly against him with his six hundred horse. He killed Artagerses, who commanded the king's guard of six thousand horse, with his own hand, and put the whole body to flight. Discovering his brother, he cried out, his eyes sparkling with rage, 'I see him,' and spurred against him, followed only by his principal officers; for his troops had quited their ranks to follow the runaways, which was an essential fault.

[x] The battle then became a single combat, in some measure, between Artaxerxes and Cyrus, and the two brothers were seen transported with rage and fury, endeavouring, like Eteocles and Polynices, to plunge their swords into each other's hearts, and to assure themselves of the throne by the death of their rival.

Cyrus having opened his way through those who were drawn up in battle before Artaxerxes, joined him, and killed his horse, that fell with him to the ground. He rose, and was remounted upon another, when Cyrus attacked him again, gave him a second wound, and was preparing to give him a third, in hopes that it would prove his last. The king, like a lion wounded by the hunters, only the more furious from the smart, sprung forwards, impetuously pushing his horse against Cyrus, who running headlong, and without regard to his person, threw himself into the midst of a flight of darts aimed at him from all sides, and received a wound from the king's javelin, at the instant all the rest discharged their weapons against him. Cyrus fell dead: some say that it was from the wound given him by the king; others affirm that he was killed by a Carian soldier. Mithridates, a young Persian nobleman, asserted, that he had given him the mortal stroke, with a javelin, which entered his temple, and pierced his head quite through. The greatest persons of his court, resolving not to survive so good a master, were all killed around his body; a certain proof, says Xenophon, that he well knew how to choose his friends, and that he was truly beloved by them. Ariæus, who ought

[x] Diod. l. xiv. p. 254.

to have been the firmest of all his adherents, fled with the left wing, as soon as he heard of his death.

Artaxerxes, after having caused the head and right hand of his brother to be cut off by the eunuch Mesabates, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus had not stopped there, but having passed through it, continued his retreat to the place where the army had encamped the day before, which was about four leagues distant.

Tissaphernes, after the defeat of the greatest part of his left wing by the Greeks, led on the rest against them, and by the side of the river passed through the light-armed infantry of the Greeks, who opened to give him passage, and made their discharge upon him as he passed without losing a man. They were commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, who was esteemed an able captain. Tissaphernes kept on without returning to the charge, because he perceived he was too weak, and went forward to Cyrus's camp, where he found the king, who was plundering it; but had not been able to force the quarter defended by the Greeks left to guard it, who saved their baggage.

The Greeks on their side, and Artaxerxes on his, who did not know what was going on elsewhere, believed each of them that they had gained the victory; the first, because they had put the enemy to flight, and pursued them; and the king, because he had killed his brother, beaten the troops who had opposed him, and plundered their camp. The event was soon cleared up on both sides. Tissaphernes, upon his arrival at the camp, informed the king, that the Greeks had defeated his left wing, and pursued it with great vigour; and the Greeks, on their side learnt, that the king, in pursuing Cyrus's left, had penetrated into the camp. Upon this advice, the king rallied his troops, and marched in quest of the enemy; and Clearchus, being returned from pursuing the Persians, advanced to support the camp.

The two armies were soon very near each other, when, by a movement made by the king, he seemed to intend to charge the Greeks by their left, who fearing to be surrounded on all sides, wheeled about, and halted with the river on their backs, to prevent their being taken in the rear. Upon seeing that,

the king changed his form of battle also, drew up his army in front of them, and marched on to the attack. As soon as the Greeks saw him approach, they began to sing the hymn of battle, and advanced against the enemy even with more ardour than in the first action.

The barbarians again took to their heels, as at first, ran farther than before, and were pursued to a village at the foot of a hill, upon which their horse halted. The king's standard was observed to be there, which was a golden eagle upon the top of a pike, having its wings displayed. The Greeks preparing to pursue them, they abandoned also the hill, fled precipitately, and all their troops brake, and were in the utmost disorder and confusion. Clearchus, having drawn up the Greeks at the bottom of the hill, ordered Lycias the Syracusan and another to go up it, and observe what passed in the plain. They returned with an account that the enemy fled on all sides, and that their whole army was routed.

As it was almost night, the Greeks laid down their arms to rest themselves, much surprised, that neither Cyrus, nor any one from him, appeared; and imagining, that he was either engaged in the pursuit of the enemy, or was making haste to possess himself of some important place, for they were still ignorant of his death, and the defeat of the rest of his army. They determined therefore to return to their camp, where they arrived about night-fall, and found the greatest part of the baggage taken, with all the provisions, and four hundred waggons laden with corn and wine, which Cyrus had expressly caused to be carried along with the army for the Greeks, in case of any pressing necessity. They passed the night in the camp, the greatest part of them without any refreshment, concluding that Cyrus was alive and victorious.

The success of this battle shows the superiority of valour and military knowledge over the greatest numbers without them. The small army of the Greeks did not amount to more than twelve or thirteen thousand men; but they were seasoned and disciplined troops, inured to fatigues, accustomed to confront dangers, sensible to glory, and who, during the long Peloponnesian war, had not wanted either time or means to acquire and perfect themselves in the art of war. On Arta-

xerxes's side were reckoned nearly a million of men; but they were soldiers only in name, without force, courage, discipline, experience, or any sentiment of honour. Hence it was, that as soon as the Greeks appeared, terror and disorder ensued amongst the enemy; and in the second action, Artaxerxes himself did not dare to wait their attack, but shamefully betook himself to flight.

Plutarch here blames Clearchus the general of the Greeks very much, and imputes to him as an unpardonable neglect, his not having followed Cyrus's order, who recommended to him above all things to fall upon that body where Artaxerxes commanded in person. This reproach seems groundless. It is not easy to conceive how it was possible for that captain, who was posted on the right wing, to attack Artaxerxes immediately, who, in the centre of his own army, lay beyond the utmost extent of the enemy's left, as has been said before. It seems that Cyrus, depending as he did with great reason upon the valour of the Greeks, and desiring they should charge Artaxerxes in his post, ought to have placed them in the left wing, which answered directly to the part where the king was; that is, to the main body, and not in the right, which was very remote from it.

Clearchus may indeed be reproached with having followed the pursuit too warmly and too long. If after having put the left wing which opposed him into disorder, he had charged the rest of the enemy in flank, and had opened his way to the centre, where Artaxerxes was, it is highly probable, that he would have gained a complete victory, and placed Cyrus upon the throne. The six hundred horse of that prince's guard committed the same fault, and by pursuing the body of troops they had put to flight too eagerly, left their master almost alone, and abandoned to the mercy of the enemy; without considering that they were chosen from the whole army for the immediate guard of his person, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Too much ardour is often prejudicial in a battle, and it is the duty of an able general to know how to restrain and direct it.

Cyrus himself erred highly in this respect, and abandoned himself too much to his blind passion for glory and revenge.

In running headlong to attack his brother, he forgot, that there is a wide difference between a general and a private soldier. He ought not to have exposed himself, but as became a prince; as the head, not as the hand; as the person who was to give orders, and not as those who were to execute them.

In these remarks I only adopt those which have been made by able judges in the art of war, and would not choose to advance my own opinion upon points which I am not competent to decide.

SECT. III. EULOGY OF CYRUS.—[y] Xenophon gives us a magnificent character of Cyrus, and that not merely from the report of others, but from what he saw and knew of him in his own person. He was, says he, in the opinion of all that were acquainted with him, next to Cyrus the Great, a prince the most worthy of the supreme authority, and one who had the most noble, and most truly royal soul. From his infancy he surpassed all of his own age in every exercise, whether it were in managing the horse, drawing the bow, throwing the dart, or in the chase, in which he distinguished himself once by fighting and killing a bear that attacked him. Those advantages were enhanced in him by the nobleness of his air, an engaging aspect, and by all the graces of nature, that conduce to recommend merit.

When his father had made him satrap of Lydia, and the neighbouring * provinces, his chief care was to make the people sensible, that he had nothing so much at heart as to keep his word inviolably, not only with regard to public treaties, but the most minute of his promises; a quality very rare amongst princes, which however is the basis of all good government, and the source of their own, as well as their people's happiness. Not only the places under his authority, but the enemy themselves, reposed an entire confidence in him.

Whether good or ill were done him, he always desired to return it twofold, and wished that he might live no longer (as he said himself) than whilst he surpassed his friends in benefits, and his enemies in vengeance. (It would have been more

[y] *De Exped. Cyr.* l. i. p. 266, 267.
* Great Phrygia and Cappadocia.

glorious for him to have overcome the latter by the force of favour and benevolence.) Nor was there ever a prince, whom people were more afraid to offend, nor for whose sake they were more ready to hazard their possessions, lives, and fortunes.

Less intent upon being feared than beloved, his study was to make his greatness appear only where it was useful and beneficial, and to extinguish all other sentiments, but those which flow from gratitude and affection. He was careful to seize every occasion of doing good, to confer his favours with judgment and in season, and to show, that he thought himself rich, powerful, and happy, only as he made others sensible of his being so by his benevolence and liberality. But he took care not to exhaust the means by an imprudent profusion. He did not * lavish, but distribute his favours. He chose rather to make his liberalities the rewards of merit, than mere donations, and that they should be subservient in promoting virtue, and not in supporting the soft and abject sloth of vice.

He was particularly pleased with conferring his favours upon valiant men, and governments and rewards were bestowed only on those who had distinguished themselves by their actions. He never granted any honour or dignity to favour, intrigue, or faction, but to merit alone; upon which depends not only the glory but the prosperity of governments. By that means he soon made virtue estimable, and rendered vice contemptible. The provinces, animated with a noble emulation, furnished him in a very short time with a considerable number of excellent subjects of every kind; who, under a different government, would have remained unknown, obscure, and useless.

Never did any one know how to confer an obligation with a better grace, or to win the hearts of those who could serve him with more engaging behaviour. As he was fully sensible that he stood in need of the assistance of others for the execution of his designs, he thought justice and gratitude required that he should render his adherents all the services in his power. All the presents made him, whether of splendid arms, or rich apparel, he distributed among his friends, according to their

* Habebit sinum facilem, non perforatum: ex quo multa exeant, nihil excidat. Senec. *de vit. beat.* c. xxiii.

several tastes or occasions, and used to say, that the brightest ornament, and most exalted riches of a prince, consisted in adorning and enriching those who served him well. In fact, says Xenophon, to do good to one's friends, and to excel them in liberality, does not seem so worthy of admiration in so high a fortune; but to transcend them in goodness of heart and sentiments of friendship and affection, and to take more pleasure in conferring, than receiving obligations; this is what I find in Cyrus truly worthy of esteem and admiration. The first of these advantages he derives from his rank; the other from himself and his intrinsic merit.

By these extraordinary qualities, he acquired the universal esteem and affection as well of the Greeks as barbarians. A great proof of what Xenophon here says, is, that none ever quitted the service of Cyrus for the king's; whereas great numbers went over every day to him from the king's party after the war was declared, and even of such as had most credit at the court; because they were all convinced, that Cyrus knew best how to distinguish and reward their services.

It is most certain that young Cyrus was endowed with great virtues, and a superior merit; but I am surprised that Xenophon, in drawing his character, has described only the most beautiful features, and such as are calculated to excite our admiration of him, without saying the least word of his defects, and especially of that immoderate ambition, which was the soul of all his actions, and which at length put arms into his hands against his elder brother and king. Is it allowable in an historian, whose chief duty is to paint virtue and vice in their proper colours, to relate at large an enterprise of such a nature, without intimating the least dislike or reprobation of it? But with the Pagans, ambition was so far from being considered as a vice, that it often passed for a virtue.

SECT. IV. THE KING WISHES TO COMPEL THE GREEKS TO DELIVER UP THEIR ARMS. THEY RESOLVE TO DIE RATHER THAN SURRENDER THEMSELVES. A TREATY IS MADE WITH THEM. TISSAPHERNES TAKES UPON HIM TO CONDUCT THEM BACK TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. HE TREACHEROUSLY SEIZES

CLEARCHUS AND FOUR OTHER GENERALS, WHO ARE ALL PUT TO DEATH.—[z] The Greeks having learnt, the day after the battle, that Cyrus was dead, sent deputies to Ariæus, the general of the barbarians, who had retired with his troops to the place from whence they had marched the day before the action, to offer him, as victors, the crown of Persia in the room of Cyrus. At the same time arrived Persian heralds at arms from the king, to summon them to deliver up their arms; to whom they answered with a haughty air, that such messages were not to be sent to conquerors; that if the king would have their arms, he might come and take them; but that they would die before they would part with them; that if he would receive them into the number of his allies, they would serve him with fidelity and valour; * but if he imagined to reduce them to slavery as conquered, he might know, they had wherewithal to defend themselves, and were determined to lose their lives and liberty together. The heralds added, that they had orders to tell them, that if they continued in the place where they were, they would be allowed a suspension of arms, but if they advanced or retired, that they would be treated as enemies. The Greeks agreed, but were asked by the heralds what answer they should take back. 'Peace in continuing here, or war in marching,' replied Clearchus, without explaining himself farther; in order to keep the king always in suspense and uncertainty.

The answer of Ariæus to the Grecian deputies was, that there were many Persians more considerable than himself, who would not suffer him upon the throne, and that he should set out early the next day to return into Ionia; that, if they would march thither with him, they might join him in the night. Clearchus, with the advice of the officers, prepared to depart. He commanded from thenceforth, as being the sole person of sufficient capacity; for he had not been actually elected general in chief.

When the night came, Miltocythes the Thracian, who commanded forty horse, and about three hundred foot of his own country, went and surrendered himself to the king; and

[z] Xenoph. *in Exped. Cyr.* l. ii. p. 272—292. Diod. l. xiv. p. 255—257.

* Sin ut victis servitium indiceretur, esse sibi ferrum et juventutem, et promptum libertati aut ad mortem animum. Tacit. *Annal.* l. iv. c. 46.

the rest of the Greeks began their march under the conduct of Clearchus, and arrived about midnight at the camp of Ariæus. After they had drawn up in battle, the principal officers went to wait on him in his tent, where they swore alliance with him; and the barbarian engaged to conduct the army without fraud. In confirmation of the treaty, they sacrificed a wolf, a ram, a boar, and a bull; the Greeks dipt their swords, and the barbarians the points of their javelins, in the blood of the victims.

Ariæus did not think it proper to return by the same route they had come, because, as they had found nothing for their subsistence during the last seventeen days of their march, they must have suffered much more, had they taken the same way back again. He therefore took another; exhorting them only to make long marches at first, in order to evade the king's pursuit; but this, however, they could not effect. Towards the evening, when they were not far from some villages where they proposed to halt, the scouts came in with advice, that they had seen several equipages and convoys, which made it reasonable to judge, that the enemy were not far off. Upon which they stood their ground, and waited their coming up; and the next day, before sunrising, drew up in the same order as in the preceding battle. So bold an appearance terrified the king, who sent heralds, not to demand, as before, the surrender of their arms, but to propose peace and a treaty. Clearchus, who was informed of their arrival, whilst he was busy in drawing up his troops, gave orders to bid them wait, and to tell them, that he was not yet at leisure to hear them. He assumed purposely an air of haughtiness and grandeur, to denote his intrepidity, and at the same time to show the fine appearance and good condition of his phalanx. When he advanced with the most gallant of his officers, expressly chosen for the occasion, and had heard what the heralds had to propose, he made answer, that they must begin with giving battle, because the army, being in want of provisions, had no time to lose. The heralds having carried back this answer to their master, returned shortly after; which showed, that the king, or whoever spoke in his name, was not very distant. They said, they had orders to conduct them to villages, where they

would find provisions in abundance, and conducted them thither accordingly.

The army staid there three days, during which, Tissaphernes arrived from the king, with the queen's brother and three other Persian grandees, attended by a great number of officers and domestics. After having saluted the generals, who advanced to receive him, he told them by his interpreter, that being a neighbour of Greece, and seeing them engaged in dangers, out of which it would be difficult to extricate themselves, he had used his good offices with the king, to obtain permission to reconduct them into their own country; being convinced, that neither themselves, nor their cities, would ever be unmindful of that favour: that the king, without having declared himself positively upon that head, had commanded him to come to them, to know for what cause they had taken arms against him; and he advised them to make the king such an answer, as might not give any offence, and might enable him to do them service. 'We call the gods to witness,' replied Clearchus, 'that we did not enlist ourselves to make war with the king, or to march against him. Cyrus, concealing his true motives under different pretexts, brought us almost hither without explaining himself, the better to surprise you. And when we saw him surrounded with dangers, we thought it infamous to abandon him, after the favours we had received from him. But as he is dead, we are released from our engagement, and neither desire to contest the crown with Artaxerxes, nor to ravage his country, nor to give him the least disquiet; provided he does not oppose our return. However, if we are attacked, we shall endeavour, with the assistance of the gods, to make a good defence; and shall not be ungrateful towards those who render us any service.' Tissaphernes replied, that he would let the king know what they said, and return with his answer. But his not coming the next day gave the Greeks some anxiety: he however arrived on the third, and told them, that after much controversy, he had at length obtained the king's pardon for them: for, that it had been represented to the king, that he ought not to suffer people to return with impunity into their country, who had been so insolent as to come thither to make war upon him. 'In fine,' said he, 'you may now assure

yourselves of not finding any obstacle to your return, and of being supplied with provisions, or suffered to buy them; and you shall swear on your part, that you will pass without committing any disorders in your march, and that you will take only what is necessary; provided you are not furnished with it.' These conditions were sworn to on both sides. Tissaphernes and the queen's brother gave their hands to the colonels and captains in token of amity. After which Tissaphernes withdrew, to arrange his affairs; promising to return shortly in order to go back with them into his government.

The Greeks waited for him above twenty days, continuing encamped near Ariæus, who received frequent visits from his brothers, and other relations, as did the officers of his army from the Persians of the different party; who assured them from the king of an entire oblivion of the past; so that the friendship of Ariæus for the Greeks appeared to cool every day more and more. This change gave them some uneasiness. Several of the officers went to Clearchus and the other generals, and said to them, 'What do we here any longer? Are we not sensible, that the king desires to see us all perish, that others may be terrified by our example? Perhaps he keeps us waiting here, till he reassembles his dispersed troops, or sends to seize the passes in our way; for he will never suffer us to return into Greece to divulge our own glory and his shame.' Clearchus made answer to this discourse, that to depart without consulting the king, was to break with him, and to declare war by violating the treaty; that they should remain without a conductor in a strange country, where nobody would supply them with provisions; that Ariæus would abandon them; and that even their friends would become their enemies; that he did not know, but there might be other rivers to pass, but that, were the Euphrates the only one, they could not get over it, were the passage ever so little disputed. That if it were necessary to come to a battle, they should find themselves without cavalry against an enemy that had a very numerous and excellent body of horse; so that if they gained the victory, they could make no great advantage of it, and if they were overcome, they were utterly and irretrievably lost. 'Besides, why should the king, who has so many other means to destroy

us, engage his word only to violate it, and thereby render himself execrable in the sight of gods and men?'

Tissaphernes however arrived with his troops, in order to return into his government, and they set forward all together under the conduct of that satrap, who supplied them with provisions. Ariæus with his troops encamped with the barbarians, and the Greeks separately at some distance, which kept up a continual distrust amongst them. Besides which, there happened frequent quarrels for wood or forage, that augmented their aversion for each other. After three days' march, they arrived at the wall of Media, which is a hundred feet high, twenty broad, and twenty leagues * in extent, all built of bricks, cemented with bitumen, like the walls of Babylon, from which it was not very distant at one of its extremities. When they had passed it, they marched eight leagues in two days, and came to the river Tygris, after having crossed two of its canals, cut expressly for watering the country. They then passed the † Tygris upon a bridge of twenty-seven boats near Sitace, a very great and populous city. After four days' march, they arrived at another city very opulent also, called Opis. They found there a bastard brother of Artaxerxes with a very considerable body of troops, which he was bringing from Susa and Ecbatana to his aid. He admired the fine order of the Greeks. From thence, having passed the deserts of Media, they came, after a march of six days, to a place called the lands of Parysatis; the revenues of which appertained to that princess. Tissaphernes, to insult the memory of her son Cyrus, so dearly beloved by her, gave up the villages to be plundered by the Greeks. Continuing their march through the desert on the side of the Tygris, which they had on their left, they arrived at Cænæ, a very great and rich city, and from thence at the river Zabates.

The occasions of distrust increased every day between the

* Twenty parasangas.

† The march of the Greeks and the rest of the army, from the day after the battle till the passing of the Tygris, abounds in the text of Xenophon with very great obscurities, to explain which fully, would require a long dissertation. My plan does not admit me to enter into such discussions, which I must therefore refer to those who are more able than myself.

Greeks and barbarians. Clearchus thought it incumbent on him to come to an explanation once for all with Tissaphernes. He began with observing upon the sacred and inviolable nature of the treaties subsisting between them. 'Can a man,' said he, 'conscious of the guilt of perjury, be capable of living at ease? How would he shun the wrath of the gods, who are the witnesses of treaties, and escape their vengeance, whose power is universal?' He added afterwards many things to prove, that the Greeks were obliged by their own interest to continue faithful to him, and that, by renouncing his alliance, they must first inevitably renounce not only all religion, but reason and common sense. Tissaphernes seemed to relish this discourse, and spoke to him with all the appearance of the most perfect sincerity; insinuating at the same time, that some persons had done him bad offices with him. 'If you will bring your officers hither,' said he, 'I will show you those who have wronged you by their representations.' He kept him to supper, and professed more friendship for him than ever.

The next day Clearchus proposed in the assembly, to go with the several commanders of the troops to Tissaphernes. He suspected Menon in particular, whom he knew to have had a secret conference with the satrap in the presence of Ariæus; besides which, they had already differed several times with each other. Some objected, that it was not proper that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes, and that it was not consistent with prudence to rely implicitly upon the professions of a barbarian. But Clearchus continued to insist upon his proposal, till it was agreed, that the four other commanders, with twenty captains, and about two hundred soldiers, under the pretext of buying provisions in the Persian camp, where there was a market, should be sent along with him. When they came to the tent of Tissaphernes, the five commanders, Clearchus, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were suffered to enter, but the captains remained without at the door. Immediately, on a certain signal before agreed on, those within were seized, and the others put to the sword. Some Persian horse afterwards scoured the country, and killed all the Greeks they met, whether freemen or slaves. Clearchus, with the

other generals, was sent to the king, who ordered their heads to be struck off. Xenophon describes with sufficient extent the characters of those officers.

Clearchus was valiant, bold, intrepid, and of a capacity for forming great enterprises. His courage was not rash, but directed by prudence, and he retained all the coolness of his temper and presence of mind in the midst of the greatest dangers. He loved the troops, and let them want for nothing. He knew how to make them obey him; but out of fear. His mien was awful and severe; his language rough; his punishments instant and rigorous: he gave way sometimes to passion, but presently came to himself, and always chastised with justice. His great maxim was, that nothing could be done in an army without severe discipline; and from him came the saying, that a soldier ought to fear his general more than the enemy. The troops * esteemed his valour, and did justice to his merit; but they were afraid of his temper, and did not love to serve under him. In a word, says Xenophon, the soldiers feared him as scholars do a severe pedagogue. We may say of him with Tacitus, that by an excess of severity he made, what had otherwise been well done by him, unamiable; [a] *Cupidine severitatis in his etiam, quæ ritè faceret, acerbus.*

Proxenus was of Bœotia. From his infancy he aspired at great things, and was industrious to make himself capable of them. He spared no means for the attainment of instruction, and was the disciple of Gorgias the Leontine, a celebrated rhetorician, who sold his lectures at a very high price. When he found himself capable of commanding, and of doing good to his friends, as well as of being served by them, he entered into Cyrus's service with the view of advancing himself. He did not want ambition, but would take no other path to glory than that of virtue. He would have been a perfect captain, had he had to do with none but brave and disciplined men, and had it been only necessary to make himself beloved. He was more apprehensive of being upon bad terms with his soldiers, than his soldiers with him. He thought it sufficient for a commander, to praise good actions, without punishing bad

[a] Tacit. *Annal.* c. lxxv.

* Manebat admiratio viri et fama; sed oderant. Tacit. *Histor.* l. ii. c. 68.

ones; for which reason he was beloved by the worthy; but those of a different character abused his easiness. He died at thirty years of age.

* Could the two great persons, whose portrait we have here drawn after Xenophon, have been moulded into one, something perfect might have been made of them; by retrenching their several defects, and retaining only their virtues: but it rarely happens, that the same man,† as Tacitus says of Agricola, behaves, according to the exigency of times and circumstances, sometimes with gentleness, and sometimes with severity, without lessening his authority by the former, or the people's affection by the latter.

Menon was a Thessalian, avaricious and ambitious, but ambitious only to satiate his avarice, pursuing honour and estimation for the mere lucre of money. He courted the friendship of the great, and of persons in authority, that he might have it in his power to commit injustice and oppression with impunity. To obtain his ends, falsehood, fraud, perjury, cost him nothing; whilst sincerity, and integrity of heart, were in his opinion merely weakness and stupidity. He loved nobody; and if he professed friendship, it was only to deceive. As others make their glory consist in religion, probity, and honour, he valued himself upon injustice, deceit, and treachery. He gained the favour of the great by false reports, whispering, and calumny; and that of the soldiery, by license and impunity. In fine, he endeavoured to render himself terrible by the mischief it was in his power to do, and imagined he favoured those to whom he did none.

I had thoughts of retrenching these characters, which interrupt the thread of the history. But as men, in all times, are the same, I thought retaining them would neither be useless nor disagreeable to the reader.

SECT. V. RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS FROM THE PROVINCE OF BABYLON AS FAR AS TREBISOND.—[b] The

[b] Xenoph. *in Exped. Cyr.* l. iii. iv.

* Egregium principatûs temperamentum, si, demptis utriusque vitiis, solæ virtutes miscerentur. Tacit. *Histor.* l. ii. c. 5.

† Pro variis temporibus ac negotiis severus et comis—nec illi, quod est rarissimum, aut facilitas authoritatem, aut severitas amorem, deminuit. Tacit. *in Agric.* c. ix.


RETREAT
OF THE
TEN THOUSAND.
Drawn for Rollin's Ancient History
By Mr D'Anville
EUXINE OR BLACK SEA
COLCHI
IBERIA
OR
GEORGIA
CHALYBES
TAOCHI
CASPIAN SEA
PAPHLAGONIA
TIBARENI
ARMENIA
ASIA MINOR
OR
NATOLIA
ASIA SUPERIOR
IONIA
TURKEY IN ASIA
PISIDIA
ARMENIA
CARDUCHI
MESOPOTAMIA
OR
DIARBEK
MEDIA
SYRIA
CYPRUS
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
PHOENICIA
SYRIA
ARABIA DESERTA
HOLY LAND
ASSYRIA
BABYLONIA
ARABIA PETRÆA
EGYPT

generals of the Greeks having been seized, and the officers who attended them massacred, the troops were in the highest consternation. They were five or six hundred leagues from Greece, surrounded with great rivers and hostile nations, without a guide or any supplies of provisions. In this state of general dejection, they could not think of taking either nourishment or repose. In the middle of the night, Xenophon, a young Athenian, but of prudence and capacity superior to his years, went to some of the officers, and represented to the. that they had no time to lose; that it was of the utmost importance to prevent the bad designs of the enemy; that, however small their number, they would render themselves formidable, if they behaved with boldness and resolution; that valour and not multitude determines the success of arms; and that it was necessary above all things to nominate generals immediately; because an army without commanders is like a body without a soul. A council was immediately held, at which a hundred officers were present, and Xenophon, being desired to speak, enforced the reasons at large, which he had at first but lightly touched upon; and by his advice commanders were appointed. These were Timasion in the room of Clearchus, Xanthicles for Socrates, Cleanor for Agias, Philesius for Menon, and Xenophon for Proxenus.

Before the break of day, they assembled the army. The generals made speeches to animate the troops, and Xenophon amongst the rest. 'Fellow-soldiers,' said he, 'the loss of so many brave men by vile treachery, and the being abandoned by our friends, is very deplorable: but we must not sink under our misfortunes, and if we cannot conquer, let us choose rather to perish gloriously, than to fall into the hands of barbarians, who would inflict upon us the greatest miseries. Let us call to mind the glorious battles of Platææ, Thermopylæ, Salamis, and so many others, wherein our ancestors, though with a small number, have fought and defeated the innumerable armies of the Persians, and thereby rendered the name alone of Greek for ever formidable. It is to their invincible valour we owe the honour we possess, of acknowledging no masters upon earth but the gods, nor any happiness but what is consistent with liberty. Those gods, the avengers of perjury, and

witnesses of the enemy's perfidy, will be favourable to us; and as they are attacked in the violation of treaties, and take pleasure in humbling the proud, and exalting the low, they will also follow us to battle, and combat for us. For the rest, fellow-soldiers, as we have no refuge but in victory, which must be our sole resource, and will make us ample amends for whatever it costs to attain it; I should believe, if it were your opinion, that in order to make a more expeditious and less difficult retreat, it would be very proper to rid ourselves of all the useless baggage, and to keep only what is absolutely necessary in our march.' All the soldiers that moment lifted up their hands to signify their approbation and consent to all that had been said, and without loss of time set fire to their tents and carriages; such of them as had too much equipage giving it to others who had too little, and destroying the rest.

It was resolved to march the army without tumult or violence, if their return was not opposed; but otherwise to open themselves a passage sword in hand through the enemy. They therefore began their march in the form of a great hollow square, with the baggage in the centre. Chirisophus the Lacedæmonian had the vanguard; two of the oldest captains the right and left; and Timasion with Xenophon were posted in the rear as the youngest officers. The first day was distressing; because, having neither horse nor slingers, they were extremely harassed by a detachment sent against them: but they provided against that inconvenience by following Xenophon's advice. They chose two hundred men out of the Rhodians among the troops, whom they armed with slings, and augmented their pay for their encouragement. They could throw as far again as the Persians, because they discharged balls of lead, and the others made use only of large flints. They mounted also a squadron of fifty men upon the horses intended for the baggage, and supplied their places with other beasts of burden. By the means of this supply a second detachment of the enemy were very severely handled.

After some days' march, Tissaphernes appeared with all his forces. He contented himself at first with harassing the Greeks, who moved on continually. The latter observing the difficulty of retreating in a hollow square in the face of the enemy, from

the unevenness of ground, hedges, and other obstacles, which might oblige them to break it, changed their order of battle, and marched in two columns, with the little baggage they had in the space between them. They formed a body of reserve of six hundred chosen men, whom they divided into six companies, and subdivided by fifties and tens, to facilitate their motions according as occasion might require. When the columns came close to each other, they either remained in the rear, or filed off upon the flanks on both sides, to avoid disorder; and when they opened, they fell into the void space in the rear between the two columns. Upon any occasion of attack, they immediately ran where it was necessary. The Greeks stood several charges, but they were neither considerable, nor attended with much loss.

They arrived at the river Tygris. As its depth would not admit them to pass it without boats, they were obliged to cross the Carduchian mountains, because there was no other way, and the prisoners reported, that from thence they would enter Armenia, where they might pass the Tygris at its source, and afterwards the Euphrates, not very distant from it. To gain those defiles before the enemy could seize them, it was thought proper to set forwards in the night, in order to arrive at the foot of the mountains by the break of day; which was done accordingly. Chirisophus continued at the head of the advanced guard, with the troops armed with missive weapons, besides his ordinary corps; and Xenophon in the rear, with only the heavy-armed soldiers, because at that time there was nothing to fear on that side. The inhabitants of the country had taken possession of several of the heights, from whence it was necessary to dislodge them, which could not be done without great danger and difficulty.

The officers, having held a council of war, were of opinion, that it was proper to leave behind them all the beasts of burden not absolutely necessary, with all the slaves lately taken; because both the one and the other would retard their march too much in the great defiles they had to pass; besides which, it required a greater quantity of provisions to support them, and those who had the care of the beasts were useless in fight. That regulation was executed without delay, and they continued

their march, sometimes fighting, and sometimes halting. The passing of the mountains, which took up seven days, fatigued the troops exceedingly, and occasioned some loss; but at length they arrived at villages, where they found provisions in abundance, and rested some days, to recover the severe fatigues the army had undergone, in comparison with which all they had suffered in Persia was trivial.

But they found themselves soon after exposed to new danger. Almost at the foot of the mountains they came to a river, two hundred feet in breadth, called Centrites, which stopped their march. They had to defend themselves both against the enemy, who pursued them in the rear, and the Armenians, the soldiers of the country, who lined the opposite side of the river. They attempted in vain to pass it in a place where the water came up to their arm-pits, and were carried away by the rapidity of the current, which the weight of their arms made them unable to resist. By good fortune they discovered another place not so deep, where some soldiers had seen the people of the country pass. It required abundance of address, diligence, and valour, to keep off the enemy on both sides of them. The army, however, passed the river at length without much loss.

They marched afterwards with less interruption; passed the source of the Tygris, and arrived at the little river Teleboa, which is very beautiful, and has many villages on its banks. Here began the western Armenia; which was governed by Tiribasus, a satrap much beloved by the king, who had the honour to help him to * mount on horseback when at the court: he offered to let the army pass, and to suffer the soldiers to take all they wanted, upon condition that they should commit no ravages in their march; which proposal was accepted and ratified on each side. Tiribasus kept always a flying camp at a small distance from the army. There fell a great quantity of snow, which gave the troops some inconvenience, and they learnt from a prisoner, that Tiribasus designed to attack the Greeks in their passage over the mountains, in a defile, through which they must necessarily march. They prevented

* The French translator of Xenophon says, 'he held the king's stirrup when he got on horseback,' without considering that the ancients used none.

him by seizing that post, after having put the enemy to flight. After some days' march through deserts, they passed the Euphrates near its source, not having the water above their waist.

They suffered exceedingly afterwards from a north wind, which blew in their faces, and obstructed respiration; so that it was thought necessary to sacrifice to the wind, upon which it seemed to abate. They marched on in snow five or six feet deep, which killed several servants and beasts of burden, besides thirty soldiers. They made fires during the night, for they found plenty of wood. All the next day, they continued their march through the snow, where many of them, worn down with hunger, which was followed with languor or fainting, continued lying upon the ground, through weakness and want of spirits. When something had been given them to eat, they found themselves relieved, and continued their march.

The enemy still pursued them. Many, overtaken by the night, remained on the road without fire or provisions, so that several died of their hardships, and the enemy who followed them took some baggage. Some soldiers were also left behind, that had lost their sight, and others their toes, by the snow. Against the first evil the remedy was to wear something black before the eyes; and against the other, to keep the legs always in motion, and to bare the feet at night. Arriving at a more commodious place, they dispersed themselves into the neighbouring villages, to recover and repose after their fatigues. The houses were built under ground, with an opening at top, like a well, through which the descent was by a ladder; but there was another entrance for cattle. They found there sheep, cows, goats, poultry, with wheat, barley, and pulse; and for drink, there was beer, which was very strong, when not mingled with water, but was agreeable to those who were used to it. They drank this with a reed out of the vessels that held the beer, upon which they saw the barley swim. The master of the house where Xenophon lay, received him very kindly, and even showed him where some wine was concealed; besides which he made him a present of several horses. He taught him also to fasten a kind of hurdles to their feet, and to do the same to the other beasts of burden, to prevent their sinking in

the snow, without which they would have been up to the girth in it at every step. The army, after having rested seven days in these villages, resumed their route.

After a march of seven days, they arrived at the river Araxes, called also the Phasis, which is about a hundred feet in breadth. Two days after they discovered the Phasians, the Chalybes, and the Taochians, who kept the pass of the mountains, to prevent their descending into the plain. They saw it was impossible to avoid coming to a battle with them, and resolved to engage the same day. Xenophon, who had observed that the enemy defended only the ordinary passage, and that the mountain was three leagues in extent, proposed the sending of a detachment to take possession of the heights that commanded the enemy; which would not be difficult, as they might prevent all suspicion of their design by a march in the night, and by making a false attack by the main road, to amuse the barbarians. This was accordingly executed, the enemy put to flight, and the pass cleared.

They crossed the country of the Chalybes, who are the most valiant of all the barbarians in those parts. When they killed an enemy, they cut off his head, and carried it about in triumph, singing and dancing. They kept themselves close shut up in their cities, and when the army marched, fell suddenly upon the rear, after having carried every thing of value in the country into places of safety. After twelve or fifteen days' march they arrived at a very high mountain, called Teches, from whence they descried the sea. The first who perceived it, raised great shouts of joy for a considerable time; which made Xenophon imagine, that the vanguard was attacked, and go with haste to support it. As he approached nearer, the cry of 'the sea! the sea!' was heard distinctly, and the alarm changed into joy and gaiety; but when they came to the top, nothing was heard but a confused noise of the whole army, crying out together, 'the sea! the sea!' whilst they could not refrain from tears, nor from embracing their generals and officers. And then, without waiting for orders, they heaped up a pile of stones, and erected a trophy with broken bucklers and shattered arms.

From thence they advanced to the mountains of Colchis,

one of which was higher than the rest, and of that the people of the country had possessed themselves. The Greeks drew up in battle at the bottom of it, to ascend, for the access was not impracticable. Xenophon did not judge it proper to march in line of battle, but by files; because the soldiers could not keep their ranks, from the inequality of the ground, that in some places was easy, and in others difficult, to climb, which might discourage them. That advice was approved, and the army formed according to it. The heavy-armed troops amounted to fourscore files, each consisting of about a hundred men, with eighteen hundred light-armed soldiers, divided into three bodies, one of which was posted on the right, another on the left, and a third in the centre. After having encouraged his troops, by representing to them, that this was the last obstacle they had to surmount, and implored the assistance of the gods, the army began to ascend the hill. The enemy were not able to support their charge, and dispersed. They passed the mountain, and encamped in villages, where they found provisions in abundance.

A very strange accident happened there to the army, which put them in great consternation. For the soldiers, finding abundance of beehives in that place, and eating the honey, they were seized with violent vomiting and fluxes, attended with delirious fits; so that those, who were least ill, seemed like drunken men, and the rest, either furiously mad, or dying. The earth was strewed with their bodies as after a defeat; however, none of them died, and the distemper ceased the next day about the same hour it had seized them. The third or fourth day the soldiers got up, but in the condition in which people are after taking a violent medicine.

Two days after, the army arrived near Trebisond, a Greek colony of Sinopians, situate upon the Euxine or Black Sea, in the province of Colchis. Here they lay encamped for thirty days, and acquitted themselves of the vows they had made to Jupiter, Hercules, and the other deities, to obtain a happy return into their own country. They also celebrated the games of the horse and foot races, wrestling, boxing, the pancratium; the whole attended with the greatest joy and solemnity.

SECT. VI. THE GREEKS, AFTER HAVING UNDERGONE EXCESSIVE FATIGUES, AND SURMOUNTED MANY DANGERS, ARRIVE UPON THE SEA-COAST OPPOSITE TO BYZANTIUM. THEY PASS THE STRAIT, AND ENGAGE IN THE SERVICE OF SEUTHES, PRINCE OF THRACE. XENOPHON AFTERWARDS REPASSES THE SEA WITH HIS TROOPS, ADVANCES TO PERGAMUS, AND JOINS THIMBRON, GENERAL OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS, WHO WAS MARCHING AGAINST TISSAPHERNES AND PHARNABASUS.—[c] After having offered sacrifices to the several divinities, and celebrated the games, they deliberated upon the proper measures for their return into Greece. They concluded upon going thither by sea, and for that purpose Chirisophus offered to go to Anaxibius, the admiral of Sparta, who was his friend, in hopes of being able to obtain ships of him. He set out directly, and Xenophon regulated the order it was necessary to observe, and the precautions to be taken for the security of the camp, provisions, and forage. He believed it also proper to make sure of some vessels, besides those that were expected, and made some expeditions against the neighbouring people.

As Chirisophus did not return so soon as was expected, and provisions began to be wanting, it was resolved to proceed by land; because there was not a sufficient number of ships to transport the whole army, and those which the precaution of Xenophon had procured, were allotted to carry the women, the old and sick men, with all the unnecessary baggage. The army continued its march, and lay ten days at * Cerasus, where there was a general review of the troops, who were found to amount to eight thousand six hundred men, out of about ten thousand; the rest having died, in the retreat, of their wounds, fatigues, or diseases.

In the short time that the Greeks continued in these parts, several disputes arose, as well with the inhabitants of the country, as with some of the officers, who were jealous of Xenophon's authority, and endeavoured to render him odious to the army. But his prudence and moderation put a stop

[c] Xenoph. l. vi.

* This city of Cerasus became famous for the cherry-trees, which Lucullus first brought into Italy, and which from thence have been dispersed all over the western world.

MACEDONIA
EMATHIA
CHALCIDICE
PROPONTIS
MYSIA
LYDIA
THESSALIA
GREECE.
Drawn for Rollins Antient History.
By Mr D'ANVILLE.

to those disorders; having made the soldiers sensible, that their safety depended upon preserving union and a good understanding amongst themselves, and obedience to their generals.

From Cerasus they went to Cotyora, which is not very remote from it. They there deliberated again upon the proper measures for their return. The inhabitants of the country represented the almost insuperable difficulties of going by land, from the defiles and rivers they had to pass, and offered to supply the Greeks with ships. This seemed the best expedient, and the army embarked accordingly. They arrived the next day at Sinope, a city of Paphlagonia, and a colony of the Milesians. Chirisophus repaired thither with galleys, but without money, though the troops expected to receive some. He assured them that the army should be paid, as soon as they were out of the Euxine sea; and that their retreat was universally celebrated, and the subject of the discourse and admiration of all Greece.

The soldiers, finding themselves near enough to Greece, desired to make some booty before they arrived there, and with that view resolved to nominate a general with full authority, whereas, till then, all affairs were determined in the council of war by the plurality of voices. They cast their eyes upon Xenophon, and caused him to be desired to accept that office. He was not insensible to the honour of commanding in chief; but he foresaw the consequences, and desired time to consider. After having expressed his high sense of gratitude for an offer so much to his honour, he represented, that, to avoid jealousy and division, the success of affairs, and the interest of the army, seemed to require, that they should choose a Lacedæmonian for their general, as the Spartan state at that time was actually mistress of Greece, and in consideration of that choice, would be better disposed to support them. This reason was not relished, and they objected, that they were far from intending to depend servilely upon Sparta, or to submit to regulate their enterprises by the pleasure or dislike of that state; and pressed him again to accept the command. He was then obliged to explain himself plainly, and without evasion; and declared, that having consulted the gods by

sacrifice, upon the offer they made him, they had manifested their will by evident signs, from whence it appeared that they did not approve their choice. It was surprising to see the impression, which the sole mention of the gods made upon the soldiers, otherwise very warm and tenacious; and who besides are commonly little affected with the motives of religion. Their great ardour abated immediately, and without making any reply, they proceeded to elect Chirisophus, though a Lacedæmonian, for their general.

His authority was of no long continuance. Discord, as Xenophon had foreseen, arose amongst the troops, who were angry that their general prevented their plundering the Grecian cities through which they passed. This disturbance was principally excited by the Peloponnesians, who composed one-half of the army, and could not see Xenophon, an Athenian, in authority without pain. Different measures were proposed; but nothing being concluded, the troops divided themselves into three bodies, of which the Achaians and Arcadians, that is, the Peloponnesians, were the principal, amounting to four thousand five hundred heavy-armed foot, with Lycon and Callimachus for their generals. Chirisophus commanded another party of about fourteen hundred men, besides seven hundred light-armed infantry. Xenophon had the third, almost the same in number, of which three hundred were light-armed soldiers, with about forty horse, which were all the cavalry of the army. The first having obtained ships from the people of * Heraclea, to whom they had sent to demand them, set out before the rest to make some booty, and made a descent in the port of Calpe. Chirisophus, who was sick, marched by land; but without quitting the coast. Xenophon landed at Heraclea, and entered into the heart of the country.

New divisions arose. The imprudence of the troops and their leaders had involved them in several difficulties, not without loss, from whence the address of Xenophon extricated them more than once. Being all reunited again, after various success, they arrived by land at Chrysopolis of Chalcedon, facing Byzantium, whither they repaired some days after, having passed the small arm of the sea which separates the

* A city of Pontus.

two continents. They were upon the point of plundering that rich and powerful city, to revenge a fraud and injury which had been done them, and from the hope of enriching themselves once for all, when Xenophon made all possible haste thither. He admitted the justness of their revenge, but he made them sensible of the fatal consequences which would attend it. 'After your plundering this city, and destroying the Lacedæmonians established in it, you will be deemed the mortal enemies of their republic, and of all their allies. Athens, my country, that had four hundred galleys at sea and in the arsenals, when it took up arms against them, great sums of money in its treasury, a revenue of a thousand talents, and was in possession of all the isles of Greece, and of many cities in Europe and Asia, of which this was one, has nevertheless been reduced to yield to their power, and submit to their sway. And can you hope, who are but a handful of men, without generals, provisions, allies, or any resource, either from Tissaphernes, who has betrayed you, or the king of Persia, whom you have attempted to dethrone; can you hope, I say, in such a condition to make head against the Lacedæmonians? Let us demand satisfaction from the Byzantines, and not avenge their fault by a much greater of our own, which must draw upon us inevitable ruin.' He was believed, and the affair accommodated.

[d] From thence he led them to Salmydessa, to serve Seuthes prince of Thrace, who had before solicited him by his envoys to bring troops to his aid, in order to his reestablishment in his father's dominions, of which his enemies had deprived him. He had made Xenophon great promises for himself and his troops; but when he had done him the service he wanted, he was so far from keeping his word, that he did not give him the pay agreed upon. Xenophon keenly reproached him with this breach of faith; imputing his perfidy to his minister Heraclides, who thought to make his court to his master, by saving him a sum of money at the expense of justice, faith, and honesty; qualities which ought to be dearer than all others to a prince, as they contribute the most to his reputation, as well as to the success of affairs, and the security of a state. But that

[d] Xenoph. l. vii.

treacherous minister, who looked upon honour, probity, and justice, as mere chimeras, and that there was nothing real but the possession of much money, thought only of enriching himself by any means whatsoever, and robbed his master first with impunity, and all his subjects along with him. 'However,' continues Xenophon, 'every wise man, especially if vested with authority and command, ought to regard justice, probity, and the faith of engagements, as the most precious treasure he can possess; and as an assured resource, and an infallible support in all the events that can happen.' Heraclides was the more in the wrong for acting in this manner towards the troops, as he was a native of Greece, and not a Thracian; but avarice had extinguished all sense of honour in him.

Whilst the dispute between Seuthes and Xenophon was warmest, Charminus and Polynices arrived, as ambassadors from Lacedæmon, and brought advice, that the republic had declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus; that Thimbron had already embarked with troops, and promised a darick a month to every soldier, two to each officer, and four to the colonels, who should engage in the service. Xenophon accepted the offer, and having obtained from Seuthes, by the mediation of the ambassadors, part of the pay due to him, he went by sea to Lampsacus with the army, which amounted at that time to almost six thousand men. From thence he advanced to Pergamus, a city in the Troad. Having met near Parthenia, where ended the expedition of the Greeks, a great nobleman returning into Persia, he took him, his wife and children, with all his equipage, and by that means found himself in a condition to bestow great largesses upon the soldiers, and to make them a satisfactory amends for all the losses they had sustained. Thimbron at length arrived, who took upon him the command of the troops, and having joined them with his own, marched against Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus.

Such was the event of Cyrus's expedition. [e] Xenophon reckons from the first setting out of that prince's army from the city of Ephesus to their arrival where the battle was fought, five hundred and thirty parasangas or leagues, and fourscore and thirteen days' march; [f] and in their return from the place

[e] Xenoph. *de Exped. Cyr.* l. ii. p. 276. [f] Ibid. l. v. p. 355.

of battle to Cotyora, a city upon the coast of the Euxine or Black sea, six hundred and twenty parasangas or leagues, and a hundred and twenty-two days' march. And adding both together, he says, the way, going and coming, was eleven hundred and fifty * five parasangas or leagues, [ε] and two hundred and fifteen days' march; and that the whole time the army took to perform that journey, including the days of rest, was fifteen months.

It appears by this calculation, that the army of Cyrus marched daily, one day with another, almost six parasangas † or leagues in going, and only five in their return. It was natural, that Cyrus, who desired to surprise his brother, should use all possible diligence for that purpose.

This retreat of the ten thousand Greeks has always passed amongst judges in the art of war, as I have already observed, for a perfect model in its kind, which has never had a parallel. Indeed, no enterprise could be formed with more valour and bravery, nor conducted with more prudence, nor executed with more success. Ten thousand men, five or six hundred leagues from their own country, who had lost their generals and best officers, and find themselves in the heart of the enemy's vast empire, undertake, in the sight of a victorious and numerous army, with the king at the head of it, to retire through the seat of his empire, and in a manner from the gates of his palace, and to traverse a vast extent of unknown countries, almost all in arms against them, without being dismayed by the prospect of the innumerable obstacles and dangers, to

[ε] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 427.

* I add *five*, which are left out in the text, to make the total agree with the two parts.

† The parasanga is a road measure peculiar to the Persians, and consists of thirty stadia. The stadium is a Grecian measure, and contains, according to the most received opinion, one hundred and twenty-five geometrical paces; twenty of which in consequence are required to the common French league, which consists of 2500 paces. And this has been my rule hitherto, according to which the parasanga is a league and a half.

But I observe here a great difficulty. According to this calculation we should find, the ordinary days' marches of Cyrus, with an army of more than a hundred thousand men, would have been one day with another nine leagues, during so long a time, which according to the judges in military affairs is absolutely impossible. This is what has determined me to compute the parasanga at no more than a league. Several authors have remarked, and indeed it is not to be doubted, that the stadium, and all the other road measures of the ancients, have differed widely according to times and places, as they still do amongst us.

which they were every moment exposed; the passage of rivers, of mountains and defiles; open attacks, or secret ambuscades from the people upon their route; famine, almost inevitable in vast and desert regions; and above all, the treachery they had to fear from the troops, who seemed to be employed in escorting them, but in reality had orders to destroy them. For Artaxerxes, who was sensible how much the return of those Greeks into their country would cover him with disgrace, and discredit the majesty of the empire in the opinion of all nations, had left nothing undone to prevent it; and he desired their destruction, says Plutarch, more passionately than to conquer Cyrus himself, or to preserve his dominions. Those ten thousand men, however, notwithstanding so many obstacles, carried their point, and arrived, through a thousand dangers, victorious and triumphant in their own country. [h] Antony long after, when pursued by the Parthians almost in the same country, finding himself in like danger, cried out in admiration of their invincible valour, 'Oh the retreat of the ten thousand!'

And it was the good success of this famous retreat, which filled the people of Greece with contempt for Artaxerxes, by demonstrating to them, that gold, silver, luxury, voluptuousness, and a numerous seraglio of women, were the sole merit of the Great King; but that, as to the rest, his opulence and all his boasted power were only pride and vain ostentation. It was this prejudice, more universal than ever in Greece after this celebrated expedition, that gave birth to those bold enterprises of the Greeks, of which we shall soon treat, that made Artaxerxes tremble upon his throne, and brought the Persian empire to the very brink of destruction.

SECT. VII. CONSEQUENCES OF CYRUS'S DEATH IN THE COURT OF ARTAXERXES. CRUELTY AND JEALOUSY OF PARYSATIS. STATIRA POISONED.—[i] I return to what passed after the battle of Cunaxa in the court of Artaxerxes. As he believed that he had killed Cyrus with his own hand, and looked upon that action as the most glorious of his life, he desired that all the world should think the same; as it was wounding him in the most tender part, to dispute that honour, or endeavour

[h] Plut. *in Anto.* p. 937. Ὦ μύριοι. [i] Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1018—1021.

to share it, with him. The Carian soldier, whom we mentioned before, not contented with the great presents the king had made him upon a different pretext, perpetually declared to all that would hear him, that none but himself had killed Cyrus, and that the king did him great injustice in depriving him of the glory due to him. The prince, upon being informed of that insolence, conceived a jealousy equally base and cruel, and had the weakness to cause him to be delivered to Parysatis, who had sworn the destruction of all those that had any share in the death of her son. Animated by a barbarous spirit of vengeance, she commanded the executioners to take that unfortunate wretch, and to make him suffer the most exquisite tortures during ten days; then after they had torn out his eyes, to pour melted brass into his ears, till he expired in that cruel agony; which was accordingly executed.

Mithridates also, having boasted in an entertainment where he had heated his brain with wine, that it was he who gave Cyrus his mortal wound, paid very dear for that absurd and imprudent vanity. He was condemned to suffer the punishment of the * troughs, one of the most cruel that was ever invented, and after having languished in torment seventeen days, died at last in exquisite misery.

There only remained, for the final execution of Parysatis's project, and fully to satiate her vengeance, the punishment of the king's eunuch Mesabates, who by his master's order had cut off the head and hand of Cyrus. But as there was nothing to take hold of in his conduct, Parysatis laid this snare for him. She was a woman of great address, had abundance of wit, and excelled in playing at a certain game with dice. After the war, she had been reconciled with the king, played often with him, was of all his parties, had an unbounded complaisance for him, and far from contradicting him in any thing, anticipated his desires, did not blush at indulging his passions, and even at supplying him with the means of gratifying them. But she took especial care never to lose sight of him, and to leave Statira as little alone with him as she could, desiring to gain an absolute ascendant over her son.

One day seeing the king entirely unemployed, and with

* See the description of this torture, as before given in vol. ii.

no thoughts but of diverting himself, she proposed playing at dice with him for a thousand daricks,* to which he readily consented. She suffered him to win, and paid down the money. But affecting regret and vexation, she pressed him to begin again, and to play with her for an eunuch. The king, who suspected nothing, complied, and they agreed to except five of the favourite eunuchs on each side, that the winner should take their choice out of the rest, and the loser be bound to deliver him. Having made these conditions, they sat down to play. The queen was all attention to the game, and made use of all her skill and address in it; besides which the dice favoured her. She won, and chose Mesabates, for he was not one of those that had been excepted. As soon as she got him into her hands, before the king could have the least suspicion of the revenge she meditated, she delivered him to the executioners, and commanded them to flay him alive, to lay him afterwards upon three † cross bars, and to stretch his skin before his eyes upon stakes prepared for that purpose; which was performed accordingly. When the king knew this, he was very sorry for it, and violently angry with his mother. But without giving herself any further trouble about it, she told him with a smile, and in a jesting way, 'Really, you are a great loser, and must be highly in the right, to be so much out of humour for a decrepit wretch of an eunuch, when I, who lost a thousand good daricks, and paid them down upon the spot, don't say a word, and am satisfied.'

All these cruelties seem to have been only essays and preparations for a greater crime which Parysatis meditated. She had long retained in her heart a violent hatred for queen Statira, marks of which she had suffered to escape her upon many occasions. She perceived plainly, that her influence with the king her son, was only the effect of his respect and consideration for her as his mother, whereas that for Statira was founded in love and confidence, which rendered that influence much more secure. Of what is not the jealousy of an ambitious woman capable! She resolved to rid herself, whatever it cost her, of so formidable a rival.

* The darick was worth ten livres.
† Plutarch explains this circumstance no farther.

For the more certain attainment of her ends, she feigned a reconciliation with her daughter-in-law, and treated her with all the exterior marks of sincere friendship and real confidence. The two queens, appearing therefore to have forgotten their former suspicions and quarrels, lived upon good terms together, saw one another as before, and ate at each other's apartments. But as both of them well knew what reliance was to be placed upon the friendships and caresses of the court, especially amongst the women, they were neither of them the dupe of the other; and as the same fears always subsisted, they kept upon their guard, and never ate but of the same dishes and pieces. Could one believe it possible to deceive so attentive and cautious a vigilance? Parysatis one day, when her daughter-in-law was at table with her, took an extremely exquisite bird that had been served up, cut it in two parts, gave one half to Statira, and ate the other herself. Statira soon after was seized with sharp pains, and having quitted the table, died in the most horrible convulsions, not without inspiring the king with the most violent suspicions of his mother, of whose cruelty and implacable and revengeful spirit, he was sufficiently sensible before. He made the strictest inquiry into the crime. All his mother's officers and domestics were seized and put to the torture; when Gygis, one of Parysatis's women, and the confidant of all her secrets, confessed the whole. She had caused one side of a knife to be rubbed with poison, so that Parysatis, having cut the bird in two, put the sound part into her own mouth directly, and gave Statira the other that was poisoned. Gygis was put to death after the manner that the Persians punished poisoners, which is thus: They lay their heads upon a great and very broad stone, and beat upon it with another till they are entirely crushed, and have no remains of their former figure. As for Parysatis, the king contented himself with confining her to Babylon, whither she demanded to retire, and told her, that he would never set his foot within it whilst she was there.

CHAPTER III.

SECT. I. THE GRECIAN CITIES OF IONIA IMPLORE AID OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AGAINST ARTAXERXES. RARE PRUDENCE OF A LADY CONTINUED IN HER HUSBAND'S GOVERNMENT AFTER HIS DEATH. AGESILAUS ELECTED KING OF SPARTA. HIS CHARACTER.—[k] The cities of Ionia, that had followed the party of Cyrus, apprehending the resentment of Tissaphernes, had applied to the Lacedæmonians, as the deliverers of Greece, requesting that they would support them in the possession of the liberty they enjoyed, and prevent their country from being ravaged. We have already said that Thimbron was sent thither, to whose troops Xenophon had joined his, after their return from Persia. Thimbron was soon recalled upon some discontent, and had for his successor Dercyllidas, surnamed Sisyphus, from his industry in finding resources, and his ability in inventing machines of war. He took upon him the command of the army at Ephesus. When he arrived there, he was apprized, that there was a dispute between the two satraps, who commanded in the country.

A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399.

The provinces of the Persian monarchy, of which several, situate at the extremity of the empire, required too much application to be governed immediately by the prince, were confided to the care of the great lords commonly called satraps. They had each of them in their government an almost sovereign authority, and were, properly speaking, not unlike the viceroys we see in our days in some neighbouring states. They were supplied with a number of troops sufficient for the defence of the country. They appointed all officers, disposed of the governments of cities, and were charged with levying and remitting the tributes to the prince. They had power to raise troops, to treat with neighbouring states, and even with the generals of the enemy; in a word, to do every thing necessary to maintain good order and tranquillity in their governments. They were independent of one another; and though they served the same master, and it was their duty to concur to the

[k] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iii. p. 479—487.

same ends, nevertheless, each being more interested in the particular advantage of his own province than in the general good of the empire, they often differed among themselves, formed opposite designs, refused aid to their colleagues in necessity, and sometimes even acted entirely against them. The remoteness of the court, and the absence of the prince, gave room for these dissensions; and perhaps a secret policy contributed to keep them up, to elude, or prevent, conspiracies, which too good an understanding amongst the governors might have excited.

Dercyllidas having heard, therefore, that Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus were at variance, made a truce with the former, that he might not have them both upon his hands at the same time, entered Pharnabasus's province, and advanced as far as Æolia.

Zenis, the Dardanian, had governed that province under that satrap's authority; and, as after his death it was to have been given to another, Mania, his widow, went to Pharnabasus with troops and presents, and told him, that having been the wife of a man who had rendered him great services, she desired him not to deprive her of her husband's reward; that she would serve him with the same zeal and fidelity; and that, if she failed in either, he was always at liberty to take her government from her. She was continued in it by this means, and acquitted herself with all the judgment and ability, that could have been expected from the most consummate master in the art of ruling. To the ordinary tributes which her husband had paid, she added presents of extraordinary magnificence, and when Pharnabasus came into her province, she entertained him more splendidly than any of the other governors. She was not contented with the conservation of the cities committed to her care, she made new conquests, and took * Larissa, Amaxita, and Colona.

Hence we may observe, that prudence, good sense, and courage, are of all sexes. She was present in all expeditions in a chariot, and in person decreed rewards and punishments. None of the neighbouring provinces had a finer army than hers, in which she had a great number of Greek soldiers in

* From the Mysians and Pisidians.

her pay. She even attended Pharnabasus in all his enterprises, and was of no common support to him. So that the satrap, who knew all the value of so extraordinary a merit, did more honour to this lady, than to all the other governors. He even admitted her into his council, and treated her with such a distinction, as might have excited jealousy, if the modesty and affability of that lady had not prevented bad effects, by throwing in a manner a veil over all her perfections, which softened their lustre, and let them only occasionally appear as objects of admiration.

She had no enemies but in her own family. Midias, her son-in-law, stung with the reproach of suffering a woman to command in his place, and abusing the entire confidence she reposed in him, which gave him access to her at all times, strangled her with her son. After her death he seized two fortresses, wherein she had secured her treasures; the other cities declared against him. He did not long enjoy the fruits of his crime. Dercyllidas happily arrived at this juncture. All the fortresses of Æolia, either voluntarily or by force, surrendered to him, and Midias was deprived of the possessions he had so unjustly acquired. The Lacedæmonian general having granted Pharnabasus a truce, took up his winter-quarters in Bithynia, to avoid being chargeable to his allies.

[1] The next year, being continued in the command, he crossed over into Thrace, and arrived in the Chersonesus. He knew that the deputies of the country had been at Sparta, to represent the necessity of fortifying the isthmus with a good wall against the frequent incursions of the barbarians, which prevented the cultivation of the lands. Having measured the space, which is more than a league in breadth, he distributed the work amongst the soldiers, and the wall was finished in the autumn of the same year. Within this space were enclosed eleven cities, several ports, a great number of arable lands and plantations, with pastures of all kinds. The work being finished, he returned into Asia, where he reviewed the cities, and found them all in good condition.

A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398.

[m] Conon the Athenian, after losing the battle of Ægospo-

[1] Xenoph. p. 487, 488. [m] Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1021.

tamos, having condemned himself to a voluntary banishment, continued in the isle of Cyprus with king Evagoras, not only for the safety of his person, but also in expectation of a change of affairs; like one, says Plutarch, who waits the return of the tide before he embarks. He had always in view the reestablishment of the Athenian power, to which his defeat had given a mortal wound; and full of fidelity and zeal for his country, though little favourable to him, perpetually meditated the means of raising it from its ruins, and restoring it to its ancient splendour.

This Athenian general, knowing that, in order to succeed in his views, he had occasion for a powerful support, wrote to Artaxerxes to explain his projects to him, and ordered the person who carried his letter, to apply to Ctesias, who would give it into the king's own hands. It was accordingly delivered to that physician, who, it is said, though he did not approve the contents of it, added to what Conon had written, 'that he desired the king would send Ctesias to him, being a person very capable of doing him service, especially in maritime affairs.' [n] Pharnabasus, in concert with Conon, was gone to court to complain against the conduct of Tissaphernes, as too avowedly in favour of the Lacedæmonians. At the urgent solicitation of Pharnabasus, the king ordered five hundred talents * to be paid him for the equipment of a fleet, with instructions to give Conon the command of it. He sent Ctesias into Greece, who, after having visited Cnidos, his native country, went to Sparta.

[o] This Ctesias had at first been in the service of Cyrus, whom he had followed in his expedition. He was taken prisoner in the battle wherein Cyrus was killed, and was made use of to dress the wounds Artaxerxes had received, of which he acquitted himself so well, that the king retained him in his service, and made him his first physician. He passed several years in his service in that quality. Whilst he was there, the Greeks, in all their business at the court, applied themselves to him; as Conon did on the present occasion. His long resi-

[n] Diod. l. xiv. p. 267. Justin, l. vi. c. 1.

[o] Strab. l. xiv. p. 656. Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1014—1020. Diod. l. xiv. p. 273. Aristot. *de Hist. Anim.* l. viii. c. 28. Phot. cod. lxii.

* 500,000 crowns, or about 112,000*l.* sterling.

dence in Persia, and at the court, had given him the necessary time and means for his information in the history of the country, which he wrote in three and twenty books. The first six contained the history of the Assyrians and Babylonians, from Ninus and Semiramis down to Cyrus. The other seventeen treated of the Persian affairs from the beginning of Cyrus's reign to the third year of the XCVth Olympiad, which agrees with the three hundred and ninety-eighth before JESUS CHRIST. He wrote also a history of India. Photius has given us several extracts of both these histories, and these extracts are all that remain of the works of Ctesias. He often contradicts Herodotus, and differs sometimes also from Xenophon. He was not much esteemed by the ancients, who speak of him as of a very vain man, whose veracity is not to be relied on, and who has inserted fables, and sometimes even lies, in his history.

[p] Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus, though secretly each other's enemies, had upon the king's orders united their troops, to oppose the enterprises of Dercyllidas, who had marched into Caria. They had reduced him to post himself so disadvantageously that he must inevitably have perished, had they charged him immediately, without giving him time to look about him. Pharnabasus was of this opinion: but Tissaphernes dreading the valour of the Greeks, who had followed Cyrus, which he had experienced, and whom he conceived all the others resembled, proposed an interview, which was accepted. Dercyllidas having demanded, that the Grecian cities should continue free, and Tissaphernes, that the army and generals of Lacedæmon should retire: they made a truce, till the answers of their respective masters should be known.

A. M. 3607. Ant. J. C. 397.

[q] Whilst these things were passing in Asia, the Lacedæmonians resolved to chastise the insolence of the people of Elis, who, not content with having entered into an alliance with their enemies in the Peloponnesian war, prevented their disputing the prizes in the Olympic games. Upon pretence of the non-payment of a fine by Sparta, they had insulted one of their citizens during the games, and hindered Agis from

[p] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iii. p. 489, 490. Diod. l. xiv. p. 267.
[q] Xenoph. ibid. p. 492.

sacrificing in the temple of Jupiter Olympius. That king was charged with this expedition, which did not terminate till the third year after. He could have taken their city Olympia, which had no works, but contented himself with plundering the suburbs, and the places for the exercises, which were very fine. They demanded peace, which was granted, and were suffered to retain the superintendency of the temple of Jupiter Olympius, to which they had not much right, but were more worthy of that honour than those who disputed it with them.

[r] Agis on his return fell sick, and died upon arriving at Sparta. Almost divine honours were paid to his memory, and after the expiration of some days, according to custom, Leotychides and Agesilaus, one the son, and the other brother of the deceased, disputed the crown. The latter maintained, that his competitor was not the son of Agis, and supported his assertion by the confession of the queen herself, who knew best, and who had often, as well as her husband, acknowledged as much. In fact, there was a current report, that she had had him by Alcibiades,[s] as has been related in its place, and that the Athenian general had corrupted her by a present of a *thousand daricks. Agis protested the contrary at his death. Leotychides having thrown himself at his feet all bathed in his tears, he could not refuse the favour he implored of him, and owned him for his son before all that were present.

Most of the Spartans, charmed with the virtue and great merit of Agesilaus, and deeming it an extraordinary advantage to have a person for their king, who had been educated amongst them, and had passed like them through all the rigour of the Spartan education, supported him with their whole power. An ancient oracle, that advised Sparta to beware of *a lame reign*, was urged against him. Lysander only made a jest of it, and turned its sense against Leotychides himself; endeavouring to prove, that as a bastard, he was the lame king whom the oracle intended to caution them against. Agesilaus, as well by his own great qualities, as the powerful support

[r] Xenoph. p. 493. Plut. *in Lys.* p. 445. *In Agesil.* p. 597.
[s] Athen. l. xii. p. 534.
* 1000 pistoles.

of Lysander, carried it against his nephew, and was declared king.

As by the laws the kingdom had devolved to Agis, his brother Agesilaus, who seemed to be destined to pass his life as a private person, had been educated like other children in the Spartan discipline, which as to the mode of life was very rough, and full of laborious exercise, but * taught youth obedience perfectly well. The law dispensed with this education only to such children as were designed for the throne. Agesilaus therefore had this peculiar advantage, that he did not arrive at commanding, till he had first learned perfectly well how to obey. From thence it was, that of all the kings of Sparta, he best knew how to make his subjects love and esteem him, † because that prince, to the great qualities with which nature had endowed him for command and sovereignty, had united by his education the advantage of being humane and popular.

It is surprising that Sparta, a city so renowned in point of education and policy, should have conceived it proper to abate any thing of its severity and discipline in favour of the princes who were to reign; they having most need of being early habituated to the yoke of obedience, in order to their being the better qualified to command.

‡ Plutarch observes, that from his infancy Agesilaus was remarkable for uniting qualities in himself, which are generally incompatible; a vivacity of temper, a vehemence, a resolution invincible in appearance, an ardent passion for being first and surpassing all others, with a gentleness, submission, and docility, that complied at a single word, and made him infinitely sensible of the slightest reprimand, so that every thing might be obtained of him from the motives of honour, but nothing by fear or violence.

He was lame, but that defect was covered by the graceful-

‡ *In Agesil.* p. 596.

* Hence it was, that the poet Simonides called Sparta, *the tamer of men*, δαμασίμβροτον, as that of the Grecian cities which rendered its inhabitants by good habits the most active and vigorous, and at the same time the most obedient to the laws, of any: ὡς μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἠθῶν τοὺς πολίτας τοῖς νομοῖς πειθομένους καὶ χειροήθεις ποιοῦσαν.

† Τῇ φύσει ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ βασιλικῷ πρόσκτησάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ δημότικον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον.

ness of his person, and still more by the gaiety with which he supported and rallied it first himself. It may even be said, that this infirmity of his body set his valour and passion for glory in a stronger light; there being no labour nor enterprise, however difficult, that he would refuse upon account of that inconvenience.

[u] Praise, without an air of truth and sincerity, was so far from giving him pleasure, that it offended him, and was never received by him as such, but when it came from the mouths of those, who upon other occasions had represented his failings to him with freedom. He would never suffer his picture to be drawn during his life, and even when dying, expressly forbade any image to be made of him, either in colours or relievo. [x] His reason was, that his great actions, if he had done any, would supply the place of monuments; without which, all the statues in the world would do him no manner of honour. We only know, that he was of small stature, which the Spartans did not like in their kings; and Theophrastus affirms, that the Ephori laid a fine upon their king Archidamus, the father of him we speak of, for having espoused a very little woman: * 'For,' said they, 'she'll give us puppets instead of kings.'

[y] It has been remarked, that Agesilaus, in his way of living with the Spartans, behaved better with regard to his enemies than his friends; for he never did the least wrong to the former, and often violated justice in favour of the latter. He would have been ashamed not to have honoured and rewarded his enemies, when their actions deserved it; and was not able to reprove his friends when they committed faults. He would even support them when they were in the wrong,[z] and upon such occasions looked upon the zeal for justice as a vain pretence to cover the refusal of serving them. And in proof of this, a short letter is cited, written by him to a judge in recommendation of a friend; the words are: 'If Nicias be not guilty, acquit him for his innocence; if he be, acquit him for my sake; but however it be, acquit him.'

[u] Plut. *in Moral.* p. 55. [x] Ibid. p. 191. [y] Ibid. *in Agesil.* p. 598.
[z] Ibid. p. 603.
* Οὐ γὰρ βασιλεῖς, ἔφασαν, ἄμμιν, ἀλλὰ βασιλείδια γεννάσει.

It is understanding the rights and privileges of friendship very ill, to be capable of rendering it in this manner the accomplice of crimes, and the protectress of bad actions. The fundamental law of friendship, says Cicero, is never to ask of, or grant any thing to friends, that is not consistent with justice and honour: [a] *Hæc prima lex in amicitiâ sanciatur; ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati.*

Agesilaus was not so delicate in this point, at least in the beginning, and omitted no occasion of gratifying his friends, and even his enemies. By this officious and obliging conduct, supported by his extraordinary merit, he acquired great credit, and almost absolute power in the city, which ran so high as to render him suspected by his country. The Ephori, to prevent its effects, and give a check to his ambition, laid a fine upon him; alleging as their sole reason, * that he attached the hearts of the citizens to himself alone, which were the right of the republic, and ought not to be possessed but in common.

When he was declared king, he was put into possession of the whole estate of his brother Agis, of which Leotychides was deprived as a bastard. But seeing the relations of that prince, on the side of his mother Lampito, were all very poor, though persons of much worth, he divided the whole inheritance with them, and by that act of generosity acquired great reputation, and the good-will of all the world, instead of the envy and hatred which he might have drawn upon himself by the inheritance. These sort of sacrifices are glorious, though rare, and can never be sufficiently esteemed.

Never was king of Sparta so powerful as Agesilaus, and it was only, as Xenophon says, by obeying his country in every thing, that he acquired so great an authority; which seems a kind of paradox, thus explained by Plutarch. The greatest power was vested at that time in the Ephori and senate. The office of the Ephori subsisted only one year; they were instituted to limit the too great power of the kings, and to serve as a barrier against it, as we have observed elsewhere. For this reason the kings of Sparta, from their earliest establishment, had always retained a kind of hereditary aversion for them,

[a] *De Amicit.* n. 40.

* Ὅτι τὰς κοινὰς πολίτας, ἰδίους κτᾶται.

and continually opposed their measures. Agesilaus took a quite contrary method. Instead of being perpetually at war with them, and clashing upon all occasions with their measures, he made it his business to cultivate their good opinion, treated them always with the utmost deference and regard, never entered upon the least enterprise, without having first communicated it to them, and upon their summons quitted every thing, and repaired to the senate with the utmost promptitude and resignation. Whenever he sat upon his throne to administer justice, if the Ephori entered, he never failed to rise up to do them honour. By all these instances of respect, he seemed to add new dignity to their office, whilst in reality he augmented his own power, without its being observed, and added to the sovereignty a grandeur by so much the more solid and permanent, as it was the effect of the people's good-will and esteem for him. The greatest of the Roman emperors, as Augustus, Trajan, and Marcus Antoninus, were convinced, that the utmost a prince could do to honour and exalt the dignity of the principal magistrates, was only adding to his own power and strengthening his authority, which neither should, nor can be founded in any thing but justice.

Such was Agesilaus, of whom much will be said hereafter, and whose character it was therefore necessary to develope.

SECT. II. AGESILAUS SETS OUT FOR ASIA. LYSANDER FALLS OUT WITH HIM, AND RETURNS TO SPARTA. HIS AMBITIOUS DESIGNS TO ALTER THE SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE.—[b] Agesilaus had scarce ascended the throne, when accounts came from Asia that the king of Persia was fitting out a great fleet in Phœnicia, with intent to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the empire of the sea. Conon's letters, seconded by the remonstrances of Pharnabasus, who had in concert represented to Artaxerxes the power of Sparta as formidable, had made a strong impression upon that prince. From that time he had it seriously in his thoughts to humble that proud republic, by raising up its rival, and by that means

A. M. 3608. Ant. J. C. 396.

[b] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iii. p. 495, 496. *De Agesil.* p. 652. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 598. *In Lysand.* p. 446.

reestablishing the ancient balance between them, which could alone assure his safety, by keeping them perpetually employed against each other, and thereby prevented from uniting their forces against him.

Lysander, who desired to be sent into Asia, in order to reestablish his creatures and friends in the government of the cities, from which Sparta had removed them, strongly inclined Agesilaus to take upon himself the charge of the war, and to anticipate the barbarian king, by attacking him at a great distance from Greece, before he should have finished his preparations. The republic having made this proposal to him, he could not refuse it, and charged himself with the expedition against Artaxerxes, upon condition that thirty Spartan captains should be granted him, to assist him and compose his council, with two thousand new citizens to be chosen out of the helots who had been lately made freemen, and six thousand troops of the allies, which was immediately resolved. Lysander was placed at the head of the thirty Spartans, not only upon account of his great reputation, and the authority he had acquired, but for the particular friendship between him and Agesilaus, who was indebted to him for the throne, as well as for the honour which had been lately conferred upon him of being elected generalissimo.

The glorious return of the Greeks who had followed Cyrus, whom the whole power of Persia had not been able to prevent from retreating into their own country, had inspired all Greece with a wonderful confidence in her own strength, and a supreme contempt for the barbarians. In this disposition of the public mind, the Lacedæmonians conceived it would be a reproach to them, not to take advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for delivering the Greeks in Asia from their subjection to those barbarians, and for putting an end to the outrages and violence with which they were continually oppressing them. They had already attempted this by their generals Thimbron and Dercyllidas; but all their endeavours having hitherto proved ineffectual, they referred the conduct of this war to the care of Agesilaus. He promised them either to conclude a glorious peace with the Persians, or to employ them so effectually, as

should leave them neither leisure nor inclination to carry the war into Greece. The king had great views, and thought of no less than attacking Artaxerxes in Persia itself.'

[c] When he arrived at Ephesus, Tissaphernes sent to demand what reason had induced him to come into Asia, and why he had taken up arms. He replied, that he came to aid the Greeks who inhabited there, and to reestablish them in their ancient liberty. The satrap, who was not yet prepared, made use of art in the place of force, and assured him that his master would give the Grecian cities of Asia their liberty, provided he committed no acts of hostility till the return of the couriers. Agesilaus agreed, and the truce was sworn to on both sides. Tissaphernes, who laid no great stress upon an oath, took advantage of this delay to assemble troops on all sides. The Lacedæmonian general was apprized of it, but however kept his word; being convinced, that in affairs of state the breach of faith can have but a very short and precarious success; whereas a reputation established upon inviolable fidelity in the observance of engagements, which even the perfidy of other contracting parties has not power to alter, will establish a credit and confidence equally useful and glorious. In fact, Xenophon remarks, that this religious observation of treaties gained him the universal esteem and opinion of the cities; whilst the contrary conduct of Tissaphernes entirely lost him their favour.

Agesilaus made use of this interval in acquiring an exact knowledge of the state of the cities, and in making suitable regulations. He found great disorder every where, their government being neither democratical, as under the Athenians, nor aristocratical, as Lysander had established it. [d] The people of the country had had no communication with Agesilaus, nor had ever known him; for which reason they made no court to him, conceiving, that he had the title of general for form sake only, and that the whole power was really vested in Lysander. As no governor had ever done so much good to his friends or hurt to his enemies, it is not wonderful that he was so much beloved by the one

A. M. 3609. Ant. J. C. 395.

[c] Xenoph. p. 496, 652.
[d] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 599, 600. *In Lysand.* p. 446, 447.

and feared by the other. All therefore were eager to pay their homage to him, were every day in crowds at his door, and made his train very numerous when he went abroad; whilst Agesilaus remained almost alone. Such a conduct could not fail of offending a general and king extremely sensible and delicate in what regarded his authority, though otherwise not jealous of any one's merit, but, on the contrary, much inclined to distinguish it with his favour. He did not dissemble his disgust. He no longer paid regard to Lysander's recommendations, and ceased to employ him himself. Lysander presently perceived this alteration towards him. He discontinued his applications for his friends to the king, desired them not to visit him any more, nor attach themselves to him, but to address themselves directly to the king, and to cultivate the favour of those who in the present times had power to serve and advance their creatures. The greatest part of them gave over importuning him with their affairs, but did not cease to pay their court to him. On the contrary, they were only more assiduous than ever about his person, attended him in throngs when he took the air abroad, and regularly assisted at all his exercises. Lysander, naturally vain, and long accustomed to the homage and submission that attend on absolute power, did not take sufficient care to remove the busy crowd from his person, that continually made their addresses to him with more application than ever.

This ridiculous affectation of authority and grandeur grew still more and more offensive to Agesilaus, and seemed as if intended to insult him. He resented it so highly, that having given the most considerable commands and best governments to private officers, he appointed Lysander commissary of the stores, and distributer of provisions; and afterwards, to insult and deride the Ionians, he told them, 'that they might now go and consult his master-butcher.'

Lysander thought it then incumbent upon him to speak, and to come to an explanation with him. Their conversation was brief and laconic. 'Certainly, my lord,' said Lysander, 'you very well know how to depress your friends.' 'Yes, when they would set themselves above me; but when they study to exalt my dignity, I know also how to let them share in it.'

'But perhaps, my lord,' replied Lysander, 'I have been injured by false reports, and things I never did have been imputed to me. I must beg therefore, if it be only upon account of the strangers, who have all of them their eyes upon us, that you would give me an employment in your army, wherein you shall think me least capable of displeasing, and most of serving you effectually.'

The result of this conversation was, that Agesilaus gave him the lieutenancy of the Hellespont. In this employment he retained all his resentment, without however neglecting any part of his duty, or omitting any step that might conduce to the success of affairs. Some short time after he returned to Sparta, without any marks of honour or distinction, extremely incensed against Agesilaus, and trusting to make him feel his resentment very sensibly.

It must be allowed that Lysander's conduct, as we have here represented it, denotes a vanity and narrowness of mind on his side, highly unworthy of his reputation. Perhaps Agesilaus carried too far his sensibility and delicacy on the point of honour, and was a little too severe upon a friend and benefactor, whom a secret reprimand, attended with frankness and expressions of kindness, might have reclaimed to his duty. But, brilliant as Lysander's merit, and considerable as the services he had rendered Agesilaus, might be, they could not all of them give him a right, not only to an equality with his king and general, but to the superiority he affected, which in some measure tended to make the other insignificant. He ought to have remembered, that it is never allowable for an inferior to forget himself, and to exceed the bounds of a just subordination.

[a] Upon his return to Sparta he had it seriously in his thoughts to execute a project, which he had many years revolved in his mind. At Sparta there were only two families, or rather branches, of the posterity of Hercules, who had a right to the throne. When Lysander had attained to that high degree of power which his great actions had acquired him, he began to see with pain a city, whose glory had been so much augmented by his exploits, under the government of

[a] Plut. *in Lysand.* p. 447, 448. Diod. l. xiv. p. 244, 245.

princes to whom he was inferior neither in valour nor birth; for he was descended, as well as themselves, from Hercules. He therefore sought means to deprive those two houses of the sole succession to the crown, and to extend that right to all the other branches of the Heraclidæ, and even, according to some, to all the natives of Sparta; flattering himself, that if his design took effect, no Spartan could be capable of disputing that honour with him, and that he should have the preference over all others.

This ambitious project of Lysander shows, that the greatest captains are often those from whom a republic has most to apprehend. Those haughty, valiant spirits, accustomed to absolute power in armies, bring back with victory a daring loftiness of mind, always to be dreaded in a free state. Sparta, in giving Lysander unlimited power, and leaving it for so many years in his hands, did not sufficiently consider, that nothing is more dangerous than to confide to persons of superior merit and abilities employments which confer supreme authority, which naturally exposes them to the temptation of rendering themselves independent, and retaining in their own hands absolute power. Lysander was not proof against it, and practised secretly to open himself a way to the throne.

The undertaking was bold, and required long preparations. He thought it impossible to succeed without he could first, through fear of the divinity and the terrors of superstition, amaze and subdue the citizens into a more easy disposition to receive what he wanted to have them understand; for he knew that at Sparta, as well as throughout all Greece, nothing of the least importance was determined, without the oracle's being previously consulted. He strove by great presents to influence the priests and priestesses of Delphi, Dodona, and Ammon; though ineffectually at that time; and the latter even sent ambassadors to Sparta, to accuse him of impiety and sacrilege; but he extricated himself from that difficulty by his credit and address.

It was necessary to set other engines at work. A woman in the kingdom of Pontus, affirming that she was with child by Apollo, had been delivered some years before of a son, to whom the name of Silenus was given, and the greatest persons

of that nation had contended with eagerness for the honour of nursing and educating him. Lysander, taking this wondrous birth for the commencement, and in a manner the ground-work, of the plot he was meditating, supplied the rest himself, by employing a good number of persons, and those of no inconsiderable station, to spread abroad, by way of prologue to the piece, the miraculous birth of this infant; and, as they did this without the appearance of any affectation, people were disposed to believe it. This being done, they brought certain rumours from Delphi to Sparta, which were industriously spread abroad every where: that the priests of the temple had in their custody some books of very ancient oracles, which they kept concealed from all the world, and of which it was not permitted, either for them or any other persons whatsoever, to have any knowledge; and that only a son of Apollo, who was to come in process of time, after having given undoubted proofs of his birth to those who had the books in their keeping, was to take and carry them away.

All this being well arranged, Silenus was to present himself to the priests, and to demand those oracles as the son of Apollo; and the priests, who were in the secret, as actors well prepared and fully instructed in their parts, were on their side to make the most exact and circumstantial inquiry into every thing, not without affecting great difficulty, and asking endless questions for the full proof of his birth. At length, as absolutely convinced that this Silenus was the real son of Apollo, they were to produce the books, and deliver them to him; after which, this son of Apollo was to read the prophecies contained in them, in the presence of all the world; and particularly that for which the whole contrivance had been fabricated. The purport of this prediction was, 'That it was more expedient and advantageous for the Spartans to elect no king for the future but the most worthy of their citizens.' Lysander in consequence was to mount the tribunal, to harangue the citizens, and induce them to make this alteration. Cleon of Halicarnassus, a celebrated rhetorician, had composed a very eloquent discourse for him upon the subject, which he had got by heart.

Silenus, when grown up, having repaired to Greece in order

to play his part, Lysander had the mortification to see his piece miscarry, by the timidity and desertion of one of his principal actors, who broke his word, and disappeared at the very instant it was to have been performed. Though this intrigue had been carried on a great while, it was transacted with so much secresy to the very time that it was to have made its appearance, that nothing of it was known during the life of Lysander. How it came to light after his death we shall soon relate, but must at present return to Tissaphernes.

SECT. III. EXPEDITION OF AGESILAUS IN ASIA. DISGRACE AND DEATH OF TISSAPHERNES. SPARTA GIVES AGESILAUS THE COMMAND OF ITS ARMIES BY SEA AND LAND. HE DEPUTES PISANDER TO COMMAND THE FLEET. INTERVIEW OF AGESILAUS WITH PHARNABASUS.—[f] When Tissaphernes had received the troops sent to him by the king, and drawn together all his forces, he sent to command Agesilaus to retire out of Asia, and declared war against him in case of refusal. His officers were all alarmed, not believing him in a condition to oppose the great army of the Persian king. For himself, he heard Tissaphernes's heralds with a gay and easy countenance, and bade them tell their master, that he was under a very great obligation to him 'for having made the gods, by his perjury, the enemies of Persia and the friends of Greece.' He promised himself great things from this expedition, and would have thought it an exceeding disgrace for him, that ten thousand Greeks, under the command of Xenophon, should have passed through the heart of Asia to the Grecian sea, and beaten the king of Persia as often as he appeared against them; and that he who commanded the Lacedæmonians, whose empire extended all over Greece by sea and land, should not execute some brilliant exploit worthy of remembrance.

At first, therefore, to take vengeance for the perfidy of Tissaphernes by a just and allowable deceit, he made a feint of marching his army into Caria, the residence of that satrap; and as soon as the barbarian had caused all his troops to march that way, he turned short, and fell upon Phrygia, where

[f] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iii. p. 497—502. *De Agesil.* p. 652—656. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 600.

he took many towns, and amassed immense treasures, which he distributed amongst the officers and soldiers; letting his friends see, says Plutarch, that to break a treaty, and violate an oath, is to despise the gods themselves? and that, on the contrary, to deceive an enemy by the stratagems of war, is not only just and glorious, but a sensible delight attended with the greatest advantages.

The spring being come, he assembled all his forces at Ephesus; and to exercise his soldiers, he proposed prizes both for the horse and foot. This small inducement set every thing in motion. The place for exercises was perpetually full of all kinds of troops, and the city of Ephesus seemed only a palæstra, and a school of war. The whole market-place was filled with horses and arms, and the shops with different kinds of military equipages. Agesilaus was seen returning from the exercises, followed by a crowd of officers and soldiers, all of them crowned with wreaths, which they were going to deposit in the temple of Diana, to the great admiration and delight of every one. For, says Xenophon, where piety and discipline are seen to flourish, the best hopes must be conceived.

To give his soldiers new valour by inspiring them with contempt for their enemies, he made use of this contrivance. He one day ordered the commissaries, who had charge of the booty, to strip the prisoners and expose them to sale. There were abundance who were ready to buy their habits; but as to the prisoners, their bodies were so soft, white, and delicate, having been nurtured and brought up in the shade, that they laughed at them, as of neither service nor value. Agesilaus took this occasion to approach and say to his soldiers, pointing to the men, 'See there against whom you fight;' and showing them their rich spoils, 'and there for what you fight.

When the season for taking the field returned, Agesilaus gave out that he would march into Lydia. Tissaphernes, who had not forgotten the first stratagem he had used in regard to him, and was not willing to be deceived a second time, made his troops march directly for Caria; not doubting but at this time Agesilaus would turn his arms that way; the rather because it was natural for him, as he wanted cavalry, to endeavour to make a rough and difficult country the seat of action,

which might render the horse of an enemy useless and unserviceable. But he deceived himself: Agesilaus entered Lydia, and approached Sardis. Tissaphernes hastened thither with his horse, with intent to relieve the place. Agesilaus, knowing that his infantry could not yet have had time to arrive, thought proper to take the advantage of so favourable an opportunity to give him battle, before he had reassembled all his troops. He drew up his army in two lines; the first he formed of his squadrons, whose intervals he filled up with platoons of the light-armed foot, and ordered them to begin the charge; whilst he followed with the second line, composed of his heavy-armed infantry. The barbarians did not sustain the first shock, but took to their heels immediately. The Greeks pursued them, and forced their camp, where they made a great slaughter, and a still greater booty.

[g] After this battle the troops of Agesilaus were at entire liberty to plunder and ravage the whole country of the Great King, and at the same time had the satisfaction to see that prince inflict an exemplary punishment upon Tissaphernes, who was a very wicked man, and the most dangerous enemy of the Greeks. [h] The king had already received abundance of complaints against his conduct. Upon this occasion he was accused of treason, as not having done his duty in the battle. Queen Parysatis, always actuated by her hatred and revenge against those who had any share in the death of her son Cyrus, did not a little contribute to the death of Tissaphernes by aggravating with all her power the charges against him; for she had been entirely restored to favour by the king her son.

As Tissaphernes had great authority in Asia, the king was afraid to attack him openly, but thought it necessary to take suitable precautions, in order to secure so powerful an officer, who might prove a dangerous enemy. He charged Tithraustes with that important commission, and gave him two letters at the same time. The first was for Tissaphernes, and contained the king's orders in regard to the war with the Greeks, with full power to act as was requisite. The second was addressed to Ariæus, governor of Larissa; by which the king commanded

[g] Xenoph. p. 501, 657. Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1022. *In Agesil.* p. 601.
[h] Diod. l. xiv. p. 299. Polyæn. *Stratag.* l. vii.

him to assist Tithraustes with his advice and all his forces in seizing Tissaphernes. He lost no time, and sent to desire Tissaphernes would come to him, that they might confer together upon the operations of the ensuing campaign. Tissaphernes, who suspected nothing, went to him with only a guard of three hundred men. Whilst he was in a bath, without sabre or other arms, he was seized, and put into the hands of Tithraustes, who caused his head to be struck off, and sent it immediately to Persia. The king gave it to Parysatis; an agreeable present to a princess of her violent and vindictive temper. Though this conduct of Artaxerxes seems little worthy of a king, nobody lamented the death of that satrap, who had no veneration for the gods, nor any regard for men; who looked upon probity and honour as empty names; who made a jest of the most sacred oaths, and believed the whole ability and policy of a statesman consisted in knowing how to deceive others by hypocrisy, fraud, perfidy, and perjury.

Tithraustes had a third letter from the king, whereby he was appointed to command the armies in the room of Tissaphernes. [1] After having executed his commission, he sent great presents to Agesilaus, to induce him to enter more readily into his views and interests; and ordered him to be told, that, as the cause of the war was now removed, and the author of all these commotions put to death, nothing opposed an accommodation; that the king of Persia consented that the cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, paying him the customary tribute, provided he would withdraw his troops and return into Greece. Agesilaus replied, that he could conclude nothing without the orders of Sparta, upon whom alone depended the peace; that as for him, he was better pleased with enriching his soldiers than himself; that the Greeks besides thought it more glorious and honourable to take spoils from their enemies, than to accept their presents. However, as he was not unwilling to give Tithraustes the satisfaction of removing out of his province, and of expressing his gratitude to him for having punished the common enemy of the Greeks, he marched into Phrygia, which was the province of Pharnabasus.

Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iii. p. 501. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 601.

Tithraustes had himself proposed that expedition to him, and paid him thirty talents for the charges of his journey.

Upon his march he received a letter from the magistrates of Sparta, with orders to take upon him the command of the naval army, and liberty to depute whom he thought fit in his stead. By these new powers he saw himself absolute commander of all the troops of that state in Asia both by sea and land. This resolution was taken, in order that all operations being directed by one and the same head, and the two armies acting in concert, the plans for the service might be executed with more uniformity, and every thing conspire to the same end. Sparta till then had never conferred this honour upon any of her generals, of intrusting to him at the same time the command of the armies by sea and land. So that all the world agreed, that he was the greatest personage of his time, and best sustained the high reputation he enjoyed. But he was a man, and had his failings.

The first thing he did was to establish Pisander his lieutenant in the fleet; in which he seemed to have committed a considerable fault; because, as he had about him many older and more experienced captains, yet without regard to the service of the public, to do honour to a relation, and to please his wife, who was Pisander's sister, he intrusted him with the command of the fleet; an employment much above his abilities, though he was not without his merit.

This is the common temptation of persons in power, who believe they possess it only for themselves and their families; as if the advantage of relation to them was a sufficient title and qualification for posts which require great abilities. They do not reflect, that they not only expose the affairs of a state to ruin by their private views, but sacrifice besides the interests of their own glory, which cannot be maintained but by successes which it were inconsistent to expect from instruments so ill chosen.

A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. [k] Agesilaus continued with his army in Phrygia, upon the lands of Pharnabasus's government, where he lived in abundance of all things, and amassed great sums of money. From thence advancing as far as Paphlagonia, he made an alliance with king Cotys, who earnestly

[k] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iv. p. 507—510.

desired his amity, from the sense he entertained of his faith in the observance of treaties, and his other virtues. The same motive had already induced Spithridates, one of the king's principal officers, to quit the service of Pharnabasus, and go over to Agesilaus, to whom, since his revolt, he had rendered great services; for he had a great body of troops, and was very brave. This officer, having entered Phrygia, had laid waste the whole country under Pharnabasus, who never dared appear in the field against him, nor even trust himself to his fortresses: but carrying away whatever was most valuable and dear to him, he kept flying continually before him, and retired from one place to another, changing his camp every day. Spithridates at length, taking with him some Spartan troops, with Herippidas, (the chief of the new council of thirty sent by the republic to Agesilaus the second year,) watched him one day so closely, and attacked him so successfully, that he made himself master of his camp, and of all the rich spoils with which it abounded. But Herippidas, injudiciously setting himself up as an inexorable comptroller, was for bringing the booty that had been secreted to an account; forced even the soldiers of Spithridates to restore what they had taken, and by visiting their tents, and searching them with an unseasonable exactitude and severity, affronted Spithridates to such a degree, that he withdrew directly to Sardis with his Paphlagonians.

It is said, that in this whole expedition nothing so sensibly affected Agesilaus as the retreat of Spithridates. For, besides his being very sorry for the loss of so good an officer and so good troops, he apprehended being reproached with mean and sordid avarice: a vice equally dishonourable to himself and his country; and the slightest suspicion of which he had taken pains to avoid during his whole life. He did not think it consistent with the duty of his office to shut his eyes, through slothful ease and indolence, against all the malversations that were committed under him; but he knew, at the same time, that there is an exactitude and severity, which, by being carried too far, degenerates into minuteness and petulancy, and which, through an extreme affectation of virtue, becomes a real and dangerous vice.

[1] Some time after, Pharnabasus, who saw his whole country ravaged, demanded an interview with Agesilaus, which was negotiated by a common friend of them both. Agesilaus arrived first with his friends at the place agreed on; and while waiting for Pharnabasus, sat down upon the turf under the shade of a tree. When Pharnabasus arrived, his people spread skins upon the ground of exceeding softness from the length of their hair, with rich carpets of various colours, and magnificent cushions. But when he saw Agesilaus sitting merely upon the ground, without any preparation, he was ashamed of his effeminacy, and sat down also upon the grass. On this occasion the Persian pride was seen to pay homage to the Spartan modesty and simplicity.

After reciprocal salutations, Pharnabasus spoke to this effect: That he had served the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnesian war to the utmost of his power, fought several battles for them, and supported their naval army, without giving any room to reproach him with fraud or treachery, as Tissaphernes had done: that he was surprised at their coming to attack him in his government; burning the towns, cutting down the trees, and laying waste the whole country: that if it was the custom with the Greeks, who made profession of honour and virtue, to treat their friends and benefactors in such a manner, he did not know what they might mean by just and equitable. These complaints were not entirely without foundation, and were uttered with a modest, but pathetic, air and tone of voice. The Spartans, who attended Agesilaus, not seeing how they could be answered, cast down their eyes, and kept a profound silence. Agesilaus, who observed it, replied almost in these terms: 'Lord Pharnabasus, you are not ignorant that war often arms the best friends against each other for the defence of their country. Whilst we were such to the king your master, we treated him as a friend; but, as we are become his enemies, we make open war against him, as it is just we should, and endeavour to hurt him by the injuries we do you. However, from the instant you shall think fit to throw off the ignominious yoke of bondage, and prefer being

[1] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iv. p. 510, 511. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 602.

called the friend and ally of the Greeks, before the name of the king of Persia's slave, you may reckon that all the troops you see before your eyes, our arms, our ships, our persons to the last man of us, are only here to defend your possessions, and secure your liberty, which of all blessings is the most precious and desirable.'

Pharnabasus answered, that if the king sent another general in his place, and subjected him to the new-comer, he should very willingly accept his offer; that otherwise he would not depart from the faith he had sworn to him, nor quit his service. Agesilaus then taking him by the hand, and rising with him, replied, 'Would it were the pleasure of the gods, Lord Pharnabasus, that, with such noble sentiments, you were rather our friend than our enemy!' He promised to withdraw from his government, and never return into it, whilst he could subsist elsewhere.

SECT. IV. LEAGUE AGAINST THE LACEDÆMONIANS. AGESILAUS RECALLED BY THE EPHORI TO DEFEND HIS COUNTRY, OBEYS DIRECTLY. LYSANDER'S DEATH. VICTORY OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS NEAR NEMÆA. THEIR FLEET IS BEATEN BY CONON OFF CNIDOS. BATTLE GAINED BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS AT CORONEA.—[m] Agesilaus had been two years at the head of the army, and had already made the provinces of upper Asia tremble at his name, and resound with the fame of his great wisdom, disinterestedness, moderation, intrepid valour in the greatest dangers, and invincible patience in supporting the rudest fatigues. Of so many thousand soldiers under his command, not one was worse provided, or lay harder, than himself. He was so indifferent as to heat or cold, that he alone seemed formed * to support the most rigorous seasons, and such as it pleased God to send. These are Plutarch's express words.

A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394.

The most agreeable of all sights to the Greeks settled in Asia, was to see the lieutenants of the great king, his satraps, and other great lords, who were formerly so haughty and morose, soften their note in the presence of a man meanly

[m] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 603, 604. Xenoph. *in Agesil.* p. 657.

* Ὥσπερ μόνος ἀεὶ χρῆσθαι ταῖς ὑπὸ θεοῦ κεκραμέναις ὥραις πεφυκώς.

clad, and at his single word, however short and laconic, change their language and conduct, and in a manner transform themselves into different creatures. Deputies from all parts were sent by the people to form alliances with him, and his army increased every day by the troops of the barbarians that came to join him.

All Asia was already in motion, and most of the provinces ready to revolt. Agesilaus had already restored order and tranquillity in all the cities, had reinstated them in the possession of their liberty under reasonable modifications, not only without shedding of blood, but without even banishing a single person. Not content with such a progress, he had formed the design of attacking the king of Persia in the heart of his dominions, to put him in fear for his own person and the tranquillity he enjoyed in Ecbatana and Susa, and to find him so much business as should make it impracticable for him to embroil all Greece from his cabinet, by corrupting the orators and persons of greatest authority in its cities with his presents.

[n] Tithraustes, who commanded for the king in Asia, seeing the tendency of Agesilaus's designs, and desiring to prevent their effects, had sent Timocrates of Rhodes into Greece, with great sums of money to corrupt the principal persons in the cities, and by their means occasion commotions against Sparta. He knew that the haughtiness of the Lacedæmonians, (for all their generals did not resemble Agesilaus,) and the imperious manner with which they treated their neighbours and allies, especially since they considered themselves as the masters of Greece, had universally disgusted the people, and excited a jealousy that waited only an occasion to break out against them. This severity of governing had a natural cause in their education. Accustomed from their infancy to obey without delay or reply, first their tutors, and afterwards their magistrates, they exacted a like submission from the cities dependent upon them, were easily incensed by the least opposition, and by this punctilious and excessive severity rendered themselves insupportable.

Tithraustes therefore did not find it difficult to draw off the allies from their party. Thebes, Argos, Corinth, entered into

[n] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iii. p. 502—507. Plut. *in Lysand.* p. 449—451.

his measures: the deputy did not go to Athens. These three cities, influenced by those that governed them, made a league against the Lacedæmonians, who on their side prepared vigorously for the war. The Thebans at the same time sent deputies to the Athenians, to implore their aid, and induce them to enter into the alliance. The deputies, after having slightly passed over their ancient divisions, insisted strongly upon the considerable service they had rendered Athens, in refusing to join its enemies when they endeavoured its final destruction. They represented to them the favourable opportunity that offered for reinstating themselves in their ancient power, and for depriving the Lacedæmonians of the empire of Greece: that all the allies of Sparta, either without or within Greece, were weary of their severe and unjust sway, and waited only the signal to revolt: that the moment the Athenians should declare themselves, all the cities would rouse up at the sound of their arms; and that the king of Persia, who had sworn the ruin of Sparta, would aid them with all his forces both by sea and land.

Thrasybulus, whom the Thebans had supplied with arms and money when he undertook the reestablishment of the Athenian liberty, seconded their demand with great vigour, and the aid was unanimously resolved. The Lacedæmonians on their side took the field without loss of time, and entered Phocis. Lysander wrote to Pausanias, who commanded one of the two armies, to give him notice to march early the next day to Haliartus, which he designed to besiege, and that he should be there himself at sunrise. The letter was intercepted. Lysander, after having waited his coming up a great while, was obliged to engage, and was killed in the battle. Pausanias received this bad news on his way; but, however, continued his march to Haliartus, and called a council of war to consider upon a second battle. He did not think it consistent with prudence to hazard it, and contented himself with making a truce, to remove the bodies of those who had fallen in the former fight. Upon his return to Sparta, he was cited to give an account of his conduct; and, refusing to appear, was condemned to die. But he avoided the execution of that sentence by flight, and retired to Tegea, where he passed the remainder of his life

under the shelter and protection of Minerva, to whom he had rendered himself a suppliant, and died of disease.

Lysander's poverty, having been discovered after his death, did great honour to his memory; when it was known, that of all the gold and riches which had passed through his hands, of a power so extensive as his had been, of so many cities under his government and which made their court to him; in a word, of that kind of dominion and sovereignty always exercised by him, he had made no manner of advantage for the advancement and enriching of his house.

Some days before his death, two of the principal citizens of Sparta had contracted themselves to his two daughters; but when they knew in what condition he had left his affairs, they refused to marry them. The republic did not suffer so sordid a baseness to go unpunished, nor permit Lysander's poverty, which was the strongest proof of his justice and virtue, to be treated as an obstacle to an alliance into his family. They were fined in a great sum, publicly disgraced, and exposed to the contempt of all persons of honour. For at Sparta there were penalties established, not only for such as refused to marry, or married too late, but also for those who married amiss: and those especially were reckoned of this number, who, instead of forming alliances with virtuous families, and with their own relations, had no motive but wealth and lucre in marriage:—an admirable law, tending to perpetuate probity and honour in families, which an impure mixture of blood and manners seldom fails to alter and efface!

It must be owned, that a generous disinterestedness in the midst of all that could inflame and gratify the lust of gain, is very rare, and well worthy of admiration; but in Lysander it was attended with great defects, which sullied its lustre. Without speaking of his imprudence in introducing gold and silver into Sparta, which he despised himself, though he rendered it an object of esteem to his countrymen, and thereby occasioned their ruin. What opinion can we have of a man, brave indeed, capable of conciliating the affections, skilful in affairs, and of great ability in the arts of government and what is commonly called politics, but who regards probity and justice as nothing; to whom falsehood, fraud, and perfidy,

appear legitimate methods for the attainment of his ends; who does not fear, for the advancement of his friends and the augmenting the number of his creatures, to commit the most flagrant injustice and oppressions, and is not ashamed to profane whatever is most sacred in religion, even to the bribing of priests and forging of oracles, to satiate the empty ambition of being equal to a king, and of ascending the throne?

[o] When Agesilaus was upon the point of leading his troops into Persia, the Spartan Epicydidas arrived to let him know that Sparta was threatened with a furious war; that the Ephori recalled him, and ordered him to return immediately for the defence of his country. Agesilaus did not deliberate a moment, but returned this answer immediately to the Ephori, which Plutarch has transmitted to us. [p] 'Agesilaus to the Ephori, greeting.—We have reduced part of Asia, put the barbarians to flight, and made great preparations for war in Ionia: but as you order me to return, I am not far behind this letter, and would anticipate it if possible. I received the command not for myself, but my country and its allies. I know that a general does not deserve, or really fulfil, the duties of that name, but when he suffers himself to be guided by the laws and the Ephori, and obeys the magistrates.'

This ready obedience of Agesilaus has been much admired and applauded, and not without reason. Hannibal, though depressed with misfortunes, and driven almost entirely out of Italy, obeyed his citizens with great reluctance, when they recalled him to deliver Carthage from the dangers that threatened it. Here a victorious prince, ready to enter the enemy's country, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne, almost assured of the success of his arms, on the first order of the Ephori renounces these flattering hopes and most exalted expectations. He demonstrates the truth of what was said, 'That at Sparta the laws ruled men, and not men the laws.'

On his departure he said, 'that thirty thousand of the king's archers drove him out of Asia;' alluding in those words to a species of Persian coin, which had on one side the figure of an archer, thirty thousand of which pieces of money had been

[o] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iv. p. 513. *In Agesil.* p. 667. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 603, 604.

[p] Plut. *in Apoph. Laconic.* p. 211.

dispersed in Greece to corrupt the orators and persons of greatest power in the cities.

[q] Agesilaus on quitting Asia, where he was regretted as the common father of the people, appointed Euxenes his lieutenant, and gave him four thousand men for the defence of the country. Xenophon went with him. He left at Ephesus, with Megabyzus the guardian of Diana's temple, half the gold he had brought with him from his expedition in Persia with Cyrus, to keep it for him in trust, and in case of death to consecrate it to the goddess.

[r] In the mean time the Lacedæmonians had raised an army, and given the command of it to Aristodemus, guardian to king Agesipolis, then an infant. Their enemies assembled to concert the operations of the war. Timolaus of Corinth said, that the Lacedæmonians were like a river that grew larger in proportion as it was more distant from its source; or to a swarm of bees, which it is easy to burn in their hive, but which disperse themselves a great way when they fly abroad, and become formidable by their stings. He was therefore of opinion, that it was proper to attack them in their capital; which was approved and resolved. But the Lacedæmonians did not give them time. They took the field, and found the enemy near Nemæa, a city not very remote from Corinth, where an obstinate battle ensued. The Lacedæmonians had the advantage, which was very considerable. Agesilaus having received this news at Amphipolis, as he was hastening to the relief of his country, sent it directly to the cities of Asia for their encouragement, and gave them hopes of his speedy return, if the success of affairs would admit it.

[s] When the approach of Agesilaus was known at Sparta, the Lacedæmonians that remained in the city, to do him honour for the ready obedience he had paid to their orders, caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that all young persons who were willing to aid their king, might come and list themselves for that purpose. Not one of them failed to enter himself immediately with the utmost joy. But the Ephori chose only fifty of the bravest and most robust, whom

[q] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iv. p. 513. *De Exped. Cyr.* l. v. p. 350.
[r] Xenoph. p. 514—517.
[s] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 605.

they sent him, and desired that he would enter Bœotia with the utmost expedition; which he did accordingly.

[t] About the same time the two fleets came up with each other near Cnidos, a city of Caria: that of the Lacedæmonians was commanded by Pisander, Agesilaus's brother-in-law, and that of the Persians by Pharnabasus and Conon the Athenian. The latter, observing that the king of Persia's supplies came slowly, and occasioned the loss of many favourable opportunities, had resolved to go in person to the court, to solicit the king's assistance. As he would not prostrate himself before him, according to the Persian custom, he could not explain himself but by the intervention of others. He represented to him, with a force and spirit seldom pardoned in those who treat with princes, that it was equally shameful and astonishing, that his ministers, contrary to his intention, should suffer his affairs to be disconcerted and ruined by a disgraceful parsimony; that the richest king in the world should give place to his enemies in the very point in which he was so infinitely superior to them; that is, in riches: and that, for want of remitting to his generals the sums his service required, all their designs were rendered abortive. These remonstrances were free, but just and solid. The king received them perfectly well, and showed, by his example, that truth may often be spoken to princes with success, if courage were not wanting. Conon obtained all he demanded, and the king made him admiral of his fleet.

It was composed of more than fourscore and ten galleys: that of the enemy was somewhat inferior in number. They came in view of each other near Cnidos, a maritime city of Asia Minor. Conon, who had in some measure occasioned the taking of Athens by the loss of the sea-fight near Ægospotamos, used extraordinary efforts in this to retrieve his misfortune, and to obliterate by a glorious victory the disgrace of his former defeat. * He had this advantage, that in the battle he was going to fight, the Persians would be at the whole expense, and bear all the loss themselves; whereas the entire

[t] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iv. p. 519. Diod. l. xiv. p. 302. Justin, l. vi. c. 2, 3.

* Eo speciosiùs, quòd ne ipsorum quidem Atheniensium, sed alieni imperii viribus dimicet, pugnaturus periculo regis, victurus præmio patriæ. Justin.

fruits of the victory would accrue to the Athenians, without hazarding any thing of their own. Pisander had also strong motives to show his valour upon this occasion, that he might not degenerate from the glory of his brother-in-law, and justify the choice he had made in appointing him admiral. In fact, he behaved with extreme valour, and had at first some advantage; but the battle growing warm, and the allies of Sparta betaking themselves to flight, he could not resolve to follow them, and died sword in hand. Conon took fifty galleys, and the rest escaped to Cnidos. The consequence of this victory was the revolt of almost all the allies of Sparta; several of whom declared for the Athenians, and the rest resumed their ancient liberty. After this battle the affairs of the Lacedæmonians daily declined. All their actions in Asia were no more than the feeble efforts of an expiring power, till the defeats of Leuctra and Mantinea completed their downfall.

[u] Isocrates makes a very just reflection upon the revolutions of Sparta and Athens, which had always their source and origin in the insolent prosperity of both those republics. The Lacedæmonians, who were at first acknowledged masters of Greece without opposition, fell from their authority only in consequence of their enormous abuse of it. The Athenians succeeded them in power, and at the same time in pride; and we have seen into what an abyss of misfortunes it precipitated them. Sparta, having regained the superiority by the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily and the taking of their city, ought to have improved in her measures from the double experience of the past; as well in regard to what had befallen herself, as from the recent example of her rival: but the most striking examples and events seldom or ever occasion a people to change their conduct. Sparta became as haughty and untractable as before, and so experienced the same destiny again.

To warn the Athenians against this misfortune, Isocrates puts them in mind of the past, while he addresses them at a time wherein they were successful in every thing. 'You imagine,' says he, 'that as you are provided with a numerous fleet, absolute masters at sea, and supported by powerful allies

[u] Isocrat. *in Orat. Areop.* p. 278—280.

always ready to give you aid, you have nothing to fear, and may enjoy in repose and tranquillity the fruits of your victories:—for my part, suffer me to speak with truth and freedom, I think quite otherwise. The cause of my apprehension is, my having observed, that the decline of the greatest republics has always commenced at the time they believed themselves most powerful; and that their very security has prepared the precipice into which they have fallen. The reason of this is evident. Prosperity and adversity never come alone, but have each their train of very different effects. The first is attended with vain-glory, pride, and insolence, which dazzle the mind, and inspire rash and extravagant measures: on the contrary, the companions of adversity, are modesty, self-diffidence, and circumspection, which naturally render men prudent, and apt to derive advantage from their own failings. So that it is hard to judge which of the two conditions we ought to desire for a city; as that which appears unhappy is an almost certain path to prosperity; and the other, so flattering and splendid, generally leads on to the greatest misfortunes.' The blow which the Lacedæmonians received at the battle of Cnidos is a mournful proof of what he says.

[x] Agesilaus was in Bœotia, and upon the point of giving battle, when this bad news was brought him. Apprehending that it might discourage and deter his troops, he caused it to be reported in the army that the Lacedæmonians had gained a considerable victory at sea; and appearing in public with a wreath of flowers upon his head, he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the good news, and sent part of it in presents to his officers. [y] The two armies, almost equal in strength, were in view of each other upon the plains of Coronæa, and they drew up in battle. Agesilaus gave the left wing to the Orchomenians, and took the right himself. On the other side, the Thebans were upon the right, and the Argives on the left. Xenophon says, that this was the most furious battle of any that had been fought in his time: and we may believe him, as he was present in it, and fought near the person of Agesilaus, with whom he had returned from Asia.

[x] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 605.
[y] Plut. ibid. Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* p. 518—520. *In Agesil.* p. 659, 660.

The first charge was not very obstinate, nor of long continuance. The Thebans soon put the Orchomenians to flight, and Agesilaus overthrew and routed the Argives. But both parties, having learned that their left wing had been very severely handled and had fled, returned immediately; Agesilaus to oppose the Thebans and to wrest the victory out of their hands, and the Thebans to follow their left wing that was retired to Helicon. Agesilaus at that moment might have assured himself of a complete victory, if he would have let the Thebans pass on, and had afterwards charged them in the rear; but carried away by the ardour of his courage, he resolved to stop them with an attack in front, and to beat them by pure force. In which, says Xenophon, he showed more valour than prudence.

The Thebans, seeing Agesilaus advance against them, drew all their foot immediately into one body, formed a hollow square, and waited his coming up in good order. The engagement was sharp and bloody on all sides, but particularly where Agesilaus fought at the head of the fifty young Spartans, who had been sent him by the city. The valour and emulation of those young men were of great service to Agesilaus, and may be said to have saved his life; for they fought around him with exceeding ardour, and exposed themselves foremost in all dangers for the safety of his person. They could not however prevent his receiving several wounds through his armour from pikes and swords. Notwithstanding, with the utmost efforts they brought him off alive from the enemy; and making their bodies a rampart for him, sacrificed a great number of Thebans in his defence: and many of those young men were also left upon the field. At length, finding it too difficult to break the Thebans in front, they were forced to have recourse to what they had at first rejected. They opened their phalanx to let them pass; which when they had done, as they marched afterwards in more disorder, they charged them again upon the flanks and rear. They could, however, neither break them nor put them to flight. Those brave Thebans made their retreat continually fighting, and gained Helicon, elated with the success of the battle, wherein on their side they had always remained invincible.

Agesilaus, though very much weakened by the great number of his wounds, and the quantity of blood he had lost, would not retire to his tent till he had been carried to the place where his phalanx was drawn up, and had seen all the dead bodies removed even upon their own arms. He was informed there, that many of the enemy had taken refuge in the temple of the Itonian Minerva, which was not very distant from the field of battle, and asked what he would have done with them. As he was full of veneration for the gods, he gave orders to let them go, and even sent them a guard to escort them in safety wherever they thought fit.

The next morning, Agesilaus, to try whether the Thebans would have the courage to renew the battle, commanded his troops to crown themselves with flowers, and the music of the army to play, whilst a trophy was erected and adorned in honour of his victory. At the same instant the enemy sent heralds to demand his permission to bury their dead; which he granted, with a truce; and having confirmed his victory by that act of a conqueror, he caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian games were then celebrated. He made there a solemn procession, which was followed by a sacrifice, and consecrated to the god the tenth part of the booty taken in Asia, which amounted to a hundred talents.* These great men, no less religious than brave, never failed to express by presents their gratitude to the gods for their successes in arms; declaring, by that public homage, that they believed themselves indebted to their protection for their victories.

SECT. V. AGESILAUS RETURNS VICTORIOUS TO SPARTA. HE ALWAYS RETAINS HIS SIMPLICITY AND ANCIENT MANNERS. CONON REBUILDS THE WALLS OF ATHENS. A PEACE, DISGRACEFUL TO THE GREEKS, CONCLUDED BY ANTALCIDAS THE LACEDÆMONIAN.—[z] After the festival, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. His citizens received him with all the marks of the most real joy, and beheld him with admiration, when they observed the simplicity of his manners and the constant

[z] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 606.

* A hundred thousand crowns, or about 22,500*l.* sterling.

frugality and temperance of his life. At his return from foreign countries, where pomp, luxury, sloth, and the love of pleasures prevailed, he was not infected with the manners of the barbarians, as most of the other generals had been: he made no alteration in his diet, baths, equipage of his wife, ornaments of his arms, or furniture of his house. In the midst of so brilliant a reputation, and the universal applause, always the same, or rather more modest than before, he distinguished himself from the rest of the citizens, only by a greater submission to the laws, and a more inviolable attachment to the customs of his country; convinced, that he was king, only to be the brighter example of those virtues to others.

[a] He made greatness consist in virtue only. Hearing the Great King (so the kings of Persia used to call themselves) spoken of in magnificent terms, and his power extremely extolled; * 'I cannot conceive,' said he, 'wherein he is greater than I, unless he be more virtuous.'

There were at Sparta some citizens, who, vitiated by the prevailing taste of Greece, made their merit and glory consist in keeping a great number of horses for the race. He persuaded his sister Cynisca to dispute the prize in the Olympic games, in order to show the Greeks that those victories, on which they set so high a value, were not the effects of valour and bravery, but of riches and expense. She was the first of her sex who shared in this honour. He had not the same opinion of the exercises which contribute to render the body more robust, and inure it to labour and fatigue; and, to place them in greater estimation, would often honour them with his presence.

Sometime after Lysander's death, he discovered the conspiracy formed by that captain against the two kings, which till then had not been heard of, and came to light by a kind of accident, in the following manner: [b] Upon some affairs which related to the government, it was necessary to consult Lysander's papers, and Agesilaus went to his house for that purpose. In running them over, he fell upon the sheets which contained at large the harangue of Cleon, which had been prepared to

[a] Plut. *de sui laud.* p. 555. [b] Id. *in Agesil.* p. 606.

* Τί δ' ἐμοῦ γε μείζον ἐκεῖνος, εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερος.

recommend the new method of proceeding in the election of kings. Surprised at perusing it, he gave over his search, and went away abruptly, to communicate that oration to the citizens, and to let them see what manner of man Lysander was, and how much they had been deceived in regard to him. But Lacratidas, a wise and prudent person, who was president of the Ephori, interposed, by telling him, that it was highly improper to raise Lysander from the dead, on the contrary, that it was necessary to bury his harangue in the same grave with him, as a production of dangerous tendency, from the great art with which it was composed, and the force of persuasion that universally prevailed in it, which it might prove no easy matter to resist. Agesilaus was of the same opinion; and the piece was consigned to silence and oblivion, as the best use that could be made of it.

[c] As his credit was very high in the city, he caused Teleutias, his brother by the mother's side, to be declared admiral of the fleet. It were to be wished, that history, to justify this choice, had mentioned some other qualities in that commander than his nearness of blood to the king. Agesilaus soon after set out with his land-army to besiege Corinth, and took the long walls, as they were called, whilst his brother Teleutias attacked it by sea. He did several other exploits against the people of Greece at war with Sparta, which always indeed evince the valour and experience of the general, but are neither very important nor decisive, and which we thought, for that reason, might be omitted.

[d] At the same time Pharnabasus and Conon, having made themselves masters at sea, ravaged the whole coast of Laconia. That satrap, returning to his government of Phrygia, left Conon the command of the naval army, with very considerable sums for the reestablishment of Athens. Conon, victorious and crowned with glory, repaired thither, where he was received with universal applause. The sad prospect of a city, formerly so flourishing, and at that time reduced to so melancholy a condition, gave him more grief than he felt joy in seeing his beloved country again, after A. M. 3611. Ant. J. C. 393.

[c] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 607.

[d] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. iv. p. 534—537. Diod. l. xiv. p. 303. Justin, l. vi. c. 5.

so many years' absence. He lost no time, but fell immediately to work, employing, besides masons and the usual artisans, the soldiers, mariners, citizens, allies, in a word, all that were well inclined to Athens; Providence decreeing, that this city, formerly destroyed by the Persians, should be rebuilt by their own hands; and that having been dismantled and demolished by the Lacedæmonians, it should be reinstated at their own cost, and by the spoils taken from them. What a vicissitude and alteration was this! Athens at this time had those for its allies, who had formerly been its most violent enemies; and for enemies, those with whom before it had contracted the most strict and closest union. Conon, seconded by the zeal of the Thebans, soon rebuilt the walls of Athens, restored the city to its ancient splendour, and rendered it more formidable than ever to its enemies. [e] After having offered to the gods a whole hecatomb, that is to say, a sacrifice of a hundred oxen, as a thanksgiving for the happy reestablishment of Athens, he made a feast, to which all the citizens, without exception, were invited.

[f] Sparta could not see without extreme affliction so glorious a revolution. It looked upon the grandeur and power of a city, its ancient rival and almost continual enemy, as its own ruin. This made the Lacedæmonians take the mean resolution of avenging themselves at once upon Athens, and Conon its restorer, by making peace with the king of Persia. With this view they despatched Antalcidas to Tiribasus. His commission consisted of two principal articles. The first was, to accuse Conon to that satrap of having defrauded the king of the money which he had employed in the reestablishment of Athens; and of having formed the design of depriving the Persians of Æolia and Ionia, in order to subject them anew to the republic of Athens, upon which they had formerly depended. By the second, he had orders to make the most advantageous proposals to Tiribasus that his master could desire. Without giving himself any manner of trouble in regard to Asia, he stipulated only, that all the islands, and other cities, should enjoy their laws and liberty. The Lacedæmonians thus gave

[e] Athen. l. i. p. 3.
[f] Xenoph *Hist. Græc.* l. iv. p. 537, 538. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 608.

up to the king, with the greatest injustice and the utmost baseness, all the Greeks settled in Asia, for whose liberty Agesilaus had so long fought. It is true, he had no share in this most infamous negotiation; the whole reproach of which ought to fall on Antalcidas, who, being the sworn enemy of the king of Sparta, hastened the peace by all manner of means, because the war augmented the authority, glory, and reputation of Agesilaus.

The most considerable cities of Greece had sent deputies at the same time to Tiribasus, and Conon was at the head of those from Athens. All of them were unanimous in rejecting such proposals. Without speaking of the interest of the Greeks of Asia, with which they were extremely affected, they saw themselves exposed by this treaty; the Athenians, to the loss of the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; the Thebans, to abandon the cities of Bœotia of which they were in possession, and which would thereby regain their independence; and the Argives, to renounce Corinth, with the loss of which that of Argos itself would soon, in all probability, be attended. The deputies therefore withdrew without concluding any thing.

Tiribasus seized Conon, and put him in prison. Not daring to declare openly for the Lacedæmonians without an express order to that purpose, he contented himself with supplying them underhand with considerable sums of money for fitting out a fleet, in order that the other cities of Greece might not be in a condition to oppose them. After having taken these precautions, he set out directly for the court, to give the king an account of the state of his negotiation. That prince was well satisfied with it, and directed him in the strongest terms to put the last hand to it. Tiribasus also laid before him the Lacedæmonians' accusation of Conon. Some authors, according to Cornelius Nepos, have affirmed that he was carried to Susa, and there executed by the king's order. The silence of Xenophon, who was his contemporary, in regard to his death, makes it doubtful, whether he escaped from prison, or suffered as has been said.

Whilst this treaty was negotiating, several actions of little consequence passed between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. It was also at the same time that Evagoras extended

his conquests in the island of Cyprus, of which we shall soon treat.

[g] Tiribasus at length, upon his return, summoned the deputies of the Grecian cities to be present at the reading of the treaty. It imported, that all the Grecian cities of Asia should remain dependent on the king, and that the rest, as well small as great, should have full possession of their liberty. The king further reserved to himself the isles of Cyprus and Clazomenæ, and left those of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, to the Athenians, to whom they had long appertained. By the same treaty he engaged to join with such states as acceded to it, in order to make war by sea and land against all that should refuse to agree to it. We have already said it was Sparta itself who had proposed these conditions.

A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 387.

All the other cities of Greece, or at least the greatest part of them, rejected so infamous a treaty with horror. However, as they were weakened and exhausted by domestic divisions, and not in a condition to support a war against so powerful a prince, who threatened to fall with all his forces upon those who should refuse to accede to this agreement, they were obliged against their will to comply with it; except the Thebans, who had the courage to oppose it openly at first, but were at length reduced to accept it with the others, by whom they found themselves universally abandoned.

Such was the fruit of the jealousy and divisions which armed the Grecian cities against each other, and which was the end proposed by the policy of Artaxerxes in distributing considerable sums of money amongst the several states; invincible by arms and by the sword, but not by the gold and presents of the Persians; so remote were they in this respect from the character of the ancient Greeks their forefathers.

To comprehend aright how much Sparta and Athens differed now from what they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon the Athenian, under Artaxerxes Longimanus above sixty years before, and the latter by Antalcidas the Lacedæmonian under Artaxerxes Mnemon. [h] In the first, Greece, victorious and triumphant, assures the

[g] Xenoph. l. v. p. 548—551. [h] Diod. l. xii. p. 74, 75.

liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives the law to the Persians imposes what condition she pleases, and prescribes to them their bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days' march, or to appear with ships of war in any of the seas between the Cyanæan and Chelidonian islands; that is to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphylia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with the single stroke of a pen, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon basely all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to confine themselves in their turn within the narrow bounds of Greece.

From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interests? No doubt there are: but they are not the same men; or rather, they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recall to mind those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring like a deluge upon this little country with all the forces of the East. What was it that rendered these two cities invincible, and superior to such numerous and formidable armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissension between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contest between them, but that of honour, glory, and the love of their country.

To so laudable an union may be added an irreconcileable hatred for the Persians, which became, if I may so say, natural to the Greeks, and was the most distinguishing character of that nation. [1] It was a capital crime, and punished with death, only to mention peace, or propose any accommodation with them: and an Athenian mother was seen to throw the first stone at her son, who had dared to make such a motion, and to set others the example of stoning him.

This strict union of the two states, and this declared abhorrence of the common enemy, were for a long time the potent

[1] Isoc. *in Panegyr.* p. 143.

barriers of their security, rendered them invincible, and may be said to have been the source and principle of all the glorious successes that raised the reputation of Greece to so high a pitch. But by a misfortune common to the most flourishing states, those very successes became the cause of its ruin, and prepared the way for the disgraces which it experienced in the sequel.

[k] These two states, which might have carried their victorious arms into the heart of Persia, and have attacked in their turn the great king upon his throne itself; instead of forming in concert such an enterprise, which would at once have crowned them with glory and laden them with riches, have the folly to leave their common enemy in repose, to embroil themselves with each other upon trivial points of honour and interests of little importance, and to exhaust those forces to no purpose against themselves, which ought to have been employed solely against the barbarians, that could not have resisted them. For it is worthy of remark, that the Persians never gained any advantage over the Athenians or Lacedæmonians whilst they were united with each other, and that it was their own divisions alone which supplied them with the means to conquer both alternately, and always the one by the other.

These divisions induced them to take such measures as neither Sparta nor Athens would ever otherwise have been capable of. We see both the one and the other dishonour themselves by their mean and abject flatteries, not only of the king of Persia, but even of his satraps; pay their court to them, earnestly solicit their favour, cringe to them, and even suffer their ill humour; and all this to obtain some aid of troops or money: forgetting that the Persians, haughty and insolent to such as seemed afraid of them, became timorous and little to those who had the courage to despise them. But, in fine, what did they gain by all these mean condescensions? The treaty, which gave occasion for these reflections, and will for ever be the reproach of Sparta and Athens.

SECT. VII. WAR OF ARTAXERXES AGAINST EVAGORAS KING OF SALAMIS. EULOGY AND CHARACTER OF THAT

[k] Isoc. *in Panegyr.* p. 132—137. *In Panath.* p. 524, 525.

PRINCE. TIRIBASUS FALSELY ACCUSED. HIS ACCUSER PUNISHED.—What I have just said upon the facility with which the Greeks might have rendered themselves formidable to their enemies, will be more evident if we consider, on one side, the diversity of the nations, and the extent of country, which composed the vast empire of the Persians; and on the other, the weakness of the government, incapable of animating so great a mass, and of supporting the weight of so much business and application. At the court every thing was determined by the intrigues of women and the cabals of favourites, whose whole merit often consisted in flattering their prince, and soothing his passions. It was through their influence that officers were chosen, and the first dignities disposed of; by their opinion the services of the generals of armies were judged, and their rewards decided. The sequel will show, that from the same source arose the insurrection of provinces, the distrust of the greatest part of the governors, the discontent and consequent revolt of the best officers, and the ill success of almost all the enterprises that were formed.

Artaxerxes, freed from the care and perplexity which the war with the Greeks had occasioned, applied himself to the terminating that of Cyprus, which had lasted several years, but had been carried on with little vigour, and turned the greatest part of his forces that way.

Evagoras reigned at that time in Salamis, the capital city of the isle of Cyprus. He was descended from Teucer of * Salamis, who at his return from Troy built this city, and gave it the name of his country. His descendants had reigned there from that time; but a stranger from Phœnicia, having dispossessed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himself in the usurpation had filled the city with barbarians, and subjected the whole island to the king of Persia.

Under this tyrant Evagoras was born, and great care was taken of his education. He was distinguished amongst the youth by the beauty of his aspect, the vigour of his body, and still more by the modesty and innocence of his manners,†

‡ Isocrat. *in Evag.* p. 380.

* This Teucer was of Salamis, a little island near Athens, celebrated for the famous sea-fight under Xerxes.

† Et, qui ornat ætatem, pudor. Cic.

which are the greatest ornaments of that age. As he advanced in years, the greatest virtues, valour, wisdom, and justice, were observed to shine forth in him. He afterwards carried these virtues to so conspicuous a height, as to give jealousy to those that were at the head of the government; who conceived justly that so brilliant a merit could not continue in the obscurity of a private condition: but his modesty, probity, and integrity, reassured them, and they reposed an entire confidence in him, which he always repaid by an inviolable fidelity, without ever meditating their expulsion from the throne by violence or treachery.

A more justifiable means conducted him to it, Divine Providence, as Isocrates says, preparing the way for him. One of the principal citizens murdered the person upon the throne, and intended to seize Evagoras, and to rid himself of him, in order to secure the crown to himself; but that prince, escaping his pursuit, retired to Soli, a city of Cilicia. His banishment was so far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigour. Attended only with fifty followers, determined like himself to conquer or die, he returned to Salamis, and expelled the usurper, though supported by the credit and protection of the king of Persia. Having reestablished himself in Salamis, he soon rendered his little kingdom very flourishing, by his great care in relieving his subjects, and by protecting them in every respect; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of their lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He trained them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers.

He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon the Athenian general, after his defeat at Ægospotamos, took refuge with him; [m] not thinking it possible to find a safer asylum for himself, nor a more powerful support of his country. The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. Conon possessed great influence at the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means

A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405.

A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399.

[m] Isocrat. *in Evag.* p. 393—395.

of Ctesias his physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it.

Evagoras and Conon, engaged in the great design of subverting, or at least of reducing, the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption; a privilege which his great services and zeal for that republic had merited. The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties, from not being in a condition to make head against them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he contributed not a little, through the influence which he still had with the king of Persia, to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet. The celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidos was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic.

A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398.

A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394.

[n] The Athenians, in acknowledgment of the important services which Evagoras and Conon had rendered them with Axtaxerxes, erected statues in honour of them.

[o] Evagoras on his side, extending his conquests from city to city, endeavoured to make himself master of the whole island. The Cypriots had recourse to the king of Persia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progress of Evagoras, the effects of which he apprehended, and conscious of what importance it was to him to prevent an island's falling into the hands of an enemy, which was so favourably situated for holding Asia Minor in awe, promised them an immediate and powerful support, without declaring openly, however, against Evagoras.

[p] Being employed elsewhere by more important affairs, he could not keep his word with them so soon as he expected, and had engaged. That war of Cyprus continued six years, and the success with which Evagoras supported it against the great king, ought to have banished from the minds of the Greeks all terror of the Persian name, and united them against the common enemy. It is

A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. 390.

[n] Pausan. l. i. p. 5. [o] Diod. l. xiv. p. 311. [p] Isocrat. in *Paneg.* p. 135, 136.

true, the succours sent by Artaxerxes till then were inconsiderable, as they were also the two following years. During all that time it was less a real war, than a preparation for war: [q] but when he had disengaged himself from the Greeks, he applied to it vigorously, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces.

A. M. 3618. Ant. J. C. 386.

The land-army, commanded by Orontes his son-in-law, consisted of three hundred thousand men, and the fleet of three hundred galleys; of which Tiribasus, a Persian of the highest rank and greatest reputation, was admiral. Gaos his son-in-law commanded under him. Evagoras on his side assembled as many troops and ships as he could; but they were a handful, in comparison with the formidable preparations of the Persians. His fleet was composed of only fourscore and ten galleys, and his army scarce amounted to twenty thousand men. As he had abundance of light vessels, he laid snares for those that carried the provisions of the enemy, sunk a great number, took many, and prevented the rest from arriving; which occasioned a famine amongst the Persians, and gave rise to violent seditions, which could only be appeased by the arrival of fresh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras strengthened his fleet with sixty galleys which he caused to be built, and fifty sent him by Achoris king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occasion for.

Evagoras with his land-forces attacked immediately a part of the enemy's army which was separate from the rest, and entirely routed it. This first action was soon followed by another at sea, in which the Persians were worsted for some time, till animated by the warm reproaches and remonstrances of their admiral, they resumed courage, and obtained a complete victory. Salamis was immediately besieged by sea and land. Evagoras, leaving the defence of the city to his son Pythagoras, quitted it in the night with ten galleys, and sailed for Egypt, to engage the king to support him vigorously against the common enemy. He did not obtain from him all the aid he expected. At his return he found the city in exceeding distress; and finding himself without resource or hope, he was obliged to capitulate. The proposals made to him were, that

[q] Diod. l. xv. p. 328—333.

he should abandon all the cities of Cyprus, except Salamis, where he should content himself to reign; that he should pay an annual tribute to the king, and remain in obedience to him as a servant to a master. The extremity to which he was reduced obliged him to accept the other conditions, hard as they were; but he could never resolve to comply with the last, and persisted always in declaring, that he could only treat as a king with a king. Tiribasus, who commanded the siege, would abate nothing of his pretensions.

Orontes, the other general, jealous of his colleague's glory, had written secretly to court against him, accusing him, amongst other things, of forming designs against the king, and assigned in support of his accusation, his continuing to hold a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, and his manifest endeavours to attach to himself the chiefs of the army, by force of presents, promises, and an obliging demeanour not natural to him. Artaxerxes upon these letters believed he had no time to lose in stifling a conspiracy which he considered as ready to break out. He despatched orders immediately to Orontes, to seize Tiribasus, and send him to court in chains, which was instantly put in execution. Tiribasus, upon his arrival, demanded to be brought to a trial in form; that the heads of the accusation should be communicated to him, and the proofs and witnesses produced. The king, employed in other cares, had no leisure at that time to take cognizance of the affair.

Orontes in the mean time, seeing that the besieged made a vigorous defence, and that the soldiers of the army, discontented with the removal of Tiribasus, quitted the service and refused to obey him, was afraid affairs would take a bad turn with regard to himself. He, therefore, caused Evagoras to be spoken to underhand: the negotiation was resumed, the offers made at first by the latter were accepted, and the mortifying article, which had prevented the conclusion of the treaty, retrenched. The siege was raised in consequence. Evagoras continued king of Salamis only, and engaged to pay an annual tribute. A. M. 3619. Ant. J. C. 385.

It appears that this prince lived twelve or thirteen years after the conclusion of the treaty, for his death is dated in the

year of the world 3632. His old age was attended with a happiness and tranquillity never interrupted with sickness or disease, the usual effect of a sober and temperate life. Nicocles his eldest son succeeded him, and inherited his virtues as well as throne. He celebrated his funeral with the utmost magnificence. The discourse, entitled *Evagoras*, composed by Isocrates to inspire the young king with the desire of treading in the steps of his father, and from which I have extracted the subsequent eulogium, served for his funeral oration. He also addressed another tract to Nicocles, which bears his name, wherein he gives him admirable precepts for governing well. I shall, perhaps, have occasion to speak farther of them.

Eulogy and Character of Evagoras.—[r] Though Evagoras was only king of a little state, Isocrates, who was well able to judge of virtue and merit, compares him with the most powerful monarchs, and proposes him as the perfect model of a good king, convinced that it is not the extent of territory, but extent of mind and greatness of soul, that constitute great princes. In fact, he points out to us many qualities truly royal in him, and which ought to give us a very high idea of his merit.

Evagoras was not of the number of those princes who believe, that to reign, it is sufficient to be of the blood royal; and, that the birth which gives a right to the crown, gives also the merit and qualities necessary for wearing it with honour. He did not fancy that it could be supposed, since every other condition and station of life made a kind of apprenticeship necessary to succeed therein, that the art of reigning, the most difficult and important of all, should require no pains and preparation for its attainment. He came into the world with the most happy dispositions; a great fund of genius, a ready comprehension, a lively and quick penetration which nothing escaped, a solidity of judgment that immediately perceived what was necessary to be done; qualities which might seem to dispense with all study and application: and yet, as if he had been born without talents, and found himself obliged to supply by study what he might want by nature, he neglected no means for the embellishment of his mind, and devoted a * considerable part of his

[r] Isocrat. *in Evag.*

* Ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν, καὶ φροντίζειν, καὶ βουλεύεσθαι, τὸν πλεῖστον χρόνον διέτριβεν.

time in instructing himself, in reflecting, meditating, and consulting the judgment and experience of others.

When he ascended the throne, his greatest care and application was to know mankind, in which the ability of a prince, and of those who are at the head of affairs, principally consists. He had, no doubt, prepared himself for that science by the study of history, which gives prudence by anticipation, supplies the place of experience, and teaches us what the men are with whom we live, by what they have been in other ages. But we study men quite differently in themselves; by their manners, characters, conduct, and actions. The love of the commonwealth rendered him attentive to all persons who were capable of serving or hurting it. He applied himself to the discovery of their most secret inclinations and principles of action, and to the knowledge of their different talents and degrees of capacity, in order to assign to each his proper post, to bestow authority in proportion to merit, and to make the private and public good promote each other. He neither rewarded nor punished his subjects, says Isocrates, from the report of others, but solely upon his own knowledge and experience of them; and neither the virtues of the good, nor the vices of the bad, escaped his inquiry and penetration.

He had one quality very seldom found in those who possess the first rank, especially when they believe themselves capable of governing alone: I mean, a wonderful docility and attention to the opinion of others, which arose from a diffidence in his own abilities. With his great penetration, it did not seem necessary for him to have recourse to the counsel of others; yet he nevertheless made no resolution, and formed no enterprise, without having first consulted the wise persons he had placed about him in his court: instead of which, pride and presumption, the latent poison of sovereign power, incline the greatest part of those who arrive at thrones, either to ask no counsel at all, or not to follow it when they do.

Intent upon discovering what was excellent in every form of government and private condition of life, he proposed the uniting of all their best qualities and advantages in himself: affable and popular as in a republican state; grave and serious as in the council of the elders and senators; steady and decisive

after mature deliberation as in a monarchy; a profound politician by the extent and rectitude of his views; an accomplished warrior, from intrepid valour in battle directed by a wise moderation; a good father, a good relation, a good friend, and, what crowns his eulogy, * in every circumstance of his character, always great, and always a king.

He supported his dignity and rank, not by an air of pride and haughtiness, but by a serenity of aspect, and a mild and easy majesty, resulting from innate virtue, and the testimony of a good conscience. He won the hearts of his friends by his liberality, and conquered others by a greatness of soul, to which they could not refuse their esteem and admiration.

But what was most royal in him, and attracted the entire confidence of his subjects, neighbours, and even enemies, was his sincerity, faith, and regard to all his engagements; and his hatred, or rather detestation, for all disguise, falsehood, and fraud. A single word from him had as much regard paid to it as the most sacred oath; and it was universally known, that nothing was capable of inducing him to violate it in the least circumstance whatsoever.

It was by all these excellent qualities that he effectually reformed the city of Salamis, and entirely changed its appearance in a very short time. He found it gross, savage, and barbarous, without any taste either for learning, commerce, or arms. What cannot a prince do that loves his people, and is beloved by them; who believes himself great and powerful only to render them happy; and knows how to set a just value upon, and do honour to, their labours, industry, and merit of every kind? He had not been many years upon the throne, before arts, sciences, commerce, navigation, and military discipline, were seen to flourish at Salamis; insomuch that that city did not give place to the most opulent of Greece.

Isocrates often repeats, that in the praises which he gives Evagoras, of which I have only extracted a part, far from exaggerating any thing, he always falls short of truth. To what can we attribute a reign so wise, so just, so moderate, so constantly employed in rendering his subjects happy, and in promoting the public good? The condition of Evagoras,

* Τυράννικος δὲ τῷ πᾶσι τούτοις διαφέρειν.

before he came to govern, seems to me to have contributed very much to it. The being born a prince, and the never having experienced any other condition than that of master and sovereign, are, in my opinion, great obstacles to the knowledge and practice of the duties of that high station. Evagoras, who came into the world under a tyrant, had long obeyed before he commanded. He had borne in a private and dependent life the yoke of an absolute and despotic power. He had seen himself exposed to envy and calumny, and had been in danger on account of his merit and virtue. Such a prince had only to be told upon his ascending the throne, what was said to a great * emperor; † 'You have not always been what you now are. Adversity has prepared you to make a good use of power. You have lived long amongst us, and like us.' You have been in danger under bad princes. You have trembled for yourself, and known by experience how virtue and innocence have been treated.' What he had personally suffered, what he had feared for himself or others, what he had seen unjust and unreasonable in the conduct of his predecessors, had opened his eyes, and taught him all his duty. It sufficed to tell him, what the emperor Galba told Piso, when he adopted him his associate in the empire: ‡ 'Remember what you condemned or applauded in princes, when you were a private man. You have only to consult the judgment you then passed upon them, and to act conformably to it, in order to acquire full instruction in the art of reigning well.'

Trial of Tiribasus.—[s] We have already said, that Tiribasus, having been accused by Orontes of forming a conspiracy against the king, had been sent to court in chains. Gaos, admiral of the fleet, who had married his daughter, apprehending that Artaxerxes would involve him in the affair with his father-in-law, and cause him to be put to death upon mere suspicion, conceived he had no other means for his security than an open

[s] Diod. l. xv. p. 334, 335.

* Trajan.

† Quàm utile est ad usum secundorum per adversa venisse! Vixisti nobiscum, periclitatus es, timuisti. Quæ tunc erat innocentium vita scis, et expertus es. Plin. *in Panegyr.*

‡ Utilissimus quidem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe, aut volueris. Tacit. *Hist.* l. i. c. 16.

revolt. He was very well beloved by the soldiers, and all the officers of the fleet were particularly attached to him. Without loss of time he sent deputies to Achoris king of Egypt, and concluded a league with him against the king of Persia. On another side, he warmly solicited the Lacedæmonians to come into that league, with assurances of making them masters of all Greece, and of establishing universally their form of government; at which they had long seemed to aspire. They hearkened favourably to these proposals, and embraced with joy this occasion of taking arms against Artaxerxes; the rather, because the peace which they had a short time before concluded with him, by which they had given up the Greeks of Asia, had covered them with shame.

As soon as Artaxerxes had put an end to the war of * Cyprus, he thought of concluding also the affair of Tiribasus. He had the justice to appoint for that purpose, as commissioners, three of the greatest noblemen of Persia, of distinguished probity, and of the highest reputation in his court. The affair came to an examination and a hearing on both sides. For so considerable a crime, as that of having conspired against the king's person, no other proofs were produced than the letter of Orontes; that is to say, of a declared enemy, studious to supplant his rival. Orontes was in hopes, from his credit at court, that the affair would not have been discussed in the usual forms, and that upon the memorial sent by him, the accused would have been condemned without farther examination. But that was not the custom with the Persians. By an anciently established regulation, to which, amongst other privileges, they had a right by birth, no person was ever to be condemned, without being first heard and confronted with his accusers. This was granted to Tiribasus, who answered to all the articles of the letter. As to his connivance with Evagoras, the very treaty concluded by Orontes was his apology; as it was absolutely the same as that prince had proposed to him, except one condition, which would have done honour to his master. As to his intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, the glorious treaty he had made them sign sufficiently explained,

* Diodorus postpones the decision of this affair till after the war with the Cadusians, of which we shall soon speak. This seems very improbable.

whether his own, or the king's interests, were his motives for it. He did not deny his credit in the army; but how long, he inquired, had it been a crime to be beloved by the officers and soldiers? and he concluded his defence, by representing the long services he had rendered the king with inviolable fidelity; and especially his good fortune in having formerly saved his life, when he was hunting, and in great danger of being devoured by two lions. The three commissioners were unanimous in declaring Tiribasus innocent. The king restored him to his former favour, and, justly enraged at the black design of Orontes, let the whole weight of his indignation fall upon him. A single example of this kind against informers convicted of falsehood, would for ever shut the door against calumny. How many innocents have been destroyed for want of observing this rule, which even the Pagans considered as the basis of all justice, and the guardian of the public tranquillity!

SECT. VII. THE EXPEDITION OF ARTAXERXES AGAINST THE CADUSIANS. HISTORY OF DATAMES THE CARIAN.—[t] When Artaxerxes had terminated the Cyprian war, he entered upon another against the Cadusians, who it is probable had revolted, and refused to pay the customary tribute; for authors say nothing as to the occasion of this war. Those people inhabited part of the mountains situate between the Euxine and Caspian seas, in the north of Media. The soil is there so ungrateful, and so little proper for cultivation, that no corn is sowed upon it. The people subsisted almost entirely upon apples, pears, and other fruits of that kind. Inured from their infancy to a hard and laborious life, they looked upon dangers and fatigues as nothing; and for that reason were well calculated for soldiers. The king marched against them in person at the head of an army of three hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse. Tiribasus attended him in this expedition.

Artaxerxes had not advanced far into the country, when his army suffered extremely by famine. The troops could find nothing to subsist upon; and it was impossible to bring provisions from other places, as the roads were difficult and impracticable. The whole camp were reduced to eat their beasts of

[t] Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1023, 1024.

burden; and these soon became so scarce, that an ass's head was valued at sixty drachmas,* and was very hard to be got at that price. The king's table itself began to fall short, and only a few horses remained, the rest having been entirely consumed.

In this melancholy conjuncture, Tiribasus contrived a stratagem which saved the king and army. The Cadusians had two kings, who were encamped separately with their troops. Tiribasus, who took care to be informed of all that passed, had been apprized that there was some misunderstanding between them, and that their jealousy of each other prevented their acting in concert, as they ought to have done. After having communicated his design to Artaxerxes, he went himself to one of the kings, and despatched his son to the other. They each of them informed the king to whom they applied, that the other had sent ambassadors to treat with Artaxerxes privately, and advised him to lose no time, but to make his peace directly, in order that the conditions of it might be the more advantageous; promising to assist them with their whole credit. The fraud succeeded. The † Pagans thought it might allowably be used with enemies. Ambassadors set out from both princes respectively, from the one with Tiribasus, and from the other with his son.

As this double negotiation lasted some time, Artaxerxes began to suspect Tiribasus; and his enemies, taking that opportunity, forgot nothing to his prejudice that might ruin him in the king's opinion. That prince already repented the confidence he had reposed in him, and thereby gave room for those who envied him to vent their calumnies and invectives. Upon what does the fortune of the most faithful subjects depend with a credulous and suspicious prince! Whilst this passed, arrived Tiribasus on his side, and his son on the other, each with ambassadors from the Cadusians. The treaty being concluded with both parties, and the peace made, Tiribasus became more powerful than ever in his master's favour, and returned with him.

The king's behaviour in this march was much admired.

* Thirty livres.

† Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat? Virgil.

Neither the gold with which he was covered, nor his purple robes, nor the jewels that glittered all over him, and were worth six and thirty millions of livres,* prevented his taking an equal share in the whole fatigue with the meanest soldier. He was seen, with his quiver at his back and his shield on his arm, to dismount from his horse, and march foremost in those rugged and difficult roads. The soldiers, observing his patience and fortitude, and animated by his example, became so light, that they seemed rather to fly than walk. At length he arrived at one of his palaces, where the gardens were kept in admirable order, and there was a park of great extent and well planted, which was the more surprising, as the whole country about it was entirely naked, and bore no kind of trees. As it was the depth of winter, and the cold was excessive, he gave the soldiers permission to cut down the wood in this park, without sparing the finest trees, either pines or cypresses. But the soldiers not being able to resolve to fell timber of such exceeding beauty and stateliness, the king took an axe, and began by cutting the finest and largest tree himself; after which the troops had no farther scruples, but cut down all the wood they wanted, and kindled as many fires as were necessary to enable them to pass the night without any inconvenience. When we reflect how much value noblemen generally set upon their gardens and houses of pleasure, we must feel pleased with Artaxerxes's generosity in making this sacrifice, which argued great goodness of heart, and a sensibility for the distresses and sufferings of his soldiers. But he did not always support that character.

The king had lost in this enterprise a great number of his best troops, and almost all his horses: and as he imagined that he was despised upon that account, and the ill success of his expedition, he became very much out of humour with the grandees of his court, and put to death a great number of them in the emotions of his wrath, and more out of distrust, and the fear of their attempting something against him. For fear, in a suspicious prince, is a very destructive and bloody passion; whereas true courage is gentle, humane, and averse to all jealousy and suspicion.

* Twelve thousand talents.

[u] One of the principal officers that perished in this expedition against the Cadusians, was Camisares, by nation a Carian, and governor of Leuco-Syria, a province enclosed between Cilicia and Cappadocia. His son Datames succeeded him in that government, which was given him in consideration of the good services he had also rendered the king in the same expedition. He was the greatest captain of his time; and Cornelius Nepos, who has given us his life, prefers Amilcar and Hannibal alone to him amongst the barbarians. It appears from this life, that no one ever excelled him in boldness, valour, and ability in inventing schemes and stratagems, in activity in the execution of his designs, in presence of mind to decide instantly, and to find resources upon the most desperate occasions; in a word, in every thing that regards the science of war. It seems that nothing was wanting to his having acquired a more illustrious name, than a more spacious theatre, and perhaps an historian who would have given a more minute narrative of his exploits. For Cornelius Nepos, according to his general plan, could not relate them otherwise than in a very succinct manner.

He began to distinguish himself particularly by the execution of a commission that was given him to reduce Thyus, a very powerful prince, and governor of Paphlagonia, who had revolted against the king. As he was his near relation, he thought it incumbent upon him at first to try the methods of lenity and conciliation, which almost cost him his life, through the treachery of Thyus, by the ambuscades he laid for him. Having escaped so great a danger, he attacked him with open force; though he saw himself abandoned by Ariobarzanes, satrap of Lydia, Ionia, and all Phrygia, whom jealousy prevented from giving him aid. He took his enemy prisoner, with his wife and children; and knowing with what joy the king would receive the news, he endeavoured to make it the more sensibly felt by the pleasure of a surprise. He set out with his illustrious prisoner, without giving the court any advice, and made long marches, to prevent its being known by report before his arrival. When he came to Susa, he equipped Thyus in a very singular manner. He was a man of a very tall stature, of a

[u] Corn. Nep. *in vit. Datamis.*

haggard and terrible aspect, a black complexion, with the hair of his head and beard very long. He dressed him in a magnificent habit, put a collar and bracelets of gold about his neck and arms, and added to this equipage all the ornaments of a king, as in fact he was. For himself, in the coarse habit of a peasant, and clad like a hunter, armed with a club in his right hand, he led Thyus in his left in a leash, like a wild beast that had been taken in the toils. The novelty of the sight drew the whole city after it: but nobody was so much surprised and pleased as the king, when he saw them approach in that pleasant masquerade. The rebellion of a prince, very powerful in his country, had given Artaxerxes great and just alarm, and he did not expect to have seen him so soon in his hands. So sudden and successful an execution gave him a higher opinion than ever of the merit of Datames.

To express his sense of it, he gave him an equal share in the command of the army, designed against Egypt, with Pharnabasus and Tithraustes, the two principal persons in the state, and even appointed him general in chief when he recalled Pharnabasus.

When he was upon the point of setting out for that expedition, Artaxerxes ordered him to march directly against Aspis, who had made the country where he commanded in the neighbourhood of Cappadocia revolt. The commission was of little importance for an officer who had been appointed general, and besides very dangerous, because it was necessary to go in quest of the enemy into a very remote country. The king soon perceived his error, and countermanded him: but Datames had set out directly with a handful of men, and marched night and day; judging that diligence alone, and not a great number of troops, was all that was necessary to surprise and vanquish the enemy. It happened according to his expectation, and the couriers despatched by the king met Aspis in chains upon the road to Susa.

Nothing was talked of at the court but Datames. No one knew which to admire most, his ready obedience, his wise and enterprising bravery, or his extraordinary success. So glorious a reputation gave offence to the courtiers in power. Enemies in secret to each other, and divided by a contrariety of

interests, and a competition in their pretensions, they united together against a superior merit which reproached their defects, and was therefore a crime in their acceptation. They conspired to ruin him in the king's opinion, and succeeded but too well. As they besieged him perpetually, and he was not upon his guard against persons who appeared so well affected to his service, they inspired him with jealousy and suspicion against the most zealous and faithful of his officers.

An intimate friend of Datames, who held one of the highest posts at the court, apprized him of what was passing, and of the conspiracy which had been formed against him, and had already rendered the king disaffected towards him. * He represented to him, that if the Egyptian expedition, with which he was charged, should take a bad turn, he would find himself exposed to great dangers: that it was the custom of kings to attribute good successes to themselves and their auspicious fortune only, and to impute the bad to the faults of their generals, and to make them responsible for these at the peril of their heads: that he ran the greater risk, as all that were about the king's person and had any ascendant over him, were his declared enemies, and had sworn his destruction.

Upon this advice, Datames resolved to quit the king's service, though without doing any thing hitherto contrary to the fidelity which he owed him. He left the command of the army to Mandrocles of Magnesia, departed with his own troops for Cappadocia, seized Paphlagonia, which joined it, allied himself secretly with Ariobarzanes, raised troops, took possession of the fortresses, and put good garrisons in them. He received advice, that the Pisidians were arming against him. He did not wait their attack, but made his army march thither under the command of his youngest son, who had the misfortune to be killed in a battle. However lively the father's affliction might be upon that occasion, he concealed his death, lest the bad news should discourage his troops. When he approached near the enemy, his first care was to take posses-

* Docet eum magno fore in periculo, siquid, illo imperante, in Ægypto adversi accidisset. Namque eam esse consuetudinem regum, ut casus adversos hominibus tribuant, secundos fortunæ suæ; quo facilè fieri, ut impellantur ad eorum perniciem, quorum ductu res malè gestæ nuncientur. Illum hoc majore fore in discrimine, quòd, quibus rex maximè obediat, eos habeat inimicissimos. Corn. Nep.

sion of an advantageous post. [x] Mithrobarzanes, his father-in-law, who commanded the horse, believing his son entirely ruined, determined to go over to the enemy. Datames, without concern or emotion, caused a rumour to be spread throughout the army, that it was only a feint concerted between him and his father-in-law, and followed him close, as if he designed to put his troops into a disposition for charging the enemy in two different quarters. The stratagem had all the success he expected from it. When they joined battle, Mithrobarzanes was treated as an enemy on both sides, and cut to pieces with his troops. The army of the Pisidians was put to flight, and left Datames master of the field, and of all the rich booty found in the camp of the conquered.

Datames had not till then declared openly against the king, the actions we have related being only against governors, with whom he might have particular differences, which, as we have observed before, was common enough. His own eldest son, called Scismas, made himself his accuser, and discovered his whole designs to the king. Artaxerxes was highly alarmed. He knew all the merit of this new enemy, and that he did not engage in any enterprise without having maturely considered all its consequences, and taken the necessary measures to secure its success; and that hitherto the execution had always corresponded with the wisdom of his projects. He sent an army against him into Cappadocia of almost two hundred thousand men, of which twenty thousand were horse, all commanded by Autophradates. The troops of Datames did not amount to the twentieth part of the king's; so that he had no resource but in himself, the valour of his soldiers, and the happy situation of the post he had chosen. For in that consisted his chief excellence; never captain having better known how to take his advantages, and choose his ground, when he was to draw up an army in battle.

His army, as I have observed, was far inferior to that of the enemy. He had posted himself in a situation where they could not surround him; where, upon the least movement they made, he could attack them with very considerable advantage; and where, had they resolved to fight, their odds in

[x] Diod. l. xv. p. 399.

number would have been absolutely useless to them. Autophradates well knew, that according to all the rules of war, he ought not to hazard a battle in such a conjuncture: but he observed at the same time, that it would be disgraceful for him, with so numerous an army, to retreat, or to continue any longer in inaction before a handful of enemies. He therefore gave the signal. The first attack was rude; but the troops of Autophradates soon gave way, and were entirely routed. The victor pursued them for some time with great slaughter. There were only a thousand men killed on the side of Datames.

Several battles, or rather skirmishes, were fought afterwards, in which the latter was always victorious; because, perfectly knowing the country, and succeeding especially in stratagems of war, he always posted himself advantageously, and engaged the enemy in difficult ground, from whence they could not extricate themselves without loss. Autophradates seeing all his endeavours ineffectual, and his supplies entirely exhausted, and despairing of ever being able to subject by force so artful and valiant an enemy, suggested an accommodation, and proposed to him the being restored to the king's favour upon honourable conditions. Datames was not ignorant that there was little security for him in such a choice, because princes are seldom reconciled in earnest with a subject who has failed in his obedience, and to whom they see themselves in some sort obliged to submit. However, as despair alone had hurried him into the revolt, and he had always retained at heart sentiments of zeal and affection for his prince, he joyfully accepted offers which would put an end to the violent condition in which his misfortune had engaged him, and afford him the means of returning to his duty, and of employing his talents for the service of the prince to whom they were due. He promised to send deputies to the king; upon which ensued a cessation of arms, and Autophradates retired into Phrygia, which was his government.

Datames was not deceived. Artaxerxes, furiously enraged against him, had changed the esteem and affection which he formerly professed for him, into an implacable hatred. Finding himself incapable of conquering him by force of arms, he was not ashamed to employ artifice and treachery: means

unworthy every man of honour, and how much more so of a prince! He hired several murderers to assassinate him; but Datames was so happy as to escape their ambuscades. At length Mithridates, the son of Ariobarzanes, to whom the king had made magnificent promises, if he could deliver him from so formidable an enemy, having insinuated himself into his friendship, and having long treated him with all the marks of the most entire fidelity, in order to acquire his confidence, took the advantage of a favourable opportunity when he was alone, and stabbed him with his sword, before he was in a condition to defend himself.

Thus * fell this great captain in the snares of a pretended friendship, who had always made it a point of honour to observe the most inviolable fidelity towards those with whom he had any engagements. Happy, had he always piqued himself also upon being as faithful a subject as he was a true friend; and if he had not, in the latter part of his life, sullied the lustre of his heroic qualities by the ill use he made of them; which neither the fear of disgrace, the injustice of those who envied him, the ingratitude of his master for the services he had rendered him, nor any other pretext, could sufficiently authorize.

I am surprised that, worthy as he was, from his uncommon virtues, of being compared to the greatest persons of antiquity, his merit has remained in a manner buried in silence and oblivion. His great actions and exploits are however worthy of being preserved in history. For it is in such small bodies of troops as those of Datames, where every energy is exerted, where prudence directs, and where chance has no share, that the abilities of a general appear in their full light.

CHAPTER IV. HISTORY OF SOCRATES ABRIDGED.

As the death of Socrates is one of the most considerable events of antiquity, I think it incumbent on me to treat that subject with all the extent it deserves. With this view I shall

* Ita vir, qui multos consilio, neminem perfidiâ ceperat, simulatâ captus est amicitiâ. Corn. Nep.

go somewhat back in order to give the reader a just idea of this Prince of Philosophers.

Two authors will supply me principally with what I have to say upon this subject: Plato and Xenophon, both disciples of Socrates. It is to them that posterity is indebted for many of his discourses, (*as that philosopher left nothing in writing,) and for an ample account of all the circumstances of his condemnation and death. Plato was an eye-witness of the whole, and relates, in his *Apology*, the manner of Socrates's accusation and defence; in his *Crito*, his refusal to make his escape out of prison; in his *Phædon*, his admirable discourse upon the immortality of the soul, which was immediately followed by his death. Xenophon was absent at that time, and upon his return to his native country after the expedition of the younger Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes: so that he wrote his *Apology* of Socrates only from the report of others; but his actions and discourses in his four books of memorable things, he repeats from his own knowledge. Diogenes Laertius has given us the life of Socrates, but in a very dry and abridged manner.

SECT. I. BIRTH OF SOCRATES. HE APPLIES AT FIRST TO SCULPTURE; THEN TO THE STUDY OF THE SCIENCES: HIS WONDERFUL PROGRESS IN THEM. HIS TASTE FOR MORAL PHILOSOPHY: HIS MANNER OF LIVING, AND SUFFERINGS FROM THE ILL-HUMOUR OF HIS WIFE.

A. M. 3553. Ant. J. C. 471.

[y] Socrates was born at Athens in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad. His father Sophroniscus was a sculptor, and his mother Phænarete a midwife. Hence we may observe, that meanness of birth is no obstacle to true merit, in which alone solid glory and real nobility consist. It appears from the comparisons which Socrates often used in his discourses, that he was neither ashamed of his father's nor mother's profession. [z] He was surprised that a sculptor should employ his whole attention to fashion an insensible stone into the likeness of a man, and that a man should take so little

[y] Diog. Laert. *in Socrat.* p. 100. [z] Ibid. p. 110.

* Socrates, cujus ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit, literam nullam reliquit. Cic. *de Orat.* l. iii. n. 57.

pains not to resemble an insensible stone. [a] He would often say, that he exercised the function of a midwife with regard to the mind, in making it bring forth all its thoughts; and this was indeed the peculiar talent of Socrates.[a] He treated subjects in so simple, natural, and clear an order, that he made those with whom he disputed say what he wished, and find an answer themselves to all the questions he proposed to them. He at first learned his father's trade, in which he made himself very expert. [b] In the time of Pausanias, there was a Mercury and the Graces still to be seen at Athens of his workmanship; and it is to be presumed, these statues would not have found a place among those of the greatest masters in the art, if they had not been thought worthy of it.

[c] Crito is reported to have taken him out of his father's shop, from admiration of his fine genius, and the opinion he entertained that it was inconsistent for a young man, capable of the greatest things, to continue perpetually employed upon stone with a chisel in his hand. He was the disciple of Archelaus, who conceived a great affection for him. Archelaus had been pupil to Anaxagoras, a very celebrated philosopher. His first study was physics, the works of nature, and the motions of the heavens, stars, and planets; according to the custom of those times, wherein only that part of philosophy was known; and Xenophon [d] assures us that he was very well acquainted with it. But * after having found by his own experience, how difficult, abstruse, and intricate, and at the same time of how little use that kind of learning was to the generality of mankind, he was the first, as Cicero remarks, who conceived the thought of bringing down philosophy from heaven, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses; humanizing it, if I may use that expression, and rendering it more familiar,

[a] Plat. *in Theatet.* p. 149, &c. [b] Paus. l. ix. p. 596.
[c] Diog. p. 101. [d] Lib. iv. *Memorab.* p. 710.

* Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit è cœlo, et, in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coëgit de vitâ et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis quærere. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. v. n. 10.

Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus à rebus occultis, et ab ipsâ naturâ involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse; ut de virtutibus et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quæreret; cœlestia autem vel procul esse à nostrâ cognitione censeret, vel si maximè cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre. Cic. *Acad. Quæst.* l. i. n. 15

more useful in common life, more within the reach of man's capacity, and applying it solely to what might make them more rational, just, and virtuous. [e] He thought it was a sort of folly to devote the whole vivacity of his mind, and employ all his time, in inquiries merely curious, involved in impenetrable darkness, and absolutely incapable of contributing to the happiness of mankind; whilst he neglected to inform himself in the ordinary duties of life, and to learn what is conformable, or opposite to, piety, justice, and probity; in what fortitude, temperance, and wisdom consist; what is the end of all government, what the rules of it, and what qualities are necessary for commanding and ruling well. We shall see in the sequel the use he made of this study.

It was so far from preventing his discharging the duties of a good citizen, that it was the means of making him the more observant of them. He bore arms, as did all the people of Athens; but with more pure and elevated motives. He made many campaigns, was present in many actions, and always distinguished himself by his valour and fortitude. He was seen, towards the end of his life, giving in the senate, of which he was a member, the most shining proofs of his zeal for justice, without being intimidated by the greatest present dangers.

He had accustomed himself early to a sober, severe, laborious life; without which it seldom happens, that men are capable of discharging the greatest part of the duties of good citizens. It is difficult to carry the contempt of riches and the love of poverty farther than he did. [f] He looked upon it as a divine perfection to be in want of nothing; and believed, that the less we are contented with, the nearer we approach to the divinity. * Seeing the pomp and show displayed by luxury in certain ceremonies, and the infinite quantity of gold and silver employed in them: 'How many things,' said he, congratulating himself on his condition, 'do I not want!' *Quantis non egeo!*

[g] His father left him fourscore minæ, that is to say, about two hundred pounds, which he lent to one of his friends who

[e] Xenoph. *Memorab.* l. i. p. 710. [f] Ibid. p. 731.
[g] Liban. *in Apolog. Socrat.* p. 640.
* Socrates in pompâ, cùm magna vis auri argentique ferretur; Quàm multa non desidero, inquit! Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. v.

had occasion for that sum. But the affairs of that friend having taken an ill turn, he lost the whole, and suffered that misfortune with such indifference and tranquillity, that he did not so much as complain of it. [h] We find in Xenophon's *Œconomics*, that his whole estate amounted to no more than five minæ, or twelve pounds. The richest persons of Athens were among his friends, who could never prevail upon him to accept any share of their wealth. When he was in want of any thing, he was not ashamed to declare it: * 'If I had money,' said he one day in an assembly of his friends, 'I should buy me a cloak.' He did not address himself to any body in particular, but contented himself with that general information. His disciples contended for the honour of making him this small present; which was being too slow, says Seneca; their own observation ought to have anticipated both the want and the demand.

He generously refused the offers and presents of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, who was desirous of having him at his court; adding, that he could not go to a man who could give him more than it was in his power to return. Another philosopher does not approve this answer. 'Would it have been making a prince a small return,' says Seneca, 'to undeceive him in his false ideas of grandeur and magnificence; to inspire him with a contempt for riches; to show him the right use of them; to instruct him in the great art of reigning; in a word, to teach him how to live, and how to die? But,' continues Seneca, 'the true reason which prevented his going to the court of that prince was, that he did not think it consistent for him to seek a voluntary servitude, whose liberty even a free city could not tolerate.' *Noluit ire ad voluntariam servitutem is cujus libertatem civitas libera ferre non potuit.*[1]

[k] The peculiar austerity of his life did not render him gloomy and morose, as was common enough with the philosophers of those times. [l] In company and conversation he was always gay and facetious, and the life and soul of the enter-

[h] Xenoph. *Œcon.* p. 822.
[k] Xenoph. *in Conviv.*
[1] Senec. *de Benef.* l. v. c. 6.
[l] Ælian. l. iv. c. 11. l. ix. c. 35.

* Socrates amicis audientibus: Emissem, inquit, pallium, si nummos haberem. Neminem poposcit, omnes admonuit. A quo acciperet, ambitus fuit—Post hoc quisquis properaverit, serò dat: jam Socrati defuit. Senec. *de Benef.* l. vii. c. 24.

tainment. Though he was very poor, he piqued himself upon the neatness of his person and house, and could not endure the ridiculous affectation of Antisthenes, who always wore dirty and ragged clothes. He told him once, that through the holes in his cloak, and the rest of his tatters, abundance of vanity might be discerned.

One of the most distinguishing qualities of Socrates, was a tranquillity of soul, that no accident, no loss, no injury, no ill treatment, could ever alter. Some have believed, that he was by nature hasty and passionate, and that the moderation, to which he had attained, was the effect of his reflections, and of the efforts he had made to subdue and correct himself; which would still add to his merit. [m] Seneca tells us, that he had desired his friends to apprize him whenever they saw him ready to fall into a passion, and that he had given them that privilege over him, which he took himself with them. * Indeed the best time to call in aid against a passion which has so violent and sudden a power over us, is when we are yet ourselves, and in cool blood. At the first signal, the least hint, he either softened his tone, or was silent. Finding himself exasperated against a slave; 'I would beat you,' says he, 'if I were not angry:' [n] *Cæderem te, nisi irascerer.* Having received a box on the ear, he contented himself with only saying, with a smile; [o] 'It is a misfortune not to know when to put on a helmet.'

Without going out of his own house, he found enough to exercise his patience in all its extent. Xanthippe, his wife, put it to the severest proofs by her capricious, passionate, violent disposition. It seems that, before he took her for his companion, he was not ignorant of her character; and he says himself in Xenophon,[p] that he had expressly chosen her, from conviction, that if he should be capable of bearing her insults, there would be nobody, though ever so difficult to endure, with whom he could not live. If this was the view with which he married her, it was certainly fully answered. Never was woman of so violent and fantastical a spirit, and so

[m] Senec. *de Irâ*, l. iii. c. 15.
[n] Ibid. l. i. c. 15.
[o] Ibid. l. iii. c. 11.
[p] Xenoph. *in Conviv.* p. 876.

* Contra potens malum et apud nos gratiosum, dum conspicimus, et nostri sumus, advocemus.

bad a temper. There was no kind of abuse or injurious treatment, which he had not to experience from her. She would sometimes be transported with such an excess of rage, as to tear off his cloak in the open street;[q] and even one day, after having vented all the reproaches her fury could suggest, she emptied a pot of foul water upon his head: at which he only laughed, and said, 'That so much thunder must needs produce a shower.'

[r] Some ancient authors write, that Socrates married a second wife, named Myrto, who was the grand-daughter of Aristides the Just, and that he suffered exceedingly from them both, as they were continually quarrelling with each other, and never agreed, but in loading him with reproaches, and offering him the grossest insults. They pretend, that during the Peloponnesian war, after the pestilence had swept off great part of the Athenians, a decree was made, whereby, to retrieve the sooner the ruins of the republic, each citizen was permitted to have two wives at the same time, and that Socrates took the benefit of this new law. Those authors found this circumstance solely upon a passage in a treatise on nobility, ascribed to Aristotle. But besides that, according to Plutarch himself, Panætius, a very grave author, has fully refuted this opinion, neither Plato nor Xenophon, who were well acquainted with all that related to their master, say any thing of this second marriage of Socrates; and on another side, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus Siculus, who have treated at large all the particulars of the Peloponnesian war, are alike silent in regard to the pretended decree of Athens, which permitted bigamy. We may see in the first volume of the *Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres*, a dissertation of Monsieur Hardion's upon this subject; wherein he demonstrates, that the second marriage of Socrates, and the decree respecting bigamy, are supposititious facts.

SECT. II. OF THE DÆMON, OR FAMILIAR SPIRIT OF SOCRATES.—Our knowledge of Socrates would be defective if we knew nothing of the genius, which, he pretended, assisted him with its counsel and protection in the greatest part of his

[q] Diog. *in Socrat.* p. 112.
[r] Plut. *in Aristid.* p. 335. Athen. l. xiii. p. 555. Diog. Laert. *in Socrat.* p. 105.

actions. It is not agreed amongst authors what this genius was, commonly called, 'The Dæmon of Socrates,' from the Greek word Δαιμόνιον, that signifies something of a divine nature, conceived as a secret voice, a sign, or such an inspiration as diviners are supposed to have had: this genius dissuaded him from the execution of his designs when they would have been prejudicial to him, without ever inducing him to undertake any action: [s] *Esse divinum quoddam, quod Socrates dæmonium appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti.* [t] Plutarch, in his treatise entitled, *Of the Genius of Socrates*, relates the different sentiments of the ancients concerning the existence and nature of this genius. I shall confine myself to that, which seems the most natural and reasonable of them all, though he does not lay much stress upon it.

We know that the Divinity alone has a clear and unerring knowledge of futurity; that man cannot penetrate into its darkness but by uncertain and confused conjectures: that those who succeed best in that research, are such, as by a more exact and studied comparison of the different causes capable of influencing future events, discern with greater force and perspicuity, what will be the result and issue of the conflict of those different causes in conducing to the success or miscarriage of an effect or enterprise. This foresight and discernment has something of divine in it, exalts us above the rest of mankind, approximates us to the divinity, and makes us participate in some measure in his counsels and designs, by giving us an insight and foreknowledge, to a certain degree, of what he has ordained concerning the future. Socrates had a just and piercing judgment, joined with the most exquisite prudence. He might call this judgment and prudence Δαιμόνιον, *something divine*, using indeed a kind of equivocal expression, without attributing to himself however the merit due to his wisdom in forming conjectures with regard to the future. The Abbé Fraguier comes very near the same opinion in the dissertation he has left upon this subject in the [u] *Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres.*

[s] Cic. *de Divin.* l. i. n. 122. [t] Page 580. [u] Tom. iv. p. 368.

[x] The effect, or rather function, of this genius, was to stop and prevent his acting, without ever inducing him to act. He received also the same impulse, when his friends were going to engage in any unlucky affair, which they communicated to him; and several instances are related, wherein they found themselves under much inconvenience from not having believed him. Now what other signification can be given to this, than that it implies, under mysterious terms, a mind, which by its own lights, and the knowledge of mankind, has attained a sort of insight into futurity? And if Socrates had not intended to lessen in his own person the merit of an unerring judgment, by attributing it to a kind of instinct; if at bottom he had desired any thing to be understood, besides the general aid of the divine wisdom, which speaks in every man by the voice of reason, would he have escaped, says Xenophon,[y] the imputation of arrogance and falsehood?

[z] God has always prevented me from speaking to you, says he to Alcibiades, whilst the tenderness of your age would have rendered my discourses of no utility to you. But I conceive I may now enter into a dispute with you, as an ambitious young man, for whom the laws open a way to the dignities of the republic. Is it not visible here, that prudence prevented Socrates from conversing seriously with Alcibiades at a time when grave and serious conversation would have given him a disgust, of which he might perhaps never have got the better? [a] And when, in the dialogue upon the Republic, Socrates ascribes his avoiding public business to inspiration from above, does he mean any thing more than what he says in his *Apology*, that a just and good man, who, in a corrupt state, intermeddles with the government, is not long without perishing? If [b] when he was going to appear before the judges that were to condemn him, that divine voice does not make itself heard to prevent him, as it was accustomed to do upon dangerous occasions, the reason is, that he did not deem it a misfortune for him to die, especially at his age, and in his circumstances. Every body knows what his prognostication had been long before, with respect to the unfortunate expedition of Sicily.

[x] Plat. *in Theag.* p. 128. [y] *Memorab.* l. i. p. 708. [z] Plat. *in Alcib.* p. 150.
[a] Lib. vi. *de Rep.* p. 496. *Apolog. Soc.* p. 31, 32. [b] *Apolog. Soc.* p. 40.

He attributed it to his dæmon, and declared it to be the inspiration of that spirit. A wise man, who sees an affair ill concerted, and conducted with precipitation, may easily prophesy the event of it, without the aid of a dæmon's inspiration.

It must be allowed, however, that the opinion which gives to men, genii and angels, to direct and guard them, was not unknown, even to the Pagans. [c] Plutarch cites some verses of Menander, in which that poet expressly says, 'That every man at his birth has a good genius given him, which attends him during the whole course of his life as a guide and director.'

Ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαραστατεῖ
Εὐθὺς γενομένῳ, μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου
Ἀγαθός.

It may be believed with probability enough, that the dæmon of Socrates, which has been so differently spoken of, as to make it a question, whether it was a good or bad angel, was no more than the force and rectitude of his judgment, which acting according to the rules of prudence, and with the aid of a long experience, supported by wise reflections, made him foresee the events of those things, upon which he was either consulted, or deliberated himself.

I conceive at the same time, that he was not sorry the people should believe him inspired, or that his acquaintance with futurity was the effect of a divinity, whatsoever that might be. That opinion might exalt him very much in the mind of the Athenians, and give him an authority, of which it is well known that the greatest * persons of the Pagan world were very fond, and which they endeavoured to acquire by secret communications, and pretended conferences, with some divinity: but it likewise drew the jealousy of many of the citizens upon him.

SECT. III. SOCRATES DECLARED THE WISEST OF MANKIND BY THE ORACLE OF DELPHI.—[d] This declaration of the oracle, so advantageous in appearance for Socrates, did not a little

[c] *De anim. tranquil.* p. 474. [d] Plat. *in Apolog.* p. 21, 22.

* Lycurgus and Solon had recourse to the authority of oracles to advance their credit. Zaleucus pretended, that his laws had been dictated to him by Minerva. Numa Pompilius boasted his conferences with the goddess Egeria. The first Scipio Africanus made the people believe that the gods gave him secret counsels. Even Sertorius's hind had something divine in it.

contribute to the inflaming envy, and stirring up of enemies against him, as he tells us himself in his *Apology*, wherein he recounts the occasion, and true meaning, of that oracle.

Chærephon, a zealous disciple of Socrates, happening to be at Delphi, demanded of the oracle, whether there was a wiser man than Socrates in the world: the priestess replied, there was none. This answer puzzled Socrates extremely, and he could scarce comprehend the meaning of it. For on the one side, he well knew, says he of himself, that there was no wisdom in him, neither little nor great; and on the other, he could not suspect the oracle of falsehood, the divinity being incapable of telling a lie. He therefore considered it attentively, and took great pains to penetrate the meaning of it. At first he applied himself to a powerful citizen, a statesman, and a great politician, who passed for one of the wisest men of the city, and who was himself still more convinced of his own merit than others. He found by his conversation that he knew nothing, and insinuated as much to him in terms sufficiently intelligible; which made him extremely odious to that citizen, and all who were present. He did the same by several others of the same profession; and all the fruit of his inquiry was, to draw upon himself a greater number of enemies. From the statesman he addressed himself to the poets, whom he found still fuller of self-esteem, but really more void of knowledge and wisdom. He pursued his inquiries to the artisans, and could not meet with one, who, because he succeeded in his own art, did not believe himself very capable, and fully informed in all other points of the greatest consequence; which presumption was the almost universal failing of the Athenians. As they had naturally abundance of wit, they pretended to know every thing, and believed themselves capable of pronouncing upon all matters. His inquiries amongst strangers were not more successful.

Socrates afterwards entering into and comparing himself with all those he had questioned, * discovered, that the differ-

* Socrates in omnibus ferè sermonibus sic disputat, ut nihil affirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat, nisi id ipsum, eóque præstare cæteris, quòd illi, quæ nesciant, scire se putent; ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quòd hæc esset una omnis sapientia, non arbitrari se scire quod nesciat. Cic. *Acad. Quæst.* l. i. n. 15, 16.

ence between him and them was, that they all believed they knew what they did not know, and that for his part, he sincerely avowed his ignorance. From thence he concluded, that GOD alone is truly wise, and that the true meaning of his oracle was to signify, that all human wisdom was no great matter, or, to speak more properly, was nothing at all. And as to the oracle's naming me, it no doubt did so, says he, by way of setting me up for an example, as if it intended to declare to all men, The wisest amongst you is he who knows, like Socrates, that there is no real wisdom in him.

SECT. IV. SOCRATES DEVOTES HIMSELF ENTIRELY TO THE INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUTH OF ATHENS. AFFECTION OF HIS DISCIPLES FOR HIM. THE ADMIRABLE PRINCIPLES WITH WHICH HE INSPIRES THEM BOTH WITH RESPECT TO GOVERNMENT AND RELIGION.—After having related some particularities in the life of Socrates, it is time to proceed to that in which his character principally and peculiarly consisted; I mean the pains he took to instruct mankind, and particularly to form the youth of Athens.

[e] He seemed, says Libanius, the common father of the republic, so attentive was he to the happiness and advantage of all his countrymen. But as it is very difficult to correct the aged, and to make people change principles, who revere the errors in which they have grown grey, he devoted his labours principally to the instruction of youth, in order to sow the seeds of virtue in a soil more fit to produce the fruits of it.

[f] He had no open school like the rest of the philosophers, nor set times for his lessons. He had no benches prepared, nor ever mounted a professor's chair. He was the philosopher of all times and seasons. He taught in all places, and upon all occasions; in walking, conversation, at meals, in the army, and in the midst of the camp, in the public assemblies of the senate or people, in prison itself, and when he drank the poison, he philosophized, says Plutarch, and instructed mankind. And from thence the same judicious author takes occasion to establish a great principle on the subject of govern-

[e] *In Apol. Socrat.* p. 641. [f] Plut. *an seni sit ger. resp.* p. 796.

ment; which Seneca* before him had placed in its full light. To be a public man, says he, it is not necessary to be actually in office, to wear the robe of judge or magistrate, and to sit in the highest tribunals for the administration of justice. Many do this, who, though honoured with the fine names of orators, prætors, and senators, if they want the merit of those characters, ought to be regarded as private persons, and often deserve to be confounded with the lowest and vilest of the populace. But whoever knows how to give wise counsel to those who consult him, to animate the citizens to virtue, and to inspire them with sentiments of probity, equity, generosity, and love of their country; such a man, says Plutarch, is the true magistrate and ruler, in whatsoever condition or place he be.

Such was Socrates. The services he did the state, by the instructions he gave their youth, and the disciples he formed, are inexpressibly great. Never had master a greater number, nor more illustrious. Had Plato been the only one, he would be worth a multitude. [g] Upon the point of death he blessed and thanked God for three things; that he had endowed him with a rational soul, that he was born a Greek, and not a barbarian, and that he had placed his birth in the lifetime of Socrates. Xenophon [h] had the same advantage. It is said, that one day Socrates met him in the street, and stopping him with his staff, asked him whether he knew where provisions were sold? It was not difficult to answer this question. But Socrates having demanded in what place men learnt virtue, and seeing this second question put him to a stand: 'If you desire to know it,' continued the philosopher, 'follow me, and you shall be informed.' Which he did immediately, and was afterwards the first who collected and published his master's discourses.

[g] Plut. *in Mario*, p. 433.

[h] Diog. *in Xenoph.* p. 120.

* Habet ubi se etiam in privato latè explicet magnus animus—Ita deliturerit (vir ille) ut ubicunque otium suum absconderit, prodesse velit et singulis et universis ingenio, voce, consilio. Nec enim is solus reip. prodest, qui candidatos extrahit, et tuetur reos, et de pace belloque censet, sed qui juventutem exhortatur, qui in tantâ bonorum præceptorum inopiâ virtute instruit animos, qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque cursu ruentes prensat ac retrahit, et, si nihil aliud, certè moratur, in privato publicum negotium agit. An ille plus præstat, qui inter peregrinos et cives, aut urbanus prætor adeuntibus adsessoris verba pronunciat; quàm qui docet, quid sit justitia, quid pietas, quid patientia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptus, quid deorum intellectus, quam gratuitum bonum sit conscientia? Senec. *de tranquil. anim.* c. iii.

[j] Aristippus, upon a conversation with Ischomachus, in which he had introduced some strokes of Socrates's doctrine, conceived so ardent a passion to become his disciple, that he grew lean and wan in consequence of it, till he could go to the fountain head, and imbibe his fill of a philosophy, that taught the knowledge of evil, and its cure.

What is reported of Euclid the Megarian, explains still better how high the eagerness of Socrates's disciples ran, to receive the benefit of his instructions. [k] There was at that time an open war between Athens and Megara, which was carried on with so much animosity, that the Athenians obliged their generals to take an oath to lay waste the territory of Megara twice a year, and prohibited the Megarians to set foot in Attica upon pain of death. This decree could not extinguish nor suspend the zeal of Euclid. [l] He left his city in the evening in the disguise of a woman, with a veil upon his head, and came to the house of Socrates in the night, where he continued till the approach of day, when he returned in the same manner he came.

The ardour of the young Athenians to follow him was incredible. They left father and mother, and renounced all parties of pleasure, to attach themselves to him, and to hear his discourses. We may judge of this by the example of Alcibiades, the most ardent and fiery of all the Athenians. The philosopher, however, never spared him, and was always careful to calm the sallies of his passions, and to rebuke his pride, which was his great disease. I have before related some instances of this temper of his. [m] One day when Alcibiades was boasting of his wealth, and the great estates in his possession, (for this it is which generally puffs up the pride of young people of quality,) he carried him to a geographical map, and asked him to find Attica. It was so small, it could scarcely be discerned upon that draught; he found it, however, though with some difficulty: but upon being desired to point out his own estate there: 'It is too small,' says he, 'to be distinguished in so little a space.' 'See then,' replied Socrates, 'what consequence you attach to an imperceptible spot of land.'

[j] Plut. *de Curios.* p. 516.
[l] Aul. Gell. *Noct. Att.* l. vi. c. 10.
[k] Plut. *in Peric.* p. 168.
[m] Ælian, l. iii. c. 28.

This reasoning might have been urged much further still. For what was Attica compared to all Greece, Greece to Europe, Europe to the whole world, and the world itself to the vast extent of the infinite orbs which surround it? What an insect, what a nothing, is the most powerful prince of the earth in the midst of this abyss of bodies and immense spaces, and what a portion of it does he occupy!

The young people of Athens, dazzled with the glory of Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, and full of a wild ambition, after having received for some time the lessons of the sophists, who promised to make them very great politicians, conceived themselves capable of every thing, and aspired at the highest employments. [n] One of these, named Glauco, had taken it so strongly into his head to enter upon the administration of the public affairs, though not yet twenty years old, that none of his family or friends were able to divert him from a design so little suited to his age and capacity. Socrates, who had an affection for him upon account of Plato his brother, was the only person that could prevail upon him to change his resolution.

Meeting him one day, he accosted him with so much address and dexterity, that he engaged him to give him the hearing, which was already a great point gained. 'You are desirous then of governing the republic?' said he to him. 'True,' replied Glauco. 'You cannot have a more noble design,' answered Socrates: 'for if you succeed, you will have it in your power to serve your friends effectually, to aggrandize your family, and to extend the confines of your country. You will make yourself known not only at Athens, but throughout all Greece; and perhaps your renown, like that of Themistocles, may spread abroad amongst the barbarous nations. In short, wherever you are, you will attract the respect and admiration of the whole world.'

So smooth and insinuating a prelude was extremely pleasing to the young man, who was attacked on his blind side. He stayed willingly, without requiring to be pressed so to do, and the conversation continued. 'Since you desire to be esteemed and honoured, no doubt your view is to be useful to the public?' 'Certainly.' 'Tell me, then, I beg you, in the

[n] Xenoph. *Memorab.* l. iii. p. 772—774.

name of the gods, what is the first service you propose to render the state?' As Glauco seemed at a loss, and meditated upon what he should answer: 'I presume,' continues Socrates, it is to enrich it, that is to say, to augment its revenues.' 'Exactly so.' 'You are well versed then undoubtedly in the revenues of the state, and know perfectly to what they may amount? You have not failed to make them your particular study, in order that if a fund should happen to fail on a sudden by any unforeseen accident, you might be able to supply the deficiency by another?' 'I protest,' replied Glauco, 'that never entered into my thoughts.' 'At least you will tell me to what the expenses of the republic amount; for you must know the importance of retrenching such as are superfluous?' 'I own I am as little informed in this point as the other.' 'You must therefore defer your design of enriching the state till another time; for it is impossible you should do it, whilst you are unacquainted with its revenues and expenses.'

'But,' said Glauco, 'there is still another means which you have not mentioned. A state may be enriched by the ruin of its enemies.' 'You are in the right,' replied Socrates. 'But that depends upon its being the strongest; otherwise it incurs the danger of losing what it has. For which reason, he who talks of engaging in a war, ought to know the forces on both sides; that if he finds his own party strongest, he may boldly advise the war, and if weakest, dissuade the people from undertaking it. Now do you know the strength of our republic, and that of our enemies, by sea and land? Have you a state of them in writing? Be so kind to let me see it.' 'I have it not at present,' said Glauco. 'I see, then,' said Socrates, 'that we shall not soon enter into a war, if you are charged with the government; for you have abundance of inquiries to make, and much pains to go through, before you will resolve upon it.'

He ran over in this manner several other articles of no less importance, with which Glauco appeared equally unacquainted; till he brought him to confess how ridiculous those people were, who have the rashness to intrude themselves into the administration of affairs, without any other preparation for the service of the public than that of a high esteem for themselves.

and an immoderate ambition of rising to the first places and dignities. 'Have a care, dear Glauco,' said he to him, 'lest a too warm desire of honours should deceive you into pursuits that may cover you with shame by setting your incapacity and slender abilities in full light.'

Glauco improved from the wise admonitions of Socrates, and took time to inform himself in private before he ventured to appear in public: This is a lesson for all ages, and may be very useful to persons in all stations and conditions of life.

[o] Socrates did not urge his friends to enter early upon public employments; but first to take pains to improve their minds by the knowledge necessary to their success in them. [p] 'A man must be very simple,' said he, 'to believe that the mechanic arts are to be acquired without the help of proper masters, and that the knowledge requisite in governing states, which is the highest degree of human prudence, demands no previous labour and application.' His great care, in regard to those who aspired at public employments, was to form their manners upon the solid principles of probity and justice; and especially to inspire them with a sincere love of their country, with the most ardent passion for the public good, and a high idea of the power and goodness of the gods: because, without these qualities, all other abilities serve only to render men more wicked, and more capable of doing evil. Xenophon has transmitted to us a conversation of Socrates with Euthydemus, upon Providence, which is one of the finest passages to be found in the writings of the ancients.

'Did you never reflect within yourself,' says Socrates to Euthydemus, 'how much care the gods have taken to bestow upon man all that is necessary for him?' 'Never, I assure you,' replied he. 'You see,' continued Socrates, 'how necessary light is, and how precious that gift of the gods ought to appear to us.' 'Without it,' added Euthydemus, 'we should be like the blind, and all nature as if it were dead: but because we have occasion for intervals of relaxation, they have also given us the night for our repose.' 'You are in the right; and for this we ought to render them continual praises and thanksgiving. They have ordained that the sun, that bright

[o] Xenoph *Memorab.* l. iv. p. 800. [p] Ibid. p. 792

and luminous star, should preside over the day to distinguish its different parts, and that its light should serve not only to discover the wonders of nature, but to dispense over every part life and heat; and at the same time they have commanded the moon and stars to illuminate the night, which of itself is dark and obscure. Is there any thing more worthy of admiration than this variety and vicissitude of day and night, of light and darkness, of labour and rest;—and all this for the convenience and good of man?' Socrates enumerates in like manner the infinite advantages we receive from fire and water for the necessaries of life; and continuing to observe upon the wonderful attention of Providence in all that regards us: 'What say you,' pursued he, 'upon the sun's return after winter to revisit us; and that, as the fruits of one season wither and decay, he ripens new ones to succeed them? That having rendered man this service, he retires, lest he should incommode him by excess of heat; and then, after having receded to a certain point, which he could not pass without putting us in danger of perishing with cold, that he returns in the same track to resume his place in those parts of the heavens where his presence is most beneficial to us? And because we could neither support the cold nor heat, if we were to pass in an instant from the one to the other, are you not struck with admiration that this luminary approaches and removes so slowly, that the two extremes arrive by almost insensible degrees? * Is it possible not to discover, in this disposition of the seasons of the year, a Providence and goodness attentive not only to our necessities, but even to our delights and enjoyments?'

'All these things,' said Euthydemus, 'make me doubt whether the gods have any other employment than to shower down their gifts and benefits upon mankind. There is one point, however, that puts me to a stand, which is, that the brute animals partake of all these blessings as well as ourselves.' 'Yes,' replied Socrates: 'but do you not observe, that all these animals subsist only for man's service? The strongest and most vigorous of them he subjects at his will; he makes

* Ὥρας ἁρμοττούσας πρὸς τοῦτο παρέχειν, αἳ ἡμῖν ὃ μόνον ὧν δεόμεθα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα παρασκευάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἐυφραινόμεθα.

them tame and gentle, and employs them with great advantage in war, tillage, and the other occasions of life.'

'What if we consider man in himself?' Here Socrates examines the diversity of the senses, by the ministry of which man enjoys all that is best and most excellent in nature; the vivacity of his mind, and the force of his reason, which exalt him infinitely above all other animals; the wonderful gift of speech, by the means of which we communicate our thoughts reciprocally, publish our laws, and govern states.

'From all this,' says Socrates, 'it is easy to discern that there are gods, and that they have man in their particular care, though he cannot discover them by his senses. Do we perceive the thunder whilst it crushes every thing which opposes it? Do we distinguish the winds whilst they make such dreadful havoc before our eyes? Our soul itself, which is so intimately connected with us, which moves and actuates us, is it visible? can we behold it?—It is the same with regard to the gods, of whom none are visible in the distribution of their favours. This GREAT GOD himself,' (these words are remarkable, and demonstrate that Socrates acknowledged one supreme GOD, the Author of all being, and superior to all others, who were only the ministers of his will,) 'this great GOD, who has formed the universe, and supports the stupendous work, whose every part is finished with the utmost goodness and harmony; he who preserves them perpetually in immortal vigour, and causes them to obey him with a never-failing punctuality, and a rapidity not to be followed by our imagination; this God makes himself sufficiently visible by the endless wonders of which he is author; but continues always invisible in himself. Let us not then refuse to believe even what we do not see; and let us supply the defects of our corporeal eyes, by using those of the soul: but especially let us learn to render the just homage of respect and veneration to the Divinity, whose will it seems to be, that we should have no other perception of him than by his benefits vouchsafed to us. Now this adoration, this homage, consists in pleasing him, and we can only please him in doing his will.'

[q] In this manner Socrates instructed youth; these are the

[q] Xenoph. *Memorab.* l. iv. p. 803, 805.

principles and sentiments with which he inspired them; on the one side, a perfect submission to the laws and magistrates, in which he made justice consist; on the other, a profound regard for the Divinity, which constitutes religion. In things surpassing our understanding, he advises us to consult the gods; and as they impart themselves only to those that please them, he recommends above all things the making of them propitious by a prudent and regular conduct. * 'The gods are free,' says he, 'and it depends upon them either to grant what we ask, or to give us the directly reverse of it.' He cites an excellent prayer from a poet whose name has not come down to us; 'Great God, give us, we beseech thee, those good things of which we stand in need, whether we crave them or not; and remove from us all those which may be hurtful to us, even though we implore them of thee.' The vulgar imagined, that there are things which the gods observe, and others of which they take no notice: but Socrates taught, that the gods observe all our actions and words; that they penetrate into our most secret thoughts; are present in all our deliberations; and that they inspire us in all our actions.

SECT. V. SOCRATES APPLIES HIMSELF TO DISCREDIT THE SOPHISTS IN THE OPINION OF THE YOUNG ATHENIANS. WHAT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD OF THE IRONICAL CHARACTER ASCRIBED TO HIM.—Socrates found it necessary to guard the young people against a bad taste which had prevailed for some time in Greece. A sect of assuming men arose, who, ranking themselves as the first sages of Greece, were in their conduct entirely the reverse. For instead of being infinitely remote from all avarice and ambition, like Pittacus, Bias, Thales, and the others, who made the study of wisdom their principal occupation, these men were ambitious and covetous, entered into the intrigues and affairs of the world, and made a trade of their pretended knowledge. [r] They called themselves† sophists. They wandered from city to city, and caused themselves to be

[r] Plat. *in Apolog.* p. 19, 20.

* Ἐκ θεοῖς ἐστὶν, οἶμαι, ὥστε καὶ δοῦναι ἅττ' ἄν τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνῃ, καὶ στέρεσθαι τούτων. Plat. *in Alcib.* ii. p. 148.

† Sic enim appellantur hi qui ostentationis aut quæstûs causâ philosophantur. Cic. *in Lucul.* n. 129.

cried up as oracles, and walked about attended by crowds of their disciples, who, through a kind of enchantment, abandoned the embraces of their parents to follow these proud teachers, whom they paid a great price for their instruction. There was nothing these masters did not profess:—theology, physics, ethics, arithmetic, astronomy, grammar, music, poetry, rhetoric, and history. They knew every thing, and could teach every thing. Their greatest supposed skill lay in philosophy and eloquence. Most of them, like Gorgias, valued themselves upon giving immediate answers to all questions that could be proposed to them. Their young disciples acquired nothing from their precepts, but a silly esteem for themselves, and an universal contempt for every body else; so that not a scholar quitted these schools, but was more impertinent than when he first entered them.

It was necessary to decry the false eloquence and bad logic of these proud teachers in the opinion of the young Athenians. To attack them openly, and dispute with them in a direct manner, by a connected discourse, was what Socrates could well have done, for he possessed in a supreme degree the talents of elocution and reasoning; but this was not the way to succeed against great haranguers, whose sole aim was to dazzle their auditors with a vain glitter and rapid flow of words. He therefore took another course, and * employing the artifices and address of irony, which he knew how to apply with wonderful art and delicacy, he chose to conceal, under the appearance of simplicity and the affectation of ignorance, all the beauty and great force of his genius. Nature, which had given him so fine a soul, seemed to have formed his outside expressly for supporting the ironic character. He was very ugly, and, besides that, † had something very dull and stupid in his physiognomy. The whole air of his person, which had nothing but what was very common and very poor in it, perfectly corresponded with that of his countenance.

When ‡ he happened to fall into the company of some one of

* Socrates in ironiâ dissimulantiâque longè omnibus lepore atque humanitate præstitit. Cic. l. ii. *de Orat.* n. 270.

† Zopyrus physiognomon—stupidum esse Socratem dixit et bardum. Cic *de Fat.* n. 10.

‡ Socrates de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat

these sophists, he proposed his doubts with a diffident and modest air, asked simple questions in a plain manner, and, as if he had been incapable of expressing himself otherwise, made use of trivial comparisons, and allusions taken from the meanest employments. The sophist heard him with a scornful attention, and instead of giving him a precise answer, had recourse to his common-place phrases, and talked a great deal without saying any thing to the purpose. Socrates, after having praised (in order not to enrage) his adversary, entreated him to adapt himself to his weakness, and to descend so low as him, by satisfying his questions in a few words; because neither his wit nor memory were capable of comprehending or retaining so many fine and exalted notions, and all his knowledge was confined to question and answer.

This passed in a numerous assembly, and the teacher could not recede. When Socrates had once got him out of his intrenchment, by obliging him to answer his questions succinctly, he carried him on from one to another, to the most absurd consequences; and after having reduced him either to contradict himself, or be silent, he complained that the learned man would not vouchsafe to instruct him. The young people, however, perceived the incapacity of their master, and changed their admiration for him into contempt. Thus the name of sophist became odious and ridiculous.

It is easy to judge that men of the sophists' character, of which I have now spoken, who were in high credit with the great, who lorded it amongst the youth of Athens, and had been long celebrated for their wit and learning, could not be attacked with impunity; and the rather, because they had been assailed in the two most sensible points, their fame and their interest. [a] Socrates, for having endeavoured to unmask their vices and discredit their false eloquence, experienced from these men, who were equally corrupt and haughty, all that could be feared or expected from the most malignant envy and

[a] refellere. Ita, cùm aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est illâ dissimulatione quam Græci εἰρωνίαν vocant. Cic. *Acad. Quæst.* l. iv. n. 15.

Sed et illum quem nominavi (Gorgiam) et cæteros sophistas, ut è Platone intelligi potest, lusos videmus à Socrate. Is enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, quæ ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. Cic. *de Finib.* l. ii. n. 2.

[b] Plat. *in Apolog.* p. 23.

the most envenomed hatred; to which it is now time to proceed.

SECT. VI. SOCRATES IS ACCUSED OF HOLDING BAD OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE GODS, AND OF CORRUPTING THE ATHENIAN YOUTH. HE DEFENDS HIMSELF WITHOUT ART OR FEAR. HE IS CONDEMNED TO DIE.—Socrates was accused a little before the first year of the 95th Olympiad, soon after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants out of Athens, in the sixty-ninth year of his life; but the prosecution had been projected long before. The oracle of Delphi, which had declared him the wisest of mankind; the contempt into which he had brought the doctrine and morals of the sophists of his time, who were then in high reputation; the liberty with which he attacked all vice; the singular attachment of his disciples to his person and maxims, had all concurred in alienating people against him, and had drawn abundance of envy upon him. A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402.

[t]His enemies having sworn his destruction, and perceiving the difficulty of the attempt, prepared the way for it at a distance, and at first attacked him in the dark, and by obscure and secret methods. It is said, that in order to sound the people's disposition towards Socrates, and to try whether it would ever be safe to cite him before the judges, they engaged Aristophanes to bring him upon the stage in a comedy, wherein the first seeds of the accusation meditated against him were sown. It is not certain whether Aristophanes was suborned by Anytus and the rest of Socrates's enemies to compose that satirical piece against him. It is very likely that Socrates's declared contempt for all comedies in general, and for those of Aristophanes in particular, whilst he professed an extraordinary esteem for the tragedies of Euripides, might be the poet's true motive for taking his revenge of the philosopher. However it were, Aristophanes, to the disgrace of poetry, lent his pen to the malice of Socrates's enemies, or his own resentment, and employed his whole genius and capacity to depreciate the best and most excellent man that ever the pagan world produced.

He composed a piece called 'The Clouds,' wherein he

[t] Ælian. l. ii. c. 13. Plat. *in Apolog. Socrat.* p. 19.

introduces the philosopher perched in a basket, and hoisted up amidst the air and clouds, from whence he delivers maxims, or rather the most ridiculous subtilties. A very aged debtor, who desires to escape the close pursuit of his creditors, comes to him to be taught the art of tricking them at law; to prove by unanswerable reasons that he owes them nothing; and, in a word, of a very bad, to make a very good, cause. But finding himself incapable of any improvement from the sublime lessons of his new master, he brings his son to him in his stead. This young man soon after quits this learned school so well instructed, that at their first meeting he beats his father, and proves to him by subtile but invincible arguments, that he has reason for treating him in that manner. In every scene where Socrates appears, the poet makes him utter a thousand impertinencies, and as many impieties against the gods, and in particular against Jupiter. He makes him talk like a man of the greatest vanity and highest opinion of himself, with an equal contempt for all others, who out of a criminal curiosity is desirous of penetrating into what passes in the heavens, and of diving into the abysses of the earth; who boasts of having always the means of making injustice triumph; and who is not contented with keeping those secrets for his own use, but teaches them to others, and thereby corrupts youth. All this is attended with a refined raillery and wit, that could not fail of highly pleasing a people of so quick and delicate a taste as the Athenians, who were besides naturally jealous of all transcendent merit. They were so much charmed with it, that without waiting the conclusion of the representation, they ordered the name of Aristophanes to be set down above all his competitors.

Socrates, who had been informed that he was to be brought upon the stage, went that day to the theatre to see the comedy, contrary to his custom; for it was not common for him to go to those assemblies, unless when some new tragedy of Euripides was to be performed, who was his intimate friend, and whose pieces he esteemed upon account of the solid principles of morality he took care to interspérse in them. It has, however, been observed, that he once had not patience to wait the conclusion of one of them, wherein the actor had advanced a

dangerous maxim, but went out immediately, without considering the injury which his withdrawing might do to his friend's reputation. He never went to comedies, unless when Alcibiades and Critias forced him thither against his will; as he was offended at the unbounded licentiousness which reigned in them, and could not endure to see the reputation of his fellow-citizens publicly torn in pieces. He was present at this without the least emotion, and without expressing any discontent: and some strangers being anxious to know who the Socrates intended by the play was, he rose up from his seat, and showed himself during the whole representation. [u] He told those who were near him, and were amazed at his indifference and patience, that he imagined himself at a great entertainment, where he was agreeably laughed at, and that it was necessary to be able to bear a joke.

There is no probability, as I have already observed, that Aristophanes, though he was not Socrates's friend, had entered into the black conspiracy of his enemies, and had any thought of occasioning his destruction. It is more probable, that a poet who diverted the public at the expense of the principal magistrates and most celebrated generals, was also willing to make them laugh at the expense of a philosopher. All the guilt was on the side of those who envied him, and his enemies, who were in hopes of making great use of the representation of this comedy against him. The artifice was indeed deep and well planned. In bringing a man upon the stage, he is only represented by his bad, weak, or equivocal qualities. That view of him is followed with ridicule: ridicule accustoms people to the contempt of his person, and contempt proceeds to injustice. For the world are naturally emboldened in insulting, abusing, and injuring a man, when once he becomes the object of general contempt.

These were the first blows struck at him, and served as an essay and trial of the great affair meditated against him. It lay dormant a long while, and did not break out until twenty years afterwards. The troubles of the republic might well occasion that long delay. For it was in that interval that the enterprise against Sicily happened, the event of which was so

[u] Plut. *de educ. liber.* p. 10.

unfortunate, that Athens was besieged and taken by Lysander, who changed its form of government and established the thirty tyrants, who were not expelled till a very short time before the affair we speak of.

Melitus then appeared as accuser, and entered a process in form against Socrates. His accusation consisted of two heads. The first was, that he did not admit the gods acknowledged by the republic, and introduced new divinities: The second, that he corrupted the youth of Athens: and concluded with inferring that sentence of death ought to pass against him.

A. M. 3603. Ant. J. C. 401.

Never had accusation so little foundation, or even probability and pretext, as this. Socrates for forty years had made it his profession to instruct the Athenian youth. He had advanced no opinions in secret and in the dark. His lessons were given publicly, and in the view of great numbers of auditors. He had always observed the same conduct, and taught the same principles. What then could be Melitus's motive for this accusation after such a length of time? How came his zeal for the public good, after having been languid and drowsy for so many years, to awake on a sudden, and become so violent? Is it pardonable in so zealous and worthy a citizen as Melitus would wish to appear, to have continued mute and inactive whilst a person was corrupting the whole youth of that city, by instilling seditious maxims into them, and inspiring them with a disgust and contempt for the established government? For he who does not prevent an evil when it is in his power, is equally criminal with him that commits it. [x] These are the expressions of Libanius in a declamation of his called the *Apology of Socrates*. But, continues he, allowing that Melitus, whether through forgetfulness, indifference, or real and serious engagements, never thought for so many years of entering an accusation against Socrates; how came it to pass, that in a city like Athens, which abounded with wise magistrates, and what is more, with bold informers, so public a conspiracy as that imputed to Socrates should have escaped the eyes of those whom either the love of their country or invidious malignity rendered so

[x] Liban. *in Apolog. Socrat.* p. 645—648.

vigilant and attentive? Nothing was ever less credible, or more void of all probability.

[y] As soon as the conspiracy broke out, the friends of Socrates prepared for his defence. Lysias, the most able orator of his time, brought him an elaborate discourse of his composing, wherein he had set forth the reasons and measures of Socrates in their fullest light, and interspersed the whole with tender and pathetic strokes,[z] capable of moving the most obdurate hearts. Socrates read it with pleasure, and approved it very much; but as it was more conformable to the rules of rhetoric than the sentiments and fortitude of a philosopher, he told him frankly that it did not suit him. Upon which Lysias, having asked how it was possible to be well done, and at the same time not suit him:—In the same manner, said he, using according to his custom a vulgar comparison, that an excellent workman might bring me magnificent apparel, or shoes embroidered with gold, to which nothing would be wanting on his part, but which, however, would not fit me. He persisted therefore inflexibly in the resolution he had formed, not to demean himself by begging suffrages in the low abject manner common at that time. He employed neither artifice nor the glitter of eloquence: he had no recourse either to solicitation or entreaty: he brought neither his wife nor children to incline the judges in his favour by their sighs and tears. Nevertheless,* though he firmly refused to make use of any voice but his own in his defence, and to appear before his judges in the submissive posture of a suppliant, he did not behave in that manner out of pride, or contempt of the tribunal: it was from a noble and intrepid assurance, resulting from greatness of soul, and the usual attendant upon consciousness of truth and innocence. So that his defence had nothing timorous or weak in it. His discourse was bold, manly, generous, without passion, without emotion, full of the noble liberty of a philosopher, with no other ornament than that of truth, and displaying throughout the character and language of innocence. Plato, who was present, transcribed it afterwards, and without

[y] Cicer. l. i. *de Orat.* 231—233. [z] Quint. l. xi. c. 1.

* His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit; adhibuitque liberam contumaciam à magnitudine animi ductam, non à superbiâ. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. i.

any additions composed from it the work which he calls *The Apology of Socrates*, one of the most consummate master-pieces of antiquity. I shall here make an extract from it.

[a] Upon the day assigned, the proceeding commenced in the usual forms; the parties appeared before the judges, and Melitus spoke. The worse his cause, and the less provided it was with proofs, the more occasion he had for address and art to cover its weakness. He omitted nothing that might render the adverse party odious; and instead of reasons, which could not but fail him, he substituted the delusive glitter of a lively and pompous eloquence. Socrates, in observing that he could not tell what impression the discourse of his accusers might make upon the judges, owns, that for his part he scarce knew himself, such an artful colouring and likelihood had they given to their arguments, though there was not the least word of truth in all they had advanced.

[b] I have already said that their accusation consisted of two heads. The first regards religion. Socrates inquires out of an impious curiosity into what passes in the heavens and in the bowels of the earth. He does not acknowledge the gods adored by his country. He endeavours to introduce new deities; and, if he may be believed, an unknown god inspires him in all his actions. To make short, he believes there are no gods.

The second head relates to the interest and government of the state. Socrates corrupts the youth by instilling bad sentiments concerning the Divinity into them, by teaching them a contempt of the laws, and the order established in the republic; by declaring openly against the choice of the magistrates by lot; * by exclaiming against the public assemblies, where he is never seen to appear; by teaching the art of making the worst of causes good; by attaching the youth to himself out of a spirit of pride and ambition, under the pretence of instructing them; and by proving to children that they may treat their

[a] Plat. *in Apolog. Socrat.* Xenoph. *in Apolog. Socrat. et in Memor.*

[b] Plat. *in Apolog.* p. 24.

* Socrates in reality did not approve this manner of electing the magistrates. He observed, that when a pilot, a musician, or an architect is wanted, nobody is willing to take him at a venture; though the faults of these people are far from being of such great importance as those errors which are committed in the administration of the republic. Xenoph. *Memorab.* l. fig. 1. p. 712.

parents ill with impunity. He glories in a pretended oracle, and believes himself the wisest of mankind. He taxes all others with folly, and condemns without reserve all their maxims and actions; constituting himself by his own authority the general censor and reformer of the state. Notwithstanding which, the effects of his lessons may be seen in the persons of Critias and Alcibiades, his most intimate friends, who have done great mischiefs to their country, and have been the most wicked of citizens and the most abandoned of men.

This concluded with recommending to the judges to be very much upon their guard against the dazzling eloquence of Socrates, and to suspect extremely the insinuating and artificial turns of address which he would employ to deceive them.

[c] Socrates began his discourse with this point, and declared that he would speak to the judges as it was his custom to talk in his common conversation, that is to say, with much simplicity, and no art.

[d] He then proceeds to particulars. Upon what foundation can it be alleged, that he does not acknowledge the gods of the republic; he, who has been often seen sacrificing in his own house and in the temples? Can it be doubted whether he uses divination, since it is made a crime in him to report that he received counsels from a certain divinity; and is thence inferred that he aims at introducing new deities? But in this he innovates nothing more than others, who, putting their faith in divination, observe the flight of birds, consult the entrails of victims, and remark even words and accidental encounters: different means which the gods employ to give mankind a foreknowledge of the future. Old or new, it is still evident that Socrates acknowledges divinities, by the confession of even Melitus himself, who in his information avers that Socrates believes demons, that is to say subaltern spirits, the offspring of the gods. Now every man who believes the offspring of the gods, believes the gods.

[e] As to what relates to the impious inquiries into natural things imputed to him; without despising or condemning those who apply themselves to the study of physics, he declares that, as for himself, he had entirely devoted himself to what

[c] Plat. p. 17. [d] Ibid. p. 27. Xenoph. p. 703. [e] Xenoph. p. 710.

concerns moral virtue, the conduct of life, and the rules of government, as to a knowledge infinitely more useful than any other; and he calls upon all those who have been his hearers, to come forth and convict him of falsehood if he does not say what is true.

'I am accused of corrupting the youth, and of instilling dangerous maxims into them, as well in regard to the worship of the gods as the rules of government. You know, Athenians, that I never made it my profession to teach, nor can envy, however violent against me, reproach me with ever having sold my instructions. I have an undeniable evidence for me in this respect, which is my poverty. Always equally ready to communicate my thoughts either to the rich or poor, and to give them full leisure to question or answer me, I lend myself to every one who is desirous of becoming virtuous: and, if amongst those who hear me, there are any that prove either good or bad, neither the virtues of the one, of which I am not the cause, nor the vices of the other, to which I have not contributed, are to be ascribed to me. My whole employment is to persuade the young and old not to entertain too much love for the body, for riches, and all other precarious things, of whatsoever nature they be; but to let their principal regard be for the soul, which ought to be the chief object of their affection: for I incessantly urge to you, that virtue does not proceed from riches, but, on the contrary, riches from virtue; and that all the other goods of human life, as well public as private, have their source in the same principle.

'If to speak in this manner be to corrupt youth, I confess, Athenians, that I am guilty, and deserve to be punished. If what I say be not true, it is most easy to convict me of falsehood. I see here a great number of my disciples; they have only to appear. But perhaps reserve and consideration for a master who has instructed them, will prevent them from declaring against me: at least their fathers, brothers, and uncles cannot, as good relations and good citizens, excuse themselves from standing forth to demand vengeance against the corrupter of their sons, brothers, and nephews. But these are the persons who take upon them my defence, and interest themselves in the success of my cause.

[f] "Pass on me what sentence you please, Athenians; but I can neither repent nor change my conduct. I must not abandon or suspend a function which God himself has imposed on me. Now, it is He who has charged me with the care of instructing my fellow-citizens. If, after having faithfully kept all the posts wherein I was placed by our generals at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium, the fear of death should at this time make me abandon that in which the Divine Providence has placed me, by commanding me to pass my life in the study of philosophy for the instruction of myself and others; this would be a most criminal desertion indeed, and make me highly worthy of being cited before this tribunal, as an impious man who does not believe the gods. Should you resolve to acquit me, on condition that I keep silence for the future, I should not hesitate to make answer; Athenians, I honour and love you, but I shall choose rather to obey * God than you, and to my latest breath shall never renounce philosophy, nor cease to exhort and reprove you according to my custom, by telling each of you when you come in my way, "My † good friend, and citizen of the most famous city in the world for wisdom and valour, are you not ashamed to have no other thoughts than of amassing wealth, and of acquiring glory, credit, and dignities, whilst you neglect the treasures of prudence, truth, and wisdom, and take no pains in rendering your soul as good and perfect as it is capable of being?"

[g] "I am reproached with abject fear and meanness of spirit, for being so busy in imparting my advice to every one in private, and yet having always avoided being present in your assemblies, to give my counsels to my country. I thought I had given sufficient proofs of my courage and fortitude both in the field, where I have borne arms with you, and in the senate, when I alone opposed the unjust sentence you pronounced against the ten captains, who had not taken up and interred the bodies of those who were killed or drowned in the sea-fight near the islands Arginusæ; and when, upon more than one occasion, I opposed the violent and cruel orders of the thirty

[f] Plat. p. 28, 29. [g] Ibid. p. 31.

* Πείσομαι τῷ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑμῖν.

† The Greek signifies, *O best of men, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν* which was an obliging manner of accosting.

tyrants. What is it then that has prevented me from appearing in your assemblies? It is that demon, Athenians, that voice divine, which you have so often heard me mention, and which Melitus has taken so much pains to ridicule. That spirit has attached itself to me from my infancy: it is a voice which I never hear, but when it would prevent me from persisting in something I have resolved, for it never exhorts me to undertake any thing. It is that which has always opposed me when I would have intermeddled in the affairs of the republic: and its opposition was very seasonable; for I should have been amongst the dead long ago, had I been concerned in the measures of the state, without effecting any thing to the advantage of myself or our country. Do not take it ill, I beseech you, if I speak my thoughts without disguise, and with truth and freedom. Every man who would generously oppose a whole people, either amongst us or elsewhere, and who inflexibly applies himself to prevent the violation of the laws and the practice of iniquity in a city, will never do so long with impunity. It is absolutely necessary for him who would contend for justice, if he has the slightest wish to live, to remain in a private station, and never to have any share in public affairs.

[h] 'For the rest, Athenians, if, in the extreme danger in which I now am, I do not imitate the behaviour of those who, upon less emergencies, have implored and supplicated their judges with tears, and have brought before them their children, relations, and friends; it is not through pride and obstinacy, or any contempt for you, but solely for your honour, and for that of the whole city. It is fit that you should know that there are amongst our citizens, those who do not regard death as an evil, and who give that name only to injustice and infamy. At my age, and with the reputation which I have, whether true or false, would it be consistent for me, after all the lessons I have given upon the contempt of death, to be afraid of it myself, and to belie by my last act all the principles and sentiments of my past life?

'But without speaking of my fame, which I should extremely injure by such a conduct, I do not think it allowable to entreat

[h] Plat. p. 34, 35.

a judge, nor to procure an acquittal by supplications: he ought to be persuaded and convinced. The judge does not sit upon the bench to show favour by violating the laws, but to do justice by conforming to them. He did not take an oath to favour whom he pleases; but to do justice where it is due. We ought not therefore to accustom you to perjury, nor you to suffer yourselves to be accustomed to it; for in so doing, both the one and the other of us equally injure justice and religion, and both become criminal.

'Do not therefore expect from me, Athenians, that I should have recourse amongst you to means which I believe neither honest nor lawful; especially upon this occasion, wherein I am accused of impiety by Melitus. For if I should influence you by my prayers, and thereby induce you to violate your oaths, it would be undeniably evident that I should teach you not to believe in the gods; and even in defending and justifying myself, should furnish my adversaries with arms against me, and prove that I believe no divinity. But I am very far from such thoughts. I am more convinced of the existence of God than my accusers; and so convinced, that I abandon myself to God and you, that you may judge of me as you shall deem best for yourselves and me.'

Socrates* pronounced this discourse with a firm and intrepid tone. His air, his action, his visage, bore no resemblance to that of a person accused: he seemed the master of his judges, from the assurance and greatness of soul with which he spoke, without, however, losing any thing of the modesty natural to him. So noble and majestic a deportment displeased and gave offence. It is common for † judges, who look upon themselves as the absolute dispensers of life or death to such as are before them, to expect, out of a secret tendency of mind, that they should appear in their presence with humble submission and respectful awe: a homage which they think due to their supreme authority.

This was what happened now. Melitus, however, had not at first the fifth part of the voices. We have reason to suppose

* Socrates ita in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum. Cic. l. i. *de Orat.* n. 231.

† Odit judex ferè litigantis securitatem; cùmque jus suum intelligat, tacitus reverentiam postulat. Quint. l. iv. c. 1.

that the judges assembled upon this occasion might amount to five hundred, without reckoning the president. The law condemned the accuser to pay a fine of a thousand drachmas,* if he had not the fifth part of the suffrages. This law had been wisely established to check the boldness and impudence of calumniators. Melitus would have been obliged to pay this fine, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him, and presented themselves also as the accusers of Socrates. Their influence drew over a great number of voices, and there were two hundred and eighty-one against Socrates, and consequently only two hundred and twenty for him. He wanted no more than thirty-one † to have been acquitted; for he would then have had two hundred and fifty-one, which would have been the majority.

By this first sentence the judges only declared Socrates guilty, without decreeing against him any ‡ penalty. For when the law did not determine the punishment, and when a crime against the state was not in question, (in which manner I conceive Cicero's expression, *fraus capitalis*, may be understood,) the person found guilty had a right to choose the penalty he thought he deserved. Upon his answer the judges deliberated a second time, and afterwards passed their final sentence. Socrates was informed that he might demand an abatement of the penalty, and change the condemnation of death into banishment, imprisonment, or a fine. He replied generously, that he would choose neither of those punishments, because that would be to acknowledge himself guilty. 'Athenians,' said he, 'to keep you no longer in suspense, as you oblige me to sentence myself according to what I deserve, I condemn myself, for having passed my life in instructing yourselves and your children; for having neglected with that view my domestic affairs, and all public employments and dignities; for having devoted myself entirely to the service of my country, in labouring incessantly to render my fellow-

* About 25*l.*

† The text varies in Plato: it says, thirty-three, or thirty; whence it is probably defective.

‡ Primis sententiis statuebant tantùm judices damnarent an absolverent. Erat autem Athenis, reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi pœnæ æstimatio. Ex sententiâ, cùm judicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quasi æstimationem commeruisse se maximè confiteretur. Cic. l. i. *de Orat.* n. 231, 232.

citizens virtuous. I condemn myself, I say, to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the expense of the republic for the rest of my life.' * This last answer so † much offended the judges, that they condemned him to drink hemlock, a punishment very much in use amongst them.

[i] This sentence did not shake the constancy of Socrates in the least. 'I am going,' said he, addressing himself to his judges with a noble tranquillity, 'to suffer death by your order, to which nature had condemned me from the first moment of my birth; but my accusers will suffer no less from infamy and injustice by the decrees of truth. Did you expect from me, that to extricate myself out of your hands, I should have employed, according to the custom, flattery and pathetic expressions, and the timorous and grovelling behaviour of a suppliant? But, in trials, as well as war, an honest man ought not to use all sorts of means for the preservation of his life. It is equally dishonourable both in the one and the other, to ransom it only by prayers and tears, and all those other abject methods which you see every day practised by people in my present condition.'

Apollodorus, who was one of his friends and disciples, having advanced to him to express his grief for his dying innocent: 'What,' replied he with a smile, 'would you have had me die guilty?'

[k] Plutarch, to show that only our weakest part, the body, is in the power of man, but that there is another infinitely more noble part of us entirely superior to their threats and inaccessible to their attacks, cites these admirable words of Socrates, which are more applicable to his judges than his accusers: 'Anytus and Melitus may kill me, but they cannot hurt me.' As if he had said, in the language of the Pagans,

* It appears in Plato, that after this discourse, Socrates, without doubt to remove from himself an imputation of pride and contumacy, modestly offered to pay a fine proportionate to his indigence, that is to say, one mina, (fifty livres,) and that at the solicitation of his friends, who had bound themselves for him, he rose in his offer to thirty minæ. Plat. *in Apolog. Socrat.* p. 38. But Xenophon positively asserts the contrary, p. 705. This difference may be reconciled, perhaps, by supposing that Socrates refused at first to make any offer, and that he suffered himself at length to be overcome by the earnest solicitations of his friends.

† Cujus responso sic judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent. Cic. l. i. *de Orat.* n. 233.

[i] Plut. p. 39.

[k] *De anim. tranquil.* p. 475.

'Fortune may deprive me of my goods, my health, and my life; but I have a treasure within me, of which no external violence can deprive me; I mean virtue, innocence, fortitude, and greatness of mind.'

This great man, * fully convinced of the principle he had so often inculcated to his disciples,—that guilt is the only evil a wise man ought to fear—chose rather to be deprived of some years which he might perhaps have to live, than to forfeit in an instant the glory of his whole past life, in dishonouring himself for ever by the shameful behaviour he was advised to observe towards his judges. Seeing that his contemporaries had but a slight knowledge of him, he referred himself to the judgment of posterity; and by the generous sacrifice of the remnant of a life already far advanced, acquired and secured to himself the esteem and admiration of all succeeding ages.

SECT. VII. SOCRATES REFUSES TO ESCAPE OUT OF PRISON. HE PASSES THE LAST DAY OF HIS LIFE IN DISCOURSING WITH HIS FRIENDS UPON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. HE DRINKS THE POISON. PUNISHMENT OF HIS ACCUSERS. HONOURS PAID TO HIS MEMORY.—After the sentence had been passed upon him, † Socrates, with the same intrepid aspect with which he had held the tyrants in awe, went forward towards the prison, which lost that name, says Seneca, when he entered it, and became the residence of virtue and probity. His friends followed him thither, and continued to visit him during thirty days which passed between his condemnation and death. The cause of that long delay was, The Athenians sent every year a ship to the isle of Delos, to offer certain sacrifices; and it was prohibited to put any person to death in the city, from the time that the priest of Apollo had crowned the poop of this vessel, as a signal of its departure, till the same vessel should return. So that sentence having been passed

* Maluit vir sapientissimus quod superesset ex vitâ sibi perire, quàm quod præterisset: et quando ab hominibus sui temporis parùm intelligebatur, posterorum se judiciis reservavit, brevi detrimento jam ultimæ senectutis ævum seculorum omnium consecutus. Quint. l. i. c. 1.

† Socrates eodem illo vultu, quo aliquando solus triginta tyrannos in ordinem redegerat, carcerem intravit, ignominiam ipsi loco detracturus. Neque enim poterat carcer videri, in quo Socrates erat. Senec. *ir. Consol. ad Helvet.* c. xiii.

Socrates carcerem intrando purgavit, omnique honestiorem curiâ reddidit. Ibid. *de vit. beat.* c. xxvii.

upon Socrates the day after that ceremony began, it was necessary to defer the execution of it for thirty days, during the continuance of this voyage.

In this long interval, death had sufficient opportunity to present itself before his eyes in all its terrors, and to put his constancy to the proof, not only by the severe rigour of a dungeon, and the irons upon his legs, but by the continual prospect and cruel expectation of an event which nature always abhors. [1] In this sad condition he did not cease to enjoy that profound tranquillity of mind which his friends had always admired in him. He conversed with them with the same temper he had always expressed; and Crito observes, that the evening before his death he slept as peaceably as at any other time. He even at that time composed a hymn in honour of Apollo and Diana, and turned one of Æsop's fables into verse.

The day before or the same day that the ship was to arrive from Delos, the return of which was to be followed by the death of Socrates, Crito, his intimate friend, came to him early in the morning to let him know that mournful news, and at the same time to inform him that it depended only upon himself to quit the prison; that the jailor was gained; that he would find the doors open, and offered him a safe retreat in Thessaly. Socrates laughed at this proposal, and asked him, 'whether he knew any place out of Attica where people did not die?' Crito urged the thing very seriously, and pressed him to take advantage of so precious an opportunity, adding arguments upon arguments to induce his consent, and to engage him to resolve upon his escape. Without mentioning the inconsolable grief he should suffer for the death of such a friend, How should he support the reproaches of an infinity of people, who would believe that it was in his power to have saved him, but that he would not sacrifice a small part of his wealth for that purpose? Could the people ever be persuaded that so wise a man as Socrates would not quit his prison, when he might do it with all possible security? Perhaps he might fear to expose his friends, or to occasion the loss of their fortunes, or even of their lives or liberty. Ought there to be any thing more dear and precious to them than the preservation

[1] Plat. *in Criton.*

of Socrates? ' Even strangers themselves dispute that honour with them; many of whom have come expressly with considerable sums of money to purchase his escape; and declare, that they should think themselves highly honoured to receive him amongst them, and to supply him abundantly with all he should have occasion for. Ought he then to abandon himself to enemies, who have occasioned his being condemned unjustly; and can he think it allowable to betray his own cause? Is it not essential to his goodness and justice, to spare his fellow-citizens the guilt of innocent blood? But if all these motives cannot alter him, and he is not concerned with regard to himself, can he be insensible to the interests of his children? In what a condition does he leave them? And can he forget the father, to remember only the philosopher?

Socrates, after having heard him with attention, praised his zeal, and expressed his gratitude; but before he could accede to his opinion, was for examining whether it was just for him to depart out of prison without the consent of the Athenians. The question therefore here is to know whether a man condemned to die, though unjustly, can without a crime escape from justice and the laws? I do not know whether, amongst us, there are many persons to be found who would believe that this could be made a question.

Socrates begins with removing every thing foreign to the subject, and comes immediately to the bottom of the affair. ' I should certainly rejoice extremely, my dear Crito, if you could persuade me to quit this place, but cannot resolve to do so without being first persuaded. We ought not to concern ourselves for what the people may say, but for what the sole Judge of all that is just or unjust shall say, and that alone is truth. All the considerations you have alleged, as money, reputation, family, prove nothing, unless you show me that what you propose is just and lawful. It is a received and constant principle with us, that all injustice is shameful and fatal to him that commits it, whatever men may say, or whatever good or evil may ensue from it. We have always reasoned from this principle even to our latest days, and have never departed in the least from it. Would it be possible, dear Crito, that at our age our most serious discourses should

resemble those of infants, who say Yes and No almost in the same breath, and have no fixed and determinate notion?' At each proposition he waited Crito's answer and assent.

'Let us therefore resume our principles, and endeavour to make use of them at this time. It has always been a maxim with us, that it is never allowable upon any pretence whatsoever to commit injustice, not even in regard to those who injure us, nor to return evil for evil; and that when we have once engaged our word, we are bound to keep it inviolably; no interest being capable to dispense with it. Now, if at the time I should be ready to make my escape, the laws and republic should present themselves in a body before me, what could I answer to the following questions which they might put to me? What are you going to do, Socrates? Is flying from justice in this manner ought else than ruining entirely the laws and the republic? Do you believe that a state can subsist after justice is not only no longer in force in it, but is even corrupted, subverted, and trod under foot by individuals? But, it may be said, the republic has done me injustice, and has sentenced me wrongfully. Have you forgot, the laws would reply, that you are under an agreement with us to submit your private judgment to that of the republic? You were at liberty, if our government and regulations did not suit you, to retire and settle yourself elsewhere: but a residence of seventy years in our city sufficiently denotes that our regulations have not displeased you, and that you have complied with them from an entire knowledge and experience of them, and out of choice. In fact, you owe all you are, and all you possess, to them; birth, nurture, education, and establishment: for all these proceed from the tuition and protection of the republic. Do you believe yourself free to break through engagements with her, which you have confirmed by more than one oath? Though she should intend to destroy you can you render her evil for evil, and injury for injury? Have you a right to act in that manner towards your father and mother; and do you not know that your country is more considerable, and more worthy of respect before God and man, than either father or mother, or all the relations in the world together; that your country is to be honoured and revered, to

be complied with in her excesses, and to be treated with tenderness and kindness even in her most violent proceedings? In a word, that she is either to be reclaimed by wise counsels and respectful remonstrances, or to be obeyed in her commands, and all she shall decree suffered without murmuring? As for your children, Socrates, your friends will render them all the services in their power; at least, the Divine Providence will not fail them. Resign yourself therefore to our reasons, and take the counsel of those who have given you birth, nurture, and education. Set not so high a value upon your children, your life, or any thing in the world, as upon justice; that when you appear before the tribunal of Pluto, you may not be at a loss to defend yourself in the presence of your judges. But if you demean yourself otherwise, we shall continue your enemies as long as you live, without ever affording you relaxation or repose; and when you are dead, our sisters, the laws in the regions below, will be as little favourable to you; knowing that you have been guilty of using your utmost endeavours to destroy us.'

Socrates observed to Crito, that he seemed actually to hear all he had said, and that the sound of these words echoed so continually in his ears that they entirely engrossed him, and left him no other thoughts nor words. Crito, agreeing in fact that he had nothing to reply, continued silent, and withdrew from his friend.

[m] At length the fatal ship returned to Athens, which was in a manner the signal for the death of Socrates. The next day all his friends, except Plato, who was sick, repaired to the prison early in the morning. The jailor desired them to wait a little, because the eleven magistrates (who had the direction of the prisons) were at that time signifying to the prisoner that he was to die the same day. Presently after they entered, and found Socrates, whose * chains had been taken off, sitting by Xanthippe his wife, who held one of his children in her arms. As soon as she perceived them, she uttered piercing cries, sobbing, and tearing her face and hair, and made the prison

[m] Plut. *in Phæd.* p. 59, &c.

* At Athens, as soon as sentence was pronounced upon a criminal, he was unbound, and considered as the victim of death, whom it was no longer lawful to keep in chains.

resound with her complaints. 'Oh, my dear Socrates, your friends are come to see you this day for the last time!' He desired that she might be taken away, and she was immediately carried home.

Socrates passed the rest of the day with his friends, and conversed with them with his usual cheerfulness and tranquillity. The subject of conversation was most important and well suited to his present condition, that is to say, the immortality of the soul. What gave occasion to this discourse was a question introduced in a manner by chance, Whether a true philosopher ought not to desire and take pains to die? This proposition, taken too literally, implied an opinion that a philosopher might kill himself. Socrates shows that nothing is more unjust than this notion; and that man, appertaining to God, who formed and placed him with his own hand in the post he possesses, cannot abandon it without his permission, nor quit life without his order. What is it then that can induce a philosopher to entertain this love for death? It can be only the hope of that happiness which he expects in another life, and that hope can be founded only upon the opinion of the soul's immortality.

Socrates employed the last day of his life in entertaining his friends upon this great and important subject, from which conversation Plato's admirable dialogue, entitled *Phædon*, is wholly taken. He explains to his friends all the arguments for believing the soul immortal, and refutes all the objections against it, which are very near the same as are made at this day. This treatise is too long for me to attempt an abstract of it.

[n] Before he anwers any of these objections, he deplores a misfortune common enough amongst men, who, in consequence of hearing ignorant persons, that contradict and doubt every thing, dispute, believe there is nothing certain. 'Is it not a great misfortune, dear Phædon, that having reasons which are true, certain, and very easy to be understood, there should, however, be persons in the world who are not at all affected with them, from their having heard those frivolous disputes wherein all things appear sometimes true and sometimes false.

[n] Plat. p. 90, 91.

These unjust and unreasonable men, instead of blaming themselves for these doubts, or imputing them to the narrowness of their own capacities, by ascribing the defect to the reasons themselves, proceed at length to a detestation of them, and believe themselves more judicious and better informed than all others, because they imagine they are the only persons who comprehend that there is nothing true or certain in the nature of things.

Socrates demonstrates the injustice of this proceeding. He observes, that of two things equally uncertain, wisdom enjoins us to choose that which is most advantageous with least hazard. 'If what I advance,' says he, 'upon the immortality of the soul proves true, it is good to believe it; and if after my death it proves false, I shall still have drawn from it in this life this advantage, of having been less sensible here of the evils which generally attend human life.' This reasoning* of Socrates (which is real and true in the mouth of a Christian alone) is very remarkable. If what I say is true, I gain every thing, whilst I hazard very little; and if false, I lose nothing; on the contrary, I am still a great gainer.

Socrates does not confine himself to the mere speculation of this great truth, that the soul is immortal; he draws from it useful and necessary conclusions for the conduct of life, in explaining what the hope of a happy eternity demands from man, that it be not frustrated, and that instead of attaining the rewards prepared for the good, they do not experience the punishment allotted for the wicked. The philosopher here sets forth these great truths, which a constant tradition, though very much obscured by fiction and fable, had always preserved amongst the Pagans: the last judgment of the righteous and wicked; the eternal punishments to which great criminals are condemned; a place of peace and joy without end for the souls that have retained their purity and innocence, or which during this life have expiated their offences by repentance and satisfaction; and an intermediate state, in which they purify themselves, for a certain time, from less considerable crimes that have not been atoned for during this life.

* Monsieur Pascal has expatiated upon this reasoning in his seventh article, and deduced from it a demonstration of infinite force.

[o] 'My friends, there is still one thing, which it is very just to believe; and this is, that if the soul be immortal, it requires to be cultivated with attention, not only for what we call the time of life, but for that which is to follow, I mean eternity; and the least neglect in this point may be attended with endless consequences. If death were the final dissolution of being, the wicked would be great gainers by it as being delivered at once from their bodies, their souls, and their vices: but as the soul is immortal, it has no other means of being freed from its evils, nor any safety for itself, but in becoming very good and very prudent; for it carries nothing away with it but its good or bad deeds, its virtues or vices, which are commonly the consequence of the education it has received, and the causes of eternal happiness or misery.

[p] 'When the dead are arrived at the fatal rendezvous of departed souls, whither their * demon conducts them, they are all judged. Those who have passed their lives in a manner neither entirely criminal nor absolutely innocent, are sent into a place where they suffer pains proportioned to their faults, till being purged and cleansed of their guilt, and afterwards restored to liberty, they receive the reward of the good actions they have done in the body. Those who are judged to be incurable on account of the greatness of their crimes, who deliberately and wilfully have committed sacrileges and murders, and other such great offences, the fatal destiny that passes judgment upon them hurls them into Tartarus, from whence they never depart. But those who are found guilty of crimes, great indeed, but worthy of pardon; who have committed violences in the transports of rage against their father or mother, or have killed some one in a like emotion and afterwards repented, these suffer the same punishment and in the same place with the last, but for a time only, till by their prayers and supplications they have obtained pardon from those they have injured.

'But for those who have passed through life with peculiar sanctity of manners, delivered from their base earthly abodes as from a prison, they are received on high in a pure region

[o] Plat. p. 107. [p] Ibid. 113, 114.

* Demon is a Greek word, which signifies spirit, genius, and with us, angel.

which they inhabit; and as philosophy has sufficiently purified them, they live * without their bodies through all eternity in a series of joys and delights which it is not easy to describe, and which the shortness of my time will not permit me to explain more at large.

'What I have said will suffice, I conceive, to prove that we ought to endeavour strenuously throughout our whole lives to acquire virtue and wisdom: for you see how great a reward and how high a hope is proposed to us. And though the immortality of the soul were dubious, instead of appearing a certainty as it does, every wise man ought to assure himself that it is well worth his trouble to risk his belief of it in this manner. And, indeed, can there be a more glorious hazard? We ought to enchant ourselves with this blessed hope, for which reason I have lengthened this discourse so much.'

Cicero expresses these noble sentiments of Socrates with his usual delicacy. † Almost at the very moment, says he, that he held the deadly draught in his hand, he talked in such a manner as showed that he looked upon death not as a violence done to him, but as a means bestowed upon him of ascending to heaven. He declared that, upon departing out of this life, two ways are open to us: the one leads to the place of eternal misery such souls as have sullied themselves here below in shameful pleasures and criminal actions; the other conducts those to the happy mansions of the gods who have retained their purity upon earth, and have led in human bodies a life almost divine.

[q] When Socrates had done speaking, Crito desired him to give him and the rest of his friends his last instructions in regard to his children, and his other affairs, that by executing

[q] Page 115—118.

* The resurrection of the body was unknown to the Pagans.

† Cùm penè in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in cœlum videretur ascendere. Ita enim censebat, itaque disseruit: duas esse vias duplicesque cursus animorum è corpore excedentium. Nam, qui se humanis vitiis contaminâssent, et se totos libidinibus dedidissent, quibus coarctati velut domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinâssent, iis devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum à consilio deorum: qui autem se integros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio, seseque ab his semper sevocâssent, essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum, his ad illos, à quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. 1. n. 71, 72.

them they might have the consolation of doing him some pleasure. 'I shall recommend nothing to you this day,' replied Socrates, 'more than I have always done, which is to take care of yourselves. You cannot do yourselves a greater service, nor do me and my family a greater pleasure.' Crito having asked him afterwards in what manner he wished to be buried: 'As you please,' said Socrates, 'if you can lay hold of me, and I do not escape out of your hands.' At the same time looking upon his friends with a smile: 'I can never persuade Crito,' says he, 'that Socrates is he who converses with you, and disposes the several parts of his discourse; for he always imagines that I am what he is going to see dead in a little while. He confounds me with my carcass, and therefore asks me how I would be interred.' In finishing these words he rose up, and went to bathe himself in a chamber adjoining. After he came out of the bath, his children were brought to him, for he had three, two very little, and the other grown up. He spoke to them for some time, gave his orders to the women who took care of them, and then dismissed them. Being returned into his chamber, he laid himself down upon his bed.

The servant of the Eleven entered at the same instant, and having informed him that the time for drinking the hemlock was come, (which was at sunset,) the servant was so much affected with sorrow, that he turned his back and fell a weeping. 'See,' said Socrates, 'the good disposition of this man! Since my imprisonment he has often come to see me and to converse with me. He is more worthy than all his fellows. How heartily the poor man weeps for me!' This is a remarkable example, and might teach those who hold an office of this kind how they ought to behave to all prisoners, but more especially to persons of merit, if at any time they should happen to fall into their hands. The fatal cup was brought. Socrates asked what it was necessary for him to do. 'Nothing more,' replied the servant, 'than as soon as you have drank off the draught to walk about till you find your legs grow weary, and afterwards lie down upon your bed.' He took the cup without any emotion or change in his colour or countenance, and regarding the man with a firm and steady look, 'Well,' said he, 'what

say you of this drink; may one make a libation out of it?' Upon being told that there was only enough for one dose: 'At least,' continued he, 'we may say our prayers to the gods, as it is our duty, and implore them to make our exit from this world and our last stage happy, which is what I most ardently beg of them.' After having spoken these words he kept silence for some time, and then drank off the whole draught with an amazing tranquillity, and a serenity of aspect not to be expressed.

Till then his friends, with great violence to themselves, had refrained from tears; but after he had drank the potion they were no longer their own masters, and wept abundantly. Apollodorus, who had been in tears during almost the whole conversation, began then to utter great cries, and to lament with such excessive grief as pierced the hearts of all that were present. Socrates alone remained unmoved, and even reproved his friends, though with his usual mildness and good-nature. 'What are you doing?' said he to them; 'I am amazed at you. Ah! what is become of your virtue? Was it not for this I sent away the women that they might not fall into these weaknesses? For I have always heard say that we ought to die peaceably, and blessing the gods. Be at ease, I beg you, and show more constancy and resolution.' These words filled them with confusion, and obliged them to restrain their tears.

In the mean time he kept walking to and fro, and when he found his legs grow weary, he lay down upon his back as he had been directed.

The poison then operated more and more. When Socrates found it began to gain upon the heart, uncovering his face, which had been covered without doubt to prevent any thing from disturbing him in his last moments, 'Crito,' said he, and these were his last words, 'we owe a cock to Æsculapius; discharge that vow for me, and pray don't forget it:' soon after which he breathed his last. Crito drew near and closed his mouth and eyes. Such was the end of Socrates, in the first year of the 95th Olympiad, and the seventieth of his age. Cicero* says he could never read the description of his death in Plato without tears.

* Quid dicam de Socrate, cujus morti illacrymari soleo Platonem legens? *De Nat. Deor.* l. iii n. 82.

Plato and the rest of Socrates's disciples, apprehending the rage of his accusers was not satiated by that victim, retired to Megara to the house of Euclid, where they staid till the storm blew over. Euripides, however, to reproach the Athenians with the horrible crime they had committed in condemning the best of men to die upon such slight grounds, composed his tragedy called *Palamedes*, in which, under the name of that hero, who was also destroyed by a foul calumny, he deplored the misfortune of his friend. When the actor came to repeat this verse,

You doom the justest of the Greeks to perish;

the whole theatre, remembering Socrates by so marked a characteristic, melted into tears, and a decree passed to prohibit speaking any more of him in public. Some believe Euripides was dead before Socrates, and reject this anecdote.

Be this as it may, the people of Athens did not open their eyes till some time after the death of Socrates. Their hatred being satisfied, their prejudices were dispelled, and time having given them opportunity for reflection, the notorious injustice of the sentence appeared in all its horrors. Nothing was heard throughout the city but discourses in favour of Socrates. The Academy, the Lyceum, private houses, public walks, and market-places, seemed still to reecho the sound of his loved voice. Here, said they, he formed our youth, and taught our children to love their country, and to honour their parents. In this place he gave us his admirable lessons, and sometimes made us seasonable reproaches, to engage us more warmly in the pursuit of virtue. Alas! how have we rewarded him for such important services? Athens was in universal mourning and consternation. The schools were shut up, and all exercises suspended. The accusers were called to account for the innocent blood they had caused to be shed. Melitus was condemned to die, and the rest banished. [r] Plutarch observes, that all those who had any share in this black calumny, were in such abomination amongst the citizens, that no one would give them fire, answer them any question, nor go into the same bath with them; and had the place cleansed where they had

[r] *De invid. et odio*, p. 538.

bathed, as being polluted by their touching it; which drove them into such despair, that many of them killed themselves.

[a] The Athenians, not contented with having punished his accusers, caused a statue of brass to be erected to him, of the workmanship of the celebrated Lysippus, and placed it in one of the most conspicuous parts of the city. Their respect and gratitude rose even to a religious veneration; they dedicated a chapel to him, as to a hero and a demigod, which they called Σωκρατεῖον, that is to say, *the chapel of Socrates.*

SECT. VIII. REFLECTIONS UPON THE SENTENCE PASSED ON SOCRATES BY THE ATHENIANS, AND UPON SOCRATES HIMSELF.—We must be very much surprised, when on the one side we consider the extreme delicacy of the people of Athens, with respect to what regards the worship of the gods, which ran so high as to occasion their condemning the most eminent persons upon the simple suspicion of their failing in respect for them; and on the other, when we see the exceeding toleration, to call it no worse, with which the same people hear comedies every day, in which all the gods are turned into ridicule in a manner capable of inspiring the highest contempt for them. All Aristophanes's pieces abound with pleasantries, or rather buffooneries, of this kind; and if it is true, that this poet did not know what it was to spare the greatest men of the republic, it may be said also as justly, he spared the gods still less.

Such were the daily entertainments in the theatre, which the people of Athens heard not only without pain, but with such joy, pleasure, and applause, that they rewarded the poet with public honours who diverted them so agreeably. What was there in Socrates that came near this excessive license? Never did any person of the Pagan world speak of the Divinity, or of the adoration due to him, in so pure, so noble, and so respectful a manner. He did not declare against the gods publicly received and honoured by a religion more ancient than the city; he only avoided imputing to them the crimes and infamous actions, which the popular credulity ascribed to them, and which were only calculated to depreciate and decry them in

[a] Diog. p. 116.

the minds of the people. He did not blame the sacrifices, festivals, nor the other ceremonies of religion; he only taught, that all that pomp and outward show could not be agreeable to the gods without uprightness of intention and purity of heart.

This wise, this illumined, this religious man, however, with all his veneration and noble sentiments in regard to the Divinity, is condemned as an impious person by the suffrages of almost a whole people, without his accusers being able to instance one single avowed fact, or to produce any evidence that has the least appearance of probability.

From whence could so evident, so universal, and so determinate a contradiction, arise amongst the Athenians? A people, abounding in other respects with wit, taste, and knowledge, must without doubt have had their reasons, at least in appearance, for a conduct so different, and sentiments so opposite, to their general character. May we not say that the Athenians considered their gods in a double light? They confined their real religion to the public, solemn, and hereditary worship, as they had received it from their ancestors, as it was established by the laws of the state, had been practised from immemorial time, and especially confirmed by the oracles, auguries, offerings, and sacrifices. It is by this standard they regulated their piety; against which they could not suffer the least attempt whatsoever: it was of this worship alone that they were jealous; it was for these ancient ceremonies that they were such ardent zealots; and they believed, though without foundation, that Socrates was an enemy to them. But there was another kind of religion, founded upon fable, poetical fictions, popular opinions, and foreign customs; for this they were little concerned, and abandoned it entirely to the poets, to the representations of the theatre, and common conversation.

[t] What grossness did they not attribute to Juno and Venus? No citizen would have wished that his wife or daughters should resemble these goddesses. Timotheus, the famous musician, having represented Diana upon the stage of Athens, transported with folly, fury, and rage, one of the spectators conceived he could not utter a greater imprecation against him, than to wish

[t] Plut. *de superstit.* p. 170.

his daughter might resemble that divinity. It is better, says Plutarch, to believe there are no gods, than to imagine them of this kind; open and declared impiety being less profane, if we may be allowed to say so, than so gross and absurd a superstition.

However it be, the sentence, of which we have related the circumstances, will, through all ages, cover Athens with infamy and reproach, which all the splendour of its glorious actions, for which it is otherwise so justly renowned, can never obliterate: and it shows at the same time what is to be expected from a people, gentle, humane, and beneficent at bottom, for such the Athenians really were, but volatile, proud, haughty, inconstant, wavering with every wind and every impression. It is therefore with reason that public assemblies have been compared to a tempestuous sea; as that element, like the people, though calm and peaceable of itself, is subject to be frequently agitated by a violence not its own.

As to Socrates, it must be allowed that the Pagan world never produced any thing so great and perfect. When we observe to what a height he carries the sublimity of his sentiments, not only in respect to the moral virtues, temperance, sobriety, patience in adversity, the love of poverty, and the forgiveness of wrongs; but, what is far more considerable, in regard to the Divinity, his unity, omnipotence, creation of the world, and providence in the government of it; the immortality of the soul, its ultimate end and eternal destiny; the rewards of the good and the punishment of the wicked: when we consider this train of sublime knowledge, we ask ourselves whether it is a Pagan who thinks and speaks in this manner; and are scarce persuaded that from so dark and obscure a stock as Paganism should shine forth such brilliant and glorious rays of light.

It is true, his reputation has not been unimpeached, and it has been affirmed that the purity of his manners did not correspond with those of his sentiments. [u] This question has been discussed by the learned, but my plan will not admit me to treat it in its full extent. The reader may see abbé Fraguier's dissertation in defence of Socrates, against the reproaches

[u] *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscript.* tom. iv. p. 372.

made him upon account of his conduct. The negative argument he makes use of in his justification seems a very strong one. He observes, that neither Aristophanes in his comedy of *The Clouds*, which is entirely directed against Socrates, nor his vile accusers in his trial, have advanced one word that tends to impeach the purity of his manners; and it is not probable that such violent enemies as those would have neglected one of the most likely methods to discredit him in the opinion of his judges, if there had been any foundation or probability for the use of it.

I confess, however, that certain principles of Plato, his disciple, held by him in common with his master, with respect to the nudity of the combatants in the public games, from which at the same time he did not exclude the fair sex; and the behaviour of Socrates himself, who wrestled naked man to man with Alcibiades, give us no great idea of that philosopher's delicacy in point of modesty and bashfulness. [x] What shall we say of his visit to Theodota, a woman of Athens of indifferent reputation, only to assure himself with his own eyes of her extraordinary beauty, which was much talked of, and of the precepts he gave her, in order to attract admirers and to retain them in her snares? Are such lessons very suitable to a philosopher? I pass over many other things in silence.

I am the less surprised after this, that several of the Fathers have censured him in regard to the purity of his manners, and that they have thought fit to apply to him, as well as to his disciple Plato, what St. Paul [y] says of the philosophers; That God by a just judgment abandoned them to a reprobate mind, and to the most shameful lusts, as a punishment; for that having clearly known there was but one true God, they had not honoured him as they ought, by publicly avowing their belief, and were not ashamed to associate with him an innumerable multitude of divinities, ridiculous and infamous even in their own opinions.

And in this, properly speaking, consists the crime of Socrates, which did not make him guilty in the eyes of the Athenians, but gave occasion for his being justly condemned by eternal

[x] Xenoph. *Memorab.* l. iii. p. 783—786.
[y] Rom. ch. i. ver. 17—32.

Truth. She had illuminated his soul with the most pure and sublime lights of which the Pagan world was capable; for we are not ignorant, that all knowledge of God, even natural, cannot come but from himself alone. He held admirable principles on the subject of the Divinity. He agreeably rallied the fables of the poets, upon which the ridiculous mysteries of his age were founded. He often spoke, and in the most exalted terms, of the existence of one only God, eternal, invisible, creator of the universe, supreme director and arbiter of all events, avenger of crimes, and rewarder of virtues: but he * had not the courage to bear public testimony to these great truths. He perfectly discerned the falsehood and absurdity of the Pagan system; and nevertheless, as Seneca says of the wise man, and as he acted himself, he observed exactly all the customs and ceremonies, not as agreeable to the gods, but as enjoined by the laws. He † acknowledged at bottom one only Divinity, and worshipped with the people that multitude of infamous idols which ancient superstition had heaped up during a long succession of ages. He held peculiar opinions in the schools, but followed the multitude in the temples. As a philosopher, he despised and detested the idols in secret; as a citizen of Athens and a senator, he paid them in public the same adoration with others: by so much the more worthy of blame, says St. Augustin, as that worship, which was only external and dissembled, seemed to the people to be the effect of sincerity and conviction.

And it cannot be said that Socrates altered his conduct at the end of his life, or that he then expressed a greater zeal for truth. In his defence before the people, he declared that he had always received and honoured the same gods as the Athenians: and the last order he gave before he expired, was to sacrifice in his name a cock to Æsculapius. Behold then

* Quæ omnia (ait Seneca) sapiens servabit tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata—Omnem istam ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longa ævo longa superstitio congessit, sic, inquit, adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem, quàm ad rem, pertinere—Sed iste, quem philosophia quasi liberum fecerat, tamen, quia illustris senator erat, colebat quod reprehendebat, agebat quod arguebat, quod culpabat adorabat—eo damnabilius, quo illa, quæ mendaciter agebat, sic ageret, ut eum populus veraciter agere existimaret. S. August. *de civit. Dei*, l. vi. c. 10.

† Eorum sapientes, quos philosophos vocant, scholas habebant dissentientes, et templa communia Id. l. *de ver. rel.* c. i.

this prince of the philosophers, declared by the Delphic oracle the wisest of mankind, who, notwithstanding his internal conviction of one only Divinity, dies in the bosom of idolatry, and professing to adore all the gods of the Pagan theology. Socrates is the more inexcusable in this, since, declaring himself a man expressly appointed by Heaven to bear witness to the truth, he fails in the most essential duty of the glorious commission he ascribes to himself. For if there be any truth in religion that we ought more particularly to avow, it is that which regards the unity of the Godhead, and the vanity of idol-worship. In this his courage would have been well placed; nor would it have been any great difficulty to Socrates, determined besides as he was to die. But, * says St. Augustin, it was not these philosophers who were designed by God to enlighten the world, nor to bring men over from the impious worship of false deities to the holy religion of the true God.

We cannot deny Socrates to have been the hero of the Pagan world in regard to moral virtues. But to judge rightly of him, let us draw a parallel between this supposed hero and the martyrs of Christianity, who often were young children and tender virgins, and yet were not afraid to shed the last drop of their blood, to defend and confirm the same truths, which Socrates knew, without daring to assert them in public: I mean the unity of God, and the vanity of idols. Let us also compare the so much boasted death of this prince of philosophers with that of our holy bishops, who have done the Christian religion so much honour, by the sublimity of their genius, the extent of their knowledge, and the beauty and excellence of their writings; a saint Cyprian, a saint Augustin, and so many others, who were all seen to die in the bosom of humility, fully convinced of their unworthiness and nothingness, penetrated with a lively fear of the judgments of God, and expecting their salvation from his sole goodness and condescending mercy. Philosophy inspires no such sentiments; they could proceed only from the grace of the Mediator, which Socrates was not thought worthy to know.

* Non sic isti nati erant, ut populorum suorum opinionem ad verum cultum veri Dei à simulacrorum superstitione atque ab hujus mundi vanitate converterent. S. August. l. *de ver. rel.* c. ii.

BOOK THE TENTH.

THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

Manners and Customs of the Greeks.

The most essential part of history, and that which it concerns the reader most to know, is that which explains the character and manners as well of the people in general, as of the great persons in particular, of whom it treats; and this may be said to be in some sort the soul of history, while the facts are only the body. I have endeavoured, as occasion offered, to paint in their true colours the most illustrious personages of Greece; it remains for me to show the genius and character of the people themselves. I shall confine myself to those of Lacedæmon and Athens, who always held the first rank amongst the Greeks, and shall reduce what I have to say upon this subject to three heads; their political government, war, and religion.

Sigonius, Meursius, Potter, and several others, who have written upon Grecian antiquities, supply me with great lights, and are of much use to me in the subject which it remains for me to treat.

Chapter I. Of POLITICAL GOVERNMENT.

There are three principal forms of government: Monarchy, in which a single person reigns; Aristocracy, in which the elders and wisest govern; and Democracy, under which the

supreme authority is lodged in the hands of the people. The most celebrated writers of antiquity, as Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and Plutarch, give the preference to the first kind, as including the most advantages with the fewest inconveniences. But all agree, and it cannot be too often inculcated, that the end of all government, and the duty of every one invested with it, be the form what it may, is to use his utmost endeavours to render those under his command happy and just, by obtaining for them on the one side safety and tranquillity, with the advantages and conveniences of life; and on the other, all the means and helps that may contribute to making them virtuous. As the pilot's aim, says Cicero,* is to steer his vessel happily into port, the physician's to preserve or restore health, the general's of an army to obtain victory; so a prince, and every man who governs others, ought to make the utility of the governed his ultimate aim; and to remember, that the supreme law of every just government is the good of the public, [a] *Salus populi suprema lex esto.* He adds, that the greatest and most noble function in the world is to be the author of the happiness of a nation.

Plato in a hundred places esteems as nothing the most shining qualities and actions of those who govern, if they do not tend to promote the two great ends I have mentioned, the virtue and happiness of the people; and he refutes at large, in the first [b] book of his *Republic*, one Thrasymachus, who advanced, that subjects were born for the prince, and not the prince for his subjects; and that whatever promoted the interests of the prince, or commonwealth, ought to be deemed just and lawful.

In the distinctions which have been made upon the several forms of government, it has been agreed, that that would be the most perfect which should unite in itself, by a happy mixture of institutions, all the advantages, and exclude all the inconveniences, of the rest; and almost all the ancients have

[a] Cic. *de leg.* l. iii. n. 8. [b] Page 338—343.

* Tenes-ne igitur, moderatorem illum reip. quò referre velimus omnia?—Ut gubernatori cursus secundus, medico salus, imperatori victoria, sic huic moderatori reip. beata civium vita proposita est, ut opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloriâ ampla, virtute honesta sit. Hujus enim operis maximi inter homines atque optimi illum esse perfectorem volo. *Ad Attic.* l viii. *Epist.* 10.

believed,[c] that the Lacedæmonian government came nearest to this idea of perfection.

ARTICLE I. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SPARTA.—From the time that the Heraclidæ had reentered Peloponnesus, Sparta was governed by two kings, who were always of the same two families, descended from Hercules by two different branches; as I have observed elsewhere. Whether from pride and the abuse of despotic power on the side of the kings, or the desire of independence, and an immoderate love of liberty on that of the people, Sparta, in its beginnings, was always involved in commotions and revolts; which would infallibly have occasioned its ruin, as had happened at Argos and Messene, two neighbouring cities equally powerful with itself, if the wise foresight of Lycurgus had not prevented the fatal consequences by the reformation which he made in the state. I have related it at large[d] in the life of that legislator, and shall only touch here upon what regards the government.

SECT. I. ABRIDGED IDEA OF THE SPARTAN GOVERNMENT. ENTIRE SUBMISSION TO THE LAWS WAS IN A MANNER THE SOUL OF IT.—Lycurgus restored order and peace in Sparta by the establishment of the senate. It consisted of twenty-eight senators, and the two kings presided in it. This august assembly, formed out of the wisest and most experienced men in the nation, served as a counterpoise to the two other authorities, that of the kings, and that of the people; and whenever the one attempted to overbear the other, the senate interposed, by joining the weakest, and thereby held the balance even between both. At length, to prevent this body itself from abusing its power, which was very great, a kind of curb was annexed to it, by the nomination of five Ephori, who were elected out of the people, whose office lasted only one year, but who had authority, not only over the senators, but the kings themselves.

The power of the kings was extremely limited, especially in the city, and in time of peace. In war they had the command of the fleets and armies, and at that time greater authority. However, they had even then a kind of inspectors and com-

[c] Polyb. l. vi. p. 458, 459. [d] Vol. ii. [e] Arist. *de rep.* l. ii. p. 331.

missioners assigned them, who served as a necessary council, and were generally chosen for that office from among those citizens who were out of favour with them, in order that there should be no connivance on their side, and the republic be the better served. There was almost continually some secret misunderstanding between the two kings; whether it proceeded from a natural jealousy between the two branches, or was the effect of the Spartan policy, to which their too great union might have given umbrage.

The Ephori had a greater authority at Sparta, than the tribunes of the people at Rome. They presided in the election of the magistrates, and called them to an account for their administration. Their power extended even to the persons of their kings, and of the princes of the blood royal, whom they had a right to imprison, which right they actually used in the case of Pausanias. When they sat upon their seats in the tribunal, they did not rise up when the kings entered, which was a mark of respect paid them by all the other magistrates, and this seems to imply a kind of superiority in the Ephori in consequence of their representing the people; and it is observed of Agesilaus,[f] that when he was seated upon his throne to dispense justice, and the Ephori came in, he never failed to rise up to do them honour. It is very probable, that before him it was not usual for the kings to behave in that manner, since Plutarch relates this behaviour of Agesilaus as peculiar to him.

All public business was proposed and examined in the senate, and there it was that resolutions were passed. But the decrees of the senate were not of force unless ratified by the people.

There must have been exceeding wisdom in the laws established by Lycurgus for the government of Sparta, because, as long as they were exactly observed, no commotions or seditions of the people were ever known in the city, no change in the form of government was ever proposed, no private person usurped authority by violence, or made himself tyrant; the people never thought of depriving the two families, in which it had always been, of the sovereignty, nor did any of the kings ever attempt to assume more power than the laws permitted.

[f] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 597.

[g] This reflection, which both Xenophon and Polybius make, shows the idea they had of the wisdom of Lycurgus in political matters, and the opinion we ought to have of it. In fact, no other city of Greece had this advantage, and all of them experienced many changes and vicissitudes, for want of similar laws to perpetuate their form of government.

The reason of this constancy and stability of the Lacedæmonians in their government and conduct is, that in Sparta the laws governed absolutely, and with sovereign authority; whereas the greatest part of the other Grecian cities, abandoned to the caprice of private individuals, to despotic power, to an arbitrary and irregular sway, experienced the truth of Plato's saying: [h] That the city is miserable, where the magistrates command the laws, and not the laws the magistrates.

The example of Argos and Messene, which I have already pointed out, would alone suffice to show how just and true that reflection is. [i] After their return from the Trojan war, the Greeks, distinguished by the name of Dorians, established themselves in three cities of Peloponnesus, Lacedæmon, Argos, and Messene; and swore mutually to assist each other. These three cities, governed alike by monarchical power, had the same advantages; except that the two latter were far superior to the other in the fertility of the territory where they were situated. Argos and Messene, however, did not long preserve their superiority. The haughtiness of the kings, and the disobedience of the people, occasioned their fall from the flourishing condition in which they had been at first; and their example proved, says Plutarch, after Plato, that it was the peculiar favour of the gods which gave the Spartans such a man as Lycurgus, capable of prescribing so wise and reasonable a plan of government.

To support it without change, particular care was taken to educate the youth according to the laws and manners of the country; in order that, by being early ingrafted into them, and confirmed by long habitude, they might become, as it were, a second nature. The hard and sober manner in which they were brought up, inspired them during the rest of their lives

[g] Xenoph. *in Agesil.* p. 651. Polyb. l. vi. p. 459.
[h] Plat. l. iv. *de leg.* p. 715.
[i] Plat. l. iii. *de leg.* p. 683—685. Plut. *in Lycurg.* p 43.

with a natural taste for frugality and temperance that distinguished them from all other nations, and wonderfully adapted them to support the fatigues of war. [k] Plato observes, that this salutary custom had banished from Sparta, and all the territory dependent upon it, drunkenness, debauchery, and all the disorders that ensue from them; insomuch that it was a crime punishable by law to drink wine to excess even in the Bacchanalia, which every where else were days of license, and on which whole cities gave themselves up to the last excesses.

They also accustomed the children from their earliest infancy to an entire submission to the laws, magistrates, and all in authority; and * their education, properly speaking, was no more than an apprenticeship of obedience. It was for this reason that Agesilaus advised Xenophon to send his children to Sparta as to an excellent school,† where they might learn the greatest and most noble of all sciences, 'to obey and to command,' for the one naturally leads on to the other. It was not only the mean, the poor, and the ordinary citizens, who were subjected in this manner to the laws; but the rich, the powerful, the magistrates, and even the kings: and they distinguished themselves from the others only by a more exact obedience; convinced that such behaviour was the surest means to their being obeyed and respected themselves by their inferiors.

[l] Hence came the so much celebrated answers of Demaratus. Xerxes could not comprehend, how the Lacedæmonians, who had no master to control them, should be capable of confronting dangers and death. 'They are free and independent of all men,' replied Demaratus, 'but the law is above them and commands them; and that law ordains that they must conquer or die.' [m] Upon another occasion, when somebody expressed their surprise, that being king he should suffer himself to be banished: 'It is,' says he, 'because at Sparta the laws are stronger than the kings.'

[n] This appears evidently in the ready obedience of Agesilaus

[k] Plat. l. i. *de leg.* p. 637.
[l] Herod. l. vii. c. 145, 146.
[m] Plut. *in Apoph. Lacon.* p. 220.
[n] Idem *in Agesil.* p. 603, 604.
* "Ωστε τὴν παιδείαν εἶναι μελέτην ἐμφυτείας. Plut. *in Lycurg.* p. 58.
† Μαθησομένους τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ κάλλιστον, ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 606.

to the orders of the Ephori, when recalled by them to the support of his country; a delicate occasion for a king and a conqueror: but to him it seemed more * glorious to obey his country and the laws, than to command numerous armies, or even to conquer Asia.

SECT. II. LOVE OF POVERTY INSTITUTED AT SPARTA.—To this entire submission to the laws of the state, Lycurgus added another principle of government no less admirable, which was to remove from Sparta all luxury, profusion, and magnificence; to bring riches absolutely into discredit, to make poverty honourable, and at the same time necessary, by substituting a species of iron money in the place of gold and silver coin, which till then had been current. I have explained elsewhere the measures that he used to make so difficult an undertaking succeed, and shall confine myself here to examining what judgment should be passed on it, as it affects a government.

Was the poverty to which Lycurgus reduced Sparta, and which seemed to prohibit to that state all conquest, and to deprive it of all means of augmenting its force and grandeur, well adapted to render it powerful and flourishing? Does such a constitution of government, which till then had no example, nor has since been imitated by any state, evince a great fund of prudence and policy in a legislator? And was not the modification conceived afterwards under Lysander, of continuing private persons in their poverty, and restoring to the public the use of gold and silver coin, a wise amendment of what was too strained and excessive in that law of Lycurgus of which we are speaking?

It seems, if we consult only the common views of human prudence, that it is just to reason in this manner; but the event, which is an infallible evidence and arbiter in this place, obliges me to be of a quite different opinion. Whilst Sparta remained poor, and persisted in the contempt of gold and silver, which continued for several ages, she was still powerful and glorious; and the commencement of her decline may be

* Multo gloriosius duxit, si institutis patriæ paruisset, quàm si bello superâsset Asiam. Corn. Nep. *in Agesil.* c. iv.

dated from the time when she began to break through the severe prohibition of Lycurgus against the use of gold and silver money.

The education which he instituted for the young Lacedæmonians, the hard and sober life which he recommended with so much care, the laborious and violent exercises of the body prescribed by him, the abstraction from all other application and employment, in a word, all his laws and institutions show, that his view was to form a nation of soldiers, solely devoted to arms and military functions. I do not pretend absolutely to justify this scheme, which had its great inconveniences, and I have expressed my thoughts of it elsewhere. But, admitting this to be his view, we must confess that legislator showed great wisdom in the means he took to carry it into execution.

The almost inevitable danger of a people solely trained up for war, who have always their arms in their hands, and that which is most to be feared, is injustice, violence, ambition, the desire of increasing their power, of taking advantage of their neighbours' weakness, of oppressing them by force, of invading their lands under false pretexts, which the lust of dominion never fails to suggest, and of extending their bounds as far as possible; all vices and extremes which are horrid in private persons, and the ordinary intercourse of life, but which men have thought fit to applaud as grandeur and glory in the persons of princes and conquerors.

The great care of Lycurgus was to defend his people against this dangerous temptation. Without mentioning the other means he made use of, he employed two which could not fail of producing their effect. The * first was to prohibit all navigation and war at sea to his citizens. The situation of his city, and the fear lest commerce, the usual source of luxury and disorder, should corrupt the purity of the Spartan manners, might have a share in this prohibition. But his principal motive was to put it out of his citizens' power to project conquests, which a people shut up within the narrow bounds of a peninsula, could not carry very far without being masters at sea.

The second means, still more efficacious, was to forbid all

* Ἀπεῖργετο δὲ αὐτοῖς ναύταις εἶναι, καὶ ναυμαχεῖν. Plut. *in instit. Lacon.* p. 239.

use of gold or silver money, and to introduce a species of iron coin in its stead, which was of great weight and small value, and could only be current at home. How with such money could foreign troops be raised and paid, fleets fitted out, and numerous armies kept up either by land or sea?

So that the design of Lycurgus, in rendering his citizens warlike, and putting arms into their hands, was not, as [o] Polybius observes, and Plutarch after him, to make them illustrious conquerors, who might carry war into remote regions, and subject great numbers of people. His sole end was, that, shut up within the extent of the lands and domain left them by their ancestors, they should have no thoughts but of maintaining themselves in peace, and defending themselves successfully against such of their neighbours as should have the rashness to invade them; and for this they had occasion for neither gold nor silver, as they found in their own country, and still more in their sober and temperate manner of life, all that was sufficient for the support of their armies, when they did not quit their own lands, or the neighbouring territories.

Now, says Polybius, this plan once admitted, it must be allowed that nothing could be more wise nor more happily conceived than the institutions of Lycurgus, for the maintaining a people in the possession of their liberty, and securing to them the enjoyment of peace and tranquillity. In fact, let us imagine a little republic, like that of Sparta, of which all the citizens are inured to labour, accustomed to live on little, warlike, courageous, intrepid; and that the fundamental principle of this small republic is to do no wrong to any one, nor to disturb its neighbours, nor invade their lands or property; but, on the contrary, to declare in favour of the oppressed against the injustice and violence of oppressors; is it not certain, that such a republic, surrounded by a great number of states of equal extent, would be generally respected by all the neighbouring nations, would become the supreme arbiter of all their quarrels, and exercise an empire over them, by so much the more glorious and lasting, as it would be voluntary, and founded solely upon the opinion which those neighbours would have of its virtue, justice, and valour?

[o] Polyb. l. vi. p. 491. Plut. *in Lycurg.* p 59.

[p] This was the end that Lycurgus proposed to himself. Convinced that the happiness of a city, like that of a private person, depends upon virtue, and upon being well within itself, he regulated Sparta so as that it might always suffice to its own happiness, and act upon principles of wisdom and equity. From thence arose that universal esteem of the neighbouring people, and even of strangers, who asked from the Lacedæmonians neither money, ships, nor troops; but only that they would lend them a Spartan to command their armies; and when they had obtained their request, they paid him entire obedience, with every kind of honour and respect. In this manner the Sicilians obeyed Gylippus, the Chalcidians Brasidas, and all the Greeks of Asia, Lysander, Callicratidas, and Agesilaus; * regarding the city of Sparta as a model for all others, in the arts of living and governing well.

The epocha of the declension of Sparta begins with the open violation of Lycurgus's laws. I do not pretend that they had always been exactly observed till that time, which was far from the case; but the spirit and genius of those laws had almost always prevailed with the majority of the persons who governed. As soon as the ambition of reigning over all Greece had inspired them with the design of having naval armies and foreign troops, and that money was necessary for the support of those forces, Sparta, forgetting her ancient maxims, saw herself reduced to have recourse to the barbarians, whom till then she had detested, and basely to make her court to the kings of Persia, whom she had formerly vanquished with so much glory; and that, only to draw from them some aids of money and troops against her own brethren, that is to say, against people born and settled in Greece like themselves. Thus had they the imprudence and misfortune to recall with gold and silver into Sparta, all the vices and crimes which the iron money had banished; and to prepare the way for the changes which ensued, and were the cause of their ruin. And this infinitely exalts the wisdom of Lycurgus, in having foreseen, at such a distance, what might strike at the happiness of his citizens, and provided salutary remedies against it in the

[p] Plut. p. 58.

* Πρὸς σύμπασαν τὴν τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν πόλιν, ὥσπερ παιδαγωγὸν ἢ διδάσκαλον ἐυσχήμονος βίου καὶ τεταγμένης πολιτείας ἀποβλέποντες.

form of government which he established at Sparta. We must not, however, attribute the whole honour of this plan to him alone. Another legislator, who had preceded him several ages, has a right to share this glory with him.

SECT. III. LAWS ESTABLISHED BY MINOS IN CRETE, THE MODEL OF THOSE OF SPARTA.—All the world knows, that Lycurgus had formed the plan of most of his laws upon the model of those observed in the island of Crete, where he passed a considerable time for the better studying of them. It is proper I should give some idea of them here, having forgotten to do it in the place where it would have been more natural, that is, when I spoke for the first time of Lycurgus and his institutions.

Minos, whom fabulous history calls the son of Jupiter, was the author of these laws. He lived about a hundred years before the Trojan war. He was a powerful, wise, and gentle prince; and still more estimable for his moral virtues than his military abilities. After having conquered the island of Crete, and several others in its neighbourhood, he applied himself to strengthen by wise laws the new state, of which he had possessed himself by the force of arms. [q] The end which he proposed in the establishment of these laws, was to render his subjects happy by making them virtuous. He banished idleness and voluptuousness from his states, and with them luxury and effeminate pleasures, the fruitful sources of all vice. Well knowing that liberty is justly regarded as the most precious and greatest good, and that it cannot subsist without a perfect union of the people, he endeavoured to establish a kind of equality amongst them; which is the tie and basis of it, and well calculated to remove all envy, jealousy, hatred, and dissension. He did not undertake to make any new divisions of lands, nor to prohibit the use of gold and silver. He applied himself to the uniting of his subjects by other ties, which seemed to him neither less firm nor less reasonable.

A. M. 2720. Ant. J. C. 1284.

He decreed, that the children should be all brought up and educated together, by troops and bands; in order that they

[q] Strab. l. x. p. 480.

might learn early the same principles and maxims. Their life was hard and sober. They were accustomed to be satisfied with little, to suffer heat and cold, to walk over steep and rugged places, to skirmish with each other in small parties, to suffer courageously the blows they received, and to exercise themselves in a kind of dance in which they carried arms in their hands, and which was afterwards called the Pyrrhic; in order, says Strabo, that, even to their very diversions, every thing might breathe and form them for war. They were also made to learn certain airs of music, but of a manly, martial kind.

They were not taught either to ride, or to wear heavy armour: but in return, they were made to excel in drawing the bow, which was their most usual exercise. The reason of this was natural. Crete is not a flat even country, nor fit for breeding horses, as is that of the Thessalians, who were considered the best cavalry in Greece; but a rough, broken country, full of hills and high lands, where heavy-armed troops could not exercise themselves in the horse-race. But as archers and light-armed soldiers, fit to execute the devices and stratagems of war, the Cretans pretended to hold the foremost rank.

Minos thought proper to establish in Crete a community of tables and meals. Besides several other great advantages which he found in this institution, as the introducing a kind of equality in his dominions, the rich and poor having the same diet, the accustoming his subjects to a frugal and sober life, the cementing friendship and unity between them by the usual gaiety and familiarity of the table, he had also in view the custom of war, in which the soldiers are obliged to eat together. [8] It was the public that supplied the expenses of these tables. Out of the revenues of the state, a part was applied to the uses of religion, and the salaries of the magistrates, and the rest allotted for the public meals. So that the women, children, and men of all ages, were fed at the cost, and in the name, of the republic. In this respect Aristotle gives the preference to the meals of Crete before those of Sparta, wherein private persons were obliged to furnish their proportion, and

[7] Plat. *de leg.* l. i. p. 623.

[8] Arist. *de rep.* l. ii. c. 10.

without it were not admitted into the assemblies: which was to exclude the poor.

[t] After eating, the old men discoursed upon the affairs of the state. The conversation turned generally upon the history of the country, upon the actions and virtues of its great men, who had distinguished themselves either by their valour in war, or their wisdom in the art of government; and the youth, who were present at these entertainments, were exhorted to propose those great persons to themselves as their models, for the forming of their manners, and the regulation of their conduct.

[u] Minos, as well as Lycurgus, is reproached with having no other view in his laws than war; which is a very great fault in a legislator. It is true, this appears to have been his principal object, because he was convinced that the repose, liberty, and riches of his subjects were under the protection, and in a manner under the guard of arms and military knowledge; the conquered being deprived of all those advantages by the victor. But he was desirous that war should be made only for the sake of peace; and his laws are far from being confined to that sole object.

Amongst the Cretans, the cultivation of the mind was not entirely neglected, and care was taken to give the youth some tincture of learning. The works of Homer, [x] of much later date than the laws of Minos, were not unknown amongst them, though they set small value upon, and made little use of, foreign poets.[y] They were very curious in such knowledge as is proper to form the manners; and, what is no small praise, * they piqued themselves upon thinking much and speaking little. [z] The poet Epimenides, who made a voyage to Athens in the time of Solon, and was in great estimation there, was of Crete, and is by some placed in the number of the seven sages.

One of Minos's institutions, which Plato [a] admires the most, was to inspire early into the youth a high respect for the maxims, customs, and laws of the state, and not to suffer them to dispute or call in question the wisdom of their institutions;

[t] Athen. l. iv. p. 143.
[u] Plat. *de leg.* l. ii. p. 626.
[x] Plat. *de leg.* l. ii. p. 680.
[y] Plut. *in Solon.* p. 84.
[z] Ibid. l. i. p. 641.
[a] *De leg.* l. i. p. 634.
* Πολυυοίαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυλογίαν ἀσκεῖν.

since they were to consider them not as prescribed and imposed by men, but as emanations of the divinity himself. Accordingly he had industriously apprized the people, that Jupiter himself had dictated them to him. He paid the same attention in regard to the magistrates and aged persons, towards whom he recommended honour should be particularly shown; and in order that nothing might violate the respect due to them, he ordained, that if any defects were observed in them, they should never be mentioned in the presence of the youth: a wise precaution, and one which would be of great utility in the ordinary practice of life!

The government of Crete was at first monarchical, of which Minos has left a perfect model to all ages. According to him, as a great and most excellent * man observes, the king has supreme power over the people, but the laws supreme power over him. He has an absolute power to do good, and his hands are tied up from doing evil. The laws intrust the people in his hands as the most sacred of deposits, upon condition that he shall be the father of his subjects. The same laws require, that a single man by his wisdom and moderation shall constitute the felicity of an infinite number of subjects; not that the subjects, by their misery and abject slavery, shall be subservient to the gratification of the pride and low passions of a single man. According to him, the king ought to be abroad the defender of his country at the head of armies, and at home the judge of his people, to render them good, wise, and happy. It is not for himself that the gods have made him king; he is only so for the service of his people. He owes to them his whole time, care, and affection; and is worthy of the throne, only as far as he forgets himself, and devotes himself to the public good. [b] Such is the idea Minos had of the sovereignty, of which he was a living image in his own person, and which Hesiod has perfectly expressed in two words, by calling that prince, 'the most royal of mortal kings,' *βασιλεύτατον θνητῶν βασιλήων*: that is to say, that he possessed in a supreme degree all royal virtues, and was a king in all things.

[c] It appears that the authority of king was of no long dura-

[b] Plat. *in Min.* p. 320. [c] Arist. *de Rep.* l. ii. c. 10.

* Monsieur de Fenelon, archbishop of Cambray.

tion, and that it gave place to a republican government, as Minos had intended. The senate, composed of thirty senators, formed the public council. In that assembly the public affairs were examined, and resolutions taken; but they were of no force till the people had given them their approbation, and confirmed them by their suffrages. The magistrates, to the number of ten, established for maintaining good order in the state, and therefore called * *Cosmi*, held the two other bodies of the state in check, and preserved the balance between them. In time of war the same persons commanded the army. They were chosen by lot, but only out of certain families. Their office was for life, and they were not accountable to any for their administration. Out of this company the senators were elected.

The Cretans made the slaves and mercenaries cultivate the lands, who were obliged to pay them a certain annual sum. They were called *Periœci*, probably from their being drawn from neighbouring nations whom Minos had subjected. As they inhabited an island, and consequently a country separate from all others, the Cretans had not so much to fear from these vassals as the Lacedæmonians from the Helots, who often joined the neighbouring people against them. [d] A custom anciently established in Crete, from whence it was adopted by the Romans, gives us reason to believe that the vassals who tilled the lands were treated with great mildness and humanity. In the feasts of Mercury, the masters waited on their slaves at table, and did them the same offices as they received from them the rest of the year;—precious remains and traces of the primitive world, in which all men were equal, that seemed to inform the masters that their servants were of the same condition with themselves, and that to treat them with cruelty and pride was to renounce humanity.

[e] As a prince cannot do every thing alone, and is obliged to associate cooperators with himself, for whose conduct he is accountable, Minos charged his brother Rhadamanthus with a share in the administration of justice in the capital city, which is the most essential and indispensable function of sovereignty.

[d] Athen. l. xiv. p. 639.

[e] Plat. *in Min.* p. 320.

* Κόσμος, ordo.

He knew his probity, disinterestedness, ability, and constancy, and had taken pains to form him for so important an office. Another minister had the care of the rest of the cities, through which he made a circuit three times a year, to examine whether the laws established by the prince were duly observed, and the inferior magistrates and officers religiously acquitted themselves of their duty.

Crete, under so wise a government, changed its aspect entirely, and seemed to have become the abode of virtue, probity, and justice; as we may judge from what fabulous history tells us of the honour Jupiter did these two brothers, in making them the judges of the infernal regions; for every body knows that fable is founded upon real history, though disguised under agreeable emblems and allegories, adapted to recommend truth by the ornaments of fancy.

[f] It was, according to fabulous tradition, a law established from the beginning of time, that men on departing this life should be judged, in order to their receiving the reward or punishment due to their good or evil actions. In the reign of Saturn, and in the first years of that of Jupiter, this judgment was pronounced at the instant preceding death, which left room for very flagrant injustice. Princes, who had been cruel and tyrannical, appearing before their judges in all the pomp and splendour of their power, and producing witnesses to depose in their favour; because, as they were still alive, they dreaded their anger; the judges, dazzled with this vain show, and deceived by such false evidence, declared these princes innocent, and dismissed them with permission to enter into the happy abodes of the just. The same may be said in regard to the rich: but for the poor and helpless, calumny and malice pursued them even to this last tribunal, and found means to have them doomed for ever as criminals.

Fabulous history adds, that, upon reiterated complaints and warm remonstrances made to Jupiter upon this account, he changed the form of these trials. The time for them was fixed for the very moment after death. Rhadamanthus and Æacus, both sons of Jove, were appointed judges; the first for the Asiatics, the other for the Europeans; and Minos over

[f] Plat. *in Gorg.* p. 523—526. *In Axioch.* p. 371.

them to decide supremely in cases of doubt and obscurity. Their tribunal is situated in a place called 'The Field of Truth,' because neither falsehood nor calumny can approach it. The greatest prince must appear there, as soon as he has resigned his last breath, deprived of all his grandeur, reduced to his naked self, without defence or protection, silent and trembling for his own doom, after having made the whole world tremble for theirs. If he be found guilty of crimes which are of a nature to be expiated, he is confined in Tartarus for a certain time only, and with assurances of being released as soon as he shall be sufficiently purified. But if his crimes are unpardonable, such as injustice, perjury, and the oppression of his people, he is cast into the same Tartarus, there to suffer eternal miseries. The just, on the contrary, of whatsoever condition they are, are conducted into the blest abodes of peace and joy, to partake of a felicity which shall have no end.

Who does not see that the poets, under the cover of these fictions, ingenious indeed, but little to the honour of the gods, intended to give us the model of an accomplished prince, whose first care is to render justice to his people; and to depict the extraordinary happiness Crete enjoyed under the wise government of Minos? This happiness did not expire with him. [g] The laws he established subsisted in all their vigour even in Plato's time; that is to say, more than nine hundred years after. [h] And they were considered as the effect of his long * conversations for many years with Jupiter, who had condescended to become his teacher, to enter into a † familiarity with him as with a friend, and to form him in the great art of reigning with a secret complacency, as a favourite disciple and a tenderly-beloved son. It is in this manner Plato explains these words of Homer, [i] Διὸς μεγαλῷ ὀαριστῆς: the most exalted praise, according to him, that can be given to a mortal, and which that poet ascribes only to Minos.

Notwithstanding so shining and solid a merit, the theatres

[g] Plat. *in Min.* p. 321. [h] Ibid. p. 319. [i] *Odyss.* T. ver. 179.

* Et Jovis arcanis Minos admissus. Horat.

† This poetical fiction is perhaps taken from the holy Scriptures, which say of Moses: And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend. *Exod.* xxxiii. 11.

of Athens resounded with imprecations against the memory of Minos; and Socrates, in the dialogue of Plato which I have already often cited, observes upon, and gives the reason for them: but first he makes a reflection well worthy of being weighed: 'When either the praise or dispraise of great men is in question, it is of the utmost importance,' says he, 'to make use of circumspection and wisdom; because upon that depends the idea men form to themselves of virtue and vice, and the distinction they ought to make between the good and the bad. For,' adds he, 'God conceives a just indignation when a prince is blamed who resembles himself; and on the contrary another praised who is directly the reverse. We must not believe that nothing is sacred but brass and marble; (he speaks of the statues that were worshipped:) the just man is the most sacred, and the wicked the most detestable, of all beings in this world.'

After this reflection, Socrates observes, that the source and cause of the Athenians' hatred of Minos was the unjust and cruel tribute he imposed upon them, in obliging them to send him, every nine years, seven young men and as many maids, to be devoured by the Minotaur: and he cannot avoid reproaching that prince with having drawn upon himself the abhorrence of a city like Athens abounding with learned men, and of having sharpened the tongues of the poets against him, a dangerous and formidable race of men, from the poisoned shafts which they never fail to let fly against their enemies.

It appears from what I have repeated, that Plato imputes to this Minos, of whom we are treating, the imposition of that cruel tribute. Apollodorus, Strabo, and Plutarch, seem to be of the same opinion. * The Abbé Banier alleges and proves that they are mistaken, and confound the first Minos, of whom we speak, with a second, his grandson, who reigned after him in Crete, and who, to avenge the death of his son Androgeus, killed in Attica, declared war against the Athenians, and imposed that tribute, to which Theseus put an end by killing the Minotaur. It would indeed be difficult to reconcile so inhuman and barbarous a conduct with what all antiquity relates of the goodness, lenity, and equity of Minos, and with the

* *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscrip.* tom. iii.

magnificent praises it bestows upon the polity and institutions of Crete.

It is true, that in aftertimes the Cretans degenerated very much from their ancient reputation, which at length they absolutely lost by an entire change of their manners, becoming avaricious, and so self-interested as to think that no gain was base, enemies of labour and regularity of life, professed liars and knaves; so that to *Cretise* became a proverb amongst the Greeks, implying to lie and to deceive. Every body knows that * St. Paul cites against them as truth the testimony of one of their ancient poets, (it is believed to be Epimenides,) who paints them in colours much to their dishonour. But this change of manners, at whatever time it took place, does not at all affect the probity of the ancient Cretans, nor the glory of Minos their king.

[k] The most certain proof of that legislator's wisdom, as Plato observes, is the solid and lasting happiness which the sole imitation of his laws effected at Sparta. Lycurgus had regulated the government of that city upon the plan and idea of that of Crete; and it subsisted in an uniform manner for many ages, without experiencing the vicissitudes and revolutions so common in all the other states of Greece.

ARTICLE II. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS.—The government of Athens was neither so permanent nor so uniform as that of Sparta, but suffered various alterations, according to the diversity of times and conjunctures. Athens, after having long been governed by kings and afterwards by archons, assumed entire liberty, which gave place, however, for some years to the tyrannic power of the Pisistratidæ, but was soon after reestablished, and subsisted with splendour till the defeat in Sicily, and the taking of the city by the Lacedæmonians. The latter subjected them to the Thirty Tyrants, whose authority was not of long duration, and gave place again to liberty, which continued amidst various events during a long series of years, till the Roman power had subdued Greece and reduced it into a province.

[k] Plat. p. 320.

* Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί. The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies. Titus i. 12.

I shall consider in this place only the popular government, and shall examine in particular five or six heads of it: The foundation of their government according to Solon's establishment; the different parts of which the republic consisted; the council or senate of five hundred; the assemblies of the people; the different tribunals for the administration of justice; the revenues or finances of the republic. I shall be obliged to dwell more at large upon what regards the government of Athens, than I have upon that of Sparta, because the latter is almost sufficiently known, from what has been said of it in the life of Lycurgus.[1]

SECT. I. FOUNDATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS ACCORDING TO SOLON'S PLAN.—[m] Solon was not the first who established the popular government at Athens. Theseus long before him had traced out the plan, and begun the execution of it. After having united the twelve towns into one city, he divided the inhabitants into three bodies: that of the nobility, to whom the superintendence of religious affairs and all offices were confided; the labourers, or husbandmen; and the artisans. He had proposed the establishment of a kind of equality between the three orders. For if the nobles were considerable by their honours and dignities, the husbandmen had the advantage from their utility to the public, and the necessity there was for their labours; and the artisans had the superiority to both the other bodies from their number. Athens, properly speaking, did not become a popular state till the establishment of the nine Archons, whose authority continued only for one year, whereas before it lasted for ten; and it was not till many years after that Solon, by the wisdom of his laws, confirmed and regulated this form of government.

[n] Solon's great principle was to establish as much as possible a kind of equality amongst his citizens, which he regarded with reason as the foundation and essential point of liberty. He resolved therefore to leave the public employments in the hands of the rich, as they had been till then; but to give the poor also some share in the government, from which they were excluded. For this reason he made an estimation of what

[1] Vol. ii. [m] Plut. *in Thes.* p. 10, 11. [n] Ibid. *in Solon.* p. 87.

each individual was worth. Those who were found to have an annual revenue of five hundred measures, as well in grain as liquids, were placed in the first class, and called the *Pentacosiomedimni*, that is, those who had a revenue of five hundred measures. The second class was composed of such as had three hundred, and could maintain a horse for war; these were called *horsemen* or *knights*. Those who had only two hundred, were in the third class, and were called * *Zugitæ*. Out of these three classes alone the magistrates and commanders were chosen. All the other citizens who were below these three classes, and had less revenues, were comprised under the name of *Thetæ*, i. e. hirelings, or rather workmen labouring with their hands. Solon did not permit them to hold any office, and granted them only the right of giving their suffrages in the assemblies and trials of the people, which at first seemed a very slight privilege, but at length was found to be a very great advantage, as will appear in the sequel. I do not know whether Solon foresaw it, but he used to say, [o] that the people were never more obedient and submissive, than when they possessed neither too much nor too little liberty: which comes very near Galba's expression, [p] when, in order to induce Piso to treat the Roman people with mildness and lenity, he desires him to remember, † that he was going to command men who were incapable of bearing either entire liberty or absolute subjection.

[q] The people of Athens, being become more haughty after their victories over the Persians, pretended to have a right to share in all the public offices and the magistracy: and Aristides, to prevent the disorders which a too tenacious opposition might have occasioned, thought proper to give way to them in this point. [r] It appears, however, from a passage in Xenophon, that the people contented themselves with those offices from whence some profit arose, and left those which related

[o] Plut. *in Solon.* p. 110.
[p] Tacit. *Hist.* l. x. c. 16.
[q] Plut. *in Aristid.* p. 332.
[r] Xenoph. *de rep. Athen.* p. 691.

* It is believed they were so called from their being ranked between the Knights and the Thetæ; as in the galleys those who rowed in the middle were termed Zugitæ; their place was between the Thalamitæ and Thranitæ.

† Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam servitutem pati possunt, nec totam libertatem.

more particularly to the government of the state in the hands of the rich.

[s] The citizens of the first three classes paid every year a certain sum of money, to be laid up in the public treasury: the first a * talent, the Knights half a talent, and the Zugitæ ten † minæ.

As the proportion of revenue determined the order of the classes, as their revenues augmented, the people were allowed to rise to a superior class.

If [t] Plutarch may be believed, Solon formed two councils, which were the two anchors as it were of the commonwealth, to secure it from being shaken by the commotions of the assemblies of the people. The first was the Areopagus: but it was much more ancient than his institutions, and he only reformed it, and gave it new lustre by augmenting its power. The second was the council of the Four Hundred, that is, a hundred of each tribe; for Cecrops, the first king of the Athenians, had divided the people into four tribes. Clisthenes long after him changed that order, and established ten. It was in this council of the Four Hundred that all affairs were considered before they were proposed to the assembly of the people, as we shall soon explain.

I do not mention here another division of the people into three parties or factions, which till the time of Pisistratus were a continual source of troubles and seditions. One of these three parties was formed out of those who inhabited the high lands; and these favoured popular government: the other out of those who lived in the plains; and they were for oligarchy: and the third out of the people upon the coast; and these held the mean between both.

It is necessary, for the better understanding what we have now said, to enter into a more particular account of the Athenian people.

SECT. II. OF THE INHABITANTS OF ATHENS.—[u] There were

[s] Pollux, l. viii. c. 10. [t] *In Solon.* p. 88. [u] Athen. l. vi. p. 272.

* One thousand French crowns.

† Five hundred livres.

three sorts of inhabitants of Athens: citizens, strangers, and servants. In the account taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the cxvith Olympiad, their number amounted to twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand strangers, and forty * thousand servants. The number of citizens was almost the same in the time of Cecrops, and less under Pericles.

A. M. 3690. Ant. J. C. 314.

1. *Of the Citizens.*—A citizen could only be such by birth or adoption. [x]To be a natural denizen of Athens, it was necessary to be born of a father and mother both free, and Athenians. [x]We have seen that Pericles restored in all its force this law, which had not been exactly observed, and which he himself some short time after infringed. The people could confer the freedom of the city upon strangers; and those whom they had so adopted, enjoyed almost the same rights and privileges as the natural citizens. The quality of citizen of Athens was sometimes granted as an honour and mark of gratitude to those who had rendered great services to the state; as to Hippocrates: and even kings have sometimes canvassed that title for themselves or their children. Evagoras, king of Cyprus, thought it much to his honour.

When the young men had attained the age of twenty they were inrolled upon the list of citizens, after having taken an oath; and it was only in virtue of that public and solemn act that they became members of the state. The form of this oath is exceedingly remarkable, which Stobæus and [y] Pollux have preserved in the following words: 'I will never dishonour the profession of arms, nor save my life by a shameful flight. I will fight to my last breath for the religion and civil interests of the state, in concert with the other citizens, and alone if occasion be. I will not bring my country into a worse condition than I found it, but will use my utmost endeavours to make it more flourishing. I will always submit myself to the laws and magistrates, and to whatsoever shall be ordained by the common consent of the people. If any one shall violate,

[x] Vol. ii.

[y] Pollux, l. viii. c. 9.

* The text says, μυριάδας τετρακοσίας, four hundred thousand; which is a manifest error.

or attempt to annul, the laws, I will not disguise or conceal such an enterprise, but will oppose it either alone or in conjunction with my fellow-citizens; and I will constantly adhere to the religion of my forefathers. To all which I call to witness Agraulos, Enyalius, Mars, and Jupiter.' I leave the reader to his own reflections upon this august ceremony, well adapted to inspire the love of their country in the hearts of the young citizens.

The whole people at first had been divided into four tribes, and afterwards into ten. Each tribe was subdivided into several parts, which were called δῆμοι, *pagi*. It was by these two titles that the citizens were described in the public acts. *Melitus, è tribu Cecropide, è pago Pitthensi.*

2. *Of the Strangers.*—I call those by that name who, being of a foreign country, came to settle at Athens, or in Attica, whether for the sake of commerce, or the exercising any trade. They were termed μέτοικοι, *inquilini*. They had no share in the government, nor votes in the assembly of the people, and could not be admitted into any office. They put themselves under the protection of some citizen, as we find from a passage of * Terence, and upon that account were obliged to render him certain duties and services, as the clients did at Rome to their patrons. They were bound to observe all the laws of the republic, and to conform entirely to all its customs. They paid a yearly tribute to the state of twelve † drachmas; and in default of payment were made slaves, and exposed to sale. [z] Xenocrates, the celebrated but poor philosopher, was very near experiencing this misfortune, and was being carried to prison; but Lycurgus, the orator, having paid the tax, released him from the hands of the farmers of the public revenues; a kind of men who in all times have been very little sensible to merit, with the exception of an exceeding few of their number. That philosopher, meeting some time after the sons of his deliverer, told them, 'I pay your father the favour he has done me with usury, for all the world praises him upon my account.'

[z] Plut. *in Flamin.* p. 375.

* Thais patri se commendavit in clientelam et fidem: Nobis dedit sese. *Eunuch.* act. 5. scen. ult.

† Six livres.

3. *Of the Servants.*—These were of two kinds. The one who were free, and not able to get their bread by their work, were obliged by the bad state of their affairs to go into service, and their condition was reputable and not laborious. The service of the other was forced and constrained: these were slaves, who had either been taken prisoners in war, or bought of such as trafficked publicly in them. They formed part of the property of their masters, who disposed absolutely of them, but generally treated them with great humanity. [a] Demosthenes observes, in one of his harangues, that the condition of servants was infinitely more gentle at Athens than any where else. There was in that city an asylum and place of refuge for slaves, where the bones of Theseus had been interred, and that asylum still subsisted in Plutarch's time. How glorious was it for Theseus, that his tomb should do that, twelve hundred years after his death, which he had done himself during his life, and continue the protector of the oppressed as he had been!

[b] When the slaves were treated with too much rigour and inhumanity, they had their action against their masters, who were obliged to sell them to others, if the fact were sufficiently proved. [c] They could ransom themselves even against their master's consent, when they had laid up money enough for that purpose. For out of what they got by their labour, after having paid a certain proportion to their masters, they kept the remainder for themselves, and made a stock which was at their own disposal. Private persons, when they were satisfied with their services, often gave these slaves their liberty; and the same favour was always granted them by the public, when the necessity of the times obliged the state to put arms in their hands and enlist them amongst the citizens.

The humane and equitable manner in which the Athenians treated their servants and slaves, was an effect of the good temper natural to that people, and very remote from the austere and cruel severity of the Lacedæmonians towards their Helots, which often brought their republic to the very brink of destruction. [d] Plutarch, with great reason, condemns this

[a] *Philip.* 3.
[b] Plut. *de superstit.* p. 166.
[c] Plaut. *in Casin.*
[d] Plut. *in Catone*, p. 338, 339

rigour. He thinks it proper to habituate one's self always to mercy, even with regard to beasts, were it only, says he, to learn by that means to treat men well, and to serve, as it were, an apprenticeship to humanity and benevolence. He relates upon this occasion a very singular fact, and one well calculated to give an idea of the character of the Athenians. After having finished the temple called *Hecatonpedon*, they set all the beasts of burden at liberty, that had been employed in the work, and assigned them fat pasturages as consecrated animals. And it was said, that one of these beasts having come to offer itself at the work, and put itself at the head of those that drew the carts to the citadel, walking foremost, as if to exhort and encourage them, the Athenians ordained by a decree, that the creature should be maintained at the public expense till its death.

SECT. III. OF THE COUNCIL OR SENATE OF FIVE HUNDRED. —In consequence of Solon's institutions, the people of Athens had a great share and authority in the government. Appeals might be brought to their tribunals in all causes; they had a right to cancel the old laws, and establish new ones: in a word, all important affairs, whether relating to war or peace, were decided in their assemblies. In order that their determinations should be made with more wisdom and maturity, Solon had instituted a council, composed of four hundred senators, a hundred out of each tribe, which were then four in number; and they prepared and digested the affairs which were to be laid before the people, as we shall soon explain more at large. Clisthenes, about a hundred years after Solon, having increased the number of tribes to ten, augmented also that of the senators to five hundred; each tribe supplying fifty. This was called the council, or senate, of the Five Hundred. They received their stipend out of the public treasury.

They were chosen by lot, in which they made use of black and white beans, which were mingled and shaken in an urn; and each tribe gave in the names of those who aspired to that trust, and had the revenue assigned by the laws to qualify them for it. None could be admitted under the age of thirty.

After inquiry made into the manners and conduct of the candidate, he was made to take an oath, whereby he engaged to give at all times the best counsel he could to the people of Athens, and never to depart in the least from the tenour of the laws.

This senate assembled every day, except upon the days appointed for festivals. Each tribe in its turn furnished those who were to preside in it, called *Prytanes*, and this rank was decided by lot. This presidency continued thirty-five days, which being reckoned ten times, amounts to the number of days, except four, of the lunar year followed at Athens. This time of the presidency, or prytanism, was divided into five weeks, regard being had to the five tens of the *Prytanes*, who were to preside in them, and every week seven of these ten Prytanes drawn by lot presided, each their day, and were denominated Πρόεδροι, that is to say, *presidents*. He † who was so for the day, presided in the assembly of the senators and in that of the people. He was charged with the public seal, as also with the keys of the citadel and treasury.

The senators, before they assembled, offered a sacrifice to Jupiter and Minerva, under the additional appellation of 'givers of good counsel,' ‡ to implore from them the prudence and understanding necessary to form wise deliberations. The president proposed the business which was to be considered in the assembly. Every one gave his opinion in his turn, and always standing. After a question had been settled, it was drawn up in writing, and read with a loud voice. Each senator then gave his vote by scrutiny, by putting a bean into the urn. If the number of the white beans carried it, the question passed, otherwise it was rejected. This sort of decree was called Ψήφισμα, or Προβούλευμα, as much as to say, a preparatory resolution. It was afterwards laid before the assembly of the people, where, if it was received and approved, it had the force of a law; if not, its authority subsisted only one year. This shows with what wisdom Solon established this council, to inform and direct the people, to fix their inconstancy, to

* Πρυτάνεις.
† He was called Ἐπιστάτης.
‡ Βέλαιος, βέλαια.

check their temerity; and to impart to their deliberations a prudence and maturity not to be expected in a confused and tumultuous assembly composed of a great number of citizens, most of them without education, capacity, or much zeal for the public good. The reciprocal dependency and mutual concurrence of the two bodies of the state, which were obliged to lend each other their authority, and remained equally without force when without union and a good understanding, were besides a method judiciously contrived for supporting a wise balance between the two bodies; the people not being able to enact any thing without its being first proposed and approved by the senate, nor the senate to pass any decree into a law till it had been ratified by the people.

We may judge of the importance of this council by the matters which were treated in it; the same, without any exception, as were laid before the people;—wars, taxes, maritime affairs, treaties of peace, alliances; in a word, whatever related to government: without mentioning the account which they obliged the magistrates to give on quitting their offices, and the frequent decisions and judgments upon the most serious and important affairs.

SECT. IV. OF THE AREOPAGUS.—This council took its name from the place where it held its meetings, called * *the quarter, or hill of Mars*, because, according to some, Mars had been cited thither to trial for a murder committed by him. It was believed to be as ancient as the nation. Cicero and Plutarch attribute the institution of it to Solon; but he only reestablished it, by giving it more lustre and authority than it had had till then, and for that reason was looked upon as its founder. The number of the senators of the Areopagus was not fixed; at certain times they amounted to two or three hundred. Solon thought proper that only those who had borne the office of archon should be honoured with that dignity.

This senate had the care of seeing the laws duly observed, of inspecting the manners of the people, and especially of judging in criminal cases. They held their sittings in an open

* Ἄρειος πάγος.

place, and during the night. The former very probably to avoid being under the same roof with the criminals, and not to defile themselves by such an intercourse with them; the latter, that they might not be softened by the sight of the guilty, and might judge solely according to justice and the laws. It was for the same reason, that, in presence of these judges, the orators were not permitted to use any exordium or peroration, nor allowed to excite the passions, but were obliged to confine themselves solely to the subject matter of their cause. The severity of their judgments was exceedingly dreaded, particularly in regard to murder, and they were highly attentive to inspire their citizens with horror for that crime. They * condemned a child to be put to death for making it his pastime to put out the eyes of quails; conceiving this sanguinary inclination as the mark of a very wicked disposition, which might one day prove fatal to many, if it were suffered to grow up with impunity.

The affairs of religion, as blasphemies against the gods, contempt of the sacred mysteries, different species of impiety, and the introduction of new ceremonies and new divinities, were also brought before this tribunal. [e] We read in Justin Martyr, that Plato, who in his travels in Egypt had acquired great lights concerning the unity of GOD, when he returned to Athens, took great care to dissemble and conceal his sentiments, for fear of being obliged to appear and give an account of them before the Areopagitæ; and we know that St. Paul was traduced before them, as teaching a new doctrine, [f] and endeavouring to introduce new gods.

These judges were in great reputation for their probity, equity, and prudence, and generally respected. Cicero, in writing to his friend Atticus, upon the fortitude, constancy, and wise severity of the Roman senate, thinks he makes a great encomium upon it in comparing it with the Areopagus. [g] *Senatus,* Ἀρεῖος πάγος, *nil constantius, nil severius, nil fortius.* Cicero must have conceived a very advantageous idea of it, to

[e] *Cohort. ad Græc.* [f] Acts xvii. 18—20.

[g] *Ad Attic.* l. i. *Epist.* 13.

* Nec mihi videntur Areopagitæ, cùm damnaverunt puerum oculos coturnicum eruentem, aliud judicâsse, quàm id signum esse perniciosissimæ mentis, multisque malo futuræ si adolevisset. Quintil. l. v. c. 9.

speak of it as he does in the first book of his *Offices*. *He compares the famous battle of Salamis, in which Themistocles had so great a part, with the establishment of the Areopagus, which he ascribes to Solon; and makes no scruple to prefer, or at least to equal, the legislator's service to that for which Athens was obliged to the general of its army. 'For in reality,' says he, 'that victory was useful to the republic only for once, but the Areopagus will be so throughout all ages; as by the wisdom of that tribunal, the laws and ancient customs of the Athenian state are preserved. Themistocles did no service to the Areopagus, but the Areopagus abundantly contributed to the victory of Themistocles; because the republic was at that time directed by the wise counsels of that august senate.'

It appears from this passage of Cicero, that the Areopagus had a great share in the government, and I do not doubt but it was consulted upon important affairs. Cicero here perhaps may have confounded the council of the Areopagus with that of the Five Hundred. It is certain, however, that the Areopagitæ were extremely active in the public affairs.

Pericles, who could never enter the Areopagus, because, chance having always been against him, he had not passed through any of the employments necessary to his admission, attempted to weaken its authority, and attained his point: which is a great blot in his reputation.

SECT. V. OF THE MAGISTRATES.—Of these a great number were established for different functions. I shall speak only of the Archons, who are the most known. I have observed elsewhere that they succeeded the kings, and that their authority at first continued during life. It was afterwards limited to ten years, and reduced at last only to one. When Solon was commissioned to reform the government, he found them upon

* Quamvis Themistocles jure laudetur, et sit ejus nomen, quàm Solonis, illustrius, citeturque Salamis clarissimæ testis victoriæ, quæ anteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primùm constituit Areopagitas: non minùs præclarum hoc, quàm illud, judicandum est. Illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati: hoc consilio leges Atheniensium, hoc majorum instituta servantur. Et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum juverit: at ille adjuvit Themistoclem. Est enim bellum gestum consilio Senatûs ejus, qui à Solone erat constitutus. *Offic.* l. i. n. 75.

this foot, and to the number of nine. He did not abolish their office, but he very much diminished their power.

The first of these nine magistrates was called THE ARCHON, by way of eminence, and the year denominated from him:* 'Under such an Archon such a battle was fought.' The second was called THE KING, which was a remnant and vestige of the authority to which they had succeeded. The third was THE POLEMARCH, who at first commanded the armies, and always retained that name, though he had not the same authority, of which, however, he had yet preserved some part. For we have seen, in speaking of the battle of Marathon, that the polemarch had a right to vote in the council of war, as well as the ten generals then in command. The six other archons were called by the common name, THESMOTHETÆ, which implies that they had a particular superintendence over the laws, in order to their being duly observed. These nine archons had each of them a peculiar province, and were judges in certain affairs allotted to their cognizance. I do not think it necessary to enter into the particulars of their duty, nor into those of many other employments and offices established for the administration of justice, for the levying of taxes and tributes, for the preservation of good order in the city, for supplying it with provisions; in a word, for every thing relating to commerce and civil society.

SECT. VI. OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF THE PEOPLE.—These were of two sorts: the one ordinary and fixed to certain days, and for these there was no kind of summons; the other extraordinary, according to the different occasions that arose, and the people were informed of it by express proclamation.

The place for the assembly was not fixed. Sometimes it was the public market-place, sometimes a part of the city near the citadel, called Πνὺξ, and sometimes the theatre of Bacchus.

The prytanes generally assembled the people. Some days before the assembly, bills were fixed up, wherein the business to be considered was set down.

All the citizens, poor as well as rich, had a right to give their suffrages. Those were liable to a penalty who failed of

* From thence he was also called Ἐπώνυμος.

being present at the assembly, or who came late; and to induce their punctual attendance, a reward was annexed to it, at first of an obolus, which was the sixth part of a drachma, then of three oboli, which made about five pence French.

The assembly always began with sacrifices and prayers, in order to obtain from the gods the knowledge and understanding necessary to wise deliberations; and they never failed to add the most terrible imprecations against such as should wilfully advise any thing contrary to the public good.

The president proposed the affair upon which they were to deliberate. If it had been examined in the senate, and decided upon there, the resolution was read; after which those who wished to speak were invited to ascend the tribunal, that they might be the better heard by the people, and inform them in the matter proposed. The oldest generally spoke first, and then the rest according to their seniority. When the orators had done speaking, and given their opinion, that it was necessary, for instance, to approve or reject the decree of the senate, the people proceeded to vote; and the most common method of doing it was by holding up their hands, to denote their approbation, which was called χειροτονεῖν. The assembly was sometimes adjourned till another day, because it was too late to distinguish the number of those that lifted up their hands, and decide which party had the majority. After a resolution had been formed in this manner, it was reduced to writing, and read by an officer to the people with a loud voice, who confirmed it again by holding up their hands as before; after which the decree had the force of a law. And this was called ψηφισμα, from the Greek word ψῆφος, which signifies *a pebble*, or *small stone*, because they were sometimes used in giving suffrages by scrutiny.

All the great affairs of the republic were discussed in these assemblies. It was in them that new laws were proposed and old ones amended; every thing that related to religion and the worship of the gods examined; magistrates, generals, and officers created; their behaviour and conduct inquired into; peace or war concluded; deputies and ambassadors appointed; treaties and alliances ratified; freedom of the city granted; rewards and honours decreed to those who had distinguished

themselves in war, or rendered great services to the republic; and punishments ordained for those who had behaved themselves ill, or had violated the laws of the state, and were banished by the ostracism. In fine, justice was administered, and judgment passed there, upon the most important affairs. We see from this account, which is, however, very imperfect, how far the people's power extended; and with what truth it may be said, that the government of Athens, though qualified by the aristocracy and the authority of the elders, was by its constitution democratical and popular.

I shall have occasion to observe in the sequel, of what weight the talent of eloquence must have been in such a republic; and in what great repute orators must have been in it. It is not easy to conceive how they could make themselves heard in so numerous an assembly, and where such a multitude of auditors were present. We may judge how great that was, from what has been said of it in two instances. The first relates to the ostracism, and the other to the adoption of a stranger for a citizen. On each of these occasions, it was necessary that no less than six thousand citizens should be present in the assembly.

I reserve for another place the reflections which naturally arise from what I have already related, and what still remains for me to say upon the government of Athens.

SECT. VII. OF TRIALS.—There were different tribunals, according to the different nature of the affairs to be adjudged, but appeals might be brought to the people from all decrees of the other judges, and this it was that rendered their power so great and considerable. [h] All the allies, when they had any cause to try, were obliged to repair to Athens, where they often remained a considerable time without being able to obtain audience, from the multiplicity of affairs to be adjudged. This law had been imposed upon them, in order to render them more dependent upon the people, and more submissive to their authority; instead of which, had they sent commissioners upon the spot, they would have been the sole persons to whom the allies would have made their court and paid their homage.

[h] Xenoph. *de rep. Athen.* p. 664.

The parties pleaded their cause either in person, or employed advocates to do it for them. The time allowed for the hearing was generally fixed, and a water-clock, called in Greek κλεψύδρα, regulated its duration. The decree was passed by plurality of voices; and when the suffrages were equal, the judges inclined to the side of mercy, and acquitted the accused. It is remarkable that a friend was not obliged to give evidence against a friend.

All the citizens, even the poorest, and such as had no estates, were admitted into the number of the judges, provided they had attained the age of thirty, and were known to be persons of good morals. Whilst they sat in judgment, they held in their hands a kind of sceptre, which was the mark of their dignity, and laid it down when they withdrew.

The judges' salary was different at different times. They had at first only an obolus a day, and afterwards three, at which their fee remained fixed. It was but a small matter in itself, but became in time a very great charge to the public, and exhausted the treasury without much enriching individuals. We may judge of this from what is related in Aristophanes's comedy of *The Wasps*, wherein that poet ridicules the fondness of the Athenians for trying causes, and their eager desire for the gain arising from it, which protracted and multiplied suits without end.

In this comedy a young Athenian, who was to act the part I have mentioned, of turning the judges and trials of Athens into ridicule, from a computation which he makes of the revenues paid into the public treasury, finds their amount to be two thousand talents.* He then examines how much of that sum falls to the share of the six thousand judges, with whom Athens was overrun, at three oboli a head *per* day. This appears to be annually, including all of them, only a hundred and fifty talents.† The calculation is easy. The judges were paid only ten months in the year, the other two being employed in festivals, when all proceedings at law were prohibited. Now three oboli a day paid to six thousand men, makes fifteen talents a month, and consequently one hundred and fifty in

* About 280,000*l.* sterling.

† About 7000*l.* sterling.

ten months. According to this calculation, the most assiduous judge gained only seventy-five livres (about three guineas) a year. 'What then becomes of the remainder of the two thousand talents?' cries the young Athenian. 'What?' replies his father, who was one of the judges, 'it goes to those—but let us not expose the shame of Athens; let us always be for the people.' The young Athenian goes on to insinuate that the remainder went to such as robbed the public treasury; to the orators, who incessantly flattered the people, and to those who were employed in the government and army. I have extracted this remark from the works of Father Brumoi the Jesuit, of which I have already made much use, where I have spoken of the public shows and dramatic representations.

SECT. VIII. OF THE AMPHICTYONS.—The famous council of the Amphictyons is introduced here, though it was not peculiar to the Athenians, but common to all Greece, because it is often mentioned in the Grecian history, and I do not know whether I shall have a more natural occasion to mention it.

The assembly of the Amphictyons was in a manner the holding of a general assembly of the states of Greece. The establishment of it is attributed to Amphictyon, king of Athens and son of Deucalion, who gave them his name. His principal view in the institution of this council, was to unite in the sacred band of amity the several people of Greece admitted into it, and to oblige them by that union to undertake the defence of each other, and be mutually vigilant for the happiness and tranquillity of their country. The Amphictyons were also created to be the protectors of the oracle of Delphi, and the guardians of the prodigious riches of that temple; and also to adjudge the differences which might arise between the Delphians and those who came to consult the oracle. This council was held at Thermopylæ, and sometimes at Delphi itself. It assembled regularly twice a year, in the spring and autumn, and more frequently when affairs required.

The number of people or cities which had a right to sit in this assembly is not precisely known, and varied, without doubt, at different times. When the Lacedæmonians, in order

to secure to themselves alone an influence over the decrees of this council, were desirous of excluding the Thessalians, Argives, and Thebans, [1] Themistocles, in the speech he made to the Amphictyons to prevent that design from taking effect, seems to insinuate that there were only one and thirty cities at that time which had this right.

Each city sent two deputies, and, consequently, had two votes in the council; and that without distinction, or the more powerful having any prerogative of honour or preeminence over inferior states in regard to the suffrages; the liberty upon which these nations valued themselves, requiring that every thing should be equal amongst them.

The Amphictyons had full power to discuss and determine finally in all differences which might arise between the Amphictyonic cities, and to fine the culpable in heavy penalties. They could employ not only the rigour of the laws in the execution of their decrees, but even raise troops, if it were necessary, to compel such as rebelled to submit to them. The three sacred wars undertaken by their order, of which I have spoken elsewhere, are an evident proof of this power.

Before they were installed into this body, they took a very remarkable oath, of which *Æschines has preserved the form; it runs to this effect: 'I swear that I will never destroy any of the cities honoured with the right of sitting in the Amphictyonic council, nor turn their running waters out of their course either in times of war or peace. If any people shall make such an attempt, I hereby engage to carry the war into their country, to demolish their cities, towns, and villages, and to treat them in every respect as the most cruel enemies. Moreover, if at any time any person shall dare to be so impious as to steal and take away any of the rich offerings preserved in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, or abet any others in committing that crime, either by aiding or only counselling him therein, I will use my feet, hands, voice; in a word, all my powers and faculties, to avenge such sacrilege.' That oath was attended with the most terrible imprecations and execrations. 'That if any one infringes any thing contained in the

[1] Plut. *in Themist.* p. 122.
* Æschin. *in Orat.* περὶ παραπρεσβείας.

oath I have now taken, whether private person, city, or people, may that person, city, or people, be deemed accursed; and, as such, experience the whole vengeance of Apollo, Latona, Diana, and Minerva the fore-knower. May their country produce none of the fruits of the earth, and their women, instead of generating children resembling their fathers, bring forth nothing but monsters; and may their animals share in the same curse. May those sacrilegious men lose all their suits at law; may they be conquered in war, have their houses demolished, and be themselves and their children put to the sword.' I am not astonished that after such terrible engagements, the holy war, undertaken by the order of the Amphictyons, should be carried on with so much rancour and fury. The religion of an oath was of great force with the ancients: and how much more regard ought to be had to it in the Christian world, which professes to believe that the violation of it shall be punished with eternal torments; and yet how many are there amongst us who make a jest of breaking through the most solemn oaths?

The authority of the Amphictyons had always been of great weight in Greece, but it began to decline exceedingly from the moment they condescended to admit Philip of Macedon into their body. For that prince, enjoying by this means all their rights and privileges, soon knew how to set himself above all law, and to abuse his power so far as to preside by proxy both in this illustrious assembly and in the Pythian games; of which games the Amphictyons were judges and agonothetæ in virtue of their office. With this Demosthenes reproaches him in his third *Philippic:* 'When he does not deign,' says he, 'to honour us with his presence, he sends his slaves to preside over us.' An odious, but emphatical term, and highly characteristic of Grecian liberty, by which the Athenian orator designates the base and abject subjection of the greatest lords in Philip's court.

If the reader desires a more intimate knowledge of what relates to the Amphictyons, the dissertations of Monsieur Valois may be consulted, in the [k] *Memoirs of the Academy of*

[k] Vol. iii.

Belles Lettres, wherein this subject is treated with great extent and erudition.

SECT. IX. OF THE REVENUES OF ATHENS.—The revenues,* according to the passage of Aristophanes which I have cited above, and consequently as they stood in the time of the Peloponnesian war, amounted to two thousand talents; that is to say, to six millions of livres. They are generally classed under four heads.

1. The first relates to the revenues arising from agriculture, the sale of woods, the produce of the silver mines, and other funds of a like nature, appertaining to the public. Amongst these may be included the duties upon the import and export of merchandise, and the taxes levied upon the inhabitants of the city, as well natives as strangers.

In the history of Athens mention is often made of the silver mines of Laurium, which was a mountain situate between the Piræus and Cape Sunium; and those of Thrace, from whence many persons drew immense riches. † Xenophon, in a treatise wherein he considers this subject at large, demonstrates how much the public might gain by industriously working these mines, from the example of many individuals who had been enriched by them. [1] Hipponicus let his mines and six hundred slaves to an undertaker, who paid him an ‡ obolus a day for each slave, clear of all charges, which amounted to a mina per day, about two pounds five shillings. Nicias, who was killed in Sicily, farmed out his mines and a thousand slaves in the same manner, and with the same profit in proportion to that number.

2. The second species of revenue were the contributions paid to the Athenians by the allies for the common expenses of the war. At first, under Aristides, they amounted to only four hundred and sixty talents.§ Pericles augmented them almost a third, and raised them to six hundred, and some time

[1] Page 925.

* Τέλη.

† *De ration. redituum.*

‡ Six oboli made a drachma, one hundred drachmas a mina, and sixty minæ a talent.

§ A talent was worth a thousand crowns.

after they were run up to thirteen hundred. Taxes, which in the beginning were moderate and necessary, became thus in a little time excessive and exorbitant, notwithstanding all the protestations to the contrary made to the allies, and the most solemn engagements entered into with them.

3. A third sort of revenue were the extraordinary capitation taxes, levied upon the inhabitants of the country, as well natives as strangers, in pressing occasions and emergencies of the state.

4. The fines laid upon persons by the judges for different misdemeanours, were applied to the uses of the public, and laid up in the treasury; with the exception of the tenth part of them, which was consecrated to Minerva, and a fiftieth to the other divinities.

The most natural and legitimate application of these different revenues of the republic, was in paying the troops both by sea and land, building and fitting out fleets, keeping up and repairing the public buildings, temples, walls, ports, and citadels. But the greatest part of them, especially after Pericles's time, was misapplied to unnecessary uses, and often consumed in frivolous expenses, games, feasts, and shows, which cost immense sums, and were of no manner of utility to the state.

SECT. X. OF THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUTH.—I place this article under the head of government, because all the most celebrated legislators have with reason believed that the education of youth was an essential part of it.

The exercises that served to form either the bodies or minds of the young Athenians (and as much may be said of almost all the people of Greece) were dancing, music, hunting, fencing, riding, polite learning, and philosophy. It is clear, that I only skim over, and treat very slightly, these several articles.

1. *Dancing. Music.*—Dancing is one of those bodily exercises which was cultivated by the Greeks with great attention. It made a part of what the ancients called the *Gymnastic*, divided, according to * Plato, into two kinds, the *Orchestic*, which takes its name from dancing, and the *Palæstric*, † so

* Ὀρχεῖσθαι, saltare.
† Πάλη.

called from a Greek word which signifies *wrestling*. The exercises of the latter kind principally conduced to form the body for the fatigues of war, navigation, agriculture, and the other uses of society.

Dancing had another end, and taught such rules of motion as were most proper to render the shape free and easy; to give the body a just proportion, and the whole person an unconstrained, noble, and graceful air; in a word, an external politeness, if we may be allowed to use that expression, which never fails to prepossess people in favour of those who have been formed to it early.

Music was cultivated with no less application and success. The ancients ascribed wonderful effects to it. They believed it well calculated to calm the passions, soften the manners, and even humanize nations naturally savage and barbarous. [m] Polybius, a grave and serious historian, and who is certainly worthy of belief, attributes the extreme difference between two nations of Arcadia, the one infinitely beloved and esteemed for the elegance of their manners, their benevolent inclinations, humanity to strangers, and piety to the gods; the other, on the contrary, generally reproached and hated for their malignity, brutality, and irreligion: Polybius, I say, ascribes this difference to the study of music, (I mean, says he, the true and genuine music,) industriously cultivated by the one, and absolutely neglected by the other nation.

After this it is not surprising that the Greeks should have considered music as an essential part in the education of youth. * Socrates himself, in a very advanced age, was not ashamed of learning to play upon musical instruments. Themistocles, however otherwise esteemed, † was thought deficient in polite accomplishments, because at an entertainment he could not touch the lyre like the rest of the company. ‡ Ignorance in this respect was deemed a defect of education; on the contrary, skill did honour to the greatest men. § Epaminondas was

[m] Polyb. l. iv. p. 288—291.

* Socrates, jam senex, institui lyrâ non erubescebat. Quintil. l. i. c. 10.

† Themistocles, cùm in epulis recusâsset lyram, habitus est indoctior. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. i. n. 4.

‡ Summam eruditionem Græci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus—dicebantque id omnes; nec qui nesciebat, satis excultus doctrinâ putabatur. Ibid.

§ In Epaminondæ virtutibus commemoratum est saltâsse eum commodè, scien-

praised for dancing and playing well upon the flute. We may observe in this place the different tastes and genius of nations. The Romans were far from having the same opinion with the Greeks in regard to music and dancing, and set no value upon them. It is very likely that the wisest and most sensible amongst the latter did not apply to them with any great industry; and Philip's expression to his son Alexander, who had shown too much skill in music at a feast, induces me to be of this opinion: 'Are you not ashamed,' said he, 'to sing so well?'.

In other respects, there were some grounds for this esteem for dancing and music. Both the one and the other were employed in the most august feasts and ceremonies of religion, to express with greater force and dignity their acknowledgment to the gods for the favours they had vouchsafed to confer upon them. They formed generally the greatest and most agreeable part of their feasts and entertainments, which seldom or ever began or ended without some odes being sung, like those in honour of the victors in the Olympic games, and on other similar subjects. They had a part also in war; and we know that the Lacedæmonians marched to battle dancing, and to the sound of flutes. [n] Plato, the most grave philosopher of antiquity, considered both these arts, not as simple amusements, but as having a great share in the ceremonies of religion, and military exercises. Hence we see him very intent, in his books of laws, to prescribe judicious regulations with respect to dancing and music, in order to keep them within the bounds of utility and decorum.

They did not continue long within these restrictions. The licentiousness of the Grecian stage, on which dancing was in the highest vogue, and in a manner prostituted to buffoons and the most contemptible people, who made no other use of it than to awaken or cherish the most vicious passions; this licentiousness, I say, soon corrupted an art which might have been of some advantage, had it been regulated by Plato's opinion. Music had a like destiny; and perhaps the corrup-

terque tibiis cantâsse—Scilicet non eadem omnibus honesta sunt atque turpia, sed omnia majorum institutis judicantur. Corn. Nep. *in præfat. vit. Epam.*

[n] *De leg.* l. vii.

tion of this did not a little contribute to the depraving and perverting of dancing. Voluptuousness and sensual pleasure were the sole arbiters consulted as to the use which was to be made of both, and the theatre became a school of every kind of vice.

[o] Plutarch, in lamenting that the art of dancing was much fallen from the merit which rendered it so estimable to the great men of antiquity, does not omit to observe, that it was corrupted by a vicious kind of poetry, and a soft effeminate music, with which it had formed an injudicious union, and which had taken place of that ancient poetry and music, which had something noble, majestic, and even religious and heavenly in them. He adds, that being made subservient to voluptuousness and sensuality, it exercised, by their aid, a kind of tyrannical power in the theatres, which were become the public schools of criminal passions and gross vices, wherein no regard was paid to reason.

The reader, without my reminding him, will make the application of this passage of Plutarch to that sort of music with which our theatres resound at this day, and which, by its effeminate and wanton airs, has given the last wound to the little manly force and virtue that remained among us. Quintilian describes the music of his times in these terms: [p] *Quæ nunc in scenis effeminata, et impudicis modis fracta, non ex parte minimâ, si quid in nobis virilis roboris manebat, excidit.*

2. *Of the other Exercises of the Body.*—The young Athenians, and in general all the Greeks, were very careful to form themselves in all the exercises of the body, and to take lessons regularly from the masters of the Palæstræ. They called the places allotted for these exercises, Palæstræ or Gymnasia; which answers very near to our academies. Plato, in his books of laws, after having shown of what importance it was with a view to war to cultivate strength and agility of the hands and feet, adds, [q] that, far from banishing from a well-regulated republic the profession of the Athletæ, on the contrary, prizes ought to be proposed for all exercises that conduce to the improvement of the military art: such are those which render

[o] *Sympos.* l. ix. qu. 15. p. 748.
[p] Quintil. l. i. c. 10.
[q] Lib. viii. *de leg.* p. 832, 833.

the body more active, and fitter for the race; more hardy, robust, and supple; more capable of supporting great fatigues, and effecting great enterprises. We must remember, that there was no Athenian who ought not to have been capable of handling the oar in the largest galleys. The citizens themselves performed this office, which was not left to slaves and criminals as in these days. They were all destined to the trade of war, and often obliged to wear armour of iron from head to foot of a great weight. For this reason Plato, and all the ancients, looked upon the exercises of the body as highly useful, and even absolutely necessary to the good of the public, and therefore this philosopher excludes only those which were of no service in war.

[r] There were also masters who taught the youth to ride, and to handle their arms, or fence; and others whose business it was to instruct them in all that was necessary to be known, in order to excel in the art military, and to become good commanders. The whole science of the latter consisted in what the ancients called Tactics, that is to say, the art of drawing up troops in battle, and of making military evolutions. That science was useful, but it was not sufficient. [s] Xenophon shows its insufficiency, by producing a young man lately come from such a school, in which he imagined he had learnt every thing, though in reality he had only acquired a foolish esteem for himself, attended with perfect ignorance. He gives him, by the mouth of Socrates, admirable precepts as to the business of a soldier, and well calculated to form an excellent officer.

Hunting was also considered by the ancients as an exercise well calculated for forming youth to the stratagems and fatigues of war. It is for this reason that Xenophon, who was no less a great general than a great philosopher, [t] did not think it below him to write a treatise expressly upon hunting, in which he descends to the minutest particulars; and points out the considerable advantages that may be derived from it, from being inured to suffer hunger, thirst, heat, cold, without being discouraged either by the length of the course, the difficulty of the clifts and thickets through which it is often necessary to press, or the small success of the long and painful fatigues

[r] Plat. *in Lachete*, p. 181. [s] *Memorab.* l. iii. p. 761, &c. [t] *De venatione.*

which are often undergone to no purpose. He adds, that this innocent pleasure removes others equally shameful and criminal; and that a wise and moderate man would not, however, abandon himself so much to it as to neglect the care of his domestic affairs. [w] The same author, in the *Cyropædia*, frequently praises hunting, which he looks upon as a real study of the art of war; and shows, in the example of his young hero, the good use that may be made of it.

3. *Of the Exercises of the Mind.*—Athens, properly speaking, was the school and abode of polite learning, arts, and sciences. The study of poesy, eloquence, philosophy, and mathematics, was in great vogue there, and much cultivated by the youth.

The young people were sent first to learn grammar under masters, who taught them regularly, and upon proper principles, their own language; by which they attained a knowledge of its whole beauty, energy, number, and cadence. [x] Hence proceeded that fine taste which universally pervaded Athens, where, as history informs us, a simple herb-woman distinguished Theophrastus to be a foreigner, from the affectation of a single word in expressing himself. And from the same cause the orators were greatly apprehensive of letting fall the least injudicious expression, for fear of offending so refined and delicate an audience. It was very common for the young people to get the tragedies represented upon the stage by heart. We have seen that, after the defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse, many of them, who had been taken prisoners and made slaves, softened their slavery by reciting the works of Euripides to their masters, who, extremely delighted with hearing such sublime verses, treated them from thenceforth with kindness and humanity. The compositions of the other poets had no doubt the same effect; and Plutarch tells us, that Alcibiades, when very young, having entered a school in which there was not a Homer, gave the master a box on the ear as an ignorant fellow, [y] and one who dishonoured his profession.

As for eloquence, it is no wonder that it was particularly studied at Athens. It was that which opened the way to the

[w] *Cyrop.* l. i. p. 5, 6; l. ii. p. 59, 60.

[x] Cic. *in Brut.* n. 172. Quintil. l. viii. c. 1. Plut. *in Peric.* p. 156.

[y] *In Alcib.* p. 194.

highest offices, reigned absolute in the assemblies, decided the most important affairs of the state, and gave an almost unlimited power to those who had the talent of oratory in an eminent degree.

This, therefore, was the great employment of the young citizens of Athens, especially of those who aspired to the highest offices. To the study of rhetoric, they annexed that of philosophy. I comprise under the latter all the sciences, which are either parts of, or relate to, it. The persons known to antiquity under the name of Sophists had acquired a great reputation at Athens, especially in the time of Socrates. These teachers, who were as presumptuous as avaricious, set themselves up for universal scholars. Their chief strength lay in philosophy and eloquence, both of which they corrupted by the false taste and wrong principles which they instilled into their disciples. I have observed, in the life of Socrates, that philosopher's endeavours and success in discrediting them.

CHAPTER II. OF WAR.

SECT. I. THE NATIONS OF GREECE IN ALL TIMES VERY WARLIKE, ESPECIALLY THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS. —No people of antiquity (I except the Romans) can dispute the glory of arms and military virtue with the Greeks. During the Trojan war Greece signalized her valour in battle, and acquired immortal fame by the bravery of the captains she sent thither. This expedition was however, properly speaking, no more than the cradle of her infant glory; and the great exploits by which she distinguished herself there, were only her first essays and apprenticeship in the art of war.

There were in Greece several small republics, neighbours to one another by their situation, but widely distant in their customs, laws, characters, and particularly in their interests. This difference of manners and interests was a continual source and occasion of divisions amongst them. Every city, little satisfied with its own territory, was studious to aggrandize itself at the expense of its next neighbours, according as they lay most commodious for it. Hence all these little states,

either out of ambition, and to extend their conquests, or the necessity of a just defence, were always under arms; and by that continual exercise of war, there was formed throughout the whole of these nations a martial spirit, and an intrepidity of courage which made them invincible in the field; as appeared in the sequel, when the whole united forces of the east came to invade Greece, and made her sensible of her own strength, and of what she was capable.

Two cities distinguished themselves above the rest, and held indisputably the first rank; these were Sparta and Athens: in consequence of which those cities, either successively or together, had the empire of Greece, and maintained themselves through a long series of time in a power which the sole superiority of merit, universally acknowledged by all the other states, had acquired them. This merit consisted principally in their military knowledge and martial virtue; of which both of them had given the most glorious proofs in the war against the Persians. Thebes disputed this honour with them for some years, by surprising actions of valour, which had something of prodigy in them; but this was but a short-lived blaze, which, after having shone out with exceeding splendour, soon disappeared, and left that city in its original obscurity. Sparta and Athens will therefore be the only objects of our reflections, as to what relates to war; and we shall join them together, in order to be the better able to form a notion of their characters, as well in what they resemble, as in what they differ from each other.

SECT. II. ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE VALOUR AND MILITARY VIRTUE BY WHICH THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS ALWAYS DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES.—All the laws of Sparta and all the institutions of Lycurgus seem to have had no other object than war, and tended solely to the making the subjects of that republic a body of soldiers. All other employments, all other exercises, were prohibited amongst them. Arts, polite learning, sciences, trades, even husbandry itself formed no part of their employment, and seemed in their eyes unworthy of them. From their earliest infancy no other taste was instilled into them but for arms; and indeed the Spartan

education was wonderfully well adapted to that end. To go barefoot, to lie on the bare ground, to be satisfied with little meat and drink, to suffer heat and cold, to be exercised continually in hunting, wrestling, running on foot and horseback, to be inured to blows and wounds so as to vent neither complaint nor groan; these were the rudiments of education of the Spartan youth with regard to war, and enabled them one day to support all its fatigues, and to confront all its dangers.

The habit of obeying, contracted from the most early years, respect for the magistrates and elders, a perfect submission to the laws, from which no age nor condition was exempt, prepared them amazingly for military discipline, which is in a manner the soul of war, and the principle of success in all great enterprises.

Now one of these laws was to conquer or die, and never to surrender to the enemy. Leonidas with his three hundred Spartans was an illustrious example of this; and his intrepid valour, extolled in all ages with the highest applauses, and proposed as a model to all posterity, had given the same spirit to the nation, and traced them out the plan they were to follow. The disgrace and infamy annexed to the violation of this law, and to such as quitted their arms in battle, confirmed the observance of it, and rendered it in a manner inviolable. The mothers recommended to their sons, when they set out for the field, to return either with or upon their bucklers. They did not weep for those who died with their arms in their hands, but for those who preserved themselves by flight. Can we be surprised, after this, that a small body of such soldiers, with such principles, should put to a stand an innumerable army of barbarians?

The Athenians were not bred up so roughly as the people of Sparta, but had no less valour. The taste of the two nations was quite different in regard to education and employment; but they attained the same end, though by different means. The Spartans knew only how to use their arms, and were soldiers alone: but amongst the Athenians (and we must say as much of the other people of Greece) arts, trades, husbandry, commerce, and navigation, were held in honour, and thought no disgrace to any one. These occupations were no obstacles

to military skill and valour; they disqualified none for rising to the greatest commands and the first dignities of the republic. Plutarch observes, that Solon, seeing the territory of Attica was barren, applied himself to direct the industry of his citizens towards arts, trades, and commerce, in order to supply his country thereby with what it wanted on the side of fertility. This taste became one of the maxims of the government and fundamental laws of the state, and perpetuated itself amongst the people, but without lessening in the least their ardour for war.

The ancient glory of the nation, which had always distinguished itself by military bravery, was a powerful motive for not degenerating from the reputation of their ancestors. The famous battle of Marathon, wherein they had sustained alone the shock of the barbarians, and gained a signal victory over them, infinitely heightened their courage; and the battle of Salamis, in the success of which they had the greatest share, raised them to the highest pitch of glory, and rendered them capable of the greatest enterprises.

A noble emulation not to give place in merit to Sparta, the rival of Athens, and a keen jealousy of their glory, which during the war with the Persians contained itself within due bounds, were another strong incentive to the Athenians, who every day made new efforts to excel themselves, and sustain their reputation.

The rewards and honours granted to those who had distinguished themselves in battle; the monuments erected in memory of the citizens who had died in the defence of their country; the funeral orations publicly pronounced in the midst of the most august religious ceremonies, to render their names immortal: all conspired in the highest degree to eternize the valour of the Athenians particularly, and to make fortitude a kind of law and indispensable necessity to them.

[z] Athens had a law by which it was ordained, that those who had been maimed in war should be maintained at the expense of the public. The same favour was granted to the fathers and mothers, as well as to the children, of such as had fallen in battle, and left their families poor and not in a condition to

[z] Plut. *in Solon.* p. 96. Plat. *in Menex.* p. 248, 249. Diog. Laert. *in Solon.* p. 37.

support themselves. The republic, like a good mother, generously took them into her care, and fulfilled towards them all the duties, and procured them all the relief, that they could have expected from those whose loss they deplored.

This exalted the courage of the Athenians, and rendered their troops invincible, though not very numerous. In the battle of Platææ, where the army of the barbarians, commanded by Mardonius, consisted at the least of three hundred thousand men, and the united forces of the Greeks of only one hundred and eight thousand two hundred men, there were in the latter only ten thousand Lacedæmonians, of which one half were Spartans, that is to say, inhabitants of Sparta, and eight thousand Athenians. It is true, each Spartan brought with him seven Helots, which made in all thirty-five thousand men; but they were scarce ever reckoned as soldiers.

This shining merit in point of martial valour, generally acknowledged by the other states, did not suppress in their minds all sentiments of envy and jealousy; as appeared once in relation to the Lacedæmonians. The allies, who were very much superior to them in number, could with difficulty endure to see themselves subjected to their order, and murmured against it in secret. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, without seeming to have any knowledge of their disgust, assembled the whole army; and after having made all the allies sit down on one side, and the Lacedæmonians by themselves on the other, he caused proclamation to be made by a herald, that all smiths, masons, carpenters, (and so on, through the other trades,) should rise up. Almost all the allies did so, and not one of the Lacedæmonians, to whom all trades were prohibited. Agesilaus then smiling, 'You see,' said he, 'how many more soldiers Sparta alone furnishes than all the rest of the allies together;' thereby intimating, that to be a good soldier, it was necessary to be only a soldier; that trades diverted the artisan from applying himself wholly to the profession of arms and the science of war, and prevented his succeeding so well in it as those who made it their sole business and exercise. But Agesilaus spoke and acted in that manner from his prejudice in favour of the Lacedæmonian education; for indeed those whom he wished to consider only as simple artisans, demonstrated by

the glorious victories they obtained over the Persians, and even Sparta itself, that they were by no means inferior to the Lacedæmonians, entirely soldiers as they were, either in valour or military knowledge.

SECT. III. DIFFERENT KIND OF TROOPS OF WHICH THE ARMIES OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS WERE COMPOSED.—The armies both of Sparta and Athens were composed of four sorts of troops: citizens, allies, mercenaries, and slaves. The soldiers were sometimes marked in the hand, to distinguish them from the slaves, who had that character impressed upon their forehead. Interpreters believe, that it is in allusion to this double manner of marking, that it is said in the Revelation, that all were obliged[a] 'to receive the mark of the beast in the right hand, or in their foreheads;' and that St. Paul says of himself;[b] 'I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus.'

The citizens of Lacedæmonia were of two sorts; either those who inhabited Sparta itself, and who for that reason were called Spartans, or those who lived in the country. In Lycurgus's time the Spartans amounted to nine thousand, and the others to thirty thousand. This number seems to have been somewhat diminished in the time of Xerxes, as Demaratus, speaking to him of the Lacedæmonian troops, computes only eight thousand Spartans. The latter were the flower of the nation; and we may judge of the value they set upon them, by the anxiety the republic expressed for the three or four hundred besieged by the Athenians in the small island of Sphacteria, where they were taken prisoners. The Lacedæmonians generally spared the troops of their country very much, and sent only a few of them into the armies; but even these few constituted their chief strength. When a Lacedæmonian general was asked, how many Spartans there were in the army; he answered, 'as many as are necessary to repulse the enemy.' They served the state at their own expense, and it was not till after a length of time that they received pay from the public.

The greatest number of the troops in the two republics were

[a] Rev. xiii. 16. [b] Gal. vi. 17.

composed of the *Allies*, who were paid by the cities which sent them.

The foreign troops, who were paid by the republic, to whose aid they were called in, were styled *Mercenaries*.

The Spartans never marched without Helots, and we have seen that in the battle of Platææ every citizen had seven. I do not believe this number was fixed, nor do I well comprehend for what service they were designed. It would have been very bad policy to have put arms into the hands of so great a number of slaves, generally much discontented with their masters' harsh treatment of them, and who consequently would have had every thing to fear from them in a battle. Herodotus, however, in the passage I have cited from him, represents them carrying arms in the field as light-armed soldiers.

The infantry consisted of two kinds of soldiers. The one were heavy-armed, and carried great bucklers, lances, half-pikes and scimitars; and of these the main strength of the army consisted. The other were light-armed, that is to say, with bows and slings. They were commonly placed in the front of the battle, or upon the wings as a first line, to shoot arrows, and fling javelins and stones at the enemy; and when they had discharged, they retired through the intervals behind the battalions as a second line, and continued their volleys.

[c] Thucydides, in describing the battle of Mantinæa, divides the Lacedæmonian troops in this manner. There were seven regiments of four companies each, without including the Sciritæ, to the number of six hundred; these were horsemen, of whom I shall soon speak further. The company consisted, according to the Greek interpreter, of a hundred and twenty-eight men, and was subdivided into four squadrons, each of thirty-two men. So that a regiment amounted to five hundred and twelve men, and the seven made together three thousand five hundred fourscore and four. Each squadron had four men in front and eight in depth, for that was the usual depth of the files, which the officers might change according as circumstances required.

The Lacedæmonians did not actually begin to use cavalry

[c] Thucyd. l. v. p. 390.

till after the war with Messene, where they perceived their want of it. They raised their horse principally in a small city not far from Lacedæmon, called *Sciros*, from whence these troops were denominated *Sciritæ*. They were always on the extremity of the left wing, and this was their post by right.

Cavalry was still more rare amongst the Athenians: the situation of Attica, broken with abundance of mountains, was the cause of this. It did not amount, after the war with the Persians, which was the time when the prosperity of Greece was at the highest, to more than three hundred horse: but increased afterwards to twelve hundred; a very small body, however, for so powerful a republic.

I have already observed, that amongst the ancients, as well Greeks as Romans, no mention is made of the stirrup, which is very surprising. They threw themselves nimbly on horseback:

> Corpora saltu
> Subjiciunt in equos. *Æn.* l. xii. ver. 287.
>
> And with a leap sit steady on the horse.

Sometimes the horse, trained early to that practice, would bend his fore legs to give his master the opportunity of mounting with more ease;

> Inde inclinatus collum, submissos et armos
> De more, inflexis præbebat scandere terga
> Cruribus. Sil. Ital. *de equo Cœlii Equ. Rom.*

Those whom age or weakness rendered heavy, made use of a servant in mounting on horseback; in which they imitated the Persians, with whom it was the common custom. Gracchus caused handsome stones to be placed on each side of the great roads of Italy at certain distances from one another, to help travellers to get on horseback without the assistance of any body.*

I am surprised that the Athenians, expert as they were in the art of war, did not perceive that the cavalry was the most essential part of an army, especially in battles; and that some of their generals did not turn their attention that way, as Themistocles did towards maritime affairs. Xenophon was well capable of rendering them a similar service in respect to the

* Ἀναβολίως μὴ δεομένοις. Plut. *in Gracch.* p. 838. This word ἀναβολεὺς, signifies a servant, who helped his master to mount on horseback.

cavalry, of the importance of which he was perfectly apprized. He wrote two tréatises upon this subject; one of which regards the care it is necessary to take of horses, and how to acquire a knowledge of them, and to break them; which he treats with astonishing minuteness: and the other gives instructions for training and exercising the troopers themselves; both well worth the reading of all who profess arms. In the latter he states the means of placing the cavalry in honour, and lays down rules upon the art military in general, which might be of very great use to all those who are designed for the profession of arms.

I have been surprised, in running over this second treatise, to see with what care Xenophon, a soldier and a pagan, recommends the practice of religion, a veneration for the gods, and the necessity of imploring their aid upon all occasions. He repeats this maxim in thirteen different places of a tract in other respects brief enough; and rightly judging that these religious insinuations might give some people offence, he makes a kind of apology for them, and concludes the piece with a reflection which I shall repeat entire in this place. 'If any one,' says he, 'wonders that I insist so much here upon the necessity of not forming any enterprise without first endeavouring to render the Divinity favourable and propitious, let him reflect, that there are in war a thousand unforeseen and hazardous conjunctures, wherein the generals, vigilant to take advantages and lay ambuscades for each other, from the uncertainty of an enemy's motions, can take no other counsel than that of the gods. Nothing is doubtful or obscure with them. They unfold the future to whomsoever they please, by the inspection of the entrails of beasts, by the singing of birds, by visions, or in dreams. Now we may presume that the gods are more inclined to illuminate the minds of such as consult them not only in urgent necessities, but who at all times, and when no dangers threaten them, render them all the homage and adoration of which they are capable.'

It was worthy of this great man to give the most important of instructions to his son Gryllus, to whom he addresses the treatise we mention, and who, according to the common opinion, was appointed to discipline the Athenian cavalry.

SECT. IV. OF MARITIME AFFAIRS, FLEETS, AND NAVAL FORCES.—If the Athenians were inferior to the Lacedæmonians in cavalry, they had infinitely the advantage over them in naval affairs: and we have seen their skill in that department make them masters at sea, and give them a great superiority over all the other states of Greece. As this subject is very necessary to the understanding many passages in history, I shall treat it rather more extensively than I have other matters, and shall make great use of what the learned Father Dom Bernard de Montfaucon has said of it in his books upon antiquity.

The principal parts of a ship were the prow or head, the poop or stern, and the middle, called in Latin *carina*, the hulk or waist.

The PROW was the part which projected beyond the waist or belly of the ship: it was generally adorned with paintings and different sculptures of gods, men, or animals. The beak, called *rostrum*, lay lower, and level with the water: it was a piece of timber which projected from the prow, armed with a spike of brass, and sometimes of iron. The Greeks termed it ἔμβολον.

The other end of the ship, opposite to the prow, was called the POOP. There the pilot sat and held the helm, which was an oar longer and larger than the rest.

The WAIST was the hollow of the vessel, or the hold.

The ships were of two kinds. The one were rowed with oars, which were ships of war; the other carried sails, and were vessels of burden, intended for commerce and transports. Both of them sometimes made use of oars and sails together, but that very rarely. The ships of war are also very often called long ships by authors, and by that name distinguished from vessels of burden.

The long ships were further divided into two species: those which were called *actuariæ naves*, and were very light vessels, like our brigantines; and those called only long ships. The first were usually termed *open ships*, because they had no decks. Of these light vessels there were some larger than ordinary, of which some had twenty, some thirty, and others forty oars, half on one side, and half on the other, all on the same line.

The long ships, which were used in war, were of two sorts. Some had only one rank of oars on each side; the others two, three, four, five, or a greater number, as far as forty; but these last were rather for show than use.

The long ships of one rank of oars were called *aphracti*; that is to say, uncovered, and had no decks: this distinguished them from the *cataphracti*, which had decks. They had only small platforms to stand on, at the head and stern, in the time of action.

The ships most commonly used in the battles of the ancients, were those which carried from three to five ranks or benches of oars, and were called *triremes* and *quinqueremes*.

It is a great question, and has given occasion for abundance of learned dissertations, how these benches of oars were disposed. Some will have it, that they were placed at length, like the ranks of oars in the modern galleys. Others maintain, that the benches of the biremes, triremes, quinqueremes, and so on to the number of forty in some vessels, were one above another. To support this last opinion, innumerable passages are cited from ancient authors, which seem to leave no manner of doubt in it, and are considerably corroborated by the evidence of Trajan's pillar, which represents these ranks one above another. Father Montfaucon, however, avers, that all the persons of greatest skill in naval affairs whom he had consulted, declared, that the thing conceived in that manner, seemed to them utterly impossible. But reasoning is a weak proof against the experience of so many ages, confirmed by so many authors. It is true, that in admitting these ranks of oars to be disposed perpendicularly one above another, it is not easy to comprehend how they could be worked; but in the biremes and triremes of Trajan's pillar, the lower ranks are placed obliquely, and as it were rising by degrees.

In ancient times ships with several ranks of oars were not known: they made use of long ships, in which the rowers, however numerous they were, worked all upon the same line. [d] Such was the fleet which the Greeks sent against Troy. It was composed of twelve hundred sail, among which the galleys of Bœotia had each a hundred and twenty men, and those of

[d] Thucyd. l. i. p. 8.

Philoctetes fifty; and this no doubt denotes the greatest and smallest vessels. Their galleys had no decks, but were built like common boats; which is still practised, says Thucydides, by the pirates, to prevent their being so soon discovered at a distance.

[e] The Corinthians are said to have been the first who changed the form of ships; and instead of simple galleys, made vessels with three ranks, in order to add, by increasing the number of oars, to the swiftness and impetuosity of their motion. Their city, advantageously situated between two seas, was well adapted for commerce, and served as a staple for merchandise. After their example, the inhabitants of Corcyra, and the tyrants of Sicily, equipped also many galleys of three benches, a little before the war against the Persians. It was about the same time that the Athenians, animated by the forcible exhortations of Themistocles, who foresaw the war which soon after broke out, built ships of the same form, though even then the deck did not reach the whole length of the vessel; and from thenceforth they applied themselves to naval affairs with incredible ardour and success.

The beak of the prow *(rostrum)* was that part of the vessel of which most use was made in sea-fights. [f] Ariston of Corinth persuaded the Syracusans, when their city was besieged by the Athenians, to make their prows lower and shorter; which advice gained them the victory. For the prows of the Athenian vessels being very high and very weak, their beaks struck only the parts above water, and for that reason did little damage to the enemy's ships; whereas those of the Syracusans, whose prows were strong and low, and their beaks level with the water, often sunk, at a single blow, the triremes of the Athenians.

Two sorts of people served on board these galleys. The one were employed in steering and working the ship, who were the rowers, *remiges*, and the mariners, *nautæ*. The rest were soldiers intended for the fight, and are denoted in Greek by the word ἐπιβάται. This distinction did not prevail in the early times, when the same persons rowed, fought, and did all the necessary work of the ship; and this was also not wholly

[e] Thucyd. l. i. p. 10. [f] Diod. l. xiii. p. 141.

disused in later days. For Thucydides,[g] in describing the arrival of the Athenian fleet at the small island of Sphacteria, observes, that only the rowers of the lowest bench remained in the ships, and that the rest went on shore with their arms.

1. The condition of the rowers was very hard and laborious. I have already said that the rowers, as well as mariners, were all citizens and freemen, and not slaves or foreigners, as in these days. The rowers were distinguished by their several stages. The lower rank were called *thalamitæ*, the middle, *zugitæ*, and the highest *thranitæ*. Thucydides remarks, that the latter had greater pay than the rest, because they worked with longer and heavier oars than those of the lower benches. * It seems that the crew, in order to pull in concert, and with greater regularity, were sometimes guided by the singing of a man, and sometimes by the sound of an instrument; and this grateful harmony served not only to regulate the motion of their oars, but to diminish and soothe their toil.

It is a question amongst the learned, whether there was only one man to every oar in these great ships, or several, as in the galleys of these days. What Thucydides observes concerning the pay of the thranitæ, seems to imply that they worked single. For if others had shared the work with them, wherefore had they greater pay given them than those who managed an oar alone, as the latter had as much, and perhaps more of the labour than they? Father Montfaucon believes that in the vessels of more than five ranks there might be several men to one oar.

He who took care of the whole crew, and commanded the vessel, was called *nauclerus*, and was the principal officer. The second was the pilot, *gubernator;* his place was in the poop, where he held the helm in his hand, and steered the vessel. His skill consisted in knowing the coasts, ports, rocks, shoals, and especially the winds and stars; for before the invention of the compass, the pilot had nothing to direct him during the night but the stars.

[g] Thucyd. l. iv. p. 275.

* Musicam natura ipsa videtur ad tolerandos faciliùs labores veluti muneri nobis dedisse. Siquidem et remiges cantus hortatur; nec solùm in iis operibus, in quibus plurium conatus præeunte aliquâ jucundâ voce conspirat, sed etiam singulorum fatigatio quamlibet se rudi modulatione solatur. Quintil. l. i. c. 10

2. The soldiers who fought in the ships were armed almost in the same manner with the land-forces. There was no fixed number. [h] The Athenians, at the battle of Salamis, had a hundred and fourscore vessels; and in each of them eighteen fighting men, four of whom were archers, and the rest heavy-armed troops. The officer who commanded these soldiers was called τριήραρχος; and the commander of the whole fleet, ναύαρχος or στρατηγός.

We cannot exactly ascertain the number of soldiers, mariners, and rowers, that served on board each ship; but it generally amounted to two hundred, more or less, as appears from Herodotus's estimate of the Persian fleet in the time of Xerxes, and in other places where mention is made of that of the Greeks. I mean here the great vessels, the triremes, which were the species most in use.

The pay of those who served in these ships varied very much at different times. When the younger Cyrus arrived in Asia,[i] it was only three oboli, which was half a drachma, or fivepence; and the * treaty between the Persians and Lacedæmonians was concluded at that rate; which gives reason to believe that the usual pay was three oboli. Cyrus, at Lysander's request, added a fourth, which made sixpence halfpenny a day. * It was often raised to a whole drachma, about tenpence French. In the fleet fitted out against Sicily, the Athenians gave a drachma a day to the troops. The sum of sixty talents,† [k] which the people of Egesta advanced to the Athenians monthly for the maintaining of sixty ships, shows that the pay of each vessel for a month amounted to a talent, that is to say, to about one hundred and forty pounds; which supposes that each ship's company consisted of two hundred men, each of whom received a drachma, or tenpence, a day. As the officers' pay was higher, the republic perhaps either furnished the overplus, or it was deducted out of the total of the sum advanced for a vessel, by abating something in the pay of the private men.

[h] Plut. *in Themist.* p. 119.
[i] Xenoph. *Hist.* l. i. p. 441.
[k] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 431.
[l] Ibid. p. 415.

* This treaty stipulated that the Persians should pay thirty minæ a month for each ship, which was half a talent; the whole amounted to three oboli a day for every man that served on board.

† About 8,400*l.* sterling.

The same may be said of the land-troops as has been said of the seamen, except that the cavalry had double their pay. It appears that the ordinary pay of the foot was three oboli a day, and that it was augmented according to times and occasions. [m] Thimbron the Lacedæmonian, when he marched against Tissaphernes, promised a darick a month to each soldier, two to a captain, and four to the colonels. Now a darick a month is four oboli a day. The younger Cyrus, to animate his troops, who were disheartened by the idea of a too long march, instead of one darick, promised one and a half to each soldier, which amounted to a drachma, or tenpence French, a day.

It may be asked how the Lacedæmonians, whose iron coin, the only species current amongst them, would pass nowhere else, could maintain armies by sea and land; and where they found money for their subsistence. It is not to be doubted but they raised it, as the Athenians did, by contributions from their allies, and still more from the cities to which they gave liberty and protection, or from those they had conquered from their enemies. Their second fund for paying their fleet and armies was the aids which they drew from the king of Persia, as we have seen on several occasions.

SECT. V. PECULIAR CHARACTER OF THE ATHENIANS.—Plutarch will furnish us with almost all the leading features upon this head. Every body knows how well he succeeds in copying nature in his portraits, and how well calculated he was to trace the character of a people, whose genius and manners he had studied with so profound an attention.

[n] 'I. * The people of Athens,' says Plutarch, 'are easily provoked to anger, and as easily induced to resume sentiments of benevolence and compassion.' History supplies us with an infinity of examples of this kind: The sentence of death passed against the inhabitants of Mitylene, and revoked the next day: The condemnation of the ten generals, and that of Socrates,—both followed with an immediate repentance and the most lively grief.

[m] Xenoph. *Exped. Cyr.* l. vii.

[n] Plut. *de præcept. reip. ger.* p. 793.

* Ὁ δῆμος Ἀθηναίων εὐκίνητός ἐστι πρὸς ὀργὴν, εὐμετάβετος πρὸς ἔλεον.

'II. * They are better pleased with forming a prompt decision, and almost guessing at the result of an affair, than with giving themselves leisure to be informed in it thoroughly, and in all its extent.'

Nothing is more surprising than this circumstance in their character, which it is very hard to conceive, as it seems almost incredible. Artificers, husbandmen, soldiers, mariners, are generally a heavy kind of people, and very dull in their conceptions; but the people of Athens were of a quite different turn. They had naturally a penetration, vivacity, and even delicacy of wit, that surprise us. I have already mentioned what happened to Theophrastus. † He was cheapening something of an old woman at Athens that sold herbs: 'No, Mr. Stranger,' said she, 'you shall not have it for less.' He was much surprised to see himself treated as a stranger, who had passed almost his whole life at Athens, and piqued himself upon excelling all others in the elegance of his language. It was, however, from that she knew he was not of her country. We have seen that the Athenian soldiers knew the fine passages of the tragedies of Euripides by heart. Besides, these artificers and soldiers, from assisting at the public deliberations, were versed in affairs of state, and understood every thing at half a word. We may judge of this from the orations of Demosthenes, whose style we know is ardent, nervous, and concise.

'III. ‡ As they are naturally inclined to relieve persons of a low condition and mean circumstances, so are they fond of conversations seasoned with pleasantry, and calculated to make people laugh.'

° They assisted persons of a mean condition, because from such they had nothing to apprehend in regard to their liberty, and saw in them the characters of equality and resemblance with themselves. They loved pleasantry, and in that showed they were men; but men abounding with good-nature and indul-

° Xenoph. *de Athen. Rep.* p. 691.

* Μᾶλλον ἀξίωσε ὑποτοπεῖν, ἢ διδάσκεσθαι καθ' ἡσυχίαν βουλόμενος.

† Cùm Theophrastus percontaretur ex aniculâ quâdam, quanti aliquid venderet, et respondisset illa, atque addidisset: Hospes, non pote minoris; tulit molestè, se non effugere hospitis speciem, cùm ætatem ageret Athenis, optiméque loqueretur. Cic. *de Clar. Orat.* n. 17.

‡ Ὥσπερ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἀδόξοις καὶ ταπεινοῖς βοηθεῖν προθυμότερος, οὕτως τῶν λόγων τοὺς παιγνιώδεις καὶ γελοίους ἀσπάζεται καὶ προτιμᾷ.

gence, who understood raillery, who were not prone to take offence, nor over-delicate in point of the respect due to them. One day when the assembly was fully formed, and the people had already taken their places, Cleon, after having made them wait his coming a great while, appeared at last with a wreath of flowers upon his head, and desired the people to adjourn their deliberations to the next day: 'For to-day,' said he, 'I have business. I have been sacrificing to the gods, and am to entertain some strangers, my friends, at supper.' The Athenians, setting up a laugh, rose, and broke up the assembly. At Carthage, it would have cost any man his life, who had presumed to vent such a pleasantry, and to take such a liberty with a proud, * haughty, jealous, morose people, little disposed by nature to cultivate the graces, and still less inclined to humour. Upon another occasion the orator Stratocles, having informed the people of a victory, and in consequence caused sacrifices to be offered, three days after news came of the defeat of the army. As the people expressed their discontent and resentment upon the false information, he asked them, 'of what they had to complain, and what harm he had done them, in making them pass three days more agreeably than they would else have done?'

'IV. † They are pleased with hearing themselves praised, and yet readily bear to be ridiculed or criticised.' The least acquaintance with Aristophanes and Demosthenes will show, with what address and effect they employed praises and censure with regard to the people of Athens.

[p] When the republic enjoyed peace and tranquillity, says the same Plutarch in another place, the Athenian people diverted themselves with the orators who flattered them; but in important affairs and emergencies of the state, they became serious, and gave the preference to those whose custom it had been to oppose their unjust desires; such as Pericles, Phocion, and Demosthenes.

'V. ‡ They keep even those who govern them in awe, and show their humanity even to their enemies.'

[p] Plut. *in Phocion.* p. 746.

* Πικρὸν, σκυθρωπὸν, πρὸς παιδίαν καὶ χαρὰν ἀνήδυτον καὶ σκληρόν.

† Τοῖς μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν αὐτὸν μάλιστα χαίρει, τοῖς δὲ σκωπτουσιν ἥκιστα δυσχεραίνει.

‡ Φόβερός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἶτα φιλάνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πολιτῶν.

The people of Athens made good use of the talents of those who distinguished themselves by their eloquence and prudence; but they were full of suspicion, and kept themselves always on their guard against their superiority of genius and ability; they took pleasure in restraining their courage, and lessening their glory and reputation. This may be judged from the ostracism, which was instituted only as a curb on those whose merit and popularity ran too high, and which spared neither the greatest nor the most worthy persons. The hatred of tyranny and tyrants, which was in a manner innate in the Athenians, made them extremely jealous and apprehensive for their liberty with regard to those who governed.

As to what relates to their enemies, they did not treat them with rigour; they did not make an insolent use of victory, nor exercise any cruelty towards the vanquished. The amnesty decreed after the tyranny of the Thirty, shows that they could forget the injuries which they had undergone from them.

To these different characteristics, which Plutarch unites in the same passage of his works, some others may be added, extracted principally from the same author.

VI. It was from this * fund of humanity and benevolence, of which I have now spoken, and which was natural to the Athenians, that they were so attentive to the rules of politeness, and so delicate in point of decorum; qualities one would not expect to find among the common people. [q] In the war against Philip of Macedon, having intercepted one of his couriers, they read all the letters he carried, except that from Olympias his wife, which they returned sealed up and unopened, out of regard to conjugal love and secrecy, the rights of which are sacred, and ought to be respected even amongst enemies. The same Athenians having decreed that a strict search should be made after the presents distributed by Harpalus amongst the orators, would not suffer the house of Callicles, who was lately married, to be visited, out of respect for his bride, not long brought home. Such behaviour is not very common; and upon like occasions people do not always stand upon forms and politeness.

VII. The taste of the Athenians for all arts and sciences is

[q] Plut. *in Demetr.* p. 898.

* Πάτριον αὐτοῖς καὶ σύμφυτον ἦν τὸ φιλάνθρωπον. *In Pelop.* p. 280.

too well known to require dwelling long upon it in this place. But we cannot see, without admiration, a people, composed for the most part, as I have said before, of artisans, husbandmen, soldiers and mariners, carry delicacy of taste in every kind to so high a degree of perfection, which seems the peculiar attribute of a more exalted condition and a nobler education.

VIII. It is no less wonderful, that this people* should have had such great views, and risen so high in their pretensions. In the war which Alcibiades made them undertake, filled with vast projects and unbounded hopes, they did not confine themselves to the taking of Syracuse, or the conquests of Sicily, but had already grasped Italy, Peloponnesus, Libya, the Carthaginian states, and the empire of the sea as far as the Pillars of Hercules. Their enterprise failed, but they had formed it; and the taking of Syracuse, which seemed no great difficulty, might have enabled them to put it in execution.

IX. The same people, so great, and, one may say, so haughty in their projects, had nothing of that character in other respects. In what regarded the expense of the table, dress, furniture, private buildings, and, in a word, private life, they were frugal, simple, modest, and poor; but sumptuous and magnificent in every thing public and capable of doing honour to the state. Their victories, conquests, wealth, and continual communication with the people of Asia Minor, introduced neither luxury, gluttony, pomp, nor vain profusion amongst them. [r] Xenophon observes, that a citizen could not be distinguished from a slave by his dress. The richest inhabitants, and the most famous generals, were not ashamed to go to market themselves.

X. It was very glorious for Athens to have produced and formed so many persons who excelled in the arts of war and government; in philosophy, eloquence, poesy, painting, sculpture, and architecture: to have furnished alone more great men in every department than any other city of the world; if, perhaps, we except Rome, which had imbibed her information from Athens, and knew how to apply her lessons to the

[r] *De Rep. Athen.* p. 693.

* Μίνα φρονεῖ, μεγάλων ἠξίωται. Plut.

best advantage: * to have been in some sort the school, and tutor of almost the whole universe: to have, served, and still continue to serve, as the model for all nations which pique themselves most upon their fine taste: in a word, to have set the fashion and prescribed the laws of all that regards the talents and productions of the mind.

XI. I shall conclude this description of the Athenians with one more attribute, which cannot be denied them, and appears evidently in all their actions and enterprises; and that is, their ardent love of liberty. This was their darling passion, and the main-spring of their policy. We see them, from the commencement of the war with the Persians, sacrifice every thing to the liberty of Greece. They abandon without the least hesitation, their lands, estates, city, and houses, and remove to their ships in order to fight the common enemy, whose view was to enslave them. What day could be more glorious for Athens, than that in which, when all the allies were trembling at the vast offers made her by the king of Persia, she answered his ambassador by the mouth of [s] Aristides, That all the gold and silver in the world was not capable of tempting them to sell their own liberty or that of Greece? It was from such generous sentiments that the Athenians not only became the bulwark of Greece, but preserved the rest of Europe, and all the western world, from the invasion of the Persians.

These great qualities were mingled with great defects, often the very reverse of them, such as we may imagine in a fluctuating, light, inconstant, capricious people, as were the Athenians.

SECT. VI. COMMON CHARACTER OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.—I cannot refuse giving a place here to what M. Bossuet says upon the character of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The passage is long, but will not appear so; and will include all that is wanting to a perfect knowledge of the genius of both those states.

[s] Plut. *in Aristid.* p. 342.

* Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes
Intulit agresti Latio.» Horat. *Epist.* l. i. 2.

Greece taken, took her savage victors' hearts,
And polish'd rustic Latium with her arts.

Amongst all the republics of which Greece was composed, Athens and Lacedæmon were undoubtedly the principal. No people could have more wit than the Athenians, nor more solid sense than the Lacedæmonians. Athens affected pleasure; the Lacedæmonian way of life was hard and laborious. Both loved glory and liberty; but liberty at Athens tended to licentiousness: and, controlled by severe laws at Lacedæmon, the more restrained it was at home, the more ardent it was to extend itself by ruling abroad. Athens wished also to reign, but upon another principle, in which interest had a share with glory. Her citizens excelled in the art of navigation, and her sovereignty at sea had enriched her. To continue in the sole possession of all commerce, there was nothing she was not desirous of subjecting to her power; and her riches, which inspired this desire, supplied her with the means of gratifying it. On the contrary, at Lacedæmon money was in contempt. As all the laws tended to make the latter a military republic, martial glory was the sole object that engrossed the minds of her citizens. From thence she naturally affected dominion; and the more she was above interest, the more she abandoned herself to ambition.

Lacedæmon, from her regular life, was steady and determinate in her maxims and measures. Athens was more lively and active, and the people too much masters. Philosophy and the laws had indeed the most happy effects upon such exquisite natural parts as theirs, but reason alone was not capable of keeping them within due bounds. [t] A wise Athenian, who knew admirably the genius of his country, informs us, that fear was necessary to those too ardent and free spirits; and that it was impossible to govern them, after that the victory at Salamis had removed their fears of the Persians.

Two things, then, ruined them; the glory of their great actions, and the supposed security of their present condition. The magistrates were no longer heard; and as Persia was afflicted with excessive slavery, so Athens, says Plato, experienced all the evils of excessive liberty.

Those two great republics, so contrary in their manners and conduct, interfered with each other in the design they had each formed of subjecting all Greece; so that they were

[t] Plat. l. iii. *de leg.*

always enemies, still more from the contrariety of their interests than from the incompatibility of their humours.

The Grecian cities were unwilling to submit to the dominion of either the one or the other; for, besides that each was desirous of preserving their liberty, they found the empire of those two republics too grievous to bear. That of the Lacedæmonians was severe. That people were observed to have something almost brutal in their character. [u] A government too rigid, and a life too laborious, rendered their tempers too haughty, austere, and imperious in power: besides which, they could never expect to live in peace under the influence of a city, which, being formed for war, could not support itself, but by continuing perpetually in arms. [x] So that the Lacedæmonians were desirous of attaining to command, and all the world were afraid they should do so.

[y] The Athenians were naturally more mild and agreeable. Nothing was more delightful to behold than their city, in which feasts and games were perpetual; where wit, liberty, and the various passions of men, daily exhibited new objects: but the inequality of their conduct disgusted their allies, and was still more insupportable to their own subjects. It was impossible for them not to experience the extravagance and caprice of a flattered people; that is to say, according to Plato, something more dangerous than the same excesses in a prince vitiated by flattery.

These two cities did not permit Greece to continue in repose. We have seen the Peloponnesian and other wars, which were always occasioned, or fomented, by the jealousy of Lacedæmon and Athens. But the same jealousies which involved Greece in troubles, supported it in some measure, and prevented its falling into dependence upon either the one or the other of those republics.

The Persians soon perceived this condition of Greece; and accordingly the whole mystery of their politics consisted in keeping up those jealousies, and fomenting those divisions. Lacedæmon, which was the most ambitious, was the first that gave them occasion to take a part in the quarrels of the Greeks.

[u] Aristot. *Polit.* l. i. p. 4.
[x] Xenoph. *de Rep. Lacon.*
[y] Plat. *de Rep.* l. viii.

They engaged in them from the sole view of making themselves masters of the whole nation; and, industrious to weaken the Greeks by their own arms, they waited only the opportunity to crush them altogether. [z] The states of Greece in their wars already regarded only the king of Persia, whom they called the Great King, or *the king*, by way of eminence, as if they had already reckoned themselves among the number of his subjects. But it was impossible that the ancient spirit of Greece should not revive, when they were upon the point of falling into slavery, and the hands of the barbarians.

The petty kings of Greece undertook to oppose this great king, and to ruin his empire. [a] With a small army, but bred in the discipline we have related, Agesilaus, king of Sparta, made the Persians tremble in Asia Minor, and showed it was not impossible to subvert their power. The divisions of Greece alone put a stop to his conquests. The famous retreat of the ten thousand, who, after the death of the younger Cyrus, in spite of the victorious troops of Artaxerxes, made their way in a hostile manner through the whole Persian empire, and returned into their own country; that action, I say, demonstrated to Greece more than ever, that their soldiery was invincible, and superior to all opposers; and that only their domestic divisions could subject them to an enemy too weak to resist their forces when united.

We shall see, in the series of this history, by what methods Philip, king of Macedon, taking advantage of these divisions, succeeded at length, partly by address and partly by force, in making himself little less than the sovereign of Greece, and by what means he obliged the whole nation to march under his colours against the common enemy. What he had only planned, his son Alexander brought to perfection: and showed to the wondering world, how much ability and valour avail against the most numerous armies and the most formidable preparations.

[z] Plat. l. iii. *de leg.* Isocrat. *Panegyr.* [a] Polyb. l. iii.

BOOK THE ELEVENTH.

THE HISTORY OF DIONYSIUS THE ELDER AND YOUNGER, TYRANTS OF SYRACUSE.

Sixty years had elapsed since Syracuse had regained its liberty by the expulsion of the family of Gelon. The events which passed during that interval in Sicily, except the invasion of the Athenians, are of no great importance, and little known; but those which follow are highly interesting, and make amends for the chasm: I mean the reigns of Dionysius the father and son, tyrants of Syracuse; the first of whom governed thirty-eight years, and the * other twelve, in all fifty years. As this history is entirely unconnected with what passed in Greece at the same time, I shall relate it in this place altogether, and by itself; observing only, that the first twenty years of it, upon which I am now entering, agree almost in point of time with the last twenty of a former part of this volume.

This history will present to our view a series of the most odious and horrid crimes, though it abounds at the same time with instruction. When † on the one side we behold a prince,

* After having been expelled for more than ten years, he reascended the throne, and reigned two or three years.

† Erit Dionysius illic tyrannus, libertatis, justitiæ, legum exitium—Alios uret, alios verberabit, alios ob levem offensam jubebit detruncari. Senec. *de Consol. ad Marc.* c. xvii.

Sanguine humano non tantùm gaudet, sed pascitur; sed et suppliciis omnium ætatum crudelitatem insatiabilem explet. Id. *de Benef.* l. vii. c. 19.

the declared enemy of liberty, justice, and laws, treading under his feet the most sacred rights of nature and religion, inflicting the most cruel torments upon his subjects, beheading some, burning others for a slight word, delighting and feasting himself with human blood, and gratifying his inhuman cruelty with the sufferings and miseries of every age and condition: I say, when we behold such an object, can we deny a truth, which the Pagan world itself hath confessed, and which Plutarch takes occasion to observe in speaking of the tyrants of Sicily; That God in his anger gives such princes to a people, and makes use of the impious and the wicked to punish the guilty and the criminal. On the other side, when the same prince, the dread and terror of Syracuse, is perpetually anxious and trembling for his own life, and abandoned by day and night to remorse and regret, can find no person in his whole state, not even his wives and children, in whom he can confide; who will not exclaim with Tacitus, * 'That it is not without reason the oracle of wisdom has declared, That if the hearts of tyrants could be seen, we should find them torn in pieces with a thousand evils; it being certain, that the body does not suffer more from stripes and torments, than the minds of such wretches from their crimes, cruelties, and the injustice and violence of their proceedings.'

The condition of a good prince is quite different. He loves his people, and is beloved by them; he enjoys a perfect tranquillity within himself, and lives amidst his subjects as a father with his children. Though he knows that the sword of justice is in his hands, he dreads to make use of it. He loves to turn aside its edge, and can never resolve to evince his power, but with extreme reluctance, in the last extremity, and with all the forms and sanction of the laws. † But a tyrant punishes only from caprice and passion; and believes, says Plutarch, speaking

* Neque frustrà præstantissimus sapientiæ firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitiâ, libidine, malis consultis, animus dilaceraretur. Tacit. *Annal.* l. vi. c. 6.

† Hæc est in maximâ potestate verissima animi temperantia, non cupiditate aliquâ, non temeritate incendi; non priorum principum exemplis corruptum, quantum in cives suos liceat, experiendo tentare; sed hebetare aciem imperii sui.—Quid interest inter tyrannum et regem, (species enim ipsa fortunæ ac licentia par est,) nisi quòd tyranni in voluptate sæviunt, reges non, nisi ex causâ et necessitate? Senec. *de Clem.* lib. i. c. 11.

of Dionysius, that he is not really master, * and does not act with supreme authority, but in proportion as he sets himself above all laws, acknowledges no other than his own will and pleasure, and sees himself obeyed implicitly. Whereas, continues the same author, he that can do whatever he will, is in great danger of willing what he ought not.

Besides these characteristics of cruelty and tyranny, which particularly distinguish the first Dionysius, we shall see in his history, whatever unbounded ambition, sustained by great valour, extensive abilities, and talents qualified for acquiring the confidence of a people, is capable of undertaking for the attainment of sovereignty; the various means which he had the address to employ for maintaining himself in it against the opposition of his enemies, and the odium of the public; and lastly, the tyrant's good fortune in escaping, during a reign of thirty-eight years, the many conspiracies formed against him, and in transmitting peaceably the tyranny to his son, as a legitimate possession, and an hereditary right.

CHAPTER I.

SECT. I. MEANS MADE USE OF BY DIONYSIUS THE ELDER, TO POSSESS HIMSELF OF THE TYRANNY.—[a] Dionysius was a native of Syracuse, of noble and illustrious extraction according to some, but others say his birth was base and obscure. Be this as it may, he distinguished himself by his valour, and acquired great reputation, in the war with the Carthaginians. He was one of those who accompanied Hermocrates, when he attempted to reenter Syracuse by force of arms, after having been banished through the intrigues of his enemies. The event of that enterprise was not fortunate. Hermocrates was killed. The Syracusans did not spare his accomplices, several of whom were publicly executed. Dionysius was left amongst the wounded. The report of his death, designedly given out by his relations, saved his life. Providence would have spared

[a] Diod. l. xiii. p. 197.

* Ἔφη ἀπολάυειν μάλιστα τῆς ἀρχῆς ὅταν ταχίως ἃ βέλεται ποιῇ· μέγας ἂν ὁ κίνδυνος βάλεσθαι ἃ μὴ δεῖ, τὸν δὲ βέλεται ποιεῖν δυνάμενον. *Ad Princ. indoct.* p. 782.

Syracuse an infinity of misfortunes, had he expired either in the field or by the executioner.

The Carthaginians had made several attempts to establish themselves in Sicily, and to possess themselves of the principal cities there, as we have observed elsewhere. [b] The happy situation of that island for their maritime commerce, the fertility of its soil, and the riches of its inhabitants, were powerful inducements to such an enterprise. We may form an idea of the wealth of some of its cities from Diodorus Siculus's account of Agrigentum. [c] The temples were of extraordinary magnificence, especially that of Jupiter Olympius, which was three hundred and forty feet in length, sixty in breadth, and one hundred and twenty in height. The piazzas, or galleries, in extent and beauty, corresponded with the rest of the building. On one side was represented the battle of the giants, on the other the taking of Troy, in figures as large as the life. Without the city was an artificial lake, which was seven stadia (above a quarter of a league) in circumference, and thirty feet in depth. It was full of all kinds of fish, covered with swans and other water-fowls, and afforded the most agreeable prospect imaginable.

It was about the time of which we speak, that Exenetus, victor in the Olympic games, entered the city in triumph in a magnificent chariot, attended by three hundred more, all drawn by white horses. Their habits glittered with gold and silver; and nothing was ever more splendid than their appearance. Gellias, the most wealthy of the citizens of Agrigentum, had erected several large apartments in his house for the reception and entertainment of his guests. Servants waited by his order at the gates of the city, to invite all strangers to lodge at their master's house, whither they conducted them. Hospitality was much practised and esteemed by the generality of that city. A violent storm having obliged five hundred horsemen to take shelter there. Gellias entertained them all in his house, and supplied them immediately with dry clothes, of which he had always a great quantity in his wardrobe. This is understanding how to make a noble use of riches. His

[b] In the History of the Carthaginians, vol. i.
[c] Diod. l. xiii. p. 203, 206.

cellar is much talked of by historians, in which he had three hundred reservoirs hewn out of the rock, each of which contained a hundred amphoræ.*

This great and opulent city was besieged, and at length taken, by the Carthaginians. Its fall shook all Sicily, and spread an universal terror. The cause of its being lost was imputed to the Syracusans, who had but weakly succoured it. Dionysius, who even then was engrossed solely by the thoughts of his grand designs, and who was engaged, though secretly, in laying the foundation of his future power, took advantage of this favourable opportunity, and of the general complaints of Sicily against the Syracusans, to render the magistrates odious, and to exclaim against their administration. In a public assembly, held to consider of the present state of affairs, when nobody dared to open their mouths for fear of incurring the displeasure of the persons at the helm, Dionysius rose up, and boldly accused the magistrates of treason; adding, that it was his opinion, that they ought to be deposed immediately, without waiting till the term of their administration should expire. They retorted this audacity by treating him as a seditious person, and a disturber of the public tranquillity, and as such, laid a fine upon him according to the laws. This was to be paid before he could be admitted to speak again, and Dionysius was not in a condition to discharge it. Philistus, one of the richest citizens, (who wrote the history of Sicily, which is not come down to us,) deposited the money, and exhorted him at the same time to give his opinion upon the state of affairs with all the liberty which became a citizen zealous for his country. A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406.

Dionysius accordingly resumed his discourse with more vigour than before. He had long cultivated the habit of eloquence, which he looked upon with reason as a talent very necessary in a republican government; especially with relation to his views of acquiring the people's favour, and of conciliating them to his measures. He began with describing in a lively and pathetic manner the ruin of Agrigentum, a neighbouring city, and one in their alliance; the deplorable extre-

* An amphora contained about seven gallons; a hundred consequently consisted of seven hundred gallons, or eleven hogsheads seven gallons.

mity to which the inhabitants had been reduced, of quitting the place under cover of the night; the cries and lamentations of infants, and of aged and sick persons, whom they had been obliged to abandon to a ferocious and merciless enemy; and the cruel murder of all who had been left in the city, whom the barbarous victor dragged from the temples and altars of the gods, a feeble asylum against the Carthaginian fury and impiety. He imputed all these evils to the treachery of the commanders of the army, who, instead of marching to the relief of Agrigentum, had retreated with their troops; to the criminal remissness and delay of the magistrates, who had suffered themselves to be corrupted by Carthaginian bribes; and to the pride of the great and rich, who thought only of establishing their own power upon the ruins of their country's liberty. He represented Syracuse as composed of two different bodies; the one, by their power and influence, usurping all the dignities and wealth of the state; the other, obscure, despised, and trampled under foot, bearing the sad yoke of a shameful servitude, and rather slaves than citizens. He concluded with saying, that the only remedy for so many evils was to elect persons from amongst the people, devoted to their interests, and who, not being capable of rendering themselves formidable by their riches and authority, would be solely employed for the public good, and apply in earnest to the reestablishment of liberty in Syracuse.

This discourse was listened to with infinite pleasure, as all speeches are which flatter the natural propensity of inferiors to complain of the government, and was followed with the universal applause of the people, who always give themselves up blindly to those who know how to deceive them under the specious pretext of serving their interest. All the magistrates were deposed upon the spot, and others substituted in their room, with Dionysius at the head of them.

This was only the first step to the tyranny, and he did not stop here. The success of his undertaking inspired him with new courage and confidence. He had also in view the displacing of the generals of the army, and having their power transferred to himself. The design was bold and dangerous, and he set about it with address. Before he attacked them openly,

he planted his batteries against them at a distance; calumniating them by his emissaries among the people, and sparing no pains to render them suspected. He caused it to be whispered amongst the populace, that those commanders held secret intelligence with the enemy; that couriers in disguise were frequently seen passing and repassing; and that it was not to be doubted, but some conspiracy was on foot. He affected on his side not to see those leaders, nor to open himself to them at all upon the affairs of the public. He communicated none of his designs to them; as if he was apprehensive of rendering himself suspected by having any intercourse or correspondence with them. Persons of sense and discernment were not at a loss to discover the tendency of these undermining arts; nor were they silent upon the occasion: but the common people, prejudiced in his favour, incessantly applauded and admired his zeal, and looked upon him as the sole protector and asserter of their rights and liberties.

Another scheme, which he set at work with his usual address, was of very great service to him, and exceedingly promoted his designs. There was a great number of banished persons dispersed throughout Sicily, whom the faction of the nobility of Syracuse had expelled the city at different times and upon different pretences. He knew what an addition of strength so numerous a body of citizens would be to him, whom gratitude to their benefactor, and resentment against those who had occasioned their banishment, the hope of retrieving their affairs, and of enriching themselves out of the spoils of their enemies, would render well calculated for the execution of his designs, and attach them unalterably to his person and interest. He applied therefore earnestly to obtain their recall. It was given out that it was necessary to raise a numerous body of troops to oppose the progress of the Carthaginians, and the people foresaw with anxiety the expense to which the new levies would amount. Dionysius took advantage of this favourable conjuncture and disposition of the public mind. He represented, that it was ridiculous to bring foreign troops at a great expense from Italy and the Peloponnesus, whilst their own country would supply them with excellent soldiers, without being at any charge at all:

that there were numbers of Syracusans in every part of Sicily, who, notwithstanding the ill treatment they had received, had always retained the hearts of citizens under the name and condition of exiles; that they preserved a tender affection and inviolable fidelity for their country, and had chosen rather to wander about Sicily without support or settlement, than to enrol themselves in the armies of the enemy, however advantageous the offers to induce them to it had been. This discourse of Dionysius had all the effect upon the people he could have wished. His colleagues, who perceived plainly what he had in view, were afraid to contradict him; rightly judging, that their opposition would not only prove ineffectual, but incense the people against them, and even augment the reputation of Dionysius, to whom it would leave the whole honour of recalling the exiles. Their return was therefore decreed, and they accordingly came all to Syracuse without losing time.

A deputation from Gela, a city dependent on Syracuse, arrived about the same time, to demand that the garrison should be reinforced. Dionysius immediately marched thither with two thousand foot and four hundred horse. He found the city in a great commotion, and divided into two factions; one of the people, and the other of the rich and powerful. The latter having been tried in form, were condemned by the assembly to die, and to have their estates confiscated for the use of the public. This confiscation was applied to pay off the arrears which had long been due to the former garrison, commanded by Dexippus the Lacedæmonian; and Dionysius promised the troops he had brought with him from Syracuse to double the pay they were to receive from the city. This was attaching so many new creatures to himself. The inhabitants of Gela treated him with the highest marks of honour, and sent deputies to Syracuse, to return their thanks for the important service that city had done them in sending Dionysius thither. Having endeavoured in vain to bring Dexippus into his measures, he returned with his troops to Syracuse, after having promised the inhabitants of Gela, who used all means in their power to keep him amongst them, that he would soon return with more considerable aid.

He arrived at Syracuse just as the people were coming out of the theatre, who ran in throngs about him, inquiring with earnestness what he had heard of the Carthaginians. He answered with a sad and dejected air, that the city nourished far more dangerous and formidable enemies in her own bosom; that whilst Carthage was making extraordinary preparations for the invasion of Syracuse, those who were in command, instead of rousing the zeal and attention of the citizens, and setting every thing at work against the approach of so potent an enemy, lulled them with trivial amusements and idle shows, and suffered the troops to want necessaries; converting their pay to their private uses in a fraudulent manner, which was destructive to the public affairs; that he had always sufficiently comprehended the cause of such a conduct; that however it was not now upon mere conjecture, but upon too evident proof, that his complaints were founded: that Imilco, the general of the Carthaginians, had sent an officer to him, under pretext of treating about the ransom of prisoners, but in reality to prevail on him not to be too strict in examining into the conduct of his colleagues; and that if he would not enter into the measures of Carthage, at least that he would not oppose them: that for his part, he came to resign his command, and to abdicate his dignity, that he might leave no room for injurious suspicions of his acting in concert, and holding intelligence, with traitors who sold the commonwealth.

This discourse being rumoured amongst the troops and about the city, occasioned great inquietude and alarm. The next day the assembly was summoned, and Dionysius renewed his complaints against the generals, which were received with universal applause. Some of the assembly cried out that it was necessary immediately to appoint him generalissimo, with unlimited power, and that it would be too late to have recourse to so salutary a measure when the enemy was at the gates of Syracuse; that the importance of the war with which they were threatened required such a leader; that it was in the same manner formerly, that Gelon, when elected generalissimo, had defeated the Carthaginian army at Himera, which consisted of three hundred thousand men; that as for the accusation alleged against the traitors, it might be referred to another day,

but that the present affair would admit no delay. Nor was it in fact delayed; for the people (who, when once prejudiced, run headlong after their opinion without examining any thing) elected Dionysius generalissimo with unlimited power that instant. In the same assembly he caused it to be decreed, that the soldiers' pay should be doubled; insinuating that the state would be amply reimbursed by the conquests which would be the consequence of that advance. This being done, and the assembly dismissed, the Syracusans, upon cool reflection on what had passed, began to be in some consternation; as if it had not been the effect of their own choice: and comprehended, though too late, that from the desire of preserving their liberty, they had given themselves a master.

Dionysius rightly judged the importance of taking his measures before the people repented what they had done. There remained but one step more to the tyranny, which was to have a body of guards assigned him; and that he accomplished in the most artful and politic manner. He proposed that all the citizens under forty years of age, and capable of bearing arms, should march with provisions for thirty days to the city of Leontium. The Syracusans were at that time in possession of the place, and had a garrison in it. It was full of fugitive and foreign soldiers, who were very fit persons for the execution of his designs. He justly suspected, that the greatest part of the Syracusans would not follow him. He set out however, and arriving in the night, encamped upon the plains near the city. It was not long before a great noise was heard throughout the whole camp. This tumult was raised by persons planted for that purpose by Dionysius. He affected to believe that ambuscades had been laid with design to assassinate him, and in great trouble and alarm retired for refuge into the citadel of Leontium, where he passed the rest of the night, after having caused a great number of fires to be lighted, and drawn around him such of the troops as he most confided in. At break of day the people assembled in a body, to whom, expressing still great apprehension, he explained the danger he had been in, and demanded permission to choose himself a guard of six hundred men for the security of his person. Pisistratus had set him the example long before, and had used the

same stratagem when he made himself tyrant of Athens. His demand seemed very reasonable, and was accordingly complied with. He chose out a thousand men for his guard upon the spot, armed them completely, equipped them magnificently, and made them great promises for their encouragement. He also attached the foreign soldiers to his interest in a peculiar manner, by speaking to them with great freedom and affability. He made many removals and alterations in the troops, to secure the officers in his interest; and dismissed Dexippus to Sparta, as he distrusted him. At the same time he ordered a great part of the garrison, which he had sent to Gela, to join him, and assembled from all parts fugitives, exiles, debtors, and criminals; a train worthy of a tyrant.

With this escort he returned to Syracuse, that trembled at his approach. The people were no longer in a condition to oppose his undertakings, or to dispute his authority. The city was full of foreign soldiers, and saw itself upon the point of being attacked by the Carthaginians. To strengthen himself the more in the tyranny, he espoused the daughter of Hermocrates, the most powerful citizen of Syracuse, and who had contributed the most to the defeat of the Athenians. He also gave his sister in marriage to Polyxenus, brother-in-law of Hermocrates. He afterwards summoned an assembly, in which he rid himself of Daphneus and Demarchus, who had been the most active in opposing his usurpation. In this manner Dionysius, from a simple notary and a citizen of the lowest class, made himself absolute lord and tyrant of the greatest and most opulent city of Sicily.

SECT. II. COMMOTIONS IN SICILY AND AT SYRACUSE AGAINST DIONYSIUS. HE FINDS MEANS TO DISPEL THEM. TO PREVENT REVOLTS HE PROPOSES TO ATTACK THE CARTHAGINIANS. HIS WONDERFUL APPLICATION AND SUCCESS IN MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR. PLATO COMES TO SYRACUSE. HIS INTIMACY AND FRIENDSHIP WITH DION.—[a] Dionysius had a rude shock to sustain in the beginning of his usurpation. The Carthaginians having besieged Gela, he marched to its relief, and after some unsuccessful endeavours against the enemy,

[a] Diod. l. xiii. p. 227, 231.

threw himself into the place. He behaved there with little vigour, and all the service he did the inhabitants was to make them abandon their city in the night, and to cover their flight in person. He was suspected of acting in concert with the enemy, and the more, because they did not pursue him, and that he lost very few of his foreign soldiers. All the inhabitants who remained at Gela were butchered. Those of Camarina, to avoid the same fate, followed their example, and withdrew with all the effects they could carry away. The moving sight of aged persons, matrons, young virgins, and tender infants, hurried on beyond their strength, struck Dionysius's troops with compassion, and incensed them against the tyrant. Those he had raised in Italy withdrew to their own country, and the Syracusan cavalry, after having made a vain attempt to kill him upon the march, from his being surrounded with his foreigners, pushed forwards, and having entered Syracuse, went directly to his palace, which they plundered, using his wife at the same time with so much violence and ill-treatment, that she died of it soon after. Dionysius, who had foreseen their design, followed them close with only a hundred horse and four hundred foot; and having made a forced march of almost twenty leagues,[e] he arrived at midnight at the gate of Achradina, which he found shut against him. He set fire to it, and thus opened himself a passage. The richest of the citizens ran thither to dispute his entrance, but were surrounded by the soldiers, and almost all of them killed. Dionysius having entered the city, put all to the sword that came in his way, plundered the houses of his enemies, of whom he killed a great number, and forced the rest to leave Syracuse. The next morning the whole body of his troops arrived. The unhappy fugitives of Gela and Camarina, out of horror for the tyrant, retired to the Leontines. Imilco having sent a herald to Syracuse, the treaty was concluded which has been mentioned in the history of the Carthaginians.[f] By one of the articles it was stipulated, that Syracuse should continue under the government of Dionysius; which confirmed all the suspicions that had been conceived of him. This happened in the year Darius Nothus died.

A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

[e] Four hundred stadia.

[f] Vol. i.

It was then he sacrificed to his repose and security every thing that could give him umbrage. He knew that after having deprived the Syracusans of all that was most dear to them, he could not fail of incurring their utmost hatred; and the fear of the miseries he had to expect from it, increased in the usurper in proportion to their abhorrence of him. He looked upon all his new subjects as so many enemies, and believed that he could guard against the dangers which surrounded him on all sides, and dogged him in all places, only by cutting off one part of the people, to intimidate the other. He did not perceive, that by adding the cruelty of executions to the oppression of the public, he only multiplied his enemies, and induced them, after the loss of their liberty, to preserve at least their own lives by attempts upon his.

[s] Dionysius, who foresaw that the Syracusans would not fail to take advantage of the repose, in which the treaty lately concluded with the Carthaginians had left them, to attempt the reestablishment of their liberty, neglected nothing on his side to strengthen his power. He fortified the part of the city called the Isle, which was already very strong from the nature of its situation, and might be defended by a moderate garrison. He surrounded it with good walls, flanked at due distances with high towers, and separated it in that manner from the rest of the city. To these works he added a strong citadel, to serve him for a retreat and refuge in case of accident; and caused a great number of shops and piazzas to be erected, capable of containing a considerable multitude of inhabitants.

As to the lands, he chose out the best of them, which he bestowed upon his creatures and the officers of his appointing, and distributed the rest in equal proportion amongst the citizens and strangers, including amongst the former the slaves who had been made free. He divided the houses in the same manner, reserving those in the Isle for such of the citizens as he could most confide in, and for his strangers.

After having taken these precautions for his security, he began to think of subjecting several free states of Sicily, which had aided the Carthaginians. He began with the siege of Herbessus. The Syracusans in his army, seeing their swords

[s] Diod. p. 238, 241.

in their hands, thought it their duty to use them for the reestablishment of their liberty. At a time when they met in throngs to concert their measures, one of the officers, who took upon him to reprove them in harsh terms, was killed upon the spot, and his death served as a signal for their revolt. They sent immediately to Ætna for the horse who had retired thither at the beginning of the revolution. Dionysius, alarmed at this motion, raised the siege, and marched directly to Syracuse, to keep it in obedience. The revolters followed him close, and having seized upon the suburb Epipolæ, barred him from all communication with the country. Having received aid from their allies both by sea and land, they set a price upon the tyrant's head, and promised the freedom of the city to such of the strangers as should abandon him. A great number came over to them; whom they treated with the utmost favour and humanity. They made their machines advance, and battered the walls of the Isle vigorously, without giving Dionysius the least respite.

The tyrant, finding himself reduced to extremities, abandoned by the greatest part of the strangers, and shut up on the side of the country, assembled his friends to consult with them, rather by what kind of death he should put a glorious period to his career, than upon the means of saving himself. They endeavoured to inspire him with new courage, and were divided in their opinions; but at last the advice of Philistus prevailed, which was, that he should by no means renounce the tyranny. Dionysius, to gain time, sent deputies to the revolters, and demanded permission to quit the place with his adherents; which was granted, and five ships were allowed him to transport his followers and effects. He had, however, sent despatches secretly to the Campanians, who garrisoned the places in the possession of the Carthaginians, with offers of considerable reward, if they would come to his relief.

The Syracusans, who, after the treaty, believed their business done, and the tyrant entirely defeated, had disarmed part of their troops, and the rest acted with great indolence and little discipline. The arrival of the Campanians, to the number of twelve hundred horse, infinitely surprised and alarmed the city. After having beaten such as disputed their passage, they opened

themselves a way to Dionysius. At the same time, three hundred soldiers more arrived to his assistance. The face of things was then entirely altered, and terror and dejection now were transferred to the Syracusans. Dionysius, in a sally, drove the Syracusans vigorously as far as that part of the city called Neapolis. The slaughter was not very considerable, because he had given orders to spare those that fled. He caused the dead to be interred, and gave those who had retired to Ætna to understand, that they might return with entire security, promising entirely to forget the past. Many came to Syracuse, but others did not think it advisable to confide in the faith of a tyrant. The Campanians were rewarded to their satisfaction, and dismissed.

The Lacedæmonians at this time took such measures in regard to Syracuse as were most unworthy of the Spartan name. They had lately subverted the liberty of Athens, and declared publicly in all the cities dependent upon them, against popular government. They deputed one of their citizens to Syracuse, ostensibly to express the interest they took in the misfortunes of that city, and to offer it their aid; but, in reality, to confirm Dionysius in his resolution of supporting himself in the tyranny; expecting, that from the increase of his power he would prove of great advantage and support to their own.

Dionysius saw, from what had so lately happened at Syracuse, what he was to expect from the people for the future. Whilst the inhabitants were employed abroad in gathering in their harvest, he entered their houses, and seized upon all the arms he could find. He afterwards enclosed the citadel with an additional wall, fitted out abundance of ships, armed great numbers of strangers, and took all possible measures to secure himself against the disaffection of the Syracusans.

After having made this provision for his safety at home, he prepared to extend his conquests abroad; from whence he proposed to himself not merely the increase of his dominions and revenues, but the additional advantage of diverting his subjects from feeling the loss of their liberty, by turning their attention towards their ancient and always abhorred enemy, and by employing them in lofty projects, military expeditions, and glorious exploits, to which the hopes of riches and plunder

would be annexed. He relied also on acquiring by this means the affection of his troops, and on securing the esteem of the people by the grandeur and success of his enterprises.

Dionysius wanted neither courage nor policy, and had all the qualities of a great general. He took, either by force or fraud, Naxos, Catana, Leontium, and some [h] other towns in the neighbourhood of Syracuse, which for that reason were very convenient for his purposes. Some of them he treated with favour and clemency, to engage the esteem and confidence of the people: others he plundered, to strike terror into the country. The inhabitants of Leontium were transplanted to Syracuse.

These conquests alarmed the neighbouring cities, which saw themselves threatened with the same misfortune. Rhegium, situate upon the opposite coast of the strait which divides Sicily from Italy, prepared to prevent it, and entered into an alliance with the Syracusan exiles, who were very numerous, and induced the Messenians, on the Sicilian side of the strait, to aid them with a powerful supply. They had levied a considerable army, and were upon the point of marching against the tyrant, when discord arose amongst the troops, and rendered the enterprise abortive. It terminated in a treaty of peace and alliance between Dionysius and the two cities.

He had long revolved a great design in his mind—to ruin the Carthaginian power in Sicily, which was a great obstacle to his own, as his discontented subjects never failed of finding a secure refuge in the towns dependent upon that nation. The occurrence of a plague, which had lately ravaged Carthage, and extremely diminished its strength, seemed to supply a favourable opportunity for the execution of his design. But, as a man of ability, he knew that the greatness of the preparations ought to correspond with that of an enterprise, to assure the success of it; and he took his measures in a manner which shows the extent of his views, and extraordinary capacity. He therefore used uncommon pains and application, conscious that the war, into which he was going to enter with one of the most powerful nations then in the world, might be of long duration, and be attended with consequences of the utmost importance.

[h] Ætna. Enna.

His first care was to bring to Syracuse, as well from the conquered cities in Sicily as from Greece and Italy, a great number of artisans and workmen of all kinds; whom he induced to come thither by the lure of great gain and reward, the certain means of engaging the most skilful persons in every profession. He caused an infinite number of arms of all kinds to be forged; swords, javelins, lances, partisans, helmets, cuirasses, bucklers; all after the manner of the nation by whom they were to be worn. He built also a great number of galleys that had from three to five benches of rowers, and were an entirely new invention; with abundance of barks and other vessels for the transportation of troops and provisions. A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399.

The whole city seemed but one workshop, and continually resounded with the noise of the several artisans. Not only the porches of the temples, the piazzas, porticos, places of exercise, and public squares, but even private houses of any extent were full of workmen. Dionysius had distributed them with admirable order. Each species of artists, divided by streets and districts, had their overseers and inspectors, who by their presence and direction promoted and completed the works. Dionysius himself was perpetually amongst the workmen, stimulating and encouraging them by praise, and rewards in proportion to their merit. He knew how to confer different marks of honour upon them, according as they distinguished themselves by their ingenuity or industry. He would even make some of them dine with him at his own table, where he entertained them with the freedom and kindness of a friend. * It is justly said, that honour nourishes the arts and sciences, and that men of all ranks and conditions are animated by the love of glory. The prince who knows how to put the two great springs and strongest incentives of the human soul, interest and glory, in motion under proper regulations, will soon make all arts and sciences flourish in his kingdom, and fill it at a small expense with persons who excel in every profession. And this happened now at Syracuse, where a single person, of great ability in the art of governing, excited such ardour and

* Honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur ad studia gloriæ. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. i. n. 4.

emulation amongst the artificers as it is not easy to imagine or describe.

Dionysius applied himself more particularly to naval affairs. He knew that Corinth had invented the art of building galleys with three and five benches of oars, and was ambitious of acquiring for Syracuse, a Corinthian colony, the glory of bringing that invention to perfection; which he effected. The timber for building his galleys was brought, part of it from Italy, where it was drawn on carriages to the sea-side, and from thence shipped to Syracuse; and part from mount Ætna, which at that time produced abundance of pine and fir-trees. In a short time, a fleet of two hundred galleys was seen to rise, as it were, all at once out of the earth; and a hundred others formerly built were refitted by his order: he caused also a hundred and sixty sheds to be erected within the great port, each of them capable of containing two galleys, and a hundred and fifty more to be repaired.

The sight of such a fleet, built in so short a time, and fitted out with so much magnificence, would have given reason to believe that all Sicily had united its labours and revenues in accomplishing so great and expensive a work. On the other side, the view of such an incredible quantity of arms newly made, would have inclined one to think that Dionysius had solely employed himself in providing them, and had exhausted his treasures in the expense. They consisted of one hundred and forty thousand shields, and as many helmets and swords; and upwards of fourteen thousand cuirasses, finished with all the art and elegance imaginable. They were intended for the horse, for the tribunes and centurions of the foot, and for the foreign troops who had the guard of his person. Darts, arrows, and lances, were innumerable; and engines and machines of war in proportion to the rest of the preparations.

The fleet was to be manned by an equal number of citizens and strangers. Dionysius did not think of raising troops till all his preparations were complete. Syracuse and the cities in its dependence supplied him with part of his forces. Many came from Greece, and especially from Sparta. The considerable pay he offered brought soldiers in crowds from all parts to enlist in his service.

He omitted none of the precautions necessary to ensure the success of his enterprise; the importance as well as difficulty of which was well known to him. He was not ignorant that every thing depends upon the zeal and affection of the troops for their general, and applied himself particularly to gain the hearts, not of his own subjects only, but of all the inhabitants of Sicily, and was wonderfully successful in his attempts. He had entirely changed his behaviour for some time. Kindness, courtesy, clemency, a disposition to do good, and an obliging and insinuating deportment to all, had taken place of that haughty and imperious air, and inhumanity, which had rendered him so odious. He was so entirely altered, that he did not seem to be the same man.

Whilst he was hastening his preparations for war, and studying to attain his subjects' affections, he meditated an alliance with two powerful cities, Rhegium and Messina, which were capable of disconcerting his great designs by a formidable diversion. The league formed against him by those cities some time before, though without any effect, gave him some uneasiness. He, therefore, thought it necessary to make sure of the amity of them both. He presented the inhabitants of Messina with a considerable quantity of land, which was situate in their neighbourhood, and lay very commodiously for them. To give the people of Rhegium an instance of his esteem and regard for them, he sent ambassadors to desire that they would give him one of their citizens in marriage. He had lost his first wife in the popular commotion, of which mention has already been made.

Dionysius, sensible that nothing establishes a throne more effectually than the prospect of a successor, who may enter into the same designs, have the same interests, pursue the same plan, and observe the same maxims of government, took the opportunity of the present tranquillity of his affairs to contract a double marriage, in order to have a successor, to whom he might transfer the sovereignty which had cost him so many toils and dangers to acquire.

The people of Rhegium, to whom Dionysius had first applied, having called a council to take his demand into consideration, after a long debate came to a resolution not to contract any

alliance with a tyrant; and for their final answer returned, that they had only the hangman's daughter to give him. The raillery was keen, and cut deep. We shall see in the sequel how dear that city paid for their jest.

The Locrians, to whom Dionysius sent the same ambassadors, did not show themselves so difficult and delicate, but sent him for a wife Doris, the daughter of one of their most illustrious citizens. He caused her to be brought from Locris in a galley, with five benches of rowers, of extraordinary magnificence, and glittering in every part with gold and silver. He married, at the same time, Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, the most considerable and powerful of the citizens of Syracuse, and sister of Dion, of whom much will be said hereafter.—She was brought to his palace in a chariot drawn by four white horses, which was then a singular mark of distinction. The nuptials of both were celebrated the same day with universal rejoicings throughout the whole city, and attended with feasts and presents of incredible magnificence.

It was contrary to the manners and universal custom of the western nations, from the earliest times, that he espoused two wives at once; taking in this, as in every thing else, the liberty assumed by tyrants, of setting themselves above all laws.

Dionysius seemed to have an equal affection for the two wives, without giving the preference to either, to remove all cause of jealousy and discord. The people of Syracuse reported that he preferred his own countrywoman to the foreigner; but the latter had the good fortune first to bring her husband a son, which supported him not a little against the cabals and intrigues of the Syracusans. Aristomache was a long time without any symptoms of pregnancy; though Dionysius desired so earnestly to have issue by her that he put the mother of his Locrian wife to death, accusing her of hindering Aristomache from conceiving, by witchcraft and sorcery.

Aristomache's brother was the celebrated Dion, who was in great estimation with Dionysius. He was at first obliged for his credit to his sister's favour; but having afterwards given proofs of his great capacity in many instances, his own merit made him much beloved and regarded by the tyrant. Amongst the other marks which Dionysius gave him of his confidence,

he ordered his treasurers to supply him, without farther orders, with whatever money he should demand, provided they informed him the very same day what they had given him.

Dion had naturally a great and noble soul. A happy accident had conduced to inspire and confirm in him the most elevated sentiments. A kind of chance, or rather, as Plutarch says, a peculiar providence, which laid at a distance the foundations of the liberty of Syracuse, brought Plato, the most celebrated of philosophers, to that city. Dion became his friend and disciple, and made great improvements from his lessons: for, though brought up in a luxurious and voluptuous court, where the supreme good was made to consist in pleasure and magnificence, he had no sooner heard the precepts of his new master, and imbibed a taste of the philosophy that inculcates virtue, than his soul was inflamed with the love of it. Plato, in one of his letters, gives this glorious testimony of him; that he had never met with a young man upon whom his discourses made so great an impression, or who had comprehended his principles with so much quickness and vivacity.

As Dion was young and inexperienced, observing the facility with which Plato had changed his taste and inclinations, he imagined, with simplicity enough, that the same reasons would have the same effects upon the mind of Dionysius; and with this view could not rest till he had prevailed upon the tyrant to hear and converse with him. Dionysius consented: but the lust of tyrannic power had taken too deep a root in his heart to be ever eradicated from it. It was * like an indelible dye, that had penetrated his inmost soul, from whence it was impossible ever to efface it.

[i] Though the stay of Plato at the court made no alteration in Dionysius, the latter still continued to give Dion the same marks of his esteem and confidence, and even to endure, without taking offence, the freedom with which he spoke to him. Dionysius, ridiculing one day the government of Gelon, formerly king of Syracuse, and saying, in allusion to his name, that he had been the *laughing-stock*[k] of Sicily, the whole

[i] Plut. p. 960.

[k] Γέλως signifies laughing-stock.

* Τὴν βαφὴν οὐκ ἀνίεντα τῆς τυραννίδος, ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δυσσκοιὸν οὖσαν καὶ δυσέκπλυτον. Δορμαίους δὲ ὄντας ἔτι δεῖ σῶν χρήσεων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι λόγων. Plut. *in Moral.* p. 779.

court greatly admired, and took no small pains to praise the quaintness and delicacy of the conceit, insipid and flat as it was, and, indeed, as puns and quibbles generally are. Dion took it in a serious sense, and was so bold as to represent to him that he was in the wrong to talk in that manner of a prince whose wise and equitable conduct had been the model of a perfect government, and given the Syracusans a favourable opinion of monarchical power. 'You reign,' added he, 'and are trusted, for Gelon's sake; but for your sake, no man will ever be trusted after you.' It was much that a tyrant should suffer himself to be talked to in such a manner with impunity.

SECT. III. DIONYSIUS DECLARES WAR AGAINST THE CARTHAGINIANS. VARIOUS SUCCESS OF IT. SYRACUSE REDUCED TO EXTREMITIES, AND SOON AFTER DELIVERED. NEW COMMOTIONS AGAINST DIONYSIUS. DEFEAT OF IMILCO, AND AFTERWARDS OF MAGO. UNHAPPY FATE OF THE CITY OF RHEGIUM.—Dionysius seeing his great preparations were now complete, and that he was in a condition to take the field, publicly opened his design to the Syracusans, in order to interest them the more in the success of the enterprise, and told them that it was his intention to make war against the Carthaginians. He represented that people as the perpetual and inveterate enemy of the Greeks, and especially of those who inhabited Sicily; that the plague, which had lately wasted Carthage, afforded a favourable opportunity, which ought not to be neglected; that the people in subjection to such severe masters, waited only the signal to declare against them; that it would be glorious for Syracuse to reinstate the Grecian cities in their liberty, after having so long groaned under the yoke of the barbarians; that, in declaring war at present against the Carthaginians, they only anticipated them by a short time; since, as soon as they had retrieved their losses, they would not fail to attack Syracuse with all their forces.

The assembly were unanimous in opinion. Their ancient and natural hatred of the barbarians; their anger and resentment against them for having given Syracuse a master; and the hope that with arms in their hands they might find some occasion of recovering their liberty, united them in their suf-

frages. The war was resolved without any opposition, and it began that very instant. There were at Syracuse, as well in the city as the port, a great number of Carthaginians, who, relying upon the faith of treaties and the peace, exercised traffic, and thought themselves in security. The populace, by Dionysius's authority, upon the breaking up of the assembly, ran to their houses and ships, plundered their goods, and carried off their effects. They met with the same treatment throughout Sicily; and murders and massacres were added to this pillage, by way of reprisal for the many cruelties committed by the barbarians upon those they conquered, and to show them what they had to expect if they continued to make war with the same inhumanity.

After this bloody execution, Dionysius sent a letter by a herald to Carthage, in which he signified that the Syracusans declared war against the Carthaginians, if they did not withdraw their garrisons from all the Grecian cities held by them in Sicily. The reading of this letter, which took place first in the senate, and afterwards in the assembly of the people, occasioned an uncommon alarm, as the pestilence had reduced the city to a deplorable condition. However, they were not dismayed, and prepared for a vigorous defence. They raised troops with the utmost diligence, and Imilco set out immediately to put himself at the head of the Carthaginian army in Sicily. A. M. 3607. Ant. J. C. 397.

Dionysius, on his side, lost no time, and took the field with his army, which daily increased by the arrival of new troops, who came to join him from all parts. It amounted to four-score thousand foot and three thousand horse. The fleet consisted of two hundred galleys, and five hundred barks laden with provisions and machines of war. He opened the campaign with the siege of Motya, a fortified town belonging to the Carthaginians near mount Eryx, in a little island something more than a quarter of a league[1] from the continent, to which it was joined by a small neck of land, which the besieged immediately cut through, to prevent the approaches of the enemy on that side.

Dionysius having left the care of the siege to Leptines, who commanded the fleet, went with his land-forces to attack the

[1] Six stadia or furlongs.

places in alliance with the Carthaginians. Terrified by the approach of so numerous an army, they all surrendered except five; which were Ancyra, Solos, [m] Palermo, Segesta, and Entella. The last two places he besieged.

Imilco, however, to make a diversion, detached ten galleys of his fleet, with orders to attack and surprise in the night all the vessels which remained in the port of Syracuse. The commander of this expedition entered the port according to his orders, without meeting with resistance; and after having sunk a great part of the vessels which he found there, retired well satisfied with the success of his enterprise.

Dionysius, after having wasted the enemy's country, returned, and sat down with his whole army before Motya: and having employed a great number of hands in making causeways and moles, he restored the neck of land, and brought forward his engines on that side. The place was attacked with the utmost vigour, and equally well defended. After the besiegers had passed the breach, and entered the city, the besieged persisted a great while in defending themselves with incredible valour; so that it was necessary to pursue and drive them from house to house. The soldiers, enraged at so obstinate a defence, put all before them to the sword; age, youth, women, children, nothing was spared, except those who had taken refuge in the temples. The town was abandoned to the soldiers' discretion; Dionysius being pleased with an occasion of attaching the troops to his service by the allurement and hope of gain.

The Carthaginians made an extraordinary effort the next year, and raised an army of three hundred thousand foot and four thousand horse. The fleet under Mago's command consisted of four hundred galleys, and upwards of six hundred vessels laden with provisions and engines of war. Imilco had given the captains of the fleet his orders sealed up, which were not to be opened till they were out at sea. He had taken this precaution, that his designs might be kept secret, and to prevent spies from sending information of them to Sicily. The rendezvous was at Palermo; where the fleet arrived without much loss in their passage. Imilco took Eryx by treachery, and soon after compelled Motya to surrender. Messina seemed

[m] Panormus.

to him a place of importance; because it might favour the landing of troops from Italy in Sicily, and bar the passage of those that should come from Peloponnesus. After a long and vigorous defence it fell into his hands, and some time after he entirely demolished it.

Dionysius, seeing his forces extremely inferior to the enemy, retired to Syracuse. Almost all the people of Sicily, who hated him from the beginning, and were only reconciled to him in appearance and out of fear, took this occasion to quit his party, and to join the Carthaginians. The tyrant levied new troops, and gave the slaves their liberty, that they might serve on board the fleet. His army amounted to thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, and his fleet to a hundred and eighty galleys. With these forces he took the field, and removed about eight leagues from Syracuse. Imilco continued to advance with his land-army, followed by his fleet, that kept near the coast. When he arrived at Naxos, he could not continue his march along the sea-side, and was obliged to take a long compass round mount Ætna, which, by a new eruption, had set the country about it on fire, and covered it with ashes. He ordered his fleet to wait his coming up at Catana. Dionysius, apprized of this, thought the opportunity favourable for attacking it, whilst separated from the land-forces, and whilst his own, drawn up in battle upon the shore, might be of service to animate and support his fleet. The scheme was wisely concerted, but the success not answerable to it. Leptines his admiral, having advanced inconsiderately with thirty galleys, contrary to the opinion of Dionysius, who had particularly recommended to him not to divide his forces, at first sank several of the enemy's ships, but, upon being surrounded by the greater number, was forced to fly. His whole fleet followed his example, and was warmly pursued by the Carthaginians. Mago detached boats full of soldiers, with orders to kill all that endeavoured to save themselves by swimming to shore. The land-army drawn up there, saw them perish miserably, without being able to give them any assistance. The loss on the side of the Sicilians was very great, more than a hundred galleys being either taken or sunk, and twenty thousand men perishing either in the battle or the flight.

The Sicilians, who were afraid to shut themselves up in Syracuse, where they could not fail of being besieged very soon, solicited Dionysius to lead them against Imilco, whom so bold an enterprise might disconcert; besides which, they should find his troops fatigued with their long and forced march. The proposal pleased him at first; but upon reflecting that Mago, with the victorious fleet, might in the mean time advance and take Syracuse, he thought it more advisable to return thither; which was the occasion of his losing abundance of his troops, who deserted in numbers on all sides. Imilco, after a march of two days, arrived at Catana, where he halted some days to refresh his army, and refit his fleet, which had suffered exceedingly by a violent storm.

[n] He then marched to Syracuse, and made his fleet enter the port in triumph. More than two hundred galleys, adorned with the spoils of the enemy, made a noble appearance as they advanced; the crews forming a kind of concert by the uniform and regular order they observed in the motion of their oars. They were followed by an infinite number of smaller vessels; so that the port, vast as it was, was scarcely capable of containing them, the whole sea being in a manner covered with sails. At the same time on the other side appeared the land-army, composed, as has been said, of three hundred thousand foot and four thousand horse. Imilco pitched his tent in the temple of Jupiter, and the army encamped around, at somewhat more than half a league's [o] distance from the city. It is easy to judge the consternation and alarm with which such a prospect inspired the Syracusans. The Carthaginian general advanced with his troops to the walls to offer the Syracusans battle, and at the same time seized upon the two remaining * ports by a detachment of a hundred galleys. As he saw that the Syracusans did not make the least movement, he retired, contented for the present with the enemy's avowal of their weakness. For thirty days together he laid waste the country, cutting down all the trees, and destroying all before him. He then made himself master of the suburb called Achradina, and plundered the temples of Ceres and Proserpine.

[n] Diod. p. 285, 296. [o] Twelve stadia.
* The little port and that of Trogilus.

Foreseeing that the siege might probably be of long duration, he intrenched his camp, and enclosed it with strong walls, after having demolished for that purpose all the tombs, and amongst others, that of Gelon and his wife Demarata, which was a most magnificent monument. He built three forts at some distance from each other; the first at Plemmyrium; the second towards the middle of the port; the third near the temple of Jupiter; in order to secure his magazines of corn and wine. He sent also a great number of small vessels to Sardinia and Africa to fetch provisions.

At the same time arrived Polyxenus, whom his brother-in-law Dionysius had despatched at the beginning of the war into Italy and Greece for all the aid he could obtain, and he brought with him a fleet of thirty ships, commanded by Pharacides, a Lacedæmonian. This reinforcement came very seasonably, and gave the Syracusans new spirit. Upon seeing a bark laden with provisions for the enemy, they detached five galleys, and took it. The Carthaginians gave them chase with forty sail; the Syracusans advanced with their whole fleet, and in the battle made themselves masters of the admiral galley, damaged many others, took twenty-four, pursued the rest to the place where their whole fleet rode, and offered them battle a second time, which the Carthaginians, discouraged by the check they had received, were afraid to accept.

The Syracusans, emboldened by so unexpected a victory, returned to the city with the galleys they had taken, and entered it in a kind of triumph. Animated by this success, which could be only ascribed to their valour; for Dionysius was then absent with a small detachment of their fleet to procure provisions, attended by Leptines; they encouraged each other, and seeing themselves with arms in their hands, they reproached one another with cowardice, ardently exclaiming, that the time was come for throwing off the shameful yoke of servitude, and resuming their ancient liberty.

Whilst they were in the midst of these discourses, dispersed in small parties, the tyrant arrived; and having summoned an assembly, he congratulated the Syracusans upon their late victory, and promised in a short time to put an end to the war, and deliver them from the enemy. He was going to dismiss

the assembly, when Theodorus, one of the most illustrious of the citizens, a person of sense and valour, took upon him to speak, and to declare boldly for liberty. 'We are told,' said he, 'of restoring peace, terminating the war, and of being delivered from the enemy. What signifies such language from Dionysius? Can we consider as peace the wretched state of slavery to which he has reduced us? Have we any enemy more to be dreaded than the tyrant who subverts our liberty, or a war more cruel than that he has made upon us for so many years? Let Imilco conquer, he will content himself with laying a tribute upon us, and leave us the exercise of our laws; but the tyrant that enslaves us, knows no other than his avarice, his cruelty, his ambition! The temples of the gods robbed by his sacrilegious hands, our goods made a prey, and our lands abandoned to his instruments, our persons daily exposed to the most shameful and cruel treatment, the blood of so many citizens shed in the midst of us and before our eyes; these are the fruits of his reign, and the peace he obtains for us! Was it for the support of our liberties he built yon citadel? that he has enclosed it with such strong walls and high towers, and has called in for his guard that tribe of strangers and barbarians who insult us with impunity? How long, O Syracusans, shall we suffer such indignities, more insupportable to the brave and generous than death itself? Bold and intrepid against the enemy abroad, shall we always tremble like cowards in the presence of a tyrant? Providence, which has again put arms into our hands, directs us what use to make of them! Sparta, and the other cities in our alliance, who glory in being free and independent, would deem us unworthy of the Grecian name if we had any other sentiments. Let us show that we do not degenerate from our ancestors. If Dionysius consents to retire from amongst us, let us open him our gates, and let him take along with him whatever he pleases: but if he persists in the tyranny, let him experience what effects the love of liberty has upon the brave and resolute.'

After this speech, all the Syracusans, in suspense betwixt hope and fear, looked earnestly upon their allies, and particularly upon the Spartans. Pharacides, who commanded their

fleet, rose up to speak. It was expected that a citizen of Sparta would declare in favour of liberty; but he did quite the reverse: and told them, that his republic had sent him to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians, and not to make war upon Dionysius, or to subvert his authority. This answer confounded the Syracusans, and the tyrant's guard arriving at the same time, the assembly broke up. Dionysius perceiving more than ever what he had to fear, used all his endeavours to ingratiate himself with the people, and to attach the citizens to his interests; making presents to some, inviting others to eat with him, and affecting upon all occasions to treat them with kindness and familiarity.

[p] It was probably about this time, that Polyxenus, Dionysius's brother-in-law, who had married his sister Thesta, having without doubt declared against him in this conspiracy, fled from Sicily for the preservation of his life, and to avoid falling into the tyrant's hands. Dionysius sent for his sister, and bitterly reproached her for not apprizing him of her husband's intended flight, as she could not be ignorant of it. She replied, without expressing the least surprise or fear, 'Have I then appeared to you so bad a wife, and of so mean a soul, as to have abandoned my husband in his flight, had I been acquainted with his design, and not to have desired to share in his dangers and misfortunes? No! I knew nothing of it; or I should have been much happier in being called in all places the wife of Polyxenus the exile, than, in Syracuse, the sister of the tyrant.' Dionysius could not but admire an answer so full of spirit and generosity; and the Syracusans in general were so charmed with her virtue, that after the tyranny was suppressed, the same honours, equipage, and train of a queen, which she had before, were continued to her during her life; and after her death, the whole people attended her body to the tomb, and honoured her funeral with an extraordinary concourse.

On the side of the Carthaginians, affairs began to take a new appearance on a sudden. They had committed an irretrievable error in not attacking Syracuse upon their arrival, and in not taking advantage of the consternation which the sight of their fleet and army equally formidable had occasioned. At present

[p] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 966.

the plague, which was looked upon as a punishment sent from heaven for their plundering of temples and demolishing of tombs, had destroyed great numbers of their army in a short time. I have described the extraordinary symptoms of it in the history of the Carthaginians.[q] To add to that misfortune, the Syracusans, being informed of their unhappy condition, attacked them in the night by sea and land. The surprise and terror, and even haste they were in to put themselves into a posture of defence, threw them into new difficulty and confusion. They knew not on which side to send relief; all being equally in danger. Many of their vessels were sunk, and others almost entirely disabled, and a much greater number destroyed by fire. The old men, women, and children, ran in crowds to the walls, to be witnesses of that scene of horror, and lifted up their hands towards heaven, returning thanks to the gods for so signal a protection of their city. The slaughter within and without the camp, and on board the vessels, was great and dreadful, and ended only with the day.

Imilco, reduced to despair, offered Dionysius secretly three hundred thousand crowns [r] for permission to retire in the night with the remains of his army and fleet. The tyrant, who was not displeased with leaving the Carthaginians some resource, to keep his subjects in continual awe, gave his consent; but only for the citizens of Carthage. Upon which Imilco, four days after, set out with forty ships, filled with Carthaginians alone; leaving the rest of his troops behind. The Corinthians, discovering from the noise and motion of the galleys that Imilco was making off, sent to inform Dionysius of his flight, who affected ignorance of it, and gave immediate orders to pursue him: but as they saw that those orders were but slowly executed, they followed the enemy themselves, and sunk several vessels of their rear guard.

Dionysius then marched out with his troops; but before their arrival, the Sicilians in the Carthaginian service had retired to their several countries. Having first posted troops in all the passes, he advanced directly to the enemy's camp, though it was not quite day. The barbarians, who saw themselves cruelly abandoned and betrayed by Imilco and the

[q] Vol. i. p. 116.

[r] Three hundred talents.

Sicilians, lost courage and fled. Some of them were taken by the troops in the passes; others laid down their arms and asked quarter. The Iberians alone drew up, and sent a herald to capitulate with Dionysius, who incorporated them into his guards. The rest were all made prisoners.

Such was the fate of the Carthaginians; which shows, says the historian,[s] that humiliation treads upon the heels of pride, and that those who are too much puffed up with their power and success, are soon forced to confess their weakness and vanity. Those haughty victors, masters of almost all Sicily, who looked upon Syracuse as already their own, and had already entered triumphant into the great port, insulting the citizens, are now reduced to fly shamefully under the covert of the night; dragging away with them the sad ruins and miserable remains of their fleet and army, and trembling for the fate of their native country. Imilco, who had neither regarded the sacred refuge of temples nor the inviolable sanctity of tombs, after having left one hundred and fifty thousand men unburied in the enemy's country, returns to perish miserably at Carthage, avenging upon himself by his death the contempt he had expressed for gods and men.

Dionysius, who was suspicious of the strangers in his service, removed ten thousand of them, and, under the pretence of rewarding their merit, gave them the city of Leontium, which was in reality very commodiously situated, and an advantageous settlement. He confided the guard of his person to other foreigners, and the slaves whom he had made free. He made several attempts upon places in Sicily, and in the neighbouring country, especially against Rhegium.[t] The people of Italy, seeing themselves in danger, entered into a powerful alliance to put a stop to his conquests. The success was tolerably equal on both sides.

[u] About this time, the Gauls, who some months before had burnt Rome, sent deputies to Dionysius to make an alliance with him. He was at that time in Italy. The advices he had received of the great preparations making by the Carthaginians for war, obliged him to return to Sicily.

[s] Diodorus Siculus.
[t] Diod. l. xiv. p. 304, 310.
[u] Justin, l. xx. c. 5.

In fact, the Carthaginians having set on foot a numerous army under the conduct of Mago, made new efforts against Syracuse, but with no better success than the former. They terminated in an accommodation with Dionysius.

He attacked Rhegium again, and at first received no inconsiderable check. But having gained a great victory against the Greeks of Italy, in which he took more than ten thousand prisoners, he dismissed them all without ransom, contrary to their expectation; with a view of detaching the Italians from the interests of Rhegium, and of dissolving a powerful league, which might have defeated his designs against that city. Having by this act of favour and generosity acquired the good opinion of all the inhabitants of the country, and from enemies made them his friends and allies, he returned against Rhegium. He was extremely incensed against that city, upon account of their refusing to give him one of their citizens in marriage, and the insolent answer with which that refusal was attended. The besieged, finding themselves incapable of resisting so numerous an army as that of Dionysius, and expecting no quarter if the city were taken by assault, began to talk of capitulating; to which he hearkened not unwillingly. He made them pay three hundred thousand crowns, deliver up all their vessels to the number of seventy, and put a hundred hostages into his hands; after which he raised the siege. It was not out of favour or clemency that he acted in this manner, but to make their destruction sure, after having first reduced their power.

A. M. 3615. Ant. J. C. 389.

Accordingly the next year, under the false pretext, and with the reproach of their having violated the treaty, he besieged them again with all his forces, having first sent back their hostages. Both parties acted with the utmost vigour. The desire of revenge on one side, and the fear of the most cruel torments on the other, animated the troops. Those of the city were commanded by Phyto, a brave and intrepid man, whom the danger of his country rendered more courageous. He made frequent and vigorous sallies, in one of which Dionysius received a wound, of which he recovered with great difficulty. The siege went on slowly, and had already continued eleven months, when a cruel famine reduced the city to the last

extremities. A measure of wheat (of about six bushels) was sold for about ten pounds.[x] After having consumed all their horses and beasts of burden, they were reduced to support themselves with leather and hides, which they boiled; and at last to feed upon the grass of the fields like beasts; a resource, of which Dionysius soon deprived them, by making his horse eat up all the herbage around the city. Necessity at length reduced them to surrender at discretion, and Dionysius entered the place, which he found covered with dead bodies. Those who survived were rather skeletons than men. He took above six thousand prisoners, whom he sent to Syracuse. Such as could pay about two pounds[y] he dismissed, and sold the rest for slaves.

Dionysius let fall the whole weight of his resentment and revenge upon Phyto. He began with ordering his son to be thrown into the sea. The next day he ordered the father to be fastened to the extremity of the highest of his engines for a spectacle to the whole army, and in that condition he sent to tell him that his son had been thrown into the sea. 'Then he is happier than I by a day,' replied that unfortunate parent. He afterwards caused him to be led through the whole city, to be scourged with rods, and to suffer a thousand other indignities, whilst a herald proclaimed, 'that the perfidious traitor was treated in that manner, for having inspired the people of Rhegium with rebellion.' 'Say rather,' answered that generous defender of his country's liberty, 'that a faithful citizen is so used, for having refused to sacrifice his country to a tyrant.' Such an object and such a discourse drew tears from all eyes, and even from the soldiers of Dionysius. He was afraid his prisoner would be taken from him before he had satiated his revenge, and ordered him to be flung into the sea directly.

SECT. IV. VIOLENT PASSION OF DIONYSIUS FOR POESY. REFLECTIONS UPON THAT TASTE OF THE TYRANT. FLATTERY OF HIS COURTIERS. GENEROUS FREEDOM OF PHILOXENUS. DEATH OF DIONYSIUS. HIS BAD QUALITIES.—[z] At an interval of leisure which his success against Rhegium had left Diony-

[x] Five minæ [y] One mina. [z] Diod. l. xiv. p. 318.

sius, the tyrant, who was desirous of glory of every kind, and piqued himself upon the excellence of his genius, sent his brother Thearides to Olympia, to dispute in his name the prizes of the chariot-race and poetry.

The circumstance which I am now going to treat, and which regards the taste or rather passion of Dionysius for poetry and polite learning, being one of his peculiar characteristics, and having besides a mixture of good and bad in itself, makes it requisite, in order to form an equitable judgment upon this point, to distinguish wherein this taste of his is either laudable or worthy of blame.

I say the same of the tyrant's total character, with whose vices of ambition and tyranny many great qualities were united, which ought not to be disguised or misrepresented; the veracity of history requiring, that justice should be done to the most wicked, as they are not so in every respect. We have seen several things in his character that certainly deserve praise; I mean in regard to his manners and behaviour: the mildness with which he suffered the freedom of young Dion, the admiration he expressed of the bold and generous answer of his sister Thesta upon the occasion of her husband's flight, his gracious and insinuating deportment upon several other occasions to the Syracusans, the familiarity with which he conversed with the meanest citizens and even workmen, the equality he observed between his two wives, and his kindness and respect for them; all which imply that Dionysius had more equity, moderation, affability, and generosity, than is commonly ascribed to him. He is not such a tyrant as Phalaris, Alexander of Pheræ, Caligula, Nero, or Caracalla.

But to return to Dionysius's taste for poetry. In his intervals of leisure, he loved to unbend in the conversation of persons of wit, and in the study of the arts and sciences. He was particularly fond of versifying, and employed himself in the composition of poems, especially of tragedies. Thus far this passion of his may be excused, having something undoubtedly laudable in it; I mean in his taste for polite learning, the esteem he expressed for learned men, his inclination to do them good offices, and the employment to which he devoted his leisure hours. Was it not better to employ them in exer-

cising his mind and the cultivation of science, than in feasting, dancing, theatrical amusements, gaming, frivolous company, and other pleasures still more pernicious? This is the wise reflection which Dionysius the younger made when at Corinth. [a] Philip of Macedon being at table with him, spoke of the odes and tragedies his father had left behind him with an air of raillery and contempt, and seemed to be under some difficulty to comprehend at what time of his life he had leisure for such compositions. Dionysius smartly and wittily replied, 'The difficulty is very great indeed! Why, he composed them at those hours which you and I, and an infinity of others, who have so high an opinion of ourselves, pass in drinking and other diversions.'

[b] Julius Cæsar and the emperor Augustus cultivated poetry, and composed tragedies. Lucullus intended to have written the memoirs of his military actions in verse. The comedies of Terence were attributed to Lælius and Scipio, both great captains, especially the latter; and that report, which generally prevailed at Rome, was so far from lessening their reputation, that it added to the general esteem in which they were held.

These relaxations, therefore, were not blamable in their own nature; this taste for poetry was rather laudable, if kept within due bounds; but Dionysius was ridiculous for pretending to excel all others in it. He could not endure either a superior or competitor in any thing. From being in the sole possession of supreme authority, he had accustomed himself to imagine that he possessed the same paramount rank in the empire of wit: in a word, he was in every thing a tyrant. His immoderate estimation of his own merit flowed, in some measure, from the overbearing turn of mind which empire and command had given him. The continual applauses of a court, and the flatteries of those who knew how to recommend themselves by soothing his darling foible, were another source of this vain conceit. And of what will not a * great man, a minister, a prince, think himself capable, who has such incense and adoration continually paid to him? It is well known, that

[a] Plut. *in Timol.* p. 243. c. lxxxv.

[b] Suet. *in Cæs.* c. lvi. *in August.* c. lxxxv. Plut. *in Lucul.* p. 492.

* ——— Nihil est quod credere de se
Non possit, cùm laudatur diis æqua potestas. JUVENAL.

Cardinal Richelieu, in the midst of his important business, not only composed dramatic pieces, but piqued himself on his excellence in that talent; and what is more, his jealousy in that point rose so high as to use his authority in causing criticisms to be directed against the compositions of those to whom the public, a just and incorruptible judge in the question, had given the preference against him.

Dionysius did not reflect, that there are things, estimable in themselves, and conferring honour upon private persons, in which it does not become a prince to desire to excel. I have mentioned elsewhere Philip of Macedon's expression to his son Alexander, upon his having shown too much skill in music at a public entertainment: 'Are not you ashamed,' said he, 'to sing so well?' It was acting inconsistently with the dignity of his rank. If Cæsar and Augustus, when they wrote tragedies, had taken it into their heads to equal or excel Sophocles, it had not only been ridiculous, but a reproach to them. And the reason is, because a prince being obliged by an essential and indispensable duty to apply himself incessantly to the affairs of government, and having an infinitude of various business perpetually flowing in upon him, he can make no other use of the sciences, than to divert him at such short intervals, as will not admit such progress in them, as is requisite in order to excel those who make them their particular study. Hence, when the public sees a prince affect the first rank in this kind of merit, they have a right to conclude that he neglects his more important duties, and what he owes to his people's happiness, to give himself up to an employment which wastes his time and mental energy ineffectually.

We must, however, do Dionysius the justice to own, that he never was reproached for letting poetry interfere to the prejudice of his great affairs, or that it made him less active and diligent on any important occasion.

[c] I have already said, that this prince, in an interval of peace, had sent his brother Thearides to Olympia, to dispute the prizes of poetry and the chariot-race in his name. When he arrived in the assembly, the beauty as well as number of his chariots, and the magnificence of his pavilion, embroidered

[c] Diod. l. xiv. p. 318.

with gold and silver, attracted the eyes and admiration of all the spectators. The ear was no less charmed when the poems of Dionysius began to be read. He had chosen expressly for the occasion * readers with sonorous, musical voices, who might be heard far and distinctly, and who knew how to give a just emphasis and cadence to the verses they repeated. At first this had a very happy effect, and the whole audience were deceived by the art and sweetness of the pronunciation. But that charm was soon at an end, and the mind not long seduced by the ears. The verses then appeared in all their absurdity. The audience were ashamed of having applauded them, and their praise was turned into laughter, scorn, and insult. Their contempt and indignation rose to such a pitch, that they tore Dionysius's rich pavilion in pieces. Lysias, the celebrated orator, who was come to the Olympic games to dispute the prize of eloquence, which he had carried several times before, undertook to prove, that it was inconsistent with the honour of Greece, the friend and asserter of liberty, to admit an impious tyrant to share in the celebration of the sacred games, who had no other thoughts than of subjecting all Greece to his power. Dionysius was not affronted in that manner then; but the event proved as little in his favour. His chariots having entered the lists, were all of them either carried out of the course by a headlong impetuosity, or dashed in pieces against one another. And to complete the misfortune, the galley which was bringing back the persons Dionysius had sent to the games, met with a violent storm, and did not return to Syracuse without great difficulty. When the pilots arrived there, out of hatred and contempt for the tyrant, they reported throughout the city, that it was his vile poems which had occasioned so many misfortunes to the readers, racers, and even the ship itself. This bad success did not at all discourage Dionysius, nor make him abate in the least the high opinion which he entertained of his poetic vein. The flatterers, who abounded in his court, did not fail to insinuate, that such injurious treatment of his poems could proceed only from envy, which always fastens upon what is most excellent; and that sooner or later the invidious themselves would be

* These readers were called Ῥαψῳδοί.

compelled by demonstration to do justice to his merit, and acknowledge his superiority to all other poets.

[d] The infatuation of Dionysius on this subject was inconceivable. He was undoubtedly a great warrior, and an excellent captain; but he fancied himself a much better poet, and believed that his verses were a far greater honour to him than all his victories. To endeavour to undeceive him in an opinion so favourable to himself, to say nothing of the absolute hopelessness of the attempt, would have been an ill way of making court to him; so that all the learned men and poets, who ate at his table in great numbers, seemed to be in an ecstasy of admiration whenever he read them his poems. Never, according to them, was any thing comparable to them: all was great, all noble in his poetry: all was majestic, or, to speak more properly, all divine.

Philoxenus was the only one of all the tribe who did not suffer himself to be hurried away by this torrent of excessive praise and flattery. He was a man of great reputation, and excelled in Dithyrambic poetry. There is a story told of him, which La Fontaine has known how to apply admirably. Being at table with Dionysius, and seeing a very small fish set before him, and a huge one before the king, the whim took him to lay his ear close to the little fish. He was asked what he meant by that pleasantry: 'I was inquiring,' said he, 'into some affairs that happened in the reign of Nereus, but this young native of the floods can give me no information; yours is elder, and without doubt knows something of the matter.'

Dionysius having read one day some of his verses to Philoxenus, and having pressed him to give him his opinion of them, he answered with entire freedom, and told him plainly his real sentiments. Dionysius, who was not accustomed to such language, was extremely offended, and ascribing his boldness to envy, gave orders to carry him to the quarries; the common gaol being so called. The whole court were afflicted upon this account, and solicited for the generous prisoner, whose release they obtained. He was enlarged the next day, and restored to favour.

At the entertainment made that day by Dionysius for the

[d] Diod. l. xv. p. 331.

same guests, which was a kind of ratification of the pardon, and at which they were for that reason more than usually gay and cheerful; after they had plentifully regaled a great while, the prince did not fail to introduce his poems into the conversation, which were the most frequent subject of it. He chose some passages which he had taken extraordinary pains in composing, and conceived to be masterpieces, as was very discernible from the self-satisfaction and complacency he expressed whilst they were reading. But his delight could not be perfect without Philoxenus's approbation, upon which he set the greater value, as it was not his custom to be so profuse of it as the rest. What had passed the evening before was a sufficient lesson for the poet. When Dionysius asked his opinion of the verses, Philoxenus made no answer, but turning towards the guards, who stood round the table, he said in a serious, though humorous tone, without any emotion; 'Carry me back to the quarries.' * The prince comprehended all the salt and spirit of that ingenious pleasantry without being offended. The sprightliness of the conceit atoned for its freedom, which at another time would have touched him to the quick, and made him excessively angry. He only laughed at it now, and was not displeased with the poet.

He did not act in the same way upon occasion of a gross jest of Antiphon's, which was indeed of a different kind, and was the result of a violent and brutal disposition. The prince in conversation asked, which was the best kind of brass. After the company had given their opinions, Antiphon said, that was the best of which the statues of † Harmodius and Aristogiton were made. This witty expression,[e] if it may be called so, cost him his life.

The friends of Philoxenus, apprehending that his too great frankness might be also attended with fatal consequences, represented to him in the most serious manner, that those who live with princes must speak their language; that they wish to have nothing said to them but what is agreeable; that whoever does not know how to dissemble, is not qualified for a

[e] Plut. *Moral.* p. 78, 833.

* Τότε μὲν διὰ τὴν εὐτραπελίαν τῶν λόγων μεταδιάσας ὁ Διονύσιος, ἧνεγκε τὴν παῤῥησίαν τῷ γέλωτος τὴν μέμψιν ἀμβλύνοντος.

† They had delivered Athens from the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.

court; that the favours and liberalities which Dionysius continually bestowed upon them, well deserved the return of some little complaisance; that, in a word, with his blunt freedom and plain truth, he was in danger of losing not only his fortune but his life. Philoxenus told them, that he would profit by their good advice, and for the future give such a turn to his answers as should satisfy Dionysius without injuring truth.

Accordingly some time after, Dionysius having read a piece of his composing upon a very mournful subject, wherein he was to move compassion and draw tears from the eyes of the audience, he addressed himself again to Philoxenus, and asked him what he thought of his verses. Philoxenus gave him for answer one word,[f] which in the Greek language has two different significations. In one of them it implies mournful, moving things, such as inspire sentiments of pity and compassion: in the other, it expresses something very mean, defective, pitiful, and miserable. Dionysius, who was fond of his verses, and believed that every body must have the same good opinion of them, took that word in the favourable construction, and was extremely satisfied with Philoxenus. The rest of the company were not mistaken, but understood it in the right sense, though without explaining themselves.

Nothing could cure his folly for versification. It appears from Diodorus Siculus,[g] that having sent some of his poems a second time to Olympia, they were treated with the same ridicule and contempt as before. That news, which could not be kept from him, threw him into an excess of melancholy, which he could never get over, and turned soon after into a kind of madness and frenzy. He complained that envy and jealousy, the certain enemies of true merit, were always making war upon him, and that all the world conspired to ruin his reputation. He accused his best friends of having engaged in the same design; some of whom he put to death, and others he banished: amongst whom were Leptines his brother, and Philistus, who had done him such great services, and to whom he was indebted for his power. They retired to Thurium in Italy, from whence they were recalled some time after, and

[f] Οικτρά. [g] Pag. 332.

reinstated in all their fortunes and former favour: Leptines even married Dionysius's daughter.

[h] To remove his melancholy occasioned by the ill success of his verses, it was necessary to find some employment; and with this his wars and buildings supplied him. He had formed a design of establishing powerful colonies in that part of Italy which is situate upon the Adriatic sea facing Epirus; in order that his fleet might not want a secure retreat, when he should employ his forces on that side: and with this view he made an alliance with the Illyrians, and restored Alcetes, king of the Molossians, to his throne. His principal design was to attack Epirus, and to make himself master of the immense treasures which had been for many ages amassing in the temple of Delphi. Before he could set this project on foot, which required great preparations, he seemed to wish to make an essay of his abilities, by another of the same kind, though of much more easy execution. Having made a sudden irruption into Tuscany, under the pretence of pursuing pirates, he plundered a very rich temple in the suburbs of Agylla, a city of that country, and carried away a sum exceeding four millions five hundred thousand livres.[i] He had occasion for money to support his great expenses at Syracuse, as well in fortifying the port, and making it capable of receiving two hundred galleys, as in enclosing the whole city with good walls, erecting magnificent temples, and building a place of exercise upon the banks of the river Anapus.

[k] At the same time he formed the design of driving the Carthaginians entirely out of Sicily. A first victory which he gained, put him almost into a condition to accomplish his project; but the loss of a second battle, in which his brother Leptines was killed, put an end to his hopes, and obliged him to enter into a treaty, by which he gave up several towns to the Carthaginians, and paid them great sums of money to reimburse their expenses in the war. An attempt which he made upon them some years after, taking advantage of the desolation occasioned by the plague at Carthage, had no better success.

[h] Diod. l. xv. p. 336, 337.
[i] 1500 talents, or about 200,000*l.* sterling.
[k] See the history of the Carthaginians.

[l] Another victory of a very different kind, though one which he had no less at heart, made him amends, or at least comforted him, for the ill success of his arms. He had caused a tragedy of his to be represented at Athens, for the prize in the celebrated feast of Bacchus, and was declared victor. Such a victory among the Athenians, who were the best judges of this kind of literature, seems to indicate that the poetry of Dionysius was not so *mean* and *pitiful;* and it is very possible that the aversion of the Greeks for every thing which came from a tyrant, had a great share in the contemptuous sentence passed upon his poems in the Olympic games. Be this as it may, Dionysius received the news with inexpressible transports of joy. Public thanksgivings were made to the gods, the temples being scarce capable of containing the concourse of the people. Nothing was seen throughout the city but feasting and rejoicing; and Dionysius regaled all his friends with the most extraordinary magnificence. Self-satisfied to a degree that cannot be described, he believed himself at the summit of glory, and did the honours of his table with a gaiety and ease, and at the same time with a grace and dignity, that charmed all the world. He invited his guests to eat and drink more by his example than expressions, and carried his civilities of that kind to such an excess, that at the close of the banquet he was seized with violent pains, occasioned by an indigestion, of which it was not difficult to foresee the consequences.

[m] Dionysius had three children by his wife Doris, and four by Aristomache, of which two were daughters, the one named Sophrosyne, the other Arete. Sophrosyne was married to his eldest son, Dionysius the younger, whom he had by his Locrian wife; and Arete espoused her brother Theorides. But Theorides dying soon, Dion married his widow Arete, who was his own niece.

As Dionysius's distemper left no hopes of his life, Dion undertook to speak to him concerning his children by Aristomache, who were at the same time his brothers-in-law and nephews, and to insinuate to him, that it was just to prefer the issue of his Syracusan wife to that of a stranger. But the physicians, desirous of making their court to young Dionysius,

[l] Diod. p. 384, 385.

[m] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 960.

the Locrian's son, for whom the throne was intended, did not give him an opportunity: for Dionysius having demanded a medicine to make him sleep, they gave him so strong a dose as quite stupified him, and laid him in a sleep that lasted him for the rest of his life. He had reigned thirty-eight years.

He was certainly a prince of very great political and military abilities, and had occasion for them all to raise himself as he did from a mean condition to so high a rank. After having held the sovereignty thirty-eight years, he transmitted it peaceably to a successor of his own issue and election; and had established his power upon such solid foundations, that his son, notwithstanding his slender capacity for governing, retained it twelve years; all which could not have been effected without a great fund of merit. But what qualities could cover the vices which rendered him the object of his subjects' abhorrence? His ambition knew neither law nor limit; his avarice spared nothing, not even the most sacred places; his cruelty had no regard to the nearest relations; and his open and professed impiety acknowledged the Divinity only to insult him.

As he was returning to Syracuse with a very favourable wind after plundering the temple of Proserpine at Locris, 'See,' said he to his friends with a smile of contempt, 'how the immortal gods favour the navigation of the sacrilegious.'

[n] Having occasion for money to carry on the war against the Carthaginians, he rifled the temple of Jupiter, and took from that god a robe of solid gold, which ornament Hiero the tyrant had given him out of the spoils of the Carthaginians. He even jested upon that occasion, saying, that a robe of gold was much too heavy in summer, and too cold in winter; and at the same time ordered one of wool to be thrown over the god's shoulders; adding, that such a habit would be commodious in all seasons.

Another time he ordered the golden beard of Æsculapius of Epidaurus to be taken off; giving for his reason, that it was very inconsistent for the son to have a beard,* when the father had none.

He caused all the tables of silver to be taken out of the temples; and as there was inscribed upon them, according to

[n] Cic. *de Nat. deor.* l. xv. n. 83, 84.

* Apollo was represented without a beard.

the custom of the Greeks, TO THE GOOD GODS; he would (he said) take the benefit of their GOODNESS.

As for less prizes, such as cups and crowns of gold, which the statues held in their hands, those he carried off without any ceremony; saying, it was not taking, but merely receiving them; and that it was idle and ridiculous to ask the gods perpetually for good things, and to refuse them when they held out their hands themselves to present them to you. These spoils were carried by his order to the market, and sold by public sale: and when he had got the money for them, he ordered proclamation to be made, that whoever had in their custody any things taken out of sacred places, were to restore them entire, within a limited time, to the temples from whence they were brought; adding in this manner to his impiety to the gods, injustice to man.

The amazing precautions that Dionysius thought necessary to secure his life, show to what anxiety and apprehension he was abandoned. [o] He wore under his robe a cuirass of brass. He never harangued the people but from the top of a high tower; and thought he made himself invulnerable by being inaccessible. Not daring to confide in any of his friends or relations, his guard was composed of slaves and strangers. He went abroad as little as possible; fear obliging him to condemn himself to a kind of imprisonment. These extraordinary precautions are to be referred without doubt to certain periods of his reign, when frequent conspiracies against him rendered him more timid and suspicious than usual; for at other times we have seen that he conversed freely enough with the people, and was accessible even to familiarity. In those dark days of distrust and fear, he fancied that he saw all mankind in arms against him. [p] An expression which escaped his barber, who boasted, by way of jest, that he held a razor at the tyrant's throat every week, cost him his life. From thenceforth, not to abandon his head and life to the hands of a barber, he made his daughters, though very young, do him that despicable office; and when they were more advanced in years, he took the scissars and razors from them, and taught them to singe off his beard with walnut-shells. [q] He was at last reduced to do

[o] Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. v. n. 57, 63.
[p] Plut. *de Garrul.* pt 508.
[q] Cic. *de Offic.* l. ii. n. 55.

himself that office, not daring, it seems, to trust his own daughters any longer. He never went into the chamber of his wives at night, till they had been first searched with the utmost care and circumspection. His bed was surrounded with a very broad and deep trench, with a small drawbridge over it for the entrance. After having well locked and bolted the doors of his apartment, he drew up the bridge, that he might sleep in security. [r] Neither his brother, nor even his sons, could be admitted into his chamber without first changing their clothes, and being visited by the guards. Can he be said to reign, can he be said to live, who passes his days in such continual distrust and terror?

In the midst of all his greatness, possessed of riches, and surrounded with pleasures of every kind, during a reign of almost forty years, notwithstanding all his presents and profusion, he never was capable of making a single friend. He passed his life with none but trembling slaves and sordid flatterers; and never tasted the joy of loving, or of being beloved, nor the charms of social intercourse and reciprocal confidence. This he ingenuously owned himself upon an occasion not unworthy of being related.

[s] Damon and Pythias had both been educated in the principles of the Pythagorean philosophy, and were united to each other in the strictest ties of friendship, which they had mutually sworn to observe with inviolable fidelity. Their faith was put to a severe trial. One of them being condemned to die by the tyrant, petitioned for permission to make a journey into his own country, to settle his affairs, promising to return at a fixed time, the other generously offering to be his security. The courtiers, and Dionysius in particular, expected with impatience the event of so delicate and extraordinary an adventure. The day fixed for his return drawing nigh, and he not appearing, every body began to blame the rash and imprudent zeal of his friend who had bound himself in such a manner. But he, far from expressing any fear or concern, replied with a tranquil air, and confident tone, that he was sure his friend would return; as he accordingly did upon the day and hour agreed. The tyrant, struck with admiration at so uncommon

[r] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 961. [s] Cic. *de Offic.* l. iii. n. 43. Val. Max. l. iv. c. 7.

an instance of fidelity, and softened with the view of so amiable an union, granted him his life, and desired to be admitted as a third person into their friendship.

[t] He expressed with equal ingenuousness on another occasion what he himself thought of his condition. One of his courtiers named Damocles was perpetually extolling with rapture his treasures, grandeur, the number of his troops, the extent of his dominions, the magnificence of his palaces, and the universal abundance of all good things and enjoyments in his possession; always repeating, that never man was happier than Dionysius. 'Since you are of that opinion,' said the tyrant to him one day, 'will you taste and make proof of my felicity in person?' The offer was accepted with joy; Damocles was placed upon a golden couch, covered with carpets richly embroidered. The sideboards were loaded with vessels of gold and silver. The most beautiful slaves in the most splendid habits stood around, ready to serve him at the slightest signal. The most exquisite essences and perfumes had not been spared. The table was spread with proportionate magnificence. Damocles was all joy, and looked upon himself as the happiest man in the world; when unfortunately casting up his eyes, he beheld over his head the point of a sword, which hung from the roof only by a single horse-hair. He was immediately seized with a cold sweat; every thing disappeared in an instant; he could see nothing but the sword, nor think of any thing but his danger. In the height of his fear he desired permission to retire, and declared he would be happy no longer. A very natural image of the life of a tyrant. He of whom we are speaking reigned, as I have observed before, thirty-eight years.

CHAPTER II.

SECT. I. DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER SUCCEEDS HIS FATHER. DION ENGAGES HIM TO INVITE PLATO TO HIS COURT. SURPRISING ALTERATION OCCASIONED BY HIS PRESENCE. CONSPIRACY OF THE COURTIERS TO PREVENT THE EFFECTS OF IT.

A. M. 3632. Ant. J. C. 372.

[u] Dionysius the elder was succeeded

[t] Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. v. n. 61, 62.

[u] Died. l. xv. p. 385.

by one of his sons of his own name, commonly called Dionysius the younger. After his father's funeral had been solemnized with the utmost magnificence, he assembled the people, and desired they would have the same good inclinations for him as they had evinced for his father. They were very different from each other in their character. [x] For the latter was as peaceable and calm in his disposition, as the former was active and enterprising; which would have been no disadvantage to his people, had that mildness and moderation been the effect of a wise and judicious understanding, and not of natural sloth and indolence of temper.

It is surprising to see Dionysius the younger take quiet possession of the tyranny after the death of his father, as a patrimonial inheritance, notwithstanding the natural fondness of the Syracusans for liberty, which could not but revive upon so favourable an occasion, and the weakness of a young prince undistinguished by his merit, and void of experience. It seemed as if the last years of the elder Dionysius, who had applied himself towards the close of his life in making his subjects taste the advantages of his government, had in some measure reconciled them to tyranny; especially after his exploits by sea and land had acquired him a great reputation, and infinitely exalted the glory of the Syracusan power, which he had found means to render formidable to Carthage itself, as well as to the most potent states of Greece and Italy. Besides which it was to be feared, that should they attempt a change in the government, the sad consequences of a civil war might deprive them of all those advantages: whereas the gentle and humane disposition of young Dionysius gave them reason to entertain the most favourable hopes with regard to the future. He therefore peaceably ascended his father's throne

Something of this kind has been seen in England. The famous Cromwell died in his bed with as much tranquillity as the best of princes, and was interred with the same honours and pomp as a lawful sovereign. Richard his son succeeded him as protector, and for some time possessed equal authority with his father, though he had not any of his great qualities.

[y] Dion, the bravest, and at the same time the most prudent

[x] Diod. l. xvi. p. 410.

[y] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 960, 961.

of the Syracusans, who was Dionysius's brother-in-law, might have been of great support to him, had he known how to profit by his advice. In the first assembly held by Dionysius and all his friends, Dion spoke in so wise a manner upon what was necessary and expedient in the present conjuncture, as showed that the rest were infants in judgment in comparison with him; and in regard to a just boldness and freedom of speech, were no more than despicable slaves of the tyranny, solely employed in the abject endeavour of pleasing the prince. But what surprised and amazed them most was that Dion, at a time when the whole court was struck with terror at the prospect of the storm already formed on the side of Carthage, and just ready to break upon Sicily, should insist, that if Dionysius desired peace, he would embark immediately for Africa, and dispel this tempest to his satisfaction; or if he preferred making war, that he would furnish and maintain at his own expense fifty galleys of three benches completely equipped for service.

Dionysius, admiring and extolling so generous a magnanimity to the skies, professed the highest gratitude to him for his zeal and affection; but the courtiers, who looked upon Dion's magnificence as a reproach to themselves, and his great power as a lessening of their own, took immediate occasion from thence to calumniate him, and spared no expressions that might influence the young prince against him. They insinuated, that in making himself strong at sea, he would open his way to the tyranny; and that with his vessels he designed to transfer the sovereignty to his nephews, the sons of Aristomache.

But what put them most out of humour with Dion, was his manner of life, which was a continual censure of their own. For these courtiers having presently insinuated themselves into the good graces of the young tyrant, who had been wretchedly educated, thought of nothing but of supplying him perpetually with new amusements, keeping him always employed in feasting, abandoned to women, and devoted to all manner of shameful pleasures. [z] In the beginning of his reign he made a riotous entertainment, which continued for three entire months, during all which time his palace, shut against all persons of sense and reason, was crowded with drunkards,

[z] Athen. l. x. p. 435.

and resounded with nothing but low buffoonery, obscene jests, lewd songs, dances, masquerades, and every kind of gross and dissolute extravagance. It is therefore natural to believe, that nothing could be more offensive and disgusting to them than the presence of Dion, who gave into none of these pleasures. For which reason, painting his virtues in such of the colours of vice as were most likely to disguise them, they found means to calumniate him with the prince, and to make his gravity pass for arrogance, and his freedom of speech for insolence and sedition. If he advanced any wise counsel, they treated him as a sour pedagogue, who took upon him to obtrude his lectures, and to school his prince without being asked; and if he refused to share in the revels with the rest, they called him a man-hater, a splenetic, melancholy wretch, who, from the fantastic height of virtue, looked down with contempt on the rest of the world, and set himself up for the censor of mankind.

And indeed it must be confessed, that he had naturally something austere and rigid in his manners and behaviour, which seemed to denote a haughtiness of disposition, very capable not only of disgusting a young prince, nurtured from his infancy amidst flatteries and submission, but even his best friends, and those who were most closely attached to him. Full of admiration for his integrity, fortitude, and nobleness of sentiments, they represented to him, that for a statesman, who ought to know how to adapt himself to the different tempers of men, in order to apply them to his purposes, his humour was much too rough and forbidding.

[a] Plato afterwards took pains to correct that defect in him, by making him intimate with a philosopher of a gay and polite turn of mind, whose conversation was well calculated to inspire him with more easy and insinuating manners. He reminds him also of that failing in a letter, wherein he thus addresses him: 'Consider, I beg you, that you are censured as being deficient in good nature and affability; and imprint it on your mind, that the most certain means to ensure the success of affairs, is to be agreeable to the persons with whom we have to transact them. A *haughty carriage keeps people at a

[a] Plat. *Epist.* iv. p. 327, 328.

* Ἡ δ' ἀνθάδεια ἐρημία ξύνοικος. M. Dacier renders these words, *Pride is always*

distance, and reduces a man to pass his life in solitude.' Notwithstanding this defect, he continued to be highly considered at court; where his superior abilities and transcendent merit made him absolutely necessary, especially at a time when the state was threatened with great danger and commotions.

[b] As he believed, that all the vices of young Dionysius were the effect of his bad education, and entire ignorance of his duty, he conceived justly, that the first step would be to associate him if possible with persons of wit and sense, whose solid, but agreeable conversation, might at once instruct and divert him: for the prince did not naturally want parts and genius.

The sequel will show that Dionysius the younger had a natural propensity to what was good and virtuous, and a taste and capacity for arts and sciences. He knew how to set a value upon the merit and talents by which men are distinguished. He delighted in conversing with persons of ability, and from his correspondence with them, made himself capable of the highest improvements. He went so far as to familiarize the throne with those sciences which have not usually the privilege of approaching it; and by rendering them in a manner his favourites, he gave them courage to make their appearance in courts. His protection was the patent of nobility, by which he raised them to honour and distinction. Nor was he insensible to the joys of friendship. In private he was a good parent, relation, and master, and acquired the affection of all that approached him. He was not naturally inclined to violence or cruelty; and it might be said of him, that he was rather a tyrant by succession and inheritance, than by temper and inclination.

All which demonstrates, that he might have made a very tolerable prince, (not to say a good one,) had proper care been early taken to cultivate the happy disposition which he brought into the world with him. But his father, to whom all merit, even in his own children, gave umbrage, industriously suppressed in him all tendency to goodness, and every noble and elevated sentiment, by a base and obscure education, with

the companion of solitude. I have shown elsewhere, wherein this version is faulty. *Art of Teaching the Belles Lettres*, vol. iii. p. 505.

[b] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 962. Plat. *Epist.* vii. p. 327, 328.

the view of preventing his attempting any thing against himself. It was therefore necessary to find for him a person of the character before mentioned, or rather to inspire him with the desire of having such an one found.

This was what Dion laboured with wonderful address. He often talked to him of Plato, as the most profound and illustrious of philosophers, whose merit he himself had experienced, and to whom he was obliged for all he knew. He enlarged upon the brilliancy of his genius, the extent of his knowledge, the amiableness of his character, and the charms of his conversation. He represented him particularly as the man of all others most capable of forming him in the arts of governing, upon which his own and the people's happiness depended. He told him, that his subjects, governed for the future with lenity and indulgence, as a good father governs his family, would voluntarily render that obedience to his moderation and justice, which force and violence extorted from them against their will; and that by such a conduct he would, from a tyrant, become a just king, to whom all submission would be paid out of affection and gratitude.

It is incredible how much these discourses, introduced in conversation from time to time, as if by accident, without affectation, or the appearance of any premeditated design, inflamed the young prince with the desire of knowing and conversing with Plato. He wrote to him in the most importunate and obliging manner: he despatched to Athens couriers after couriers to hasten his voyage; whilst Plato, who apprehended the consequences, and had but small hopes of any good effect from it, protracted the affair, and, without absolutely refusing, sufficiently intimated, that he could not resolve upon it, without doing violence to himself. The obstacles and difficulties made to the young prince's request, were so far from disgusting him, that they only served, as it commonly happens, to inflame his desire. The Pythagorean philosophers of Græcia Magna in Italy joined their entreaties with his and Dion's, who on his part redoubled his solicitation, and used the strongest arguments to conquer Plato's repugnance. 'This is not,' said he, 'the concern of a private person, but of a powerful prince, whose change of manners will have the same

effect throughout his whole dominions, with the extent of which you are not unacquainted. It is he himself who makes all the advances; who importunes and solicits you to come to his assistance, and employs the interest of all your friends to that purpose. What more favourable conjuncture could we expect than that which Divine Providence now offers? Are you not afraid that your delays will give the flatterers, who surround the young prince, the opportunity of drawing him over to themselves, and of seducing him to change his resolution?' What reproaches would you not make yourself, and what dishonour would it not be to philosophy, should it ever be said, that Plato, who, by his counsels to Dionysius, might have established a wise and equitable government in Sicily, abandoned it to all the evils of tyranny, from fear of undergoing the fatigues of a voyage, or from I know not what other imaginary difficulties?'

[c] Plato could not resist such earnest solicitations. Vanquished by the consideration of what was due to his own character, and to obviate the reproach of his being a philosopher in words only, without having ever shown himself such in his actions, and conscious besides of the great advantages which Sicily might acquire from his voyage, he suffered himself to be persuaded.

The flatterers at the court of Dionysius, terrified with the resolution which he had taken contrary to their remonstrances, and fearing the presence of Plato, the consequences of which they foresaw, united together against him as their common enemy. They rightly judged, that if, according to the new maxims of government, all things were to be measured by the standard of true merit, and no favour was to be expected from the prince, but for services done to the state, they had nothing further to expect, and might wait their whole lives at court to no manner of purpose. They therefore devised a plan to render Plato's voyage ineffectual, though they were not able to prevent it. And this was to prevail upon Dionysius to recall Philistus from banishment, who was not only an able soldier, but a great historian, very eloquent and learned, and a zealous assertor of the tyranny. They hoped to find a counterpoise in him against

[c] Plut. p. 962.

Plato and his philosophy. Upon his being banished by Dionysius the elder, on some personal discontent, he had retired into the city of Adria, where it is believed he composed the greatest part of his writings. [d] He wrote the history of Egypt in twelve books, that of Sicily in eleven, and of Dionysius the tyrant in six; all which works are entirely lost. Cicero praises * him highly, and calls him a little Thucydides, *penè pusillus Thucydides*, to signify that he copied that author, and not without success. He was therefore recalled. The courtiers at the same time made complaints against Dion to Dionysius, accusing him of having held conferences with Theodotus and Heraclides, the secret enemies of that prince, to concert with them measures for subverting the tyranny.

[e] This was the state of affairs when Plato arrived in Sicily. He was received with infinite caresses, and with the highest marks of honour and respect. Upon his landing, he found one of the prince's chariots, equally magnificent in its horses and ornaments, awaiting him. The tyrant offered a sacrifice, as if some singular instance of good fortune had befallen him; nor was he mistaken, for a wise man who is capable of giving a prince good counsels, is a treasure of inestimable value to a whole nation. But the worth of such a person is rarely known, and more rarely applied to the uses which might be made of it.

Plato found the most happy dispositions imaginable in young Dionysius, who devoted himself entirely to his lessons and counsels. But as he had himself derived infinite improvement from the precepts and example of Socrates his master, the most able man of all the Pagan world in forming the mind to relish truth, he took care to adapt himself with wonderful address to the young tyrant's humour, avoiding all direct attacks upon his passions; taking pains to acquire his confidence by kind and insinuating behaviour; and particularly endeavouring to render virtue amiable, in order to render it at the same time

[d] Diod. l. xiii. p. 222. * Plut. *in Dion.* p. 963.

* Hunc (Thucydidem) consecutus est Syracusius Philistus, qui cum Dionysii tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumpsit in historiâ scribendâ, maximéque Thucydidem est, sicut mihi videtur, imitatus. Cic. *de Orat.* l. ii. n. 57.

. Siculus ille, creber, acutus, brevis, penè pusillus Thucydides. Id, *Epist.* xiii. *ad Qu frat.* l. ii.

triumphant over vice, which keeps mankind in its chains, by the sole force of allurements, pleasures, and voluptuousness.

The change was sudden and surprising. The young prince, who till then had abandoned himself to idleness, pleasure, and luxury, and was ignorant of all the duties of his station, the inevitable consequence of a dissolute life, awaking as from a lethargic sleep, began to open his eyes, to have some idea of the beauty of virtue, and to relish the refined pleasure of conversation equally solid and agreeable. He was now as passionately fond of learning and instruction, as he had once been averse and repugnant to them. The court, which always apes the prince, and falls in with his inclinations in every thing, entered into the same way of thinking. The apartments of the palace, like so many schools of geometry, were full of the dust made use of by the professors of that science in tracing their figures; and in a very short time the study of philosophy and of every kind of literature became the reigning and universal taste.

The great benefit of these studies, in regard to a prince, does not consist alone in storing his mind with an infinity of the most curious, useful, and often necessary information, but has the farther advantage of withdrawing him from idleness, indolence, and the frivolous amusements of a court; of habituating him to a life of application and reflection; of inspiring him with a desire of instructing himself in the duties of the sovereignty, and of knowing the characters of such as have excelled in the art of reigning; in a word, of making himself capable of governing the state in his own person, and of seeing every thing with his own eyes, that is to say, of being a king indeed. And this it was that the courtiers and flatterers, as usually happens, were unanimous in opposing.

They were considerably alarmed by an expression that escaped Dionysius, and showed how strong an impression had already been made upon his mind by the discourses he had heard upon the happiness of a king, who is regarded with tender affection by his people as their common father, and the wretched condition of a tyrant, whom they abhor and detest. Some days after Plato's arrival, was the time appointed for a solemn sacrifice, which was annually offered in the palace for

the prince's prosperity. The herald having prayed to this effect, according to custom, 'That it would please the gods to support the tyranny, and preserve the tyrant:' Dionysius, who was not far from him, and to whom these terms began to grow odious, called out to him aloud, 'Will you not give over cursing me?' Philistus and his party were infinitely alarmed at that expression, and judged from it, that time and habit must give Plato an invincible ascendant over Dionysius, if the intercourse of a few days could so entirely alter his disposition. They therefore set themselves at work upon new and more effectual stratagems against him.

They began by turning the retired life which Dionysius was induced to lead, and the studies in which he employed himself, into ridicule, as if it was intended to make a philosopher of him. But that was not all; they laboured in concert to render the zeal of Dion and Plato suspected, and even odious to him. They represented them as * impertinent censors and imperious pedagogues, who assumed an authority over him, which was neither consistent with his age nor rank. † It is no wonder that a young prince like Dionysius, who, with the most excellent disposition, and amidst the best examples, would have found it difficult to have supported himself, should at length give way to such artful insinuations in a court that had long been infected, where there was no emulation but to excel in vice, and where he was continually besieged by a crowd of flatterers incessantly praising and admiring him in every thing.

But the principal application of the courtiers was to decry the character and conduct of Dion himself; no longer separately, nor in secret, but all together, and in public. They talked openly, and to whoever would give them the hearing, that it was visible that Dion made use of Plato's eloquence, to fascinate and enchant Dionysius, with design to draw him into a voluntary resignation of the throne, that he might take possession of it for his nephews, the children of Aristomache, and establish them in the sovereignty. They publicly observed, that it was very mortifying to see that the Athenians, who had

* Tristes et superciliosos alienæ vitæ censores, publicos pædagogos. Sen. *Epist.* cxxiii.

† Vix artibus honestis pudor retinetur, nedum inter certamina vitiorum pudicitia, aut modestia, aut quidquam probi moris servaretur. Tacit. *Annal.* l. iv. c. 15.

formerly invaded Sicily with great forces both by sea and land, which had all perished there without being able to take Syracuse, should now with a single sophist attain their point, and subvert the tyranny of Dionysius, by persuading him to dismiss the ten thousand strangers who composed his guard; to lay aside his fleet of four hundred galleys, which he always kept in readiness for service; and to disband his ten thousand horse, and the greatest part of his foot; for the sake of going to find in the academy (the place where Plato taught) a pretended Supreme Good which could not be explained, and to make himself happy in imagination by the study of geometry; whilst he abandoned to Dion and his nephews a real and substantial felicity, consisting in empire, riches, luxury, and pleasure.

SECT. II. BANISHMENT OF DION. PLATO QUITS THE COURT SOON AFTER, AND RETURNS INTO GREECE. DION ADMIRED THERE BY ALL THE LEARNED. PLATO RETURNS TO SYRACUSE. —The courtiers, intent upon taking advantage of every favourable moment, perpetually besieged the young prince; and covering their secret motives under the appearance of zeal for his service, and an affected moderation in regard to Dion, incessantly advised him to take proper measures for the security of his life and throne. Such repeated discourse at first raised in the mind of Dionysius violent suspicions of Dion, which presently increased into fierce resentment, and broke out into an open rupture. Letters were privately brought to Dionysius, written by Dion to the Carthaginian ambassadors, wherein he recommended to them, 'when they should treat of peace with Dionysius, not to open the conferences but in his presence; because he would assist them in making their treaty more firm and lasting.' Dionysius read these letters to Philistus, and having concerted with him what measures to take,[f] he amused and deceived Dion with the appearance of a reconciliation, and led him alone to the sea-side below the citadel, where he showed him his letters, and accused him of having entered into a league against him with the Carthaginians. Dion would have justified himself, but he refused to hear him, and made him immediately go on board a brigantine, which had orders to

[f] Diod. l. xvi. p. 410, 411.

carry him to the coast of Italy, and to leave him there. Dion immediately after set sail for Peloponnesus.

[g] So harsh and unjust a treatment could not fail of making abundance of noise, and the whole city declared against it; especially as it was reported, though without foundation, that Plato had been put to death. [h] Dionysius, who apprehended the consequences, took pains to appease the public discontent, and to stifle the complaints. He gave Dion's relations two vessels to transport to him in Peloponnesus his riches and numerous family; for he had the equipage of a king.

As soon as Dion was gone, Dionysius made Plato change his lodging, and brought him into the citadel; in appearance to do him honour, but in reality to assure himself of his person, and prevent him from going to join Dion. In bringing Plato nearer to him, he might also have in view the opportunity of hearing him more frequently and more commodiously. For, charmed with the allurements of his conversation, and studying to please him in every thing, and to merit his affection, he had conceived an esteem, or rather passion for him, which rose even to jealousy, but a jealousy of that violence, that could suffer neither companion nor rival. He wished to engross him entirely to himself, to reign solely in his thoughts and affections, and to be the only object of his love and esteem. He seemed ready to give him all his treasures and all his authority, provided he would but love him better than Dion, and not prefer the latter's friendship to his. Plutarch has reason to call this passion *a tyrannic affection.*[i] Plato had much to suffer from it; for it had all the symptoms of the most ardent jealousy. * Sometimes it was all friendship, caresses, and fond respect, with an unbounded openness of heart, and an endless swell of tender sentiments: sometimes it was all reproaches, menaces, fierce passion, and wild emotion; and soon after it sunk into repentance, excuses, tears, and humble entreaties of pardon and forgiveness.

About this time a war broke out very conveniently for Plato,

[g] Plut. p. 964. [h] Plat *Ep.* vii. [i] Ἠράσθη τυραννικὸν ἔρωτα.

* In amore hæc omnia insunt vitia; suspiciones, inimicitiæ, injuriæ, induciæ, bellum, pax rursum. Terent. *in Eunuch.*

——— In amore hæc sunt mala: bellum,
Pax rursum. Hor.

which obliged Dionysius to restore him his liberty, and send him home. At his departure he would have overwhelmed him with presents, but Plato refused them, contenting himself with his promise to recall Dion the following spring. He did not keep his word, and only sent him his revenue, desiring Plato in his letters to excuse his breach of promise at the time prefixed, and to impute it only to the war. He assured him, as soon as peace should be concluded, that Dion should return; upon condition, however, that he should continue quiet, and not intermeddle in affairs, nor endeavour to lessen him in the opinion of the Greeks.

Plato, on his return to Greece, went to see the games at Olympia, where he happened to lodge amongst strangers of distinction. He ate and passed whole days with them, living in a plain and simple manner, without ever mentioning Socrates or the academy, or making himself known in any thing, except that his name was Plato. The strangers were overjoyed at having met with so mild and amiable a companion; but as he never talked but on common topics, they had not the least notion that he was the philosopher whose reputation was so universal. When the games were over, they went with him to Athens, where he provided them with lodgings. They were scarce arrived there, when they desired him to carry them to see the famous philosopher of his name, who had been Socrates's disciple. Plato told them smiling, that he was the man: upon which the strangers, surprised at their having possessed so inestimable a treasure without knowing it, were much displeased with, and secretly reproached themselves, for not having discerned the great merit of the man, through the veil of simplicity and modesty which he had thrown over it, whilst they admired him the more upon that account.

[k] The time Dion passed at Athens was not mispent. He employed it chiefly in the study of philosophy, for which he had a great taste, and which was become his delight. [*] He knew, however, which is not very easy, how to confine it within

[k] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 964.

[*] Retinuitque, quod est difficillimum, ex sapientiâ modum. Tacit. *in vit. Agric.* n. 4.

just bounds, and never gave himself up to it at the expense of any duty. It was at the same time that Plato made him contract a particular friendship with his nephew Speusippus, who, uniting the easy and insinuating manners of a courtier with the gravity of a philosopher, knew how to associate mirth and innocent pleasure with the most serious affairs, and by that character, very rarely found amongst men of learning, was the most proper of all men to soften what was too rough and austere in Dion's temper.

Whilst Dion was at Athens, it fell to Plato's turn to give the public games, and to have tragedies performed at the feast of Bacchus, which was usually attended with great magnificence and expense, from an extraordinary emulation which had grown into fashion. Dion defrayed the whole charge. Plato, who sought every occasion of producing him to the public, was well pleased to resign that honour to him, in order that his magnificence might make him still better beloved and esteemed by the Athenians.

Dion visited also the other cities of Greece, was present at all their feasts and assemblies, and conversed with the most excellent wits and the most profound statesmen. He was not distinguished in company by the haughtiness and pride too common in persons of his rank, but, on the contrary, by an unaffected, simple, and modest air; and still more by the elevation of his genius, the extent of his knowledge, and the wisdom of his reflections. All the cities paid him the highest honours, and even the Lacedæmonians declared him a citizen of Sparta, without regarding the resentment of Dionysius, though he actually was assisting them at that time with a powerful supply in their war against the Thebans. So many marks of esteem and distinction alarmed the tyrant's jealousy. He put a stop to the remittances of Dion's revenues, and ordered them to be received by his own officers.

[1] After Dionysius had put an end to the war in which he was engaged in Sicily, of which history relates no circumstance, he was afraid that his treatment of Plato would prejudice the philosophers against him, and make him pass for their enemy.

[1] Plat. *Epist.* vii. p. 338, 340. Plut. *in Dion.* p. 964, 966.

For this reason he invited the most learned men of Italy to his court, where he held frequent assemblies, in which, out of a foolish ambition, he endeavoured to excel them all in eloquence and depth of knowledge; venting, without application, such of Plato's discourses as he retained. But as he had those discourses only by rote, and his heart had never been rightly affected with them, the source of his eloquence was soon exhausted. He then perceived what he had lost by not having made a better use of that treasure of wisdom which he had once in his own possession and under his own roof, and by not having heard, in all their extent, the admirable lectures of the greatest philosopher in the world.

As in tyrants every thing is violent and impetuous, Dionysius was suddenly seized with an excessive desire of seeing Plato again, and used all means for that purpose. He prevailed upon Architas, and the other Pythagorean philosophers, to write to him, that he might return with all manner of security; and to be bound for the performance of all the promises which had been made to him. They deputed Archidemus to Plato, and Dionysius sent at the same time two galleys of three benches of rowers, with several of his friends on board, to entreat his compliance. He also wrote letters to him with his own hand, in which he frankly declared, that if he would not be persuaded to come to Sicily, Dion had nothing to expect from him; but that if he came, there was nothing that he would not be inclined to do in his favour.

Dion received several letters at the same time from his wife and sister, who pressed him to prevail upon Plato to make a voyage, and to satisfy the impatience of Dionysius, that he might have no new pretexts against him upon that account. Whatever repugnance Plato had to it he could not resist the warm solicitations made to him, and determined to go to Sicily for the third time, at seventy years of age.

His arrival gave the whole people new hopes, who flattered themselves that his wisdom would at length overthrow the tyranny; and the joy of Dionysius was inexpressible. He appointed the apartment of his garden for his lodging, the most honourable in the palace, and had so much confidence in him, that he suffered him to have access at all hours,

without being searched; a favour not granted to any of his best friends.

After the first caresses were over, Plato was anxious to enter upon Dion's affair, which he had much at heart, and which was the principal motive of his voyage. But Dionysius put it off at first; to which ensued complaints and murmurings, though not outwardly expressed for some time. The tyrant took great care to conceal his sentiments, endeavouring by all manner of honours and by all possible regard and complaisance, to abate his friendship for Dion. Plato dissembled on his side, and though extremely shocked at so notorious a breach of faith, he kept his opinion to himself.

Whilst they were upon these terms, and believed that nobody penetrated their secret, Helicon of Cyzicum, one of Plato's particular friends, foretold, that on a certain day there would be an eclipse of the sun; which happening according to his prediction exactly at the hour assigned, Dionysius was so much surprised and astonished at it, (a proof that he was no great philosopher,) that he made him a present of a talent.* Aristippus, jesting with the other philosophers upon that occasion, said, that he had also something very incredible and extraordinary to foretell. Upon being pressed to explain himself, 'I prophesy,' said he, 'that it will not be long before Dionysius and Plato, who seem to agree so well with each other, will be enemies.'

Dionysius verified this prediction; for being weary of the constraint he laid upon himself, he ordered all Dion's lands and effects to be sold, and applied the money to his own use. At the same time he made Plato quit the apartments in the garden, and gave him another lodging without the castle in the midst of his guards, who had long hated him, and would have been glad of an opportunity to kill him, because he had advised Dionysius to renounce the tyranny, to disband them, and to live without any other guard than the love of his people. Plato was sensible that he owed his life to the tyrant's favour, who restrained the fury of his guard.

Architas, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, who was the principal person, and supreme magistrate of Tarentum,

* A thousand crowns.

had no sooner heard of Plato's great danger, than he sent ambassadors with a galley of thirty oars to demand him from Dionysius; and to remind him, that he had come to Syracuse only upon his promise, and that of all the Pythagorean philosophers, who had engaged for his safety; that therefore he could not retain him against his will, nor suffer any insult to be done to his person, without a manifest breach of faith, and absolutely forfeiting the opinion of all honest men. These just remonstrances awakened a remnant of shame in the tyrant, who at last permitted Plato to return into Greece.

[m] Philosophy and wisdom abandoned the palace with him. To the conversations, as agreeable as useful, to that taste and passion for the arts and sciences, to the grave and judicious reflections of a profoundly wise politician, * idle tattle, frivolous amusements, and a stupid indolence, entirely averse to every thing serious or reasonable, were seen to succeed. Gluttony, drunkenness, and debauchery resumed their former empire at the court, and transformed it from the school of virtue, which it had been under Plato, into the real stable of Circe.

SECT. III. DION SETS OUT TO DELIVER SYRACUSE. SUDDEN AND FORTUNATE SUCCESS OF HIS ENTERPRISE. HORRID INGRATITUDE OF THE SYRACUSANS. UNPARALLELED GOODNESS OF DION TO THEM AND HIS MOST CRUEL ENEMIES. HIS DEATH.—[n] When Plato had quitted Sicily, Dionysius threw off all reserve, and married his sister Arete, Dion's wife, to Timocrates, one of his friends. So unworthy a treatment was, in a manner, the signal of war. From that moment Dion resolved to attack the tyrant with open force, and to revenge himself for all the wrongs he had done him. Plato did all in his power to make him change his resolution; but finding his endeavours ineffectual, he foretold the misfortunes he was about to occasion, and declared that he must expect neither assistance nor relief from him; that as he had been the guest and companion of Dionysius, had lodged in his palace, and joined in the same sacrifices with him, he should never forget the duties of hospitality; and at the same

A. M. 3613. Ant. J. C. 361.

[m] Plut. *in Moral.* p. 52.

[n] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 966, 968.

* Τὸ ληρεῖν, ἀμουσία, λήθη, εὐήθεια.

time, not to be wanting to his friendship for Dion, that he would continue neuter, always ready to discharge the offices of a mediator between them, in order to reconcile them, though he should oppose their designs, when they tended to the destruction of each other.

Whether through prudence or gratitude, or the conviction that Dion could not justifiably undertake to dethrone Dionysius; this was Plato's opinion. On the other hand, Speusippus, and all the rest of Dion's friends, perpetually exhorted him to go and restore liberty to Sicily, which opened its arms to him, and was ready to receive him with the utmost joy. This was indeed the disposition of Syracuse, which Speusippus, during his residence there with Plato, had sufficiently experienced. This was the universal cry; whilst they importuned and conjured Dion to come thither, desiring him not to be in pain for the want of ships or troops, but only to embark in the first merchant vessel he met with, and lend his person and name to the Syracusans against Dionysius.

Dion did not hesitate any longer to take that resolution, which in one respect cost him not a little. From the time that Dionysius had obliged him to quit Syracuse and Sicily, he had led in his banishment the most agreeable life it was possible to imagine, for a person who like him had contracted a taste for the delights of study. He enjoyed in peace the conversation of the philosophers, and was present at their disputations; shining in a manner entirely peculiar to himself, by the greatness of his genius and the solidity of his judgment; going to all the cities of the learned Greece, to see and converse with the most eminent for their knowledge and capacity, and to correspond with the ablest politicians; leaving every where the marks of his liberality and magnificence, equally beloved and respected by all that knew him; and receiving, wherever he came, the highest honours, which were rendered more to his merit than his birth. It was from so happy a life that he withdrew himself to go to the relief of his country, which implored his protection, and to deliver it from the yoke of a tyranny under which it had long groaned.

No enterprise perhaps was ever formed with so much boldness, or conducted with so much prudence. Dion began to

raise foreign troops privately by proper agents, for the better concealment of his design. A great number of considerable persons, and who were at the head of affairs, joined with him. But what is very surprising, of all those whom the tyrant had banished, and who were not less than a thousand, only twenty-five accompanied him in this expedition; so much had fear got possession of them. The isle of Zacynthus was the place of rendezvous, where the troops assembled to the number of almost eight hundred; but all of them of tried courage on great occasions, excellently disciplined and robust, of an audacity and experience rarely to be found amongst the most brave and warlike; and, in fine, highly capable of animating the troops which Dion was in hopes of finding in Sicily, and of setting them the example of fighting with all the valour so noble an enterprise required.

But when they were to set forwards, and it was known that this armament was intended against Sicily and Dionysius, for till then it had not been declared, they were all in a consternation, and repented their having engaged in an enterprise which they could not avoid considering as the effect of extreme rashness and folly, that in the last despair was for putting every thing to the hazard. Dion had occasion at this time for all his resolution and eloquence to reanimate the troops, and remove their fears. But after he had spoken to them, and with an assured though modest tone had made them understand, that he did not lead them in this expedition as soldiers, but as officers, to put them at the head of the Syracusans and all the people of Sicily, who had long been prepared for a revolt, their dread and sadness were changed into shouts of joy, and they desired nothing so much as to proceed on their voyage.

Dion, having prepared a magnificent sacrifice to be offered to Apollo, put himself at the head of his troops completely armed, and in that equipage marched in procession to the temple. He afterwards gave a great feast to the whole company, at the end of which, after the libations and solemn prayers had been made, there happened a sudden eclipse of the moon. Dion, who was well versed in the causes of such appearances, reassured his soldiers, who were at first in some

terror upon that account. The next day they embarked on board two trading vessels, which were followed by a third not so large, and by two barks of thirty oars.

[o] Who could have imagined, says an historian, that a man with two merchant vessels should ever dare to attack a prince who had four * hundred ships of war, a hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, with magazines of arms and corn in proportion, and treasures sufficient to pay and maintain them; who, besides all this, was in possession of one of the greatest and strongest cities then in the world, with ports, arsenals, and impregnable citadels, with the additional strength and support of a great number of potent allies? The event will show, whether force and power are adamantine chains for retaining a state in subjection, as the elder Dionysius flattered himself; or whether the goodness, humanity, and justice of princes, and the love of subjects, are not infinitely stronger and more indissoluble ties.

[p] Dion having put to sea with his small body of troops, was twelve days under sail with little wind, and the thirteenth arrived at Pachynus, a cape of Sicily, about twelve or fifteen leagues from Syracuse. When they came to that place, the pilot gave notice that they must land directly, as there was reason to fear a hurricane, and therefore it would not be proper to put to sea. But Dion, who was apprehensive of making his descent so near the enemy, and chose to land further off, doubled the cape of Pachynus. He had no sooner passed it, than a furious storm arose, attended with rain, thunder, and lightning, which drove his ships to the eastern coast of Africa, where they were in great danger of being dashed to pieces against the rocks. Happily for them a south wind rising suddenly, contrary to expectation, they unfurled

[o] Diod. l. xvi. p. 413.

[p] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 968, 972. Diod. l. xvi. p. 414, 417.

* It is not easy to comprehend how the two Dionysii were capable of maintaining so great a force by sea and land, their dominions being only a part of Sicily, and consequently of no great extent. It is true, that the city of Syracuse had been very much enriched by commerce; and undoubtedly those two princes received great contributions from the cities dependent upon them both in Sicily and Italy: but it is still no easy matter to conceive how all this could be sufficient for the enormous expenses of Dionysius the elder, in fitting out great fleets, raising and maintaining numerous armies, and erecting magnificent buildings. It were to be wished, that historians had given us some better lights upon this head.

all their sails, and after having made vows to the gods, they stood out to sea for Sicily. They ran in this manner four days, and on the fifth entered the port of Minoa, a small town of Sicily under the Carthaginians, whose commander Synalus was Dion's particular friend and guest. They were perfectly well received, and would have staid there some time to refresh themselves, after the rude fatigues they had suffered during the storm, if they had not been informed that Dionysius was absent, having embarked some days before for the coast of Italy, attended by fourscore vessels. The soldiers demanded earnestly to be led on against the enemy; and Dion, having desired Synalus to send his baggage after him at a proper time, marched directly to Syracuse.

His troops increased considerably upon his route, by the great number of those who came to join him from all parts. The news of his arrival being soon known at Syracuse, Timocrates, who had married Dion's wife, the sister of Dionysius, and to whom he had left the command of the city in his absence, despatched a courier to him into Italy, with advice of Dion's progress. But the courier, when almost at his journey's end, was so fatigued from having run the best part of the night, that he found himself under the necessity of stopping to take a little sleep. In the mean time, a wolf, attracted by the smell of a piece of meat which he had in his wallet, came to the place, and ran away with both the flesh and the bag, in which he had also put his despatches. Dionysius was by this means prevented for some time from knowing that Dion was arrived, and then received the news from other hands.

When Dion was near the Anapus, which runs about half a league from the city, he ordered his troops to halt, and offered a sacrifice upon the river side, addressing his prayers to the rising sun. All who were present, seeing him with a wreath of flowers upon his head, which he wore on account of the sacrifice, crowned themselves also in the same manner, as animated with one and the same spirit. He had been joined on his march by at least five thousand men, and advanced with them towards the city. The most considerable of the inhabitants came out in white habits to receive him at the gates. At the same time the people fell upon the tyrant's

friends, and upon the spies and informers, AN ACCURSED RACE OF WRETCHES, * THE ENEMIES OF THE GODS AND MEN, says Plutarch, who made it the daily business of their lives to disperse themselves into all parts, to mingle with the citizens, to pry into all their affairs, and to report to the tyrant whatever they said or thought, and often what they neither said nor thought. These were the first victims to the fury of the people, and were knocked on the head with clubs immediately. Timocrates, not able to throw himself into the citadel, mounted on horseback, and escaped from the city.

At that instant Dion appeared within sight of the walls. He marched at the head of his troops magnificently armed, with his brother Megacles on one side, and Callippus the Athenian on the other, both crowned with chaplets of flowers. After him came a hundred of the foreign soldiers, very fine troops, whom he had chosen for his guard. The rest followed in order of battle, with their officers at the head of them. The Syracusans beheld them with inexpressible satisfaction, and received them as a sacred procession, whom the gods themselves regarded with pleasure, and who restored them their liberty with the democracy, forty-eight years after they had been banished from their city.

After Dion had made his entry, he ordered the trumpets to sound, to appease the noise and tumult; and silence being made, a herald proclaimed, that 'Dion and Megacles were come to abolish the tyranny, and to free the Syracusans and all the people of Sicily from the yoke of a tyrant.' And being desirous to harangue the people in person, he went to the upper part of the city, through the quarter called Achradina. Wherever he passed, the Syracusans had set out, on both sides of the streets, tables and bowls, and had prepared victims; and as he came before their houses, they threw all sorts of flowers upon him, addressing vows and prayers to him as to a god. Such was the origin of idolatry, which paid divine honours to those who had done the people any great and signal services. And can there be any service, any gift, so valuable as that of liberty? Not far from the citadel, and below the place called Pentapylæ, stood a sun-dial upon a high

* Ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσίους, καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρούς.

pedestal, erected by Dionysius. Dion placed himself upon it, and in a speech to the people, who had crowded around, exhorted them to employ their utmost efforts for the recovery and preservation of their liberty. The Syracusans, transported with what he said, and anxious to express their gratitude and affection, elected him and his brother captains-general with supreme authority; and by their consent, and at their entreaty, joined with them twenty of the most considerable citizens, half of whom were of the number of those who, having been banished by Dionysius, had returned with Dion.

Having afterwards taken the castle of Epipolæ, he set the citizens who were prisoners in it at liberty, and fortified it with strong works. Dionysius arrived from Italy seven days after, and entered the citadel by sea. The same day a great number of carriages brought Dion the arms which he had left with Synalus. These he immediately distributed amongst the citizens who were unprovided. All the rest armed and equipped themselves as well as they could, expressing the greatest ardour and zeal.

Dionysius began by sending ambassadors to Dion and the Syracusans with proposals, which seemed very advantageous. The answer was, that by way of preliminary he must abdicate the tyranny; to which Dionysius did not seem averse. From thence he came to interviews and conferences; which were only feints to gain time, and abate the ardour of the Syracusans by the hope of an accommodation. Accordingly, having made the deputies, who were sent to treat with him, prisoners, he suddenly attacked, with a great part of his troops, the wall, with which the Syracusans had surrounded the citadel, and made several breaches in it. So warm and unexpected an assault put Dion's soldiers into great confusion, and they immediately fled. Dion endeavoured in vain to stop them; and believing example more efficacious than words, he threw himself fiercely into the midst of the enemy, where he stood their charge with intrepid courage, and killed great numbers of them. He received a wound in the hand from a spear; his armour was scarce proof against the great number of darts thrown at him, and his shield being pierced through in many places with spears and javelins, he was at length

beaten down. His soldiers immediately brought him off from the enemy. He left Timonides to command them, and getting on horseback, rode through the whole city, stopped the flight of the Syracusans, and taking the foreign soldiers, whom he had left to guard the quarter called Achradina, he led them on fresh against Dionysius's troops, who were already fatigued, and entirely discouraged by so vigorous and unexpected a resistance. It was now no longer a battle, but a pursuit. A great number of the tyrant's troops were killed on the spot, and the rest escaped with difficulty into the citadel. This victory was brilliant and glorious. The Syracusans, to reward the valour of the foreign troops, gave each of them a considerable sum of money; and those soldiers, to honour Dion, presented him with a crown of gold.

Soon after came heralds from Dionysius, with several letters for Dion from the women of his family, and with one from Dionysius himself. Dion ordered them all to be read in a full assembly. That of Dionysius was couched in the form of a request and justification, intermixed however with the most terrible menaces against the persons who were dearest to Dion; his sister, wife, and son. It was written with an art and address exceedingly well calculated to render Dion suspected. Dionysius put him in mind of the ardour and zeal he had formerly expressed for the support of the tyranny. He exhorted him in language, though covert and somewhat obscure, yet sufficiently plain to be understood, not to abolish it entirely; but to preserve it for himself: not to give the people their liberty, who at heart had no attachment to him; nor to abandon his own safety, and that of his friends and relations, to the capricious humour of a violent and inconstant multitude.

[q] The reading of this letter had the effect which Dionysius had proposed from it. The Syracusans, without regard to Dion's goodness to them, and the greatness of his soul in forgetting his dearest interests, and the ties of nature, to restore them their liberty, took umbrage at his too great authority, and conceived injurious suspicions of him. The arrival of Heraclides confirmed them in their sentiments, and determined

[q] Plut. *in Dion.* p. 972, 975. Diod. l. xvi. p. 419, 422.

them to act accordingly. He was one of the banished persons, a good soldier, and well known amongst the troops, from having been in considerable commands under the tyrant, very bold and ambitious, and a secret enemy of Dion's, between whom and himself there had been some difference in Peloponnesus. He came to Syracuse with seven galleys of three benches of oars, and three other vessels, not to join Dion, but with the resolution of marching with his own forces against the tyrant, whom he found reduced to shut himself up in the citadel. His first endeavour was to ingratiate himself with the people; for which his open and insinuating behaviour made him very fit, whilst Dion's austere gravity was offensive to the multitude; especially as they were become more haughty and untractable from the last victory, and * expected to be treated like a popular state, even before they could call themselves a free people; that is to say, in the full sense of the Greek terms, they wished to be used with complaisance, flattery, regard, and a deference to all their capricious humours.

What gratitude could be expected from a people that consulted only their passions and blind prejudices? The Syracusans, of their own accord, formed an assembly immediately, and chose Heraclides admiral. Dion came unexpectedly thither, and complained highly of such a proceeding; as the charge conferred upon Heraclides was an abridgement of his office; that he was no longer generalissimo, if another commanded at sea. These remonstrances obliged the Syracusans, against their will, to deprive Heraclides of the office they had so lately conferred upon him. When the assembly broke up, Dion sent for him, and after some gentle reprimands for his strange conduct towards him in so delicate a conjuncture, wherein the least division amongst them might ruin every thing, he summoned a new assembly himself, and, in the presence of the whole people, appointed Heraclides admiral, and gave him a guard, as he had himself.

He thought by dint of kind offices to get the better of his rival's ill-will. Heraclides, in his expressions and outward behaviour, made his court to Dion, confessed his obligations to him, promised eternal gratitude, was mean and submissive in

* Πρὸ τοῦ δῆμος εἶναι, τὸ δημαγωγεῖσθαι θέλοντες.

his presence, and obeyed his orders with a promptitude and punctuality which seemed to imply an entire devotion to his service, and a desire of occasions to do him pleasure. But underhand, by his intrigues and cabals, he influenced the people against him, and opposed his designs in every thing. If Dion gave his consent that Dionysius should quit the citadel by treaty, he was accused of favouring, and intending to save him: if, to satisfy them, he continued the siege, without hearkening to any proposals of accommodation, they did not fail to reproach him with the desire of protracting the war, for the sake of continuing in command, and of keeping the citizens in awe and respect.

Philistus, who came from Apulia to the tyrant's relief with several galleys, having been defeated and put to death, Dionysius sent to offer Dion the citadel with the arms and troops in it, and money to pay them for five months, if he might be permitted by a treaty to retire into Italy for the rest of his life, and be allowed the revenue of certain lands, which he mentioned, in the neighbourhood of Syracuse. The Syracusans, who were in hopes of taking Dionysius alive, rejected these proposals; and Dionysius, despairing of reconciling them to his terms, left the citadel in the hands of his eldest son Apollocrates, and taking the advantage of a favourable wind, embarked for Italy with his treasures and effects of the greatest value, and such of his friends as were dearest to him. A. M. 3644. Ant. J. C. 360.

Heraclides, who commanded the galleys, was very much blamed for having suffered him to escape by his negligence. To regain the people's favour, he proposed a new distribution of lands, insinuating, that the foundation of liberty was equality, as poverty was the principle of servitude. Upon Dion's opposing this motion, Heraclides persuaded the people to reduce the pay of the foreign troops, who amounted to three thousand men, to enact a new division of land, to appoint new generals, and deliver themselves at once from Dion's insupportable severity. The Syracusans agreed, and nominated twenty-five new officers, Heraclides being one of the number.

At the same time they sent privately to solicit the foreign soldiers to abandon Dion, and to join with them, promising to

give them a share in the government as native citizens. Those generous troops received the offer with disdain; and then placing Dion in the centre of them, with a fidelity and affection of which there are few examples, they made their bodies and their arms a rampart for him, and carried him out of the city without doing the least violence to any body, but warmly reproaching all they met with their ingratitude and perfidy. The Syracusans, who contemned their small number, and attributed their moderation to fear and want of courage, began to attack them, not doubting but they should defeat and put them all to the sword before they got out of the city.

Dion, reduced to the melancholy necessity of either fighting against his fellow-citizens or perishing with his troops, held out his hands to the Syracusans, imploring them in the most tender and affectionate manner to desist, and pointing to the citadel full of enemies, who saw all that passed with the utmost joy. But finding them deaf and insensible to all his remonstrances, he commanded his soldiers to march in close order without attacking; which they obeyed, contenting themselves with making a great noise with their arms, and raising loud cries, as if they were going to fall upon the Syracusans. The latter were so dismayed with those appearances, that they all ran away in every street without being pursued. Dion hastened the march of his troops towards the country of the Leontines.

The officers of the Syracusans, laughed at and ridiculed by the women of the city, were desirous to retrieve their honour, and made their troops take arms, and return to the pursuit of Dion. They came up with him at the pass of a river, and made their horse advance to skirmish. But when they saw that Dion was resolved in earnest to repel their insults, and had made his troops face about with great indignation, they were again seized with terror, and taking to their heels in a more shameful manner than before, made all the haste they could to regain the city.

[r] The Leontines received Dion with great marks of honour and esteem. They also made presents to his soldiers, and declared them free citizens. Some days after which they sent ambassadors to the Syracusans, to demand justice for the ill

[r] Plut. p. 975, 981. Diod. p. 422, 423.

treatment of those troops, and they on their side sent deputies to complain of Dion. Syracuse was intoxicated with inconsiderate joy and insolent prosperity, which entirely banished reflection and judgment.

Every thing conspired to swell and inflame their pride. The citadel was so much reduced by famine, that the soldiers of Dionysius, after having suffered very much, resolved at last to surrender it. They sent in the night to make that proposal, and were to give it up the next morning. But at daybreak, whilst they were preparing to execute the treaty, Nypsius, an able and valiant general, whom Dionysius had sent from Italy with corn and money to the besieged, appeared with his galleys, and anchored near Arethusa. Plenty succeeding on a sudden to famine, Nypsius landed his troops, and summoned an assembly, wherein he made a speech to the soldiers suitable to the present conjuncture, which determined them to hazard all dangers. The citadel, that was upon the point of surrendering, was relieved in this manner, contrary to all expectation.

The Syracusans at the same time hastened on board their galleys, and attacked the enemy's fleet. They sunk some of their ships, took others, and pursued the rest to the shore. But this very victory was the occasion of their ruin. Abandoned to their own discretion, without either leader or authority to command or counsel them, the officers as well as soldiers gave themselves up to rejoicing, feasting, drinking, debauchery, and every kind of loose excess. Nypsius knew well how to take advantage of this general infatuation. He attacked the wall that enclosed the citadel, and having made himself master of it, he demolished it in several places, and permitted his soldiers to enter and plunder the city. All things were in the utmost confusion. Here the citizens, half asleep, had their throats cut; there, houses were plundered, whilst the women and children were driven off into the citadel, without regard to their tears, cries, and lamentations.

There was but one man who could remedy this misfortune and preserve the city. This was in every body's thoughts, but no one had courage enough to propose it; so much ashamed were they of the ungenerous manner in which they had driven him out. As the danger increased every moment,

and already approached the quarter Achradina, in the height of their extremity and despair, a voice was heard from the cavalry and allies, which said, 'That it was absolutely necessary to recall Dion and the Peloponnesian troops from the country of the Leontines.' As soon as any body had courage enough to utter those words, they were the general cry of the Syracusans, who with tears of joy and grief offered up prayers to the gods, that they would bring him back to them. The hope alone of seeing him again, gave them new courage, and enabled them to make head against the enemy. The deputies set out immediately with full speed, and arrived at the city of Leontium late in the evening.

As soon as they alighted, they threw themselves at Dion's feet, bathed in their tears, and related the deplorable extremity to which the Syracusans were reduced. Some of the Leontines, and several of the Peloponnesian soldiers, who had seen them arrive, were already got round Dion, and rightly conceived, from their earnestness and humiliating posture, that something very extraordinary had happened. Dion had no sooner heard what they had to say, than he carried them with him to the assembly, which formed itself immediately; for the people ran thither with abundance of eagerness. The two principal deputies explained in a few words the greatness of their distress, and implored the foreign troops 'to hasten to the relief of the Syracusans, and to forget the ill treatment they had received; and the rather, because that unfortunate people had already paid a severer penalty for it, than the most injured amongst them would desire to impose.'

The deputies having finished their discourse, the whole theatre, where the assembly was held, continued in mournful silence. Dion rose: but as soon as he began to speak, a torrent of tears suppressed his utterance. The foreign soldiers called out to him to take courage, and expressed a generous compassion for his grief. At length, having recovered himself a little, he spoke to them in these terms: 'Men of Peloponnesus, and you our allies, I have assembled you here, that you might deliberate upon what regards yourselves; as for my part, I must not deliberate when Syracuse is in danger. If I cannot preserve it, I go to perish with it, and to bury myself

in its ruins. But for you, if you are resolved to assist us once more; us, who are the most imprudent and most unfortunate of mankind; come and relieve the city of Syracuse, from henceforth the work of your hands. But if the just subjects of complaint which you have against the Syracusans determine you to abandon them in their present condition, and to suffer them to perish; may you receive from the immortal gods the reward you merit for the affection and fidelity which you have hitherto expressed for me. For the rest, I have only to desire that you will keep Dion in your remembrance, who did not abandon you when unworthily treated by his countrymen, and who did not abandon his countrymen when fallen into misfortunes.'

He had no sooner ceased speaking, than the foreign soldiers rose up with loud cries, and entreated him to lead them on that moment to the relief of Syracuse. The deputies, transported with joy, saluted and embraced them, praying the gods to bestow upon Dion and them all kind of happiness and prosperity. When the tumult was appeased, Dion ordered them to prepare for the march, and as soon as they had supped, to return with their arms to the same place, being determined to set out the same night, and fly to the relief of his country.

In the mean time at Syracuse the officers of Dionysius, after having done all the mischief they could to the city, retired at night into the citadel with the loss of some of their soldiers. This short respite gave the seditious orators new courage. Flattering themselves that the enemy would lie still after what they had done, they exhorted the Syracusans to think no further of Dion, nor to receive him if he came to their relief with his foreign troops, nor to yield to them in courage, but to defend their city and liberty with their own arms and valour. New deputies were instantly despatched from the general officers to Dion to prevent his coming, and from the principal citizens and his friends to desire him to hasten his march; which difference of sentiments and contrariety of advices occasioned his advancing slowly, and by short marches.

When the night was far spent, Dion's enemies seized the gates of the city, to prevent his entrance. At the same instant, Nypsius, well apprized of all that passed in Syracuse, made a

sally from the citadel with a greater body of troops, and more determinate than before. They entirely demolished the wall that enclosed them, and entered the city, which they plundered. Nothing but slaughter and blood was seen every where. Nor did they stop for the pillage, but seemed to have no other view than to ruin and destroy all before them. One would have thought, that the son of Dionysius, whom his father had left in the citadel, being reduced to despair, and prompted by envenomed hatred for the Syracusans, was determined to bury the tyranny in the ruins of the city. To prevent Dion's relief of it, they had recourse to fire, the swiftest instrument of destruction, burning, with torches and lighted straw, all places within their power, and darting combustibles against the rest. The Syracusans, who fled to avoid the flames, were butchered in the streets, and those who, to shun the murderous sword retired into the houses, were driven out of them again by the encroaching fire; for there were abundance of houses burning, and many that fell upon the people in the streets.

These very flames opened the city for Dion, by obliging the citizens to agree in not keeping the gates shut against him. Couriers after couriers were despatched to hasten his march. Heraclides himself, his most declared and mortal enemy, deputed his brother, and afterwards his uncle Theodotus, to conjure him to advance with the utmost speed to their assistance, there being no one who was able to make head against the enemy, he himself being wounded, and the city almost entirely ruined and reduced to ashes.

Dion received this news when he was about sixty * stadia from the gates. His soldiers upon that occasion marched with the utmost diligence, and with so good a will, that it was not long before he arrived at the walls of the city. He entered by the quarter called *Hecatompedon*. He there detached his light-armed troops against the enemy, to reanimate the Syracusans by the sight of them. He then drew up his heavy-armed infantry, and the citizens who came running to join him on all sides. He divided them into small parties, of greater depth than front, and put different officers at the head of them, that they might be capable of attacking in several

* Two or three leagues.

places at once, and appear stronger and more formidable to the enemy.

After having made these dispositions, and offered up his prayers to the gods, he marched across the city against the enemy. In every street as he passed he was welcomed with acclamations, cries of joy, and songs of victory, mingled with the prayers and blessings of all the Syracusans; who called Dion their preserver and their god; and his soldiers their brothers and fellow-citizens. At that instant, there was not a single man in the city so fond of life, as not to be much more in pain for Dion's safety than his own, and not to fear much more for him than for all the rest together, seeing him march foremost to so great a danger, over blood, fire, and dead bodies, with which the streets and squares were universally covered.

On the other hand, the view of the enemy was no less terrible: for they were animated by rage and despair, and were posted in line of battle behind the ruins of the wall they had thrown down, which made the approach very difficult and dangerous. They were under the necessity of defending the citadel, which was their safety and retreat, and durst not remove from it, lest their communication should be cut off. But what was most capable of disordering and discouraging Dion's soldiers, and made their march very painful and difficult, was the fire. For, wherever they turned themselves, they marched by the light of the houses in flames, and were obliged to go over ruins in the midst of fires: exposing themselves to being crushed in pieces by the fall of walls, beams, and roofs of houses, which tottered half consumed by the flames, and under the necessity of keeping their ranks, whilst they opened their way through frightful clouds of smoke, mingled with dust.

When they had joined the enemy, only a very small number on each side were capable of coming to blows, from the want of room, and the unevenness of the ground. But at length Dion's soldiers, encouraged and supported by the cries and ardour of the Syracusans, charged the enemy with such redoubled vigour, that the troops of Nypsius gave way. The greatest part of them escaped into the citadel, which was very

near; and those who remained without, being broken, were cut to pieces in the pursuit by the foreign troops.

The time would not admit their making immediate rejoicings for their victory, in the manner so great an exploit deserved; the Syracusans being obliged to employ themselves in rescuing their houses, and to pass the whole night in extinguishing the fire; which, however, they did not effect without great difficulty.

At the return of day, none of the seditious orators durst stay in the city; but all fled self-condemned, to avoid the punishment due to their crimes. Only Heraclides and Theodotus came to Dion, and put themselves into his hands, confessing their injurious treatment of him, and conjuring him not to imitate their ill conduct: that it became Dion, superior as he was in all other respects to the rest of mankind, to show himself equally so in greatness of soul, by subduing his resentment and revenge, and forgiving the ungrateful, who owned themselves unworthy of his pardon.

Heraclides and Theodotus having made these supplications, Dion's friends advised him not to spare men of their vile and malignant disposition, but to abandon Heraclides to the soldiers, and in so doing, exterminate from the state that spirit of sedition and intrigue; a distemper that has really something of madness in it, and is no less to be feared from its pernicious consequences than tyranny itself. But Dion, to appease them, said, 'That other captains generally made the means of conquering their enemies their sole study; that for his part, he had passed much time in the academy, in learning to subdue anger, envy, and all the jarring passions of the mind. That the sign of having conquered them is not kindness and affability to friends and persons of merit; but treating those with humanity who have injured us, and in being always ready to forgive them. That he did not desire so much to appear superior to Heraclides in power and ability, as in wisdom and justice; for in that, true and essential superiority consists. That if Heraclides be wicked, invidious, and perfidious, must Dion contaminate and dishonour himself by base resentment? It is true, according to human laws, there seems to be less injustice in revenging an injury, than committing it; but if we consult

nature, we shall find both the one and the other to have their rise in the same weakness of mind. Besides, there is no disposition so obdurate and savage, but may be vanquished by the force of kind usage and obligations.' Dion, influenced by these maxims, pardoned Heraclides.

He engaged next in enclosing the citadel with a new work, and he ordered each of the Syracusans to go and cut a large stake. In the night, he set his soldiers to work, whilst the Syracusans took their rest. He surrounded the citadel in this manner with a strong palisade, before it was perceived; so that in the morning, the greatness of the work, and the suddenness of the execution, were matter of admiration for all the world, as well the enemy as the citizens.

Having finished this palisade, he buried the dead; and dismissing the prisoners taken from the enemy, he summoned an assembly. Heraclides proposed in it, that Dion should be elected generalissimo with supreme authority by sea and land. All the people of worth, and the most considerable of the citizens, were pleased with the proposal, and desired that it might have the sanction of the assembly. But the mariners and artisans, who were sorry that Heraclides should lose the office of admiral; and convinced that, however little estimable he might be in all other respects, he would at least be more for the people than Dion, opposed it with all their power. Dion, to avoid exasperating them, did not insist upon that point, and reinstated Heraclides in his command-in-chief at sea. But his opposing the distribution of lands and houses, which they were anxious should take place, and his cancelling and annulling whatever had been decreed upon that head, embroiled him with them irretrievably.

Heraclides, taking advantage of a disposition so favourable to his views, did not fail to revive his cabals and intrigues against Dion; as appeared openly by an attempt of his to make himself master of Syracuse, and to shut the gates upon his rival. But it proved unsuccessful. A Spartan, who had been sent to the aid of Syracuse, negotiated a new accommodation between Heraclides and Dion, under the strictest oaths, and the strongest assurances of obedience on the side of the former; weak ties to a man void of faith and probity.

The Syracusans having dismissed their sea forces, who were become unnecessary, applied solely to the siege of the citadel, and rebuilt the wall which had been thrown down. As no relief came to the besieged, and bread began to fall short with them, the soldiers grew mutinous, and would no longer observe any discipline. The son of Dionysius, finding himself without hope or resource, entered into a capitulation with Dion, by which he surrendered to him the citadel, with all the arms and other warlike stores. He carried his mother and sisters away with him, filled five galleys with his followers and effects, and went to his father; for Dion gave him entire liberty to withdraw unmolested. It is easy to conceive the joy of the city upon his departure. Women, children, old people, all hurried to the port to gratify their eyes with so agreeable a spectacle, and to solemnize the joyful day, on which, after so many years' servitude, the sun arose for the first time upon the liberty of Syracuse.

Apollocrates having set sail, and Dion beginning his march to enter the citadel, the princesses, who were there, did not stay till he arrived, but came out to meet him at the gates. Aristomache led the son of Dion; after whom came Arete, his wife, with her eyes fixed upon the ground and full of tears. Dion embraced his sister first, and afterwards his son. Aristomache then presenting Arete to him, spoke thus: 'The tears you see her shed, at the time that your presence restores us life and joy, the shame expressed in her looks, her silence itself, and her confusion, sufficiently denote the grief with which she is penetrated, at the sight of a husband, to whom another has been substituted contrary to her will, but who alone has always possessed her heart. Shall she salute you as her uncle, shall she embrace you as her husband?' Aristomache having spoken in this manner, Dion, with his face bathed in tears, tenderly embraced his wife; gave his son again into her arms, and sent them home to his house; because he thought proper to give up the citadel to the Syracusans, as greater evidence of their liberty.

For himself, after having rewarded with a truly royal magnificence all those who had contributed to his success, each according to their rank and merit, at the height of glory and

happiness, and the object of admiration not only of Sicily, but of Carthage and all Greece, who esteemed him the wisest and most fortunate captain that ever lived, he still retained his original simplicity; as modest and plain in his garb, equipage, and table, as if he had lived in the academy with Plato, and not with people bred in armies, with officers and soldiers, who often breathe nothing but pleasures and magnificence. Accordingly, at the time that Plato wrote[9] to him, 'That the eyes of all mankind were upon him alone;' little affected with that general admiration, his thoughts were always intent upon the academy, that school of wisdom and virtue, where exploits and successes were judged of, not from the external splendour and noise with which they are attended, but from the wise and moderate use which is made of them.

Dion designed to establish a form of government in Syracuse, composed of the Spartan and Cretan, but wherein the aristocracy was always to prevail, and to decide the most important affairs, by the authority which, according to his plan, was to be vested in a council of elders. Heraclides again opposed him in this scheme, still turbulent and seditious as usual, and solely intent upon gaining the people by flattery, caresses, and other popular arts. One day, when Dion sent for him to the council, he answered that he would not come; and that, being only a private person, he should be in the assembly with the rest of the citizens, whenever it was summoned. His view, in such behaviour, was to make his court to the people, and to render Dion odious; who, weary of his repeated insults, permitted those to kill him whom he had formerly prevented. They accordingly went to his house and despatched him. We shall see presently Dion's own sense of this action.

The Syracusans were deeply affected with his death; but as Dion solemnized his funeral with great magnificence, followed his body in person at the head of his whole army, and afterwards harangued the people upon the occasion, they were appeased, and forgave him the murder; convinced that it was impossible for the city ever to be free from commotions and sedition, whilst Heraclides and Dion governed together.

[9] After that murder Dion never knew joy, nor peace of mind.

[9] Plut. p. 981, 983. Diod. p. 432.

A hideous spectre, which he saw in the night, filled him with trouble, terror, and melancholy. The phantom seemed a woman of enormous stature, who, in her attire, air, and haggard looks, resembled a fury, and who swept his house with violence. His son's death, who for some unknown grief had thrown himself from the roof of a house, passed for the accomplishment of that ominous apparition, and was the prelude to his misfortunes. Callippus gave the finishing stroke to them. He was an Athenian, with whom Dion had contracted an intimate friendship whilst he lodged in his house at Athens, and with whom he had lived ever after in an entire freedom and unbounded confidence. Callippus, having given himself up to his ambitious views, and entertained thoughts of making himself master of Syracuse, threw off all regard for the sacred ties of friendship and hospitality, and devised how to get rid of Dion, who was the sole obstacle to his designs. Notwithstanding his care to conceal them, they got air, and came to the ears of Dion's sister and wife, who lost no time, and spared no pains, to discover the truth by a very strict inquiry. To prevent its effects, he went to them with tears in his eyes, and the appearance of being inconsolable, that any body should suspect him of such a crime, or think him capable of so black a design. They insisted upon his taking the 'great oath,' as it was called. The person who swore it was wrapped in the purple mantle of the goddess Proserpine, and, holding a lighted torch in his hand, pronounced in the temple the most dreadful execrations against himself which it is possible to imagine.

The oath cost him nothing, but did not convince the princesses. They daily received new intimations of his guilt from several hands, as did Dion himself, and all his friends in general persuaded him to prevent Callippus's crime by a just and sudden punishment. But he never could resolve upon it. The death of Heraclides, which he looked upon as a horrible blot upon his reputation and virtue, was perpetually present to his troubled imagination, and renewed by continual terrors his grief and repentance. Tormented night and day by that cruel remembrance, he professed that he had rather die a thousand deaths, and present his throat himself to whoever would kill

him, than live under the necessity of continual precautions, not only against his enemies, but the best of his friends.

Callippus ill deserved that name. He hastened to the execution of his crime, and caused Dion to be assassinated in his own house by some Zacynthian soldiers, who were entirely devoted to his interest. The sister and wife of that prince were put into prison, where the latter was delivered of a son, which she resolved to nurse there herself.

After this murder, Callippus was for some time in a splendid condition, having made himself master of Syracuse by the means of the troops, who were entirely devoted to his service, and whom he had gained by the gifts he bestowed upon them. The Pagans believed, that the Divinity ought to punish great crimes in a sudden and extraordinary manner in this life: and Plutarch observes, that the success of Callippus occasioned very great complaints against the gods, as if they suffered calmly, and without indignation, the vilest of men to raise himself to so exalted a fortune by so detestable and impious a method. But Providence was not long without justifying itself, for Callippus soon suffered the punishment of his guilt. Having marched with his troops to take Catana, Syracuse revolted against him, and threw off the yoke of so shameful a subjection. He afterwards attacked Messina, where he lost abundance of men, and particularly all the Zacynthian soldiers who had murdered Dion. No city of Sicily would receive him, but all detesting him as the most execrable of wretches, he retired to Rhegium, where, after having led for some time a miserable life, he was killed by Leptines and Polyperchon, and, it was said, with the same dagger with which Dion had been assassinated. A. M. 3646. Ant. J. C. 358.

History has few examples of so striking an attention of Providence to punish great crimes, such as murder, perfidy, treason, either in the authors of those crimes themselves, who commanded or executed them, or in the accomplices who were any way concerned in them. The divine justice displays itself from time to time in this manner, to prove that it is not unconcerned and inattentive, and to prevent the inundation of crimes, which an entire impunity would occasion; but it does not always distinguish itself by remarkable chastisements

in this world, to intimate to mankind, that greater punishments are reserved for guilt in the next.

As for Aristomache and Arete, as soon as they came out of prison, Icetas of Syracuse, one of Dion's friends, received them into his house, and treated them at first with an attention, fidelity, and generosity of the most exemplary kind, had he persevered: but complying at last with Dion's enemies, he provided a bark for them, and having put them on board, under the pretence of sending them to Peloponnesus, he gave orders to those who were to carry them, to kill them on the voyage, and to throw them into the sea. He was not long without receiving the chastisement due to his black treachery; for being taken by Timoleon, he was put to death. The Syracusans, fully to avenge Dion, killed also the two daughters of that traitor.

[t] The relations and friends of Dion, soon after his death, had written to Plato, to consult him upon the manner in which they should behave in the present troubled and fluctuating condition of Syracuse, and to know what sort of government it was proper to establish there. Plato, who knew the Syracusans were equally incapable of entire liberty or absolute servitude, exhorted them strenuously to pacify all things as soon as possible, and for that purpose, to change the tyranny, of which the very name was odious, into a lawful sovereignty, which would make subjection easy and agreeable. He advised them (and, according to him, it had been Dion's opinion) to create three kings, one to be Hipparinus, Dion's son; another Hipparinus, Dionysius the younger's brother, who seemed to be well inclined towards the people; and Dionysius himself, if he would comply with such conditions as should be prescribed him; and to invest them with an authority not much unlike that of the kings of Sparta. By the same scheme, thirty-five magistrates were to be appointed, to take care that the laws should be duly observed; these were to have great authority both in times of war and peace, and to serve as a balance between the power of the kings, the senate, and the people.

It does not appear that this advice was ever followed, and indeed it had great inconveniences. [u] It is only known, that

[t] Plat. *Ep.* viii. [u] Diod. l. xvi. p. 436.

Hipparinus, Dionysius's brother, having landed at Syracuse with a fleet and considerable forces, expelled Callippus, and exercised the sovereign power two years.

The history of Sicily, which I have related thus far, includes about fifty years, beginning with Dionysius the elder, who reigned thirty-eight, to the death of Dion.

SECT. IV. CHARACTER OF DION.—It is not easy to find so many excellent qualities in one and the same person as were united in Dion. I do not consider, in this place, his wonderful taste for the sciences, his art of associating them with the greatest employments of war and peace, of extracting from them the rules of conduct and maxims of government, and of making them an equally useful and honourable entertainment of his leisure; I confine myself to the statesman and patriot; and in this view, how admirable does he appear! Greatness of soul, elevation of sentiments, generosity in bestowing his wealth, heroic valour in battle, attended with a coolness of temper, and a prudence scarce to be paralleled; a mind vast and capable of the highest views, a constancy not to be shaken by the greatest dangers or the most unexpected revolutions of fortune, the love of his country and of the public good carried almost to excess: these are part of Dion's virtues. The design he formed of delivering his country from the yoke of tyranny, and his boldness and wisdom in the execution of it, show us of what he was capable.

But what I conceive the greatest beauty in Dion's character, the most worthy of admiration, and, if I may say so, the most above human nature, is the greatness of soul, and unexampled patience, with which he suffered the ingratitude of his countrymen. He had abandoned and sacrificed every thing to come to their relief; he had reduced the tyranny to extremities, and was upon the point of reestablishing them in the full possession of their liberty: in return for such great services, they shamefully expel him the city, accompanied with a handful of foreign soldiers, whose fidelity they had not been able to corrupt; they load him with injuries, and add to their base perfidy the most cruel outrages and indignity: to punish those ungrateful traitors he had only a signal to give, and to leave

the rest to the indignation of his soldiers: master of their temper, as well as his own, he curbs their impetuosity, and, without disarming their hands, restrains their just rage, suffering them, in the very height and ardour of an attack, only to terrify, and not kill, his enemies, because he could not forget that they were his fellow-citizens and brethren.

There seems to be only one defect that can be objected to Dion, which is, his having something rigid and austere in his temper, that made him less accessible and sociable than he should have been, and kept even persons of worth and his best friends at a kind of distance. Plato, and those who had his glory sincerely at heart, had often warned him of this. But notwithstanding the reproaches which were made him upon his too austere gravity, and the inflexible severity with which he treated the people, he still piqued himself upon making no abatement of them: whether his natural disposition was entirely averse to the arts of insinuation and persuasion; or that, from the view of correcting and reforming the Syracusans, vitiated and corrupted by the flattering and complaisant discourses of their orators, he thought fit to employ that rough and manly manner of behaviour towards them.

Dion was mistaken in the most essential point of governing. From the throne to the lowest office in the state, whoever is charged with the care of ruling and conducting others, ought particularly to study the *art of managing men's tempers, and of giving them that bent and turn of mind that may best suit his measures; which cannot be done by harshly domineering over them, by commanding haughtily, and contenting oneself with laying down the rule and the duty with inflexible rigour. There is, even in worth itself, in virtue, and the exercise of all functions, an exactitude and steadiness, or rather a kind of stiffness, which frequently degenerates into a vice when carried into extremes. I know it is never allowable to break through rules; but it is always laudable, and often necessary, to soften and make them more pliant; which is best effected by mildness of demeanour, and an insinuating behaviour; not always exacting the discharge of a duty in its

* Which art an ancient poet called flexanima, atque omnium regina rerum oratio. Cic. l. i. *de Divin.* n. 80.

utmost rigour; overlooking abundance of small faults, that do not merit much notice, and animadverting upon those which are more considerable, with favour and mildness: in a word, in endeavouring by all possible means to acquire people's affection, and to render virtue and duty amiable.

Dion's permission to kill Heraclides, which was obtained with difficulty, or rather forced from him, contrary to his natural disposition as well as principles, cost him dear, and brought that trouble and anguish upon him that lasted to the day of his death, and of which they were the principal cause.

SECT. V. DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER REASCENDS THE THRONE.

SYRACUSE IMPLORES AID OF THE CORINTHIANS, WHO SEND TIMOLEON. THAT GENERAL ENTERS SYRACUSE, NOTWITHSTANDING ALL THE ENDEAVOURS OF ICETAS TO PREVENT HIM. DIONYSIUS SURRENDERS HIMSELF TO HIM, AND RETIRES TO CORINTH.—[x] Callippus, who had caused Dion to be murdered, and had substituted himself in his place, did not possess his power long. Thirteen months after, Hipparinus, Dionysius's brother, arriving unexpectedly at Syracuse with a numerous fleet, expelled him from the city, and recovered his paternal sovereignty, which he held during two years. A. M. 3647. Ant. J. C. 357.

Syracuse and all Sicily, being harassed by different factions and intestine war, were in a miserable condition. Dionysius, taking advantage of those troubles, ten years after he had been obliged to quit the throne, had assembled some foreign troops, and having overcome Nypsæus, who had made himself master of Syracuse, he reinstated himself in the possession of his dominions. A. M. 3654. Ant. J. C. 350.

[y] It was perhaps to thank the gods for his reestablishment, and to express his gratitude to them, that he sent statues of gold and ivory to Olympia and Delphi of very great value. The galleys which carried them were taken by Iphicrates, who was at that time near [z] Corcyra with a fleet. He wrote to Athens to know in what manner he should dispose of this sacred booty, and was answered, that he need not examine scrupulously for what it was designed, but make use of it for

[x] Diod. l. xvi. p. 432—436. [y] Ibid. p. 453. [z] Corfu.

the subsistence of his troops. Dionysius complained bitterly of such treatment to the Athenians, in a letter which he wrote, wherein he reproached them, with great warmth and justice, for their avarice and sacrilegious impiety.

[a] A commander of pirates had acted much more nobly and more religiously towards the Romans about fifty years before. The latter, after the taking of Veii, the siege of which had lasted ten years, sent a golden cup to Delphi. The deputies who carried that present were taken by the pirates of Lipara, and carried to that island. It was the * custom to divide among the citizens all the prizes they took, as a common stock. The island at that time was under the government of a magistrate more like the Romans in his manners than those he governed. He was called Timasitheus,† and his behaviour agreed well with the signification of his name. Full of respect for their character of envoys, the sacred gift they carried, the motive of their offering, and still more for the majesty of the god for whom it was designed, he inspired the multitude, that generally follow the example of those who rule them, with the same sentiments of respect and religion. The envoys were received therefore with all possible marks of distinction, and their expenses borne by the public. Timasitheus convoyed them with a strong squadron to Delphi, and brought them back in the same manner to Rome. It is easy to judge how sensibly the Romans were affected with so noble a proceeding. By a decree of the senate they rewarded Timasitheus with great presents, and granted him the right of hospitality. And more than a hundred and fifty years after, when the Romans took Lipara from the Carthaginians, with the same gratitude as if the action had been but lately done, they thought themselves obliged to do further honour to the family of their benefactor, and resolved that all his descendants should be for

[a] Liv. *Decad.* i. l. v. c. 28. Diod. l. xiv. p. 307.

* Mos erat civitatis, velut publicò latrocinio, partam prædam dividere. Fortè eo anno in summo magistratu erat Timasitheus quidam, Romanis vir similior quàm suis: qui legatorum nomen, donumque, et deum cui mitteretur, et doni causam veritus ipse, multitudinem quoque, quæ semper fermè regenti est similis, religionis justæ implevit; adductosque in publicum hospitium legatos cum præsidio etiam navium Delphos prosecutos, Romam inde sospites restituit. Hospitium cum eo senatusconsulto est factum, donaque publicè data. Tit. Liv.

† Timasitheus signifies, one who honours the gods.

ever exempted from the tribute imposed upon the other inhabitants of that island.

This was certainly great and noble on both sides: but the contrast does no honour to the Athenians.

To return to Dionysius.—Though he expressed some regard for the gods, his actions evinced no humanity for his subjects. His past misfortunes, instead of correcting and softening his disposition, had only served to inflame it, and to render him more savage and brutal than before.

[b] The most worthy and considerable of the citizens, not being able to support so cruel a servitude, had had recourse to Icetas, king of the Leontines, and abandoning themselves to his conduct, had elected him their general; not that they believed he differed in any thing from the most avowed tyrants, but because they had no other resource.

During these transactions, the Carthaginians, who were almost always at war with the Syracusans, having arrived in Sicily with a great fleet, had already made a great progress there. The Sicilians and the people of Syracuse resolved to send an embassy into Greece, to demand aid of the Corinthians, from whom the Syracusans were descended, and who had always openly declared against tyrants in favour of liberty. Icetas, who proposed no other end from his command than to make himself master of Syracuse, and had no thoughts of setting it free, treated secretly with the Carthaginians, though in public he affected to praise the wise measures of the Syracusans, and even sent his deputies along with theirs.

Corinth received the ambassadors perfectly well, decreed that aid should be sent to the Syracusans, and immediately appointed Timoleon general. He had led a retired life for twenty years, without interfering in public affairs, and was far from believing, that at his age, and in the circumstances he then was, he should be thought on upon such an occasion. A. M. 3655. Ant. J. C. 349.

He was descended from one of the noblest families of Corinth, loved his country passionately, and discovered upon all occasions a singular humanity of temper, except against tyrants and bad men. He was an excellent captain; and as

[b] Diod. l. xvi. p. 459, 464. Plut. *in Timol.* p. 236, 243.

in his youth he had possessed all the maturity of age, in age he had all the fire and courage of the most ardent youth.

He had an elder brother called Timophanes, whom he tenderly loved, as he had demonstrated in a battle, in which he covered him with his body, and saved his life at the great danger of his own; but his country was still dearer to him. That brother having made himself tyrant of it, so black a crime gave him the sharpest affliction. He made use of all possible means to bring him back to his duty; kindness, friendship, affection, remonstrances, and even menaces. But finding all his endeavours ineffectual, and that nothing could prevail upon a heart abandoned to ambition, he caused his brother to be assassinated in his presence by two of his friends and intimates, and thought that, upon such an occasion, the laws of nature ought to give place to those of his country.

That action was admired and applauded by the principal citizens of Corinth, and by most of the philosophers, who looked upon it as the most noble effort of human virtue; and Plutarch seems to pass the same judgment upon it. All the world were not of that opinion, and some people reproached him as an abominable parricide, who could not fail of drawing down the vengeance of the gods upon himself. His mother especially, in the excess of her grief, uttered the most dreadful curses and imprecations against him; and when he came to console her, not being able to bear the sight of her son's murderer, she thrust him away with indignation, and shut her doors against him.

He was then struck with all the horror of his guilt, and, giving himself up to the most bitter remorse, considered Timophanes no longer as a tyrant, but as a brother, and resolved to put an end to his life, by abstaining from all nourishment. It was with great difficulty his friends dissuaded him from that fatal resolution. Overcome by their prayers and entreaties, he was at length prevailed upon to live; but he condemned himself to pass the rest of his days in solitude. From that moment be renounced all public affairs; and for several years never came to the city, but wandered about in the most solitary and desert places, abandoned to excess of grief and melancholy. So true it is, that neither the praises of flatterers, nor

the false reasonings of politicians, can suppress the cries of conscience, which is at once the witness, judge, and executioner of those who dare to violate the most sacred rights and ties of nature!

He passed twenty years in this condition. He did indeed return to Corinth at the latter part of that time, but lived there always private and retired, without concerning himself with the administration of the government. It was not without great repugnance that he accepted the employment of general, but he did not think it allowable to refuse the service of his country, and his duty prevailed against his inclination.

Whilst Timoleon assembled his troops, and was preparing to sail, the Corinthians received letters from Icetas, in which he told them, 'That it was not necessary for them to make any further levies, nor to exhaust themselves in great expenses to come to Sicily, and expose themselves to evident danger; that the Carthaginians, apprized of their design, were waiting to intercept their squadron in its passage with a great fleet; and that their slowness in sending their troops, had obliged him to call in the Carthaginians themselves to his aid, and to make use of them against the tyrant.' He had made a secret treaty with them, by which it was stipulated, that after the expulsion of Dionysius from Syracuse, he should take possession of it in his place.

The reading of these letters, far from cooling the zeal of the Corinthians, only incensed them still more, and hastened the departure of Timoleon. He embarked with ten galleys, and arrived safe upon the coast of Italy: here the news that came from Sicily extremely perplexed him, and discouraged his troops. An account was brought, that Icetas had defeated Dionysius; and having made himself master of the greatest part of Syracuse, had obliged the tyrant to shut himself up in the citadel, and in that quarter called the *Isle*, where he besieged him; and that he had given orders to the Carthaginians to prevent Timoleon's approach and landing, that they might make a peaceable partition of Sicily between them, when they should have compelled that general to retire.

And indeed the Carthaginians had sent twenty galleys to Rhegium. The Corinthians, upon their arrival at that port,

found ambassadors from Icetas, who declared to Timoleon, that he might come to Syracuse, and would be well received there provided he dismissed his troops. The proposal was an absolute insult, and at the same time more perplexing. It seemed impossible to beat the vessels which the barbarians had caused to advance to intercept them in their passage, being twice their force; and to retire, was to abandon to extreme distress the whole of Sicily, which could not avoid being the reward of Icetas's treachery, and of the support which the Carthaginians should give the tyranny.

In this delicate conjuncture, Timoleon demanded a conference with the ambassadors, and the principal officers of the Carthaginian squadron, in the presence of the people of Rhegium. It was only, he said, to exonerate himself, and for his own security, that his country might not accuse him of having disobeyed its orders, and betrayed its interests. There was a secret understanding between him and the governor and magistrates of Rhegium. They desired nothing more than to see the Corinthians in possession of Sicily, and apprehended nothing so much as the neighbourhood of the barbarians. They summoned therefore an assembly, and shut the gates of the city, upon pretence of preventing the citizens from going abroad, in order that they might devote their attention solely to the present affair.

The people being assembled, long speeches were made of little or no tendency, every body treating the same subject, and repeating the same reasons, or adding new ones, only to protract the council, and to gain time. Whilst this was doing, nine of the Corinthian galleys went off, and were suffered by the Carthaginian vessels to pass, believing that their departure had been concerted with their own officers who were in the city, and that those nine galleys were to return to Corinth, the tenth remaining to carry Timoleon to Icetas's army at Syracuse. When Timoleon was informed in a whisper, that his galleys were at sea, he slipt gently through the crowd, which, to favour his going off, thronged exceedingly around the tribunal. He got to the sea-side, embarked directly; and having rejoined his galleys, they arrived together at Tauromenium, a city of Sicily, where they were received with open

arms by Andromachus, who commanded it, and who joined his citizens with the Corinthian troops, to reinstate the Sicilians in their liberties.

It is easy to comprehend how much the Carthaginians were surprised and ashamed of being so deceived: but, as somebody told them, being Phœnicians, (who passed for the greatest cheats in the world,) fraud and artifice ought not to give them so much astonishment and displeasure.

Upon the news of Timoleon's arrival, Icetas was terrified, and made the greatest part of the Carthaginian galleys advance They had a hundred and fifty long ships, fifty thousand foot, and three hundred armed chariots. The Syracusans lost all hope when they saw the Carthaginians in possession of the port, Icetas master of the city, Dionysius blocked up in the citadel, and Timoleon without any other hold in Sicily than a nook of its coast, the small city of Tauromenium, with little hope and less force; for his troops did not amount in all to more than a thousand soldiers, and he had scarce provisions for their subsistence. Besides which, the cities placed no confidence in him. The ills they had lately suffered from the extortion and cruelty that had been practised amongst them, had exasperated them against all commanders of troops, especially after the horrid treachery of Callippus and Pharax; who being both sent, the one from Athens and the other from Sparta, to free Sicily and expel the tyrants, made them conceive the tyranny gentle and desirable, so severe were the vexations with which they had oppressed them. They were afraid of experiencing the same treatment from Timoleon.

The inhabitants of Adranon, a small city below mount Ætna, being divided amongst themselves, one party had called in Icetas and the Carthaginians, and the other had applied to Timoleon. The two chiefs arrived almost at the same time in the neighbourhood of Adranon; the former with near five thousand men, and the other with only twelve hundred. Notwithstanding this inequality, Timoleon, who justly conceived that he should find the Carthaginians in disorder, and employed in taking up their quarters and pitching their tents, made his troops advance, and without losing time to rest them, as the officers advised him, he marched directly to charge the enemy,

who no sooner saw him than they took to flight. This occasioned their killing only three hundred, and taking twice as many prisoners; but the Carthaginians lost their camp, and all their baggage. The Adranites opened their gates at the same time, and received Timoleon. Other cities sent their deputies to him soon after, and made their submission.

Dionysius himself, who renounced his vain hopes, and saw himself at the point of being reduced, as full of contempt for Icetas, who had suffered himself to be so shamefully defeated, as of admiration and esteem for Timoleon, sent ambassadors to the latter, to treat of surrendering himself and the citadel to the Corinthians. Timoleon, taking advantage of so unexpected a good fortune, made Euclid and Telemachus, two Corinthian officers, with four hundred soldiers, file off into the castle; not all at once, nor in the daytime, that being impossible, the Carthaginians being masters of the harbour, but in small bodies, and by stealth. Those troops having got successfully into the citadel, took possession of it with all the tyrant's effects, and all the stores he had laid up there. For he had a considerable number of horse, all sorts of warlike engines and darts, besides seventy thousand suits of armour, which had been laid up there long before. Dionysius had also two thousand regular troops, which with the rest he surrendered to Timoleon. And for himself, taking with him his money and some few of his friends, he embarked unperceived by the troops of Icetas, and repaired to the camp of Timoleon.

It was the first time of his life that he had appeared in the low and abject state of a private person and a suppliant; he who had been born and nurtured in the arms of the tyranny, and had seen himself master of the most powerful kingdom that ever had been usurped by tyrants. He had possessed it for ten whole years before Dion took arms against him, and for some years after that, though always in the midst of wars and battles. He was sent to Corinth with only one galley, without convoy, and with very little money. He served there for a sight, every body running to gaze at him; some with a secret joy of heart to feed their eyes with the view of the miseries of a man whom the name of tyrant rendered odious; others with a kind of compassion, from

A. M. 3657. Ant. J. C. 347.

comparing the splendid condition from which he had fallen, with the unfathomable abyss of distress into which they beheld him plunged.

His conduct at Corinth no longer excited any sentiments towards him, but those of contempt and indignation. He passed whole days in the perfumers' shops, in taverns, with courtesans, or with actresses and singers, disputing with them upon the rules of music, and the harmony of airs. Some people have thought that he behaved in such a manner through policy, not to give umbrage to the Corinthians, nor to suffer any thought or desire of recovering his dominions to be discovered. But such an opinion does him too much honour; and it seems more probable, that, nurtured and educated as he was in drunkenness and debauchery, he only followed his inclination, and that he passed his life, in the kind of slavery into which he was fallen, as he had done upon the throne, having no other resource or consolation in his misfortunes.

[c] Some writers say, that the extreme poverty to which he was reduced at Corinth obliged him to open a school there, and to teach children to read; perhaps, says Cicero,* without doubt jestingly, to retain still a species of empire, and not absolutely to renounce the habit and pleasure of commanding. [d] Whether that were his motive or not, it is certain that Dionysius, who had seen himself master of Syracuse and of almost all Sicily, who had possessed immense riches, and had had numerous fleets and great armies of horse and foot under his command; that the same Dionysius,† reduced now almost to beggary, and from a king become a schoolmaster, was a good lesson for persons of exalted stations, warning them not to confide in their grandeur, nor to rely too much upon their fortune. This was the admonition which the Lacedæmonians some time after gave Philip. [e] That prince having written to them in very haughty and menacing terms, they made him no other answer, than *Dionysius at Corinth.*

An expression of Dionysius, which has been preserved,

[c] Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. iii. n. 27.
[d] Val. Max. l. vi.
[e] Demet. *Phaler. de Elocut.* l. viii.

* Dionysius Corinthi pueros docebat, usque adeò imperio carere non poterat.

† Tantâ mutatione majores natu, neque nimis fortunæ crederet, magister ludi factus ex tyranno docuit.

seems to argue, if it be true, that he knew how to make a good use of his adversity, and to turn his misfortunes to his advantage; which would be very much to his praise, but contrary to what has been related of him before. [f] Whilst he lived at Corinth, a stranger rallied him unseasonably, and with an indecent rudeness, upon the intercourse which he had kept up with the philosophers during his most splendid fortune, and asked him by way of insult, 'Of what advantage all the wisdom of Plato had been to him?' 'Can you believe then,' replied he, 'that I have received no benefit from Plato, when you see me bear ill fortune as I do?'

SECT. VI. TIMOLEON, AFTER SEVERAL VICTORIES, RESTORES LIBERTY TO SYRACUSE, WHERE HE INSTITUTES WISE LAWS. HE RESIGNS HIS AUTHORITY, AND PASSES THE REST OF HIS LIFE IN RETIREMENT. HIS DEATH. HONOURS PAID TO HIS MEMORY.

A. M. 3658. Ant. J. C. 346.

[g] After the retreat of Dionysius, Icetas pressed the siege of the citadel of Syracuse with the utmost vigour, and kept it so closely blocked up, that the convoys sent to the Corinthians could not enter it without great difficulty. Timoleon, who was at Catana, threw them in thither frequently. To deprive them of this resource, Icetas and Mago set out together with design to besiege that place. During their absence, Leon the Corinthian, who commanded in the citadel, having observed from the ramparts that those who had been left to continue the siege were very remiss in their duty, made a sudden furious sally upon them, whilst they were dispersed, killed part of them, put the rest to flight, and seized the quarter of the city called *Achradina*, which was the strongest part of it, and that which had been least injured by the enemy. Leon fortified it in the best manner the time would admit, and joined it to the citadel by works of communication.

This bad news caused Mago and Icetas to return immediately. At the same time a body of troops from Corinth landed safe in Sicily, having deceived the vigilance of the Carthaginian squadron, which was posted to intercept them.

[f] Plut. *in Timol.* p. 243.
[g] Plut. *in Timol.* p. 243—248. Diod. l. xvi. p. 465, 474.

When they were landed, Timoleon received them with joy, and after having taken possession of Messina, marched in battle-array against Syracuse. His army consisted of only four thousand men. When he approached the city, his first care was to send emissaries amongst the soldiers that bore arms for Icetas. They represented to them, that it was highly shameful for Greeks, as they were, to endeavour to deliver up Syracuse and all Sicily to the Carthaginians, the wickedest and most cruel of all barbarians. That Icetas had only to join Timoleon, and that in concert with him they would soon overwhelm the common enemy. Those soldiers, having spread these insinuations throughout the whole camp, gave Mago violent suspicions of his being betrayed; besides which, he had already for some time sought a pretext to retire. For these reasons, notwithstanding the entreaties and warm remonstrances of Icetas, he weighed anchor, and set sail for Africa, shamefully abandoning the conquest of Sicily.

Timoleon's army the next day appeared before the place in line of battle, and attacked it in three different quarters with so much vigour and success, that Icetas's troops were universally overthrown and put to flight. Thus, by a good fortune that has few examples, he carried Syracuse by force in an instant, which was at that time one of the strongest cities in the world. When he had made himself master of it, he did not act like Dion, in sparing the forts and public edifices on account of their beauty and magnificence. To avoid giving the same cause of suspicion, which at first had raised distrust, though without foundation, against that great man, and at length had ruined him, he caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that all Syracusans who would come with their tools, might employ themselves in demolishing the forts of the tyrants. In consequence of which, the Syracusans, considering that proclamation and day as the happy commencement of their liberty, ran in multitudes, and not only demolished the citadel, but the palaces of the tyrants; breaking open their tombs at the same time, which they also threw down and destroyed.

The citadel being rased, and the ground made level, Timoleon caused tribunals to be erected upon it, for the dispensation

of justice in the name of the people; that the same place from whence, under the tyrants, every day some bloody edict had issued, might become the asylum and bulwark of liberty and innocence.

Timoleon was master of the city; but it wanted people to inhabit it: for some having perished in the wars and seditions, and others having fled to avoid the power of the tyrants, Syracuse was become a desert, and the grass was grown so high in the streets, that horses grazed in them. Almost all the cities of Sicily were in the same condition. Timoleon and the Syracusans therefore found it necessary to write to Corinth, to desire that people might be sent from Greece to inhabit Syracuse; that otherwise the country could never recover itself, especially as it was moreover threatened with a new war. For they had received advice, that, Mago having killed himself, the Carthaginians, enraged at his having acquitted himself so ill of his commission, had hung up his body upon a cross, and were making great levies to return into Sicily with a more numerous army at the beginning of the year.

Those letters being arrived with the ambassadors from Syracuse, who conjured the Corinthians to take compassion of their city, and to be a second time the founders of it; the Corinthians did not consider the calamity of that people as an occasion of aggrandizing themselves, and of making themselves masters of the city, according to the maxims of a base and infamous policy; but sending to all the sacred games of Greece, and to all public assemblies, they caused proclamation to be made in them by heralds, that the Corinthians having abolished the tyranny in Syracuse, and expelled the tyrants, declared free and independent the Syracusans, and all the people of Sicily, who should return into their own country; and exhorted them to repair thither, to partake of an equal and just distribution of the lands amongst them. At the same time they despatched couriers into Asia, and into all the isles, whither great numbers of fugitives had retired, to invite them to come as soon as possible to Corinth, which would provide them vessels, commanders, and a safe convoy, to transport them into their country at its own expense.

Upon this proclamation Corinth received universal praises

and blessings, as it justly deserved. It was every where proclaimed, that Corinth had delivered Syracuse from the tyrants, had preserved it from falling into the hands of the barbarians, and restored it to its citizens. It is not necessary to insist here upon the grandeur of so noble and generous an action: the mere relation of it must make upon the mind of every one that impression that always results from what is great and noble; and every body must own, that never conquest or triumph equalled the glory which the Corinthians then acquired by so perfect and magnanimous a disinterestedness.

Those who came to Corinth, not being sufficiently numerous, demanded an addition of inhabitants from that city and from all Greece, to augment this new kind of colony. Having obtained their request, and finding themselves increased to at least ten thousand, they embarked for Syracuse, where a multitude of people from all parts of Italy and Sicily had already joined Timoleon. It is said their number amounted to sixty thousand and upwards. Timoleon distributed the lands amongst them *gratis;* but sold the houses, with which he raised a very great sum; leaving to the old inhabitants the power of redeeming their own: and by this means he collected a considerable fund for such of the people as were poor, and unable to support either their own necessities or the charges of the war.

The statues of the tyrants, and of all the princes who had governed Sicily, were put up to sale; but first they were cited to trial, and regularly proceeded against in due form of law. One alone escaped the rigour of this inquiry, and was preserved; which was that of Gelon, who had gained a celebrated victory over the Carthaginians near Himera, and had governed the people with lenity and justice; for which his memory was still cherished and honoured. If all statues were made to undergo the same scrutiny, I do not know whether many would continue in being.

[h] History has preserved another sentence passed also in regard to a statue, but of a very different kind. The fact is curious, and will excuse the digression. Nicon, a champion of Thasos,*

[h] Suidas in Νίκων. Pausan. l. vi. p. 364.
* An island in the Ægean sea.

had been crowned fourteen hundred times victor in the solemn games of Greece. A man of such merit could not fail of being envied. After his death, one of his competitors insulted his statue, and gave it several blows; to revenge, perhaps, those he had formerly received from him it represented. But the statue, as if sensible of that outrage, fell from its height upon the person that insulted it, and killed him. The son of him who had been crushed to death proceeded juridically against the statue, as guilty of homicide, and punishable by the law of Draco. That famous legislator of Athens, to inspire a greater horror for the guilt of murder, had ordained that even inanimate things should be destroyed, whose fall should occasion the death of a man. The Thasians, conformably to this law, decreed that the statue should be thrown into the sea. But some years after, being afflicted with a great famine, and having consulted the oracle of Delphi, they caused it to be taken out of the sea, and rendered new honours to it.

Syracuse being thus raised in a manner from the grave, and people flocking from all parts to inhabit it, Timoleon, desirous of freeing the other cities of Sicily, and of finally extirpating tyranny and tyrants out of it, began his march with his army.

He compelled Icetas to renounce his alliance with the Carthaginians, obliged him to demolish his forts, and to live as a private person in the city of the Leontines. Leptines, tyrant of Apollonia and of several other cities and fortresses, seeing himself in danger of being taken by force, surrendered himself. Timoleon spared his life, and sent him to Corinth. For he thought nothing more great and honourable, than to let all Greece see the tyrants of Sicily in a state of humiliation, and living like exiles.

He returned afterwards to Syracuse, to regulate the government, and to institute such laws as should be most important and necessary, in conjunction with Cephalus and Dionysius, two legislators sent to him by the Corinthians: for he had not the weakness to desire unlimited power, and the sole administration. But on his departure, that the troops in his pay might get something for themselves, and to keep them in exercise at the same time, he sent them, under the command of Dinarchus

and Demaratus, into all the places subject to the Carthaginians. Those troops brought over several cities from the barbarians, lived always in abundance, made much booty, and returned with considerable sums of money, which was of great service in the support of the war.

[i] About this time, the Carthaginians arrived at Lilybæum, under Asdrubal and Amilcar, with an army of seventy thousand men, two hundred ships of war, and a thousand transports laden with machines, armed chariots, horses, ammunition, and provisions. They proposed no less than the entire expulsion of the Greeks out of Sicily. Timoleon did not think fit to wait their advancing; and though he could raise only six or seven thousand men, so great was the people's terror, he marched with that small body of troops against the formidable army of the enemy, and obtained a celebrated victory near the river Crimesus; an account of which may be found in the history of the Carthaginians.[k] Timoleon returned to Syracuse amidst shouts of joy and universal applauses.

He had before effected the conquest and reduction of the Sicilian tyrants, but had not changed them, nor taken from them their tyrannical disposition. They united together, and formed a powerful league against him. Timoleon immediately took the field, and soon put a final end to their hopes. He made them all suffer the just punishment their revolt deserved. Icetas, amongst others, with his son, were put to death as tyrants and traitors. His wife and daughters, having been sent to Syracuse and brought before the assembly of the people, were also sentenced to die, and executed accordingly. The people, without doubt, designed to avenge Dion, their first deliverer, by that decree. For it was the same Icetas who had caused Arete, Dion's wife, his sister Aristomache, and his son, an infant, to be thrown into the sea.

Virtue is seldom or never without those who envy it. Two accusers summoned Timoleon to answer for his conduct before the judges; and having assigned him a certain day for his appearance, demanded sureties of him. The people expressed great indignation against such a proceeding, and would have dispensed with so great a man's observing the usual formalities;

[i] Plut. *in Timol.* p. 248, 255. [k] Vol. i

this, however, he strongly opposed, giving for his reason, that all he had undertaken had no other principle, than that the laws might have their due course. He was accused of malversation during his command of the army. Timoleon, without giving himself the trouble to refute those calumnies, only replied: 'That he thanked the gods, for that they had heard his prayers, and that he at length saw the Syracusans enjoy an entire liberty of saying every thing; a liberty absolutely unknown to them under the tyrants, but which it was just to confine within due bounds.'

That great man had given Syracuse wise laws, had purged all Sicily of the tyrants which had so long infested it, had reestablished peace and security universally, and supplied the cities ruined by the war with the means of reinstating themselves. After such glorious actions, which had acquired him an unbounded credit, he voluntarily quitted his authority to live in retirement. The Syracusans had given him the best house in the city, in gratitude for his great services, and another very fine and agreeable one in the country, where he generally resided with his wife and children, whom he had sent for from Corinth; for he did not return thither, and Syracuse was become his country. He had the prudence by resigning every thing to shelter himself also entirely from envy, which never fails to attend exalted stations, and pays no respect to merit, however great and substantial. He shunned the rock on which the greatest men, through an insatiate lust of honours and power, are often shipwrecked; that is, by engaging to the end of their lives in new cares and troubles, of which age renders them incapable, and by choosing rather to sink under, than to lay down, the weight of them.*

Timoleon, who knew all the value of † a noble and glorious leisure, acted in a different manner. He passed the rest of his life as a private person, enjoying the grateful satisfaction of seeing so many cities, and such a numerous people, indebted to him for their happiness and tranquillity. But he was always respected, and consulted as the common oracle of Sicily. Neither treaty of peace, institution of law, division of land,

* Malunt deficere, quàm desinere. Quintil.
† Otium cum dignitate. Cic.

nor regulation of government, seemed well done, if Timoleon had not been consulted, and put the last hand to it.

His age was tried with a very sensible affliction, which he supported with astonishing patience; it was the loss of sight. That accident, far from lessening the consideration and regard of the people towards him, served only to augment them. The Syracusans did not content themselves with paying him frequent visits, they conducted all strangers, both in town and country, to see their benefactor and deliverer. When they had any important affair to deliberate upon in the assembly of the people, they called him in to their assistance; he came thither in a chariot drawn by two horses, went through the public square to the theatre; and in that manner was introduced into the assembly, amidst the shouts and acclamations of joy of the whole people. After he had given his opinion, which was always religiously observed, his domestics reconducted him across the theatre, and he was escorted by all the citizens beyond the gates, with continual shouts of joy and clapping of hands.

He had still greater honours paid to him after his death. Nothing was wanting that could add to the magnificence of the procession which followed his bier, of which the noblest ornaments were the tears that were shed, and the blessings uttered by every body in honour of his memory. Those tears were neither the effect of custom and the formality of mourning, nor exacted by a public decree, but flowed from a native source, and sprung from sincere affection, lively gratitude, and inconsolable sorrow. A law was also made, that, annually, for the future, upon the day of his death, musical and gymnastic games should be celebrated, and horse-races run in honour of him. But what was still more honourable for the memory of that great man, was the decree of the Syracusan people; that whenever Sicily should be engaged in a war with foreigners, they should send to Corinth for a general.

I do not know that we discover in history any thing more great and accomplished than what we are told of Timoleon. I speak not only of his military exploits and the happy success of all his undertakings. Plutarch observes a characteristic in them, which distinguishes Timoleon from all the great men of

his times; and he makes use, upon that occasion, of a very remarkable comparison. There are, says he, in painting and poetry, pieces which are excellent in themselves, and which at the first view may be known to be the works of a master; but some of them denote their having cost abundance of pains and application; whereas in others, an easy and native grace is seen, which adds exceedingly to their value; and amongst the latter he places the poems of Homer. Something of this sort occurs, he goes on, when we compare the great actions of Epaminondas and Agesilaus with those of Timoleon. In the former, we find them executed with force and innumerable difficulties; but in the latter, there is an easiness and facility, which distinguish them as the work, not of fortune, but of virtue, which fortune seems to have taken pleasure in seconding. It is Plutarch who still speaks.

But not to mention the military actions of Timoleon; what I admire most in him, is his warm and disinterested passion for the public good, reserving for himself only the pleasure of seeing others happy by his services; his extreme remoteness from ambition and haughtiness; his honourable retirement into the country; his modesty, moderation, and indifference for the honours paid him; and, what is still more uncommon, his aversion for all flattery, and even just praises. When somebody extolled, * in his presence, his wisdom, valour, and the glory he had acquired in having expelled the tyrants, he made no answer, but that he thought himself obliged to express his gratitude to the gods, in that, having decreed to restore peace and liberty to Sicily, they had vouchsafed to make choice of him in preference to all others for so honourable an office: for he was fully persuaded, that all human events are guided and disposed by the secret decrees of Divine Providence. What a treasure, what a happiness for a state, is such a minister!

For the better understanding his value, we have only to compare the condition of Syracuse under Timoleon, with its state under the two Dionysius's. It is the same city, the same

* Cùm suas laudes audiret prædicari, nunquam aliud dixit, quàm se in eâ re maximas diis gratias agere et habere, quòd, cùm Siciliam recreare constituissent, tum se potissimùm ducem esse voluissent. Nihil enim rerum humanarum sine deorum numine agi putabat. Cor. Nep. *in Timol.* c. iv.

inhabitants, and the same people: but what a difference do we perceive under the different governments we speak of! The two tyrants had no thoughts but of making themselves feared, and of depressing their subjects to render them more submissive. They were in fact dreaded, as they desired to be, but at the same time detested and abhorred, and had more to fear from their subjects, than their subjects from them. Timoleon, on the contrary, who looked upon himself as the father of the Syracusan people, and who had no thoughts but of making them happy, enjoyed the refined pleasure of being beloved and revered as a parent by his children: and he was remembered amongst them with blessings, because they could not reflect upon the peace and felicity they enjoyed, without calling to mind at the same time the wise legislator to whom they were indebted for those inestimable blessings.

BOOK THE TWELFTH.

THE HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER I.

SECT. I. STATE OF GREECE FROM THE TIME OF THE TREATY OF ANTALCIDAS. THE LACEDÆMONIANS DECLARE WAR AGAINST THE CITY OF OLYNTHUS. THEY SEIZE BY FRAUD AND VIOLENCE UPON THE CITADEL OF THEBES. OLYNTHUS SURRENDERS.—[a] The peace of Antalcidas, of which mention has been made in the third chapter of the ninth book, had plentifully scattered among the Grecian states the seeds of discontent and division. In consequence of that treaty, the Thebans had been obliged to abandon the cities of Bœotia, and suffer them to enjoy their liberty; and the Corinthians to withdraw their garrison from Argos, which by that means became free and independent. The Lacedæmonians, who were the authors and executors of this treaty, saw their power extremely augmented by it, and strove to make farther additions to it. They compelled the Mantinæans, against whom they pretended to have many causes of complaint in the last war, to demolish the walls of their city, and to inhabit four different places, as they had done before.

A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 387.

[a] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. v. p. 550, 553.

[b] The two kings of Sparta, Agesipolis and Agesilaus, were of quite different characters, and entertained equally different opinions upon the present state of affairs. The first, who was naturally inclined to peace, and a strict observer of justice, was anxious that Sparta, who was already much exclaimed against for the treaty of Antalcidas, should suffer the Grecian cities to enjoy their liberties, according to the tenour of that treaty, and not disturb their tranquillity through an unjust desire of extending her dominions. The other, on the contrary, restless, active, and full of great views of ambition and conquest, breathed nothing but war.

At the same time, deputies arrived at Sparta from Acanthus and Apollonia, two very considerable cities of Macedonia, on the subject of Olynthus, a city of Thrace, inhabited by Greeks, originally from Chalcis, in Eubœa. [c] Athens, after the victories of Salamis and Marathon, had conquered many places on the side of Thrace, and even in Thrace itself. Those cities threw off the yoke as soon as Sparta, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, had ruined the power of Athens. Olynthus was of this number. The deputies of Acanthus and Apollonia represented, in the general assembly of the allies, that Olynthus, situate in their neighbourhood, daily improved in strength in an extraordinary manner; that it perpetually extended its dominions by new conquests; that it obliged all the cities round about to submit to it, and to enter into its measures; and was upon the point of concluding an alliance with the Athenians and the Thebans. The affair being taken into consideration, it was unanimously resolved that it was necessary to declare war against the Olynthians. It was agreed that the allied cities should furnish ten thousand troops, with liberty to such as desired it, to substitute money, at the rate of three oboli [d] a day for each foot soldier, and four times as much for the horse. The Lacedæmonians, to lose no time, made their troops march directly, under the command of Eudamidas, who prevailed with the Ephori, that Phœbidas, his brother, might have the leading of those which were to follow, and to join him soon after. When he arrived in that part of Macedonia which is also called

A. M. 3621. Ant. J. C. 383.

[b] Diod. l. xv. p. 341 [c] Ibid. p. 554, 556 [d] Fivepence.

Thrace, he garrisoned such places as applied to him for that purpose, seized upon Potidea, a city in alliance with the Olynthians, which surrendered without making any defence; and began the war against Olynthus, though slowly, as was incumbent upon a general whose troops were not all assembled.

[e] Phœbidas began his march soon after, and being arrived near Thebes, encamped without the walls, near the Gymnasium or public place of exercise. Ismenius and Leontides, both polemarchs, that is, generals of the army, and supreme magistrates of Thebes, were at the head of two different factions. The first, who had engaged Pelopidas on his side, was no friend to the Lacedæmonians, nor they to him; because he publicly declared for popular government and liberty. The other on the contrary favoured an oligarchy, and was supported by the Lacedæmonians with their whole interest. I am obliged to enter into this detail, because the event I am going to relate, and which was a consequence of it, was the occasion of the important war between the Thebans and Lacedæmonians.

A. M. 3622. Ant. J. C. 382.

This being the state of affairs at Thebes, Leontides applied to Phœbidas, and proposed to him to seize the citadel called Cadmæa, to expel the adherents of Ismenius, and to give the Lacedæmonians possession of it. He represented to him, that nothing could be more glorious for him, than to make himself master of Thebes, whilst his brother was endeavouring to reduce Olynthus; that he would thereby facilitate the success of his brother's enterprise; and that the Thebans, who had prohibited their citizens by decree to bear arms against the Olynthians, would not fail, upon his making himself master of the citadel, to supply him with whatever number of horse and foot he should think proper, for the reinforcement of Eudamidas.

Phœbidas, who had much ambition and little prudence, and who sought only for an opportunity of signalizing himself by some extraordinary action, without examining the consequences, suffered himself to be easily persuaded. Whilst the Thebans, in entire security and full reliance on the treaty of

[e] Xenoph. p. 556—558. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 608, 609. Id. *in Pelop.* p. 280. Diod. l. xv. p. 341, 342.

peace lately concluded by the Grecian states, were celebrating the feasts of Ceres, and expected nothing less than such an act of hostility, Phœbidas, conducted by Leontides, took possession of the citadel. The senate was then sitting. Leontides went to them, and declared, that there was nothing to be feared from the Lacedæmonians who had just entered the citadel; that they were only the enemies of those who wished to disturb the public tranquillity; that as for himself, by the power his office of polemarch gave him, of confining whoever caballed against the state, he should put Ismenius into a place of security, who factiously endeavoured to break the peace. He was seized accordingly, and carried to the citadel. The party of Ismenius, seeing their chief a prisoner, and apprehending the utmost violence for themselves, quitted the city with precipitation, and retired to Athens, to the number of four hundred and upwards. They were soon after banished by a public decree. Pelopidas was of the number; but Epaminondas remained at Thebes unmolested, being disregarded, as a man entirely devoted to the study of philosophy, who did not intermeddle in affairs of state; and also on account of his poverty, which left no room to fear any thing from him. A new polemarch was nominated in the room of Ismenius, and Leontides went to Lacedæmon.

The news of Phœbidas's enterprise, who at a time of general peace had taken possession of a citadel by force, upon which he had no claim nor right, had occasioned great murmurings and complaints. Such especially as opposed Agesilaus, who was suspected of having shared in the scheme, demanded by whose orders Phœbidas had committed so strange a breach of public faith. Agesilaus, who well knew that those warm reproaches were aimed at him, made no difficulty of justifying Phœbidas, and declared openly, and before all the world, 'That the action ought to be considered in itself, in order to understand whether it were useful or not; that whatever was expedient for Sparta, he was not only permitted, but commanded to act, upon his own authority, and without waiting the orders of any body.' Strange principles to be advanced by a person who upon other occasions had maintained, *That justice was the first of all virtues; and that without it, valour itself, and every other*

great quality, were useless and unavailing. It is the same man that made answer, when somebody in his presence magnified the king of Persia's grandeur; *He, whom you call the great king, in what is he greater than I, unless he be more just?* A truly noble and admirable maxim, THAT JUSTICE MUST BE THE RULE OF WHATEVER IS EXCELLENT AND GREAT! But a maxim that he had only in his mouth, and which all his actions contradicted; conformably to the principle of the generality of politicians, who imagine that a statesman ought always to have justice in his mouth, but should never lose an occasion of violating it for the advantage of his country.

But let us now hear the sentence which the august assembly of Sparta, so renowned for the wisdom of its counsels and the equity of its decrees, is about to pronounce. The affair being maturely considered, the arguments discussed at large, and set in their full light, the assembly resolved, that Phœbidas should be deprived of his command, and fined a hundred thousand drachmas;[f] but that they should continue to hold the citadel, and keep a strong garrison in it. What a strange contradiction was this! says Polybius;[g] what a disregard of all justice and reason! to punish the criminal, and approve the crime; and not only to approve the crime tacitly, and without having any share in it, but to ratify it by public authority, and continue it in the name of the state, in order to reap the advantages arising from it! But this was not all: commissioners, appointed by all the cities in alliance with Sparta, were despatched to the citadel of Thebes, to try Ismenius, upon whom they passed sentence of death, which was immediately executed. Such flagrant injustice seldom remains unpunished. To act in such a manner, says Polybius again, is neither for one's country's interest, nor one's own.

[h] Teleutias, Agesilaus's brother, had been substituted in the place of Phœbidas to command the rest of the troops of the allies designed against Olynthus; whither he marched with all expedition. The city was strong, and furnished with every thing necessary to a good defence. Several sallies were made with great success, in one of which Teleutias was killed. The

[f] About 2200*l.* sterling.
[g] Lib. iv. p. 296.
[h] Xenoph. l. v. p. 559—565. Diod. l. xv. p. 342, 343.

next year king Agesipolis had the command of the army. The campaign passed in skirmishing, without any thing decisive. Agesipolis died soon after of a disease, and was succeeded by his brother Cleombrotus, who reigned nine years. About that time began the hundredth Olympiad. Sparta made fresh efforts to terminate the war with the Olynthians. Polybidas their general pressed the siege with vigour. The place being in want of provisions was at last obliged to surrender, and was received by the Spartans into the number of their allies.

A. M. 3624. Ant. J. C. 380.

SECT. II. SPARTA'S PROSPERITY. CHARACTER OF TWO ILLUSTRIOUS THEBANS, EPAMINONDAS AND PELOPIDAS. THE LATTER FORMS THE DESIGN OF RESTORING THE LIBERTY OF HIS COUNTRY. CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE TYRANTS WISELY CONDUCTED, AND HAPPILY EXECUTED. THE CITADEL IS RETAKEN.—[1] The fortune of the Lacedæmonians never appeared with greater splendour, nor their power more strongly established. All Greece was subjected to them, either by force or alliance. They were in possession of Thebes, a most powerful city, and with that of all Bœotia. They had found means to humble Argos, and to hold it in dependence. Corinth was entirely at their devotion, and obeyed their orders in every thing. The Athenians, abandoned by their allies and reduced almost to their own strength, were in no condition to make head against them. If any city or people in their alliance attempted to withdraw themselves from their power, an immediate punishment reduced them to their former obedience, and terrified all others from following their example. Thus, masters by sea and land, all trembled before them; and the most formidable princes, as the king of Persia and the tyrant of Syracuse, seemed to emulate each other in courting their friendship and alliance.

A prosperity founded in injustice can be of no long duration. The blow that was to shake the Spartan power, came from the very quarter where they had exercised the most unjust violence, and from whence they did not seem to have any thing to fear; that is to say, from Thebes. Two illustrious citizens of that

[1] Xenoph. p. 565. Diod. p. 334.

state will make a glorious appearance upon the theatre of Greece, and for that reason deserve our notice in this place.

[k] These are Pelopidas and Epaminondas; both descended from the noblest families of Thebes. Pelopidas, nurtured in the greatest affluence, and having become, whilst young, sole heir of a very rich and flourishing family, employed his wealth, from the first possession of it, in the relief of such as had occasion for it and merited his favour; showing in that wise use of his riches, that he was really their master, and not their slave. For according to Aristotle's remark, repeated by Plutarch,* most men either make no use at all of their fortunes out of avarice, or abuse them in bad or trifling expenses. As for Epaminondas, poverty was all his inheritance, in which his honour, and one might almost say, his joy and delight, consisted. He was born of poor parents, and consequently familiarized from his infancy with poverty, which he made more grateful and easy to him by his taste for philosophy. Pelopidas, who supported a great number of citizens, never having been able to prevail on him to accept his offers and to make use of his fortune, resolved to share in the poverty of his friend by making him his example, and became the model as well as admiration of the whole city, from the modesty of his dress and the frugality of his table.

[l] If Epaminondas was poor with respect to the goods of fortune, he was amply recompensed in those of the head and heart. Modest, prudent, grave, skilful in taking advantage of favourable opportunities, possessing in a supreme degree the science of war, equally valiant and wise, easy and complaisant in his intercourse with the world, suffering with incredible patience the ill treatment of the people, and even of his friends, uniting with his ardour for military exercises a wonderful taste for study and the sciences, piquing himself especially so much upon truth and sincerity that he made a scruple of telling a lie even in jest or for diversion. *Adeò veritatis diligens, ut ne joco quidem mentiretur.*

[m] They were both equally inclined to virtue. But Pelopidas

[k] Plut. *in Pelop.* p. 279. [l] Cor. Nep. *in Epam.* c. iii. [m] Plut. *in Pelop.* p. 279.

* Τῶν πολλῶν, οἱ μὲν οὐ χρῶνται τῷ πλούτῳ διὰ μικρολογίαν οἱ δὲ παραχρῶνται διὰ ἀσωτίαν.

was best pleased with the exercises of the body, and Epaminondas with the cultivation of the mind. For which reason, they employed their leisure, the one in the palæstra and the chase, and the other in conversation and the study of philosophy.

But what persons of sense and judgment must principally admire in them, and which is rarely found amongst those of their high rank, is the perfect union and friendship that always subsisted between them, during the whole time they were employed together in the administration of the public affairs, whether in war or peace. If we examine the government of Aristides and Themistocles, that of Cimon and Pericles, of Nicias and Alcibiades, we shall find them full of trouble, dissension, and debate. The two friends we speak of held the first offices in the state; all great affairs passed through their hands; every thing was confided to their care and authority. In such delicate conjunctures, what occasions of pique and jealousy generally arise? But neither difference of sentiment, diversity of interest, nor the least emotion of envy, ever altered their union and good understanding. The reason of which was, their being founded upon an unalterable principle, that is, upon virtue; which in all their actions, says Plutarch, occasioned their having neither glory nor riches, those fatal sources of strife and division, in view, but solely the public good, and made them desire, not the advancement or honour of their own families, but to render their country more powerful and flourishing. Such were the two illustrious men who are about to make their appearance, and to give a new face to the affairs of Greece, by the great events in which they will have a principal share.

[n] Leontides being apprized that the exiles had retired to Athens, where they had been well received by the people, and much respected by all people of worth and honour, laid a plot for secretly cutting them off, by means of certain unknown persons, whom he sent thither to assassinate the most considerable of them. Only Andro- A. M. 3626. Ant. J. C. 378.

[n] Xenoph. *Hist. Gr.* l. v. p. 566—568. Plut. *in Pelop.* p. 280—284. Id. *de Socrat. Gen.* p. 586—588. 594—598. Diod. l. xv. p. 344—346. Cor. Nep. *in Pelop.* c. i.—iv.

clides was killed, and Leontides failed in his designs against all the rest.

At the same time, the Athenians received letters from Sparta, to prohibit their receiving or assisting the exiles, and with orders to expel them their city, as persons declared to be the common enemies of Greece by all the allies. Humanity, a virtue peculiar and natural to the Athenians, made them reject so infamous a proposal with horror. They were transported with the opportunity of expressing their gratitude to the Thebans for a previous obligation of the same nature. For the Thebans had contributed the most to the reestablishment of the popular government at Athens, having declared in their favour by a public decree, contrary to the prohibition of Sparta; and it was from Thebes, that Thrasybulus had set out to deliver Athens from the Tyranny of the Thirty.

Pelopidas, though at that time very young, went to all the exiles one after another, of whom Melon was the most considerable. He represented to them, 'That it was neither becoming nor just to content themselves with having saved their own lives, and to look with indifference upon their country, enslaved and miserable: that whatever good-will the people of Athens might express for them, it was not fit that they should suffer their fate to depend upon the decrees of a people which their natural inconstancy, or the malignity of the orators that turned them any way at will, might soon alter: that it was necessary to hazard every thing, after the example of Thrasybulus, and to set before themselves his intrepid valour and generous fortitude as a model: that as he set out from Thebes to suppress and destroy the tyrants of Athens, so they ought to go from Athens to restore to Thebes its ancient liberty.'

This discourse made all the impression upon the exiles that could be expected. They sent privately to inform their friends at Thebes of their resolution, who extremely approved their design. Charon, one of the principal persons in the city, offered to receive the conspirators into his house. Philidas found means to get himself made secretary to Archias and Philip, who were then polemarchs or supreme magistrates of the city. As for Epaminondas, he had for some time diligently

endeavoured to inspire the younger Thebans by his discourse with a passionate desire to throw off the Spartan yoke. [o] He was ignorant of nothing that had been projected, but he believed that he ought not to have any share in it, because, as he said, he could not resolve to imbrue his hands in the blood of his countrymen; foreseeing that his friends would not keep within the due bounds of the enterprise, however lawful in itself, and that the tyrants would not perish alone; and convinced besides, that a citizen who should appear not to have taken either side, would have it in his power to make a more powerful impression upon the minds of the people.

The day for the execution of the project being fixed, the exiles thought proper that Pherenicus, having assembled all the conspirators, should stop at Thriasium, a little town not far from Thebes, and that a small number of the youngest of them should venture into the city. Twelve persons of the best families of Thebes, all united by a strict and faithful friendship with each other, though competitors for glory and honour, offered themselves for this bold enterprise. Pelopidas was of this number. After having embraced their companions, and despatched a messenger to Charon, to give him notice of their coming, they set out dressed in mean habits, carrying hounds with them, and poles in their hands for pitching of nets; that such as they met on the way might have no suspicion of them, and take them only for hunters that had wandered after their game.

Their messenger being arrived at Thebes, and having informed Charon that they were set out, the approach of danger did not alter his sentiments; and as he wanted neither courage nor honour, he prepared his house for their reception.

One of the conspirators, who was not a bad man, who even loved his country, and would have served the exiles with all his power, but had neither the resolution nor constancy necessary for such an enterprise, and could think of nothing but the difficulties and obstacles that presented themselves in crowds to his imagination, appalled with the prospect of danger, retired to his house without saying any thing, and despatched one of his friends to Melon and Pelopidas, to desire them to

[o] Plut. *de Gen. Socrat.* p. 594.

defer their enterprise, and return to Athens, there to await a more favourable opportunity. Happily, that friend, not finding his horse's bridle, and losing a great deal of time in quarrelling with his wife, was prevented from going.

Pelopidas and his companions, disguised like peasants, having separated from each other, entered the city at different gates towards the close of day. As it was then early in the winter, the north wind blew, and the snow fell; which served the better to conceal them, every body keeping within doors upon account of the cold weather; which gave them likewise a pretext for covering their faces. Some who were in the secret, received and conducted them to Charon's house; where, of exiles and others, their whole number amounted to forty-eight.

Philidas, secretary to the Bœotarchs,* who was in the plot, had some time before invited Archias and his companions to supper on that very day, promising them an exquisite repast, and the company of some of the finest women in the city. The guests being met at the appointed time, they sat down to table. They had circulated the glass, and were almost drunk, when it was whispered about, but not known where the report began, that the exiles were in the city. Philidas, without showing any concern, did his utmost to change the discourse. Archias, however, sent one of his officers to Charon, with orders to come to him immediately. It was now late, and Pelopidas and the conspirators were preparing to set out, and had put on their armour and swords, when, on a sudden, they heard a knocking at the door. Somebody went to it, and being told by the officer, that he was come from the magistrates with orders for Charon to attend them immediately, he ran to him half out of his wits to acquaint him with that terrible message. They all concluded that the conspiracy was discovered, and believed themselves lost, before it would be possible to execute any thing worthy their cause and valour. However, they were all of opinion that Charon should obey the order, and present himself before the magistrates with an air of assurance, as void of fear, and unconscious of offence.

* The magistrates and generals who were charged with the government of Thebes, were called Bœotarchs, that is to say, commanders or governors of Bœotia.

Charon was a man of intrepid courage in dangers which threatened only himself: but at that time, terrified for his friends, and apprehending also that he should be suspected of some treachery, if so many brave citizens, whom he had received into his house, should be destroyed, he went to his wife's apartment, and fetched his only son of fifteen years old at most, who in beauty and strength excelled all the youths of his age, and put him into the hands of Pelopidas, saying at the same time, 'If you discover that I have betrayed you, and have been guilty of treachery upon this occasion, revenge yourselves on me in this my only son, whom, dear as he is to me, I abandon to you, and let him fall a victim without mercy to his father's perfidy.'

These expressions wounded them to the heart; but what gave them the most sensible pain, was his imagining there was any one amongst them so mean and ungrateful as to form to himself the least suspicion in regard to him. They conjured him unanimously, not to leave his son with them, but to put him into some place of safety; that his friends and country might not want an avenger, if he should not be so fortunate as to escape the tyrants. 'No,' replied the father, 'he shall stay with you, and share your fate. If he must perish, what nobler end can he make, than to perish with his father and best friends? For you, my son, exert yourself beyond your years, and show a courage worthy of you and me. You see here the most excellent of the Thebans. Make under such masters a noble essay of glory, and learn to fight; or, if it must be so, to fall like them, for liberty. For the rest, I am not without hopes, for I believe that the justice of our cause will draw down the favour and protection of the gods upon us.' He concluded with a prayer for them, and after embracing the conspirators, went out.

He took pains on his way to recover himself, and to compose his looks and voice, that he might not appear under any concern. When he came to the door of the house where the feast was kept, Archias and Philidas came out to him, and asked the meaning of a report, that disaffected people were arrived in the city, and were concealed in some house. He seemed astonished; and finding by their answers to his

questions, that they had no precise information on the subject, he assumed a bolder tone, and said, 'It is very likely the report you speak of is only a false alarm, intended to interrupt your mirth: however, as it ought not to be neglected, I'll go immediately, and make the strictest inquiry possible into it.' Philidas praised his prudence and zeal; and carrying Archias back into the company, again engaged him in the debauch, and continued the entertainment, by keeping the guests in perpetual expectation of the women he had promised them.

Charon, on his return home, found his friends all prepared, not to conquer nor to save their lives, but to die gloriously, and to sell themselves as dear as they could. The serenity and joy of his looks explained beforehand, that they had nothing to fear. He repeated all that had passed; after which, they had no thoughts but of putting into instant execution a design, to which the least delay might occasion a thousand obstacles.

In fact at that very instant happened a second storm, far more violent and more dangerous than the first, and which seemed as if it could not possibly fail of making the enterprise miscarry. A courier from Athens arrived in great haste with a packet, which contained a circumstantial account of the whole conspiracy, as was afterwards discovered. The courier was brought first to Archias, who was already overcome with wine, and thought of nothing but pleasure. In giving him his despatches, he said, 'My lord, the person who writes you these letters, conjures you to read them immediately, being serious affairs.' Archias replied, laughing,* 'Serious affairs to-morrow;' which words were afterwards used by the Greeks as a proverb; and taking the letters, he put them under † his bolster, and continued the conversation and banquet.

The conspirators were at that time in the streets, divided into two parties; the one, with Pelopidas at their head, marched against Leontides, who was not at the feast; the other against Archias, under the command of Charon. The latter had put

* Οὐκοῦν εἰς ἄυριον, ἔφη, τὰ σπουδαῖα.
† The Greeks ate lying on couches.

on women's habits over their armour, and crowned themselves with pine and poplar wreaths, which entirely covered their faces. When they came to the door of the apartment where the feast was kept, the guests made a great noise, and set up loud shouts of joy. But they were told, that the women would not come in till the servants were all dismissed, which was done immediately. They were sent to neighbouring houses, where there was no want of wine for their entertainment. The conspirators, by this stratagem, having made themselves masters of the field of battle, entered sword in hand, and showing themselves in their true colours, put all the guests to the sword, and with them the magistrates, who were full of wine, and in no condition to defend themselves. Pelopidas met with more resistance. Leontides, who was asleep in bed, awaked with the noise that was made, and rising immediately, armed himself with his sword, and laid some of the conspirators at his feet, but was at last killed himself.

This grand affair being executed in this manner with so much despatch and success, couriers were immediately despatched to the exiles who had remained at Thriasium. The doors of the prisons were broken open, and five hundred prisoners let out. The Thebans were called upon to resume their liberty, and arms were given to all they met, the spoils affixed to the porticoes being taken down, and the armourers' and cutlers' shops broken open for that purpose. Epaminondas and Gorgidas came in arms to join them, accompanied with a numerous band of young men, and with some old persons of great worth, whom they had got together.

The whole city was in great terror and confusion; the houses all illuminated with torches, and the streets thronged with the multitude passing to and fro. The people, in a consternation at what had happened, and for want of sufficient information, waited impatiently for the day to know their destiny. The Lacedæmonian captains were therefore thought guilty of a very great error in not having fallen upon them during their disorder; for the garrison consisted of fifteen hundred men, besides three thousand, who had taken refuge in the citadel. Alarmed by the cries they heard, the illuminations they saw in the houses, and the tumult of the multitude

running backwards and forwards, they lay still, and contented themselves with guarding the citadel, after having sent couriers to Sparta with the news of what had happened, and to demand an immediate reinforcement.

The next day at sunrise the exiles arrived with their arms, and an assembly of the people was convened. Epaminondas and Gorgidas conducted Pelopidas and his company thither, surrounded with all their sacrificers, carrying in their hands the sacred fillets, and exhorting the citizens to assist their country, and to join with their gods. At this sight, the whole assembly rose up with loud acclamations and clapping of hands, and received the conspirators as their benefactors and deliverers. The same day, Pelopidas, Melon, and Charon, were elected Bœotarchs.

The arrival of the exiles was followed by that of five thousand foot, and five hundred horse, sent by the Athenians to Pelopidas, under the command of Demophoon. Those troops, with others which joined them shortly after from all the cities of Bœotia, composed an army of twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse, and without loss of time besieged the citadel, that it might be taken before relief could come from Sparta.

The besieged made a vigorous defence in hopes of a speedy succour, and seemed resolved rather to die than surrender the place; at least the Lacedæmonians were of that opinion. But they were not the greatest number of the garrison. When provisions began to fall short, and famine to press them, the rest of the troops obliged the Spartans to surrender. The garrison had their lives granted them, and were permitted to retire whither they thought fit. They were scarce marched out, when the aid arrived. The Lacedæmonians found Cleombrotus at Megara, at the head of a powerful army, which, with a little more expedition, might have saved the citadel. But this was not the first time that the natural slowness of the Lacedæmonians had occasioned the miscarriage of their most important enterprises. The three commanders, who had capitulated were tried. Two of them were punished with death; and the third had so great a fine laid upon him, that not being able to pay it, he banished himself from Peloponnesus.

Pelopidas had all the honour of this great exploit, the most

memorable of any that were ever executed by surprise and stratagem. Plutarch, with reason, comparès it to that of Thrasybulus. Both exiles, destitute in themselves of all resource, and compelled to implore a foreign support, form the bold design of attacking a formidable power with a handful of men; and having overcome all obstacles to their enterprise solely by their valour, had each of them the good fortune to deliver their country, and to change the face of affairs entirely. For the Athenians were indebted to Thrasybulus for that sudden and happy change, which, freeing them from the oppression under which they groaned, not only restored their liberty, but with it their ancient splendour, and put them into a condition to humble, and make Sparta, their ancient and constant rival, tremble in her turn. We shall see in like manner, that the war which is to reduce the pride of Sparta, and deprive her of empire over both sea and land, was the work of this single night, in which Pelopidas, without taking either citadel or fortress, but entering only one of twelve into a private house, * unloosed and broke the chains imposed by the Lacedæmonians on all the other states of Greece, though they appeared to be so firmly rivetted as never to be broken or unloosed.

SECT. III. SPHODRIAS THE LACEDÆMONIAN FORMS A DESIGN AGAINST THE PIRÆUS WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE ATHENIANS DECLARE FOR THE THEBANS. SKIRMISHES BETWEEN THE LATTER AND THE LACEDÆMONIANS.—[p] The Lacedæmonians, after the injury they pretended to have received by the enterprise of Pelopidas, did not continue quiet, but applied themselves in earnest to take their revenge. Agesilaus, rightly judging that an expedition of that kind, the end of which was to support tyrants, would not reflect much honour upon him, left it to Cleombrotus, who had lately succeeded king Agesipolis; under pretence that his great age dispensed with his undertaking it. Cleombrotus entered Bœotia with his army. The first campaign was not vigorous,

A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377.

[p] Xenoph. *Hist. Gr.* l. v. p. 568—572. Plut. *in Ages.* p. 609, 610. Id. *in Pelop.* p. 284, 285.

* Πελοπίδας, εἰ δεῖ μεταφορᾷ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἔλυσε καὶ διέκοψε τοὺς δεσμοὺς τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγεμονίας, ἀλύτους καὶ ἀῤῥήκτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας.

and terminated in committing some ravages in the country; after which the king retired; and detaching part of his troops to Sphodrias, who commanded at Thespiæ, returned to Sparta.

The Athenians, who did not think themselves in a condition to make head against the Lacedæmonians, and were afraid of the consequences of the war in which their league with the Thebans was likely to engage them, repented their having entered into it, and renounced it. Of those who persisted to adhere to the Theban party, some were imprisoned, some put to death, others banished, and the rich severely fined. The Theban affairs seemed almost desperate; as no one came forward to support them. Pelopidas and Gorgidas were then in office, and were concerting together means to embroil the Athenians with the Lacedæmonians; and this was the stratagem they contrived.

Sphodrias the Spartan had been left at Thespiæ with a body of troops, to receive and protect such of the Bœotians as should revolt against Thebes. He had acquired some reputation amongst the soldiery, and wanted neither courage nor ambition; but he was rash, superficial, self-conceited, and consequently apt to entertain vain hopes. Pelopidas and Gorgidas sent privately a merchant of his own acquaintance to him, with the offer, as from himself, of a considerable sum of money, and with insinuations better calculated to persuade him than money, since they flattered his vanity. 'After having represented to him that a person of his merit and reputation ought to form some great enterprise which might immortalize his name, he proposed to him the seizing of the Piræus, by attacking the Athenians by surprise, and when they could have no expectation of such an attempt. He added, that nothing could be more grateful to the Lacedæmonians, than to see themselves masters of Athens; and that the Thebans, enraged at the Athenians, whom they considered as traitors and deserters, would lend them no assistance.'

Sphodrias, anxious to acquire a great name, and envying the glory of Phœbidas, who, in his opinion, had rendered himself renowned and illustrious by his unjust attempt upon Thebes, conceived it would be a much more brilliant and glorious

exploit to seize the Piræus of his own accord, and deprive the Athenians of their great power at sea, by an unforeseen attack by land. He undertook therefore with great joy an enterprise, which was neither less unjust nor less horrid than that of the Cadmea, but executed neither with the same boldness nor with the same success. For having set out in the night from Thespiæ, with the view of surprising the Piræus before light, the daybreak overtook him in the plain of Thriasium near Eleusis, and finding himself discovered, he returned shamefully to Thespiæ with some booty which he had taken.

The Athenians immediately sent ambassadors with their complaints to Sparta. Those ambassadors found that the Lacedæmonians had not waited their arrival to accuse Sphodrias, but had already cited him before the council to answer for his conduct. He was afraid to obey that summons, having just reason to apprehend the issue of a trial, and the resentment of his country. He had a son, who had contracted a strict and tender friendship with the son of Agesilaus. The latter solicited his father so earnestly, or rather tormented him with such extreme importunity and perseverance, that he could not refuse Sphodrias his protection, and got him fully acquitted. Agesilaus had little delicacy, as we have seen already, with respect to the duties of justice, when the service of his friends was in question. He was, besides, of all mankind the most tender and indulgent father to his children. It is reported of him, that when they were little, he would play with them; and divert himself with riding upon a stick amongst them: and that having been one day surprised by a friend in that action, he desired him not to tell any body of it till himself was a father.

[q] The unjust sentence passed in favour of Sphodrias by the Spartans exceedingly incensed the Athenians, and determined them to renew their alliance with Thebes immediately, and to assist them with all their power. They fitted out a fleet of sixty sail, and gave the command of it to Timotheus, son of the illustrious Conon, whose reputation he well sustained by his own valour and exploits. It was he whom his enemies,

[q] Xenoph. l. v. p. 584—589. Plut. *in Ages.* p. 610, 611. Id. *in Pelop.* p. 285—288.

through envy of the glory he had acquired by his great success, painted sleeping, with the goddess Fortune at his feet, taking towns in nets for him: [r] but upon this occasion he proved that he was not asleep. After having ravaged the coast of Laconia, he attacked the isle of Corcyra,[s] which he took. He treated the inhabitants with great humanity, and made no alteration in their liberty or laws, which very much inclined the neighbouring cities in favour of Athens. The Spartans on their side made powerful preparations for the war, and were principally intent upon retaking Corcyra. Its happy situation between Sicily and Greece rendered that island very important. They therefore engaged Dionysius the tyrant in this expedition, and demanded aid of him. In the mean time they despatched their fleet under the command of Mnasippus. The Athenians sent sixty sail against them to the relief of Corcyra, under the command of Timotheus at first; but soon after, upon his seeming to act too slowly, Iphicrates was substituted in his place. Mnasippus having made himself odious to his troops by his haughtiness, rigour, and avarice, was very ill obeyed by them, and lost his life in an engagement. Iphicrates did not arrive till after his death, when he received advice that the Syracusan squadron of ten galleys was approaching, which he attacked so successfully that not one of them escaped. He had demanded, that the orator Callistratus, and Chabrias one of the most renowned captains of his time, should be joined in commission with him. Xenophon admires his wisdom and greatness of soul upon that account, in being not unwilling to appear to have occasion for advice, and not apprehending that others might share the glory of his victories with himself.

Agesilaus had been prevailed upon to take the command of the troops against Thebes. He entered Bœotia, where he did abundance of damage to the Thebans, not without considerable loss on his own side. The two armies came every day to blows, and were perpetually engaged, though not in formal battle, yet in skirmishes, which served to instruct the Thebans in the art of war, and to inspire them with valour, boldness, and experience. It is reported that the Spartan Antalcidas told Agesilaus very justly upon this head one day, when he was

[r] Plut. *in Syl.* p. 454. [s] Corfu.

brought back from Bœotia much wounded, 'My lord Agesilaus, you have a fine reward for the lessons you have given the Thebans in the art of war, which, before you taught it them, they neither would nor could learn.' It was to prevent this inconvenience, that Lycurgus, in one of the three laws which he calls *Rhetræ*, forbad the Lacedæmonians to make war often upon the same enemy, lest they should make them good soldiers, by obliging them too frequently to defend themselves.

Several campaigns passed in this manner without any thing decisive on either side. It was prudent in the Theban generals not to hazard a battle hitherto, and to give their soldiers time to inure and embolden themselves. When the occasion was favourable, they let them seasonably loose like generous hounds, and after having given them a taste of victory by way of reward, they called them off, contented with their courage and alacrity. The principal glory of their success and this wise conduct was due to Pelopidas.

The engagement at Tegyra, which was a kind of prelude to the battle of Leuctra, added much to his reputation. Having failed in his enterprise against Orchomenos, which had joined the Lacedæmonians, at his return he found the enemy posted to intercept him near Tegyra. As soon as the Thebans perceived them from the defiles, somebody ran in all haste to Pelopidas, and told him, 'We are fallen into the enemy's hands.' 'Why so?' replied he, 'Why should we not rather say, that they are fallen into ours?' At the same time he ordered his cavalry, which were his rearguard, to advance to the front, that they might begin the fight. He was assured that his foot, which were only three hundred, and were called the 'sacred battalion,' wherever they charged, would break through the enemy, though superior in number, as they were by at least two-thirds. The assault began where the generals of each party were posted, and was very fierce. The two generals of the Lacedæmonians, who had charged Pelopidas, were presently killed; all that were with them being either slain or dispersed. The rest of the Lacedæmonian troops were so daunted, that they opened a passage for the Thebans, who might have marched on and saved themselves if they had thought fit: but Pelopidas, disdaining to make use of that

opening for his retreat, advanced against those who were still drawn up in battle, and made so great a slaughter of them, that the rest were all dismayed, and fled in disorder. The Thebans did not pursue them far, lest they should be surprised. They contented themselves with having broken them, and with making a glorious retreat, not inferior to a victory, because it was made through an enemy dispersed and defeated.

This little encounter, for it can be called no more, was in a manner the source of the great actions and events we shall soon relate. It had never happened till then in any war, either against the barbarians or Greeks, that the Lacedæmonians had been defeated with the superiority of number on their side, nor even with equal forces in a pitched battle. For which reason they were insupportably proud, and their reputation alone kept their enemies in awe, who never durst show themselves in the field before them, unless superior in number. They now lost that glory; and the Thebans in their turn are to become the terror and dread even of those who had hitherto rendered themselves so universally formidable.

A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377. A. M. 3639. Ant. J. C. 374. The enterprise of Artaxerxes Mnemon against Egypt, and the death of Evagoras king of Cyprus, should naturally come in here. But I shall defer those articles, to avoid breaking in upon the Theban affairs.

SECT. IV. NEW TROUBLES IN GREECE. THE LACEDÆMONIANS DECLARE WAR AGAINST THEBES. THEY ARE DEFEATED AND PUT TO FLIGHT IN THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA. EPAMINONDAS RAVAGES LACONIA, AND MARCHES TO THE GATES OF SPARTA.—[t] Whilst the Persians were engaged in the Egyptian war, great troubles arose in Greece. In that interval the Thebans, having taken Platææ,[u] and afterwards Thespiæ, entirely demolished those two cities, and expelled the inhabitants. The Platæans retired to Athens with their wives and children, where they were received with the utmost kindness, and adopted into the number of the citizens.

[x] Artaxerxes, being informed of the state of the Grecian

[t] Diod. l. li. p. 361, 362.
[u] Platææ, a city of Bœotia; Thespiæ of Achaia.
[x] Xenoph. *Hist. Græc.* l. vi. p. 590—593. Diod. p. 365, 366.

affairs, sent a new embassy thither, to persuade the several cities and republics at war to lay down their arms, and accommodate their differences upon the plan of the treaty of Antalcidas. By that peace, as has been observed in its place, it was concluded, that all the cities of Greece should enjoy their liberty, and be governed by their own laws. In virtue of this article, the Lacedæmonians pressed the Thebans to restore liberty to all the cities of Bœotia, to rebuild Platææ and Thespiæ which they had demolished, and to restore them with the territories dependent on them to their ancient inhabitants. The Thebans on their side insisted also, that the Lacedæmonians should give liberty to all those of Laconia, and that the city of Messene should be restored to its ancient possessors. This was what equity required; but the Lacedæmonians, believing themselves much superior to the Thebans, were for imposing a law upon them, to which they would not submit themselves. A. M. 3633. Ant. J. C. 371.

All Greece being weary of a war which had already lasted several campaigns, and had no other origin than the ambition and injustice of Sparta, nor any other end than the aggrandizing of that state, was seriously intent upon effecting a general peace, and with that view had sent deputies to Lacedæmon, to concert together the means of attaining so desirable an event. [y] Amongst those deputies, Epaminondas was of the first rank. He was at that time celebrated for his great erudition and profound knowledge in philosophy; but he had not yet had an opportunity of giving any very distinguished proofs of his great capacity for the command of armies and the administration of public affairs. Seeing that all the deputies, out of respect for Agesilaus, who declared openly for the war, were afraid to contradict him, or to differ from his opinion in any thing, a very common effect of too imperious a power on one side, and too servile a submission on the other; he was the only one that spoke with a wise and noble boldness, as became a statesman who had no other view than the public good. He made a speech, not for the Thebans alone, but for Greece in general; in which he proved, that the war augmented only the power of Sparta, whilst the rest of Greece was reduced and

[y] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 611.

ruined by it. He insisted principally upon the necessity of establishing the peace upon the basis of equality and justice; because no peace could be solid and of long duration, but that wherein all parties should find an equal advantage.

A discourse like this, founded evidently upon reason and justice, and pronounced with a grave and serious tone, never fails of making an impression. Agesilaus plainly perceived, from the attention and silence with which it was heard, that the deputies were extremely affected with it, and would not fail to act conformably to his opinion. To prevent that effect,[c] he demanded of Epaminondas, 'Whether he thought it just and reasonable that Bœotia should be free and independent?' that is to say, Whether he agreed that the cities of Bœotia should depend no longer upon Thebes? Epaminondas immediately asked in his turn, with great vivacity, 'Whether he thought it just and reasonable that Laconia should enjoy the same independence and liberty?' Upon which Agesilaus, rising from his seat in great rage, insisted upon his declaring plainly, 'Whether he would consent that Bœotia should be free?' Epaminondas retorted his question again, and asked, 'Whether, on his side, he would consent that Laconia should be free?' Agesilaus, who wanted only a pretext for breaking with the Thebans, struck their name directly out of the treaty of alliance which they were about to conclude. The rest of the allies signed it, less out of inclination, than not to offend the Lacedæmonians, whose power they dreaded.

In consequence of this treaty, all the troops in the field were to be disbanded. Cleombrotus, one of the kings of Sparta, was then in Phocis, at the head of the army. He wrote to the Ephori to know the republic's resolutions. Prothous, one of the principal senators, represented that there was no room for deliberation, for that Sparta, by the late agreement, had made the recall of the troops indispensable. Agesilaus was of a different opinion. Angry with the Thebans, and particularly with Epaminondas, he was absolutely bent on war for an opportunity of revenge, and the present seemed particularly favourable, when all Greece was free and united, and only the

[c] Xenoph. l. vi. p. 593—597. Diod. l. xv. p. 365—371. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 611, 612. Id. *in Pelop.* p. 288, 289.

Thebans excluded from the treaty of peace. The advice of Prothous was therefore rejected by the whole council,* who treated him as an honest well-meaning dotard, that knew nothing of the matter; the Divinity, from thenceforth, as Xenophon observes, promoting their downfall. The Ephori wrote immediately to Cleombrotus to march against the Thebans with his troops, and sent orders at the same time to all their allies to assemble their forces, who were very averse to this war, and did not join in it but with great reluctance, and out of fear of contradicting the Lacedæmonians, whom they did not yet dare to disobey. Though no happy consequences could be expected from a war, visibly undertaken contrary to all reason and justice, and from the sole motive of resentment and revenge; the Lacedæmonians, however, from the superiority of their numbers, assured themselves of success, and imagined that the Thebans, abandoned by their allies, were in no condition to oppose them.

The Thebans were much alarmed at first. They saw themselves alone, without allies or support, whilst all Greece looked upon them as utterly lost; not knowing that in a single man they had more than an army. This man was Epaminondas. He was appointed general, and had several colleagues joined in commission with him. He immediately raised all the troops he could, and began his march. His army did not amount to six thousand men, and the enemy had above four times that number. As several bad omens were told him to prevent his setting out, he replied only by a verse of Homer's, of which the sense is, † 'There is but one good omen, which is, to fight for one's country.' However, to reassure the soldiers, by nature superstitious, and whom he observed to be discouraged, he instructed several persons to come from different places, and report auguries and omens in his favour, which revived the spirits and hopes of the troops. A. M. 3634. Ant. J. C. 370.

Pelopidas was not then in office, but commanded the sacred battalion. When he left his house to go to the army, his wife, in taking her last adieu, conjured him with a flood of tears to take care of himself: 'That,' said he, 'should be recommended

* Ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσαντο, ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν.
† Εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης. *Iliad.* xi. v. 423.

to young people; but for generals, they have no occasion for such advice; they should only be exhorted to take care of others.'

Epaminondas had had the wise precaution to secure a pass, by which Cleombrotus might have shortened his march considerably. The latter, after having taken a large compass, arrived at Leuctra, a small town of Bœotia, between Platææ and Thespiæ. Both parties consulted whether they should give battle; which Cleombrotus resolved by the advice of all his officers, who represented to him, that if, with such a superiority of troops, he declined fighting, it would confirm the report which was secretly spread, that he covertly favoured the Thebans. The latter had an essential reason for hastening a battle, to anticipate the arrival of the troops, which the enemy daily expected. However, the six generals, who formed the council of war, differed in their sentiments. A seventh, who came up very seasonably, joined the three that were for fighting; and his opinion, which coincided also with that of Epaminondas, carrying the question, the battle was resolved upon. This was in the second year of the 102d Olympiad.

The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Lacedæmonians, as has been said, consisted of twenty-four thousand foot and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans had only six thousand foot and four hundred horse; but all of them choice troops, animated by their success in former campaigns, and determined to conquer or die. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, composed of men picked up by chance, without valour, and ill-disciplined, was as much inferior to that of their enemies in courage, as it was superior in number. The infantry could not be depended on, except the Lacedæmonians; the allies, as it has been said, having engaged in the war with reluctance, because they did not approve the motive of it, and were besides dissatisfied with the Lacedæmonians.

The ability of the generals on either side supplied the place of numerous armies, especially the Theban, who was the most accomplished captain of his times. He was supported by Pelopidas at the head of the sacred battalion, composed of three hundred young Thebans, united in a strict friendship and affection, and engaged under a particular oath never to fly, but to defend each other to the last drop of their blood.

Upon the day of battle the two armies drew up on a plain. Cleombrotus was upon the right, consisting of Lacedæmonians, on whom he confided most, and whose files were twelve deep. To take advantage of the superiority of his horse in an open country, he posted them in the front of his Lacedæmonians. Archidamus, Agesilaus's son, was at the head of the allies, who formed the left wing.

Epaminondas, who resolved to charge with his left which he commanded in person, strengthened it with the choice of his heavy-armed troops, whom he drew up fifty deep. The sacred battalion was upon his left, and closed the wing. The rest of his infantry were posted upon his right in an oblique line, which, the farther it extended, was the more distant from the enemy. By this uncommon disposition, his design was to cover his right flank, to refuse his right wing and keep it as a kind of reserve, that he might not hazard the event of the battle upon the weakest part of his army; and to begin the action with his left wing, where his best troops were posted, to turn the whole weight of the battle upon king Cleombrotus and the Spartans. He was assured, that if he could penetrate the Lacedæmonian phalanx, the rest of the army would soon be put to the rout. As for his horse, he disposed them (after the enemy's example) in the front of his left.

The action began by the cavalry. As that of the Thebans were better mounted and braver troops than the Lacedæmonian horse, the latter were not long before they were broken, and driven upon the infantry, which they put into some confusion. Epaminondas following his horse close, marched swiftly up to Cleombrotus, and fell upon his phalanx with all the weight of his heavy battalion. The latter, to make a diversion, detached a body of troops with orders to take Epaminondas in flank, and to surround him. Pelopidas, upon the sight of that movement, advanced with incredible speed and boldness at the head of the sacred battalion to prevent the enemy's design, and flanked Cleombrotus himself, who, by that sudden and unexpected attack, was put into disorder. The battle was very fierce and obstinate; and whilst Cleombrotus could act, the victory continued in suspense, and declared for neither party. When he fell dead with his

wounds, the Thebans, to complete the victory, and the Lacedæmonians, to avoid the shame of abandoning the body of their king, redoubled their efforts, and a great slaughter ensued on both sides. The Spartans fought with so much fury about the body, that at length they gained their point, and carried it off. Animated by so glorious an advantage, they prepared to return to the charge, which would perhaps have proved successful, had the allies seconded their ardour. But the left wing, seeing the Lacedæmonian phalanx had been broken, and believing all lost, especially when they heard that the king was dead, took to flight, and drew off the rest of the army along with them. Epaminondas followed them vigorously, and killed a great number in the pursuit. The Thebans remained masters of the field of battle, erected a trophy, and permitted the enemy to bury their dead.

The Lacedæmonians had never received such a blow. The most bloody defeats till then had scarce ever cost them more than four or five hundred of their citizens. They had been seen, however, animated, or rather violently incensed, against Athens, to ransom, by a truce of thirty years, eight hundred of their citizens, who had suffered themselves to be shut up in the little island of Sphacteria. Here they lost four thousand men, of whom one thousand were Lacedæmonians, and four hundred * Spartans, out of seven hundred who were in the battle. The Thebans had only three hundred men killed, among whom were but few of their citizens.

The city of Sparta was at that time celebrating the gymnastic games, and was full of strangers whom curiosity had brought thither, when the couriers arrived from Leuctra with the terrible news of their defeat. The Ephori, though perfectly sensible of all the consequences, and that the Spartan empire had received a mortal wound, would not permit the representations of the theatre to be suspended, nor any change to take place in the celebration of the festival. They sent to every family the names of their relations who were killed, and staid in the theatre to see that the dances and games were continued without interruption to the end.

* Those were properly called Spartans, who inhabited Sparta; the Lacedæmonians were those settled in the country.

The next day in the morning, the loss of each family being known, the fathers and relations of those who had died in the battle met in the public square, and saluted and embraced each other with great joy and serenity in their looks; whilst the others kept themselves close in their houses, or, if necessity obliged them to go abroad, it was with a sadness and dejection of aspect which sensibly expressed their profound anguish and affliction. That difference was still more remarkable in the women. Grief, silence, tears, distinguished those who expected the return of their sons; but such as had lost their sons were seen hurrying to the temples to thank the gods, and congratulating each other upon their glory and good fortune. It cannot be denied but such sentiments evince great courage and resolution: but I would not have them entirely extinguish natural tenderness, and should have been better pleased had there been less of ferocity in them.

Sparta was under no small difficulty to know how to act in regard to those who had fled from the battle. As they were numerous, and of the most powerful families in the city, it was not safe to inflict upon them the punishments assigned by the laws, lest their despair should induce them to take some violent resolution that might be fatal to the state. For such as fled were not only excluded from all offices and employments, but it was a disgrace to contract any alliance with them by marriage. Any body that met them in the streets might buffet them, which they were obliged to suffer. They were besides to wear dirty and ragged habits, full of patches of different colours. And, lastly, they were to shave half their beards, and to let the other half grow. It would be a great loss to the Spartans to be deprived of so many of their soldiery, at a time when they had such pressing occasion for them. To remove this difficulty, they chose Agesilaus legislator, with absolute power to make such alterations in the laws as he should think fit. Agesilaus, without adding, retrenching, or changing any thing, found means to save the fugitives without prejudice to the state. In a full assembly of the Lacedæmonians, he decreed, 'That for the present day, the laws should be suspended, and of no effect; but ever after to remain in full force and authority.' By those few words he preserved the

Spartan laws entire, and at the same time restored to the state that great number of its members, by preventing their being for ever degraded, and consequently useless to the republic.

[a] After the battle of Leuctra the two parties were industriously employed, the one in retrieving their loss, and the other in improving their victory.

[b] Agesilaus, to revive the courage of his troops, marched them into Arcadia; but with a full resolution carefully to avoid a battle. He confined himself to attacking some small towns of the Mantinæans, which he took, and laid the country waste. This gave Sparta some joy, and they began to take courage from believing their condition not entirely desperate.

The Thebans, immediately after their victory, had sent an account of it to Athens, and to demand aid at the same time against the common enemy. The senate was then sitting, and received the courier with great coldness, did not make him the usual presents, and dismissed him without taking any notice of aid. The Athenians, alarmed at the considerable advantage which the Thebans had gained over the Lacedæmonians, could not dissemble the umbrage and dissatisfaction which so sudden and unexpected an increase of a neighbouring power gave them, which might soon render itself formidable to all Greece.

At Thebes, Epaminondas and Pelopidas had been elected joint governors of Bœotia. Having assembled all the troops of the Bœotians and their allies, whose number daily increased, they entered Peloponnesus, and made abundance of places and states revolt from the Lacedæmonians; Elis, Argos, all Arcadia, and the greatest part of Laconia itself. It was then about the winter solstice, and towards the end of the last month of the year, so that in a few days they were to quit their offices; the first day of the next month being assigned by law, for their resigning them to the persons appointed to succeed them, upon pain of death, if they held them beyond that term. Their colleagues, apprehending the badness of the season, and still more, the dreadful consequences of infringing that law, were for marching back the army immediately to Thebes.

[a] Xenoph. l. vi. p. 598. Diod. l. xv. p. 375—378.
[b] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 613—615. Id. *in Pelop.* p. 290.

Pelopidas was the first who, entering into the opinion of Epaminondas, animated the citizens, and engaged them to take advantage of the enemy's alarm, and to pursue their enterprise, without regard to a formality, from the observance of which they might justly believe themselves dispensed by the state itself, as the service of the state, when founded in justice, is the sovereign law and rule of the people's obedience.

They entered Laconia therefore at the head of an army of seventy thousand good soldiers, of which the Thebans did not form a twelfth part. But the great reputation of the two generals was the cause, that all the allies, even without orders or a public decree, obeyed them with respectful silence, and marched with entire confidence and courage under their command. It was six hundred years since the Dorians had established themselves at Lacedæmon, and in all that time they had never seen, till now, an enemy upon their lands; none having hitherto dared to set foot in them, and much less to attack their city, though without walls. The Thebans and their allies, finding a country hitherto untouched by an enemy, ran through it with fire and sword, destroying and plundering as far as the river Eurotas, without any opposition whatsoever.

Parties had been posted to defend some important passes. Ischolas the Spartan, who commanded one of these detachments, distinguished himself in a peculiar manner. Finding it impossible, with his small body of troops, to support the enemy's attack, and thinking it disgraceful for a Spartan to abandon his post, he sent back the young men, who were of an age and condition to serve their country effectually, and kept none with him but such as were advanced in years. These, unanimously devoting themselves, after the example of Leonidas, to the public good, sold their lives very dear; and after having defended themselves a long time, and made great slaughter of their enemies, they all perished to a man.

Agesilaus acted upon this occasion with great address and wisdom. He looked upon this irruption of the enemy as an impetuous torrent, which it was not only in vain but dangerous to oppose, whose rapid course would be but of short duration, and after some ravages subside of itself. He contented himself with distributing his best troops into the middle and all

the most important parts of the city, and with strongly securing all the posts. He was determined not to quit the town, nor to hazard a battle, and persisted in that resolution, without regard to all the raillery, insults, and menaces of the Thebans, who defied him by name, and called upon him to come out and defend his country, him, who had alone been the cause of all its sufferings, by kindling the war.

But a subject of far greater affliction to Agesilaus were the commotions and disorders excited within the city, the murmurs and complaints of the old men in the highest affliction and despair from being witnesses of what they saw, as well as of the women, who seemed quite distracted with hearing the threatening cries of the enemy, and seeing the neighbouring country all on fire, whilst the flames and smoke, which drove almost upon them, seemed to denounce a like misfortune to themselves. Whatever courage Agesilaus might express in his outward behaviour, he could not fail of being sensibly affected with so mournful an object, to which was added the grief of sullying his reputation; who, having found the city in a most flourishing and potent condition when he came to the government, now saw it fallen to such a degree, and all its ancient glory lost under him! He was, besides, secretly mortified at so mournful a contradiction of a boast he had often made, 'That no woman of Sparta had ever seen the smoke of an enemy's camp.'

Whilst he was giving different orders in the city, he was informed, that a certain number of mutineers had seized an important post, with a resolution to defend themselves in it. Agesilaus ran immediately thither; and, as if he had been entirely unacquainted with their bad design, he said to them, 'Comrades, it is not there I sent you.' At the same time he pointed to different posts to divide them; to which they went, believing their enterprise had not been discovered. This order, which he gave without emotion, evinces a great presence of mind in Agesilaus, and shows, that in times of trouble it is not proper to see too much, that the culpable may not want time to reflect and repent. He thought it more advisable to suppose that small troop innocent, than to urge them to a declared revolt by a too rigorous inquiry.

The Eurotas was at that time very much swoln by the melting of the snows, and the Thebans found more difficulty in passing it than they expected, as well from the extreme coldness of the water as its rapidity. As Epaminondas passed at the head of his infantry, some of the Spartans pointed him out to Agesilaus; who, after having attentively considered and followed him with his eyes a long time, said only, * 'Wonderful man!' in admiration of the valour that induced him to undertake such great things. Epaminondas would have been glad to have given battle in Sparta itself, and to have erected a trophy in the midst of it. He did not however dare to attempt the forcing of the city; and not being able to induce Agesilaus to quit it, chose to retire. It would have been difficult for Sparta, without aid, and unfortified, to have defended itself long against a victorious army. But the prudent captain who commanded it, was apprehensive of drawing upon his hands the whole force of Peloponnesus, and still more, of exciting the jealousy of the Greeks, who would never have pardoned his destroying so potent a republic, and pulling out, as Leptines says, one of the eyes of Greece, as a proof of his skill.[c] He confined himself therefore to the glory of having humbled the proud, whose laconic language added new haughtiness to their commands, and of having reduced them to the necessity, as he boasted himself, of lengthening their † monosyllables. On his return he again wasted the country.

[d] In this expedition the Thebans reinstated Arcadia into one body, and took Messenia from the Spartans, who had been in possession of it ‡ very long, after having expelled all its inhabitants. It was a country equal in extent to Laconia, and as fertile as the best soil in Greece. Its ancient inhabitants, who were dispersed in different regions of Greece, Italy, and Sicily, on the first notice given them, returned with incredible joy;

[c] Arist. *Rhet.* l. iii. c. 10. [d] Paus. l. iv. p. 267, 268.

* Ὦ τῦ μεγαλοπραγμενος ἀνδρῶτυ. The Greek expression is not easy to be translated. It signifies, Oh the actor of great deeds!

† The Lacedæmonians sometimes answered the most important despatches by a single monosyllable. Philip having written to them, 'If I enter your country, I will put all to fire and sword,' they replied, 'If;' to signify they would take all possible care to put it out of his power.

‡ The Messenians had been driven out of their country two hundred and eighty-seven years.

animated by the love of their country, natural to all men, and almost as much by their hatred of the Spartans, which length of time had only increased. They built themselves a city, which, from the name of the old one, was called Messene. Amongst the unhappy events of this war, none gave the Lacedæmonians more sensible displeasure, or rather more lively grief, than this; because from time immemorial an irreconcilable enmity had subsisted between Sparta and Messene, which seemed incapable of being extinguished but by the final ruin of the one or the other.

[e] Polybius points out an ancient error in the conduct of the Messenians with regard to Sparta, which was the cause of all their misfortunes. This was their too great solicitude for present tranquillity, and, through an excessive love of peace, their neglecting the means of making it sure and lasting. Two of the most powerful states of Greece were their neighbours, the Arcadians and Lacedæmonians. The latter, from their first settlement in the country, had declared open war against them: the others, on the contrary, always joined with them, and entered into all their interests. But the Messenians had neither the courage to oppose their violent and irreconcilable enemies with valour and constancy, nor the prudence to treat with due regard their faithful and affectionate allies. When the two states were either at war with each other, or carried their arms elsewhere, the Messenians, with little foresight for the future, and regarding only their present repose, made it a rule never to engage in the quarrel on either side, and to observe an exact neutrality. On such conjunctures they congratulated themselves upon their wisdom and success in preserving their tranquillity, whilst their neighbours all around them were involved in trouble and confusion. But this tranquillity was of no long duration. The Lacedæmonians, having subdued their enemies, fell upon them with all their forces; and finding them unsupported by allies, and incapable of defending themselves, they reduced them to submit, either to the yoke of a rigid slavery, or to banish themselves from their country. And this was several times their case. They ought

[e] Polyb. l. iv. p. 299, 300

to have reflected, says Polybius,* that as there is nothing more desirable or advantageous than peace, when founded on justice and honour; so there is nothing more shameful, and at the same time more pernicious, when attained by bad measures, and purchased at the price of liberty.

SECT. V. THE TWO THEBAN GENERALS, AT THEIR RETURN, ARE ACCUSED, AND ACQUITTED. SPARTA IMPLORES AID OF THE ATHENIANS. THE GREEKS SEND AMBASSADORS TO ARTAXERXES. INFLUENCE OF PELOPIDAS AT THE COURT OF PERSIA.—It might be expected, that the two Theban captains, on their return to their country after such memorable actions, should have been received with general applause, and all the honours that could be conferred upon them. Instead of which, they were both summoned to answer as criminals against the state; in having, contrary to the law, whereby they were obliged to resign their command to new officers, retained it four months beyond the appointed term; during which they had executed in Messenia, Arcadia, and Laconia, all those great exploits we have related.

Such conduct is surprising, and the relation of it cannot be read without a secret indignation: but it had a very plausible foundation. The zealous assertors of a liberty lately regained, were apprehensive that the example might prove very pernicious, in authorizing some future magistrate to maintain himself in command beyond the established term, and in consequence to turn his arms against his country. It is not to be doubted, but the Romans would have acted in the same manner; and if they were so severe as to put an officer to death, though victorious, for having fought without his general's orders, how would they have behaved to a general, who should have continued four months in the supreme command, contrary to the laws?

[f] Pelopidas was the first cited before the tribunal. He defended himself with less force and greatness of mind than was expected from a man of his character, for he was naturally warm and fiery. That valour, haughty and intrepid in fight,

[f] Plut. *de sui laude*, p. 540.

* Εἰρήνη γὰρ, μετὰ μὲν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ χρήσιμος, καλλιστόν ἐστι κτῆμα καὶ λυσιτελέστατον· μετὰ δὲ κακίας ἢ δειλίας ἐσχατιδίστου, πάντων αἴσχιστον καὶ βλαβερώτατον.

forsook him before the judges. His air and discourse, which had something timid and groveling in it, denoted a man who was afraid of death, and did not in the least incline the judges in his favour, and it was not without difficulty that they acquitted him. Epaminondas appeared, and spoke with a quite different air and tone. He seemed, if I may be allowed the expression, to charge danger in front without emotion. Instead of justifying himself, he made a panegyric upon his actions, and repeated in a lofty style, in what manner he had ravaged Laconia, reestablished Messenia, and reunited Arcadia in one body. He concluded with saying, that he should die with pleasure, if the Thebans would concede the sole glory of those actions to him, and declare that he had done them by his own authority, and without their participation. All the voices were in his favour; and he returned from his trial, as he used to return from battle, with glory and universal applause. Such dignity has true valour, that it in a manner seizes the admiration of mankind by force.

He was by nature designed for great actions, and gave an air of grandeur to every thing he did. [g] His enemies, jealous of his glory, and with design to affront him, got him elected *Telearch;* an office very unworthy of a person of his merit. He however thought it no dishonour to him, and said, that he would demonstrate, that * 'the office did not only show what the man was, but also the man what the office was.' He accordingly raised that employment to very great dignity, which before consisted in only taking care that the streets were kept clean, the dirt carried away, and the drains and common sewers in good order.

[h] The Lacedæmonians, having every thing to fear from an enemy, whom the late successes had rendered still more haughty and enterprising than ever, and seeing themselves exposed every moment to a new inroad, had recourse to the Athenians, and sent deputies to them to implore their aid. The person who spoke, began with describing, in the most pathetic terms, the deplorable condition and extreme danger to which Sparta was reduced. He enlarged upon the insolent

[g] Plut. *de Præcept. reip. ger.* p. 811. [h] Xenoph. l. vi. p 609—613

* Οὐ μόνον ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἀνήρ.

haughtiness of the Thebans, and their ambitious views, which tended to nothing less than the making themselves masters of all Greece. He insinuated what Athens in particular had to fear from them, if they were suffered to extend their power by the increase of allies, who every day went over to their party, and augmented their forces. He called to mind the happy times in which the strict union between Athens and Sparta had preserved Greece, and contributed to the equal glory of both states; and concluded with saying, how great an addition it would be to the Athenian name, to aid a city, its ancient friend and ally, which more than once had generously sacrificed itself for the common interest and safety.

The Athenians could not deny all that the deputy advanced in his discourse, but at the same time they had not forgotten the bad treatment which they had suffered from the Spartans on more than one occasion, and especially after the defeat in Sicily. However, their compassion of the present misfortunes of Sparta prevailed over their resentment of former injuries, and determined them to assist the Lacedæmonians with all their forces. [i] A short time after, the deputies of several states being assembled at Athens, a league and confederacy was concluded against the Thebans, conformably to the late treaty of Antalcidas, and the intention of the king of Persia, who was continually urging its execution.

[k] A slight advantage gained by the Spartans over their enemies, raised them from that dejection of spirits in which they had hitherto remained; as it generally happens, that in a mortal distemper the least glimpse of a recovery enlivens hope and recalls joy. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, having received a considerable aid from Dionysius the younger, tyrant of Sicily, put himself at the head of his troops, and defeated the Arcadians in a battle, called 'the battle without tears,' [l] because he did not lose a man, and killed a great number of the enemy. The Spartans before had been so much accustomed to conquer that they had become almost insensible to the pleasure of victory: but when the news of this battle arrived, and they

[i] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 613—616.
[k] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 614, 615. Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619, 620.
[l] Diod. l. xv. p. 333.

saw Archidamus return victorious, they could not contain their joy, nor keep within the city. His father was the first that went out to meet him, weeping with joy and tenderness. He was followed by the officers and magistrates. The crowd of old men and women came down as far as the river, lifting up their hands to heaven, and returning thanks to the gods, as if this action had obliterated the shame of Sparta, and they began to see those happy days again, in which the Spartan glory and reputation had risen so high.

[m] Philiscus, who had been sent by the king of Persia to reconcile the Grecian states, was arrived at Delphi, whither he summoned their deputies to repair. The god was not at all consulted in the affair which was discussed in the assembly. The Spartans demanded, that Messene and its inhabitants should return to their obedience to them. Upon the Thebans' refusal to comply with that demand, the assembly broke up, and Philiscus retired, after having left considerable sums of money with the Lacedæmonians for levying troops and carrying on the war. Sparta, reduced and humbled by its losses, was no longer the object of the Persians' fear or jealousy; but Thebes, victorious and triumphant, gave them just cause of inquietude.

[n] To form a league against Thebes with greater certainty, the allies had sent deputies to the great king. The Thebans on their side deputed Pelopidas; an extremely wise choice, from the great reputation of the ambassador, which is no indifferent circumstance in respect to the success of a negotiation. The battle of Leuctra had spread his fame into the remotest provinces of Asia. When he arrived at the court, and appeared amongst the princes and nobility, they cried out in admiration of him, 'This is he, who deprived the Lacedæmonians of their empire by sea and land, and reduced Sparta to confine itself between the Eurotas and Taygetus; Sparta, that not long since, under its king Agesilaus, threatened no less than to invade us in Susa and Ecbatana.'

Artaxerxes, extremely pleased with his arrival, paid him extraordinary honours, and piqued himself upon extolling him

[m] Xenoph. p. 619. Diod. p. 381.
[n] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 620—622. [c] Plut. *in Pelop.* p. 294.

highly before the lords of his court; in esteem indeed of his great merit, but much more out of vanity and self-love, and to insinuate to his subjects, that the greatest and most illustrious persons made their court to him, and paid homage to his power and good fortune. But after having admitted him to audience, and heard his discourse, in his opinion more nervous than that of the Athenian ambassadors, and more simple than that of the Lacedæmonians, which was saying a great deal, he esteemed him more than ever; and as it is * common with kings, who are but little accustomed to constraint, he did not dissemble his extreme regard for him, and his preference of him to all the rest of the Grecian deputies.

Pelopidas, as an able politician, had apprized the king, how important it was to the interest of his crown to protect an infant power, which had never borne arms against the Persians, and which, in forming a kind of balance between Sparta and Athens, might be able to make an useful diversion against those republics, the perpetual and irreconcilable enemies of Persia, and which had lately caused it so many losses and inquietudes. Timagoras, the Athenian, was the best received after him; because being passionately desirous of humbling Sparta, and at the same time of pleasing the king, he did not appear averse to the views of Pelopidas.

The king having pressed Pelopidas to explain what favours he had to ask of him, he demanded, 'That Messene should continue free and exempt from the yoke of Sparta; that the Athenian galleys, which had sailed to infest the coast of Bœotia, should be recalled, or that war should be declared against Athens; that those who would not come into the league, or march against such as should oppose it, should be attacked first.' All which was decreed, and the Thebans declared friends and allies of the king. When this decree was read to the ambassadors, Leon, Timagoras's colleague, said loud enough to be heard by Artaxerxes, 'Athens has nothing now to do but to find some other ally than the king.'

Pelopidas, having obtained all he desired, left the court, without accepting any more of the king's many presents, than what was necessary to carry home as a token of his favour and

* Πάθος βασιλικὸν παθών.

good-will; and this aggravated the complaints which were made against the other Grecian ambassadors, who were not so reserved and delicate in point of interest. One of them, the envoy from the Arcadians, said, on his return home, that he had seen many slaves at the king's court, but no men. He added, that all his magnificence was no more than vain ostentation, and that the so much boasted * Plane-tree of gold, which was valued at so high a price, had not shade enough under it for a grasshopper.

Of all the deputies, Timagoras had received the most presents. He did not only accept of gold and silver, but of a magnificent bed, and slaves to make it, the Greeks not seeming to him expert enough in that office; which shows that sloth and luxury were little in fashion at Athens. He received also twenty-four cows, with slaves to take care of them; as it was necessary for him to drink milk for some indisposition. Lastly, at his departure, he was carried in a chair to the sea-side at the king's expense, who gave four talents° for that service. His colleague, Leon, on their arrival at Athens, accused him of not having held any communication with him, and of having joined with Pelopidas in every thing. He was brought to a trial in consequence, and condemned to suffer death.

It does not appear that the acceptance of presents was what most incensed the Athenians against Timagoras. For Epicrates, a simple porter, who had been at the Persian court, and had also received presents, having said, in a full assembly, that he was of opinion a decree ought to pass, by which, instead of the nine archons annually elected, nine ambassadors should be chosen out of the poorest of the people, to be sent to the king, in order to their being enriched by the voyage; the assembly only laughed, and made a jest of it. But what offended them more, was the Thebans' having obtained all they demanded. In which, says Plutarch, they did not duly consider the great reputation of Pelopidas, nor comprehend how much stronger and more efficacious that was in persuading, than all the harangues and the rhetorical flourishes of the other ambassadors; especially with a prince, accustomed to

° Four thousand crowns.

* It was a tree of gold, of exquisite workmanship, and great value, which people went to see out of curiosity.

caress, and comply with, the strongest, as the Thebans undoubtedly were at that time, and who besides was not sorry to humble Sparta and Athens, the ancient and mortal enemies of his throne.

The esteem and regard of the Thebans for Pelopidas were not a little augmented by the good success of his embassy, which had procured the freedom of Greece, and the reestablishment of Messene; and he was extremely applauded for his conduct at his return.

But Thessalia was the theatre where the valour of Pelopidas made the greatest figure, in the expedition with which he was commissioned by the Thebans against Alexander, tyrant of Pheræ. I shall relate it entire, and unite under one point of view all which relates to that great event, without any other interruption than the journey of Pelopidas into Macedonia, to appease the troubles of that court.

SECT. VI. PELOPIDAS MARCHES AGAINST ALEXANDER, TYRANT OF PHERÆ, AND REDUCES HIM TO REASON. HE GOES TO MACEDONIA, TO APPEASE THE TROUBLES OF THAT COURT, AND BRINGS PHILIP TO THEBES AS A HOSTAGE. HE RETURNS INTO THESSALY, IS SEIZED BY TREACHERY, AND MADE A PRISONER. EPAMINONDAS DELIVERS HIM. PELOPIDAS GAINS A VICTORY AGAINST THE TYRANT, AND IS KILLED IN THE BATTLE. EXTRAORDINARY HONOURS PAID TO HIS MEMORY. TRAGICAL END OF ALEXANDER.—[p] The reduced condition of Sparta and Athens, which for many years had domineered over all Greece, either in conjunction or separately, had inspired some of their neighbours with the desire of supplanting those cities, and given birth to the hope of succeeding them in the preeminence. A power had risen up in Thessaly, which began to grow formidable. Jason, Tyrant of Pheræ, had been declared generalissimo of the Thessalians by the consent of all the people of that province; and it was to his merit, which was generally acknowledged, that he owed that dignity. He was at the head of an army of above eight thousand horse and twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, without reckoning the light-armed soldiers, and might have undertaken any thing

A. M. 3634. Ant. J. C. 370.

[p] Xenoph. l. vi. p. 579—583, 598—601. Diod. l. xv. p. 371—373.

with such a body of disciplined and intrepid troops, who had an entire confidence in the valour and conduct of their general. But death prevented his designs. He was assassinated by persons who had conspired his destruction.

His two brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron, were substituted in his place, the latter of whom killed the other for the sake of reigning alone, and was soon after killed himself by Alexander of Pheræ, who seized the tyranny under the pretence of revenging the death of Polydorus his father. Against him Pelopidas was sent.

A. M. 3635. Ant. J. C. 369.

As the tyrant made open war against several states of Thessaly, and was secretly intriguing to subject them all, the cities sent ambassadors to Thebes to demand troops and a general. Epaminondas being employed in Peloponnesus, Pelopidas took upon himself the conduct of this expedition. He set out for Thessaly with an army, made himself master of Larissa, and obliged Alexander to make his submission to him. He there endeavoured by mild usage and friendship to change his disposition, and from a tyrant, to make him become a just and humane prince; but finding him incorrigible, and of unexampled brutality, and hearing new complaints every day of his cruelty, debauched life, and insatiable avarice, he began to employ warm reproofs and severe menaces. The tyrant, alarmed at such usage, withdrew secretly with his guard; and Pelopidas, leaving the Thessalians in security from any attempts of the tyrant, and in good understanding with each other, set out for Macedonia, where his presence had been desired.

Amyntas II. was lately dead, and had left three legitimate children, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and one natural son, called Ptolemy. Alexander reigned but one year, and was succeeded by Perdiccas,* with whom his brother Ptolemy disputed the crown. The two brothers invited Pelopidas either to be the arbitrator and judge of their quarrel, or to espouse the side on which he should see the most right.

Pelopidas was no sooner arrived, than he put an end to all their disputes, and recalled those who had been banished by

* Plutarch makes this quarrel between Alexander and Ptolemy: which cannot agree with Æschines's account (*de Fals. Legat.* p. 400) of the affairs of Perdiccas after Alexander's death, which I shall relate in the history of Philip. As Æschines was contemporary with them, I thought it proper to substitute Perdiccas in the place of Alexander.

either party. Having taken Philip, the brother of Perdiccas, and thirty other children of the noblest families of Macedonia for hostages, he carried them to Thebes; to show the Greeks how far the authority of the Thebans extended, from the reputation of their arms, and the entire confidence that was placed in their justice and fidelity. It was this Philip who was father of Alexander the Great, and afterwards made war against the Greeks, to subject them to his power.

The troubles and factions arose again in Macedonia some years after, occasioned by the death of Perdiccas, who was killed in a battle. The friends of the deceased called in Pelopidas. Being desirous to arrive before Ptolemy, who was making new efforts to establish himself upon the throne, had time to execute his projects, and not having an army, he raised some mercenary troops in haste, with whom he marched against Ptolemy. When they were near each other, Ptolemy found means to corrupt those mercenary soldiers by presents of money, and to bring them over to his side. At the same time, awed by the reputation and name of Pelopidas, he went to meet him as his superior and master, had recourse to caresses and entreaties, and promised in the most solemn manner to hold the crown only as guardian to the son of the deceased, to acknowledge as friends and enemies all those who were so to the Thebans; and as security for his engagements, he gave his son Philoxenus and fifty other children, who were educated with him, as hostages. These Pelopidas sent to Thebes.

The treachery of the mercenary soldiers ran very much in his thoughts. He was informed that they had sent the greatest part of their effects, with their wives and children, into the city of Pharsalus,* and conceived that to be a fair opportunity for being revenged on them for their perfidy. He, therefore, drew together some Thessalian troops, and marched to Pharsalus, where he was scarce arrived before Alexander the tyrant came against him with a powerful army. Pelopidas, who had been appointed ambassador to him, believing that he came to justify himself, and to answer the complaints of the Thebans, went to him accompanied only by Ismenias, without any

* A city of Thessaly.

precaution. He was not ignorant of his being an impious wretch, as void of faith as of honour; but he imagined, that respect for Thebes, and regard to his dignity and reputation, would prevent him from attempting any thing against his person. He was mistaken; for the tyrant, seeing them alone and unarmed, made them both prisoners, and seized Pharsalus.

Polybius exceedingly blames the imprudence of Pelopidas upon this occasion.[q] There are, says he, in the intercourse of society, certain assurances, and, as it were, ties of sincerity, upon which one may reasonably rely: such are the sanctity of oaths, the pledge of wives and children delivered as hostages, and above all, the consistency of the past conduct of those with whom one treats: when, notwithstanding those motives for our confidence, we are deceived, it is a misfortune, but not a fault: but to trust one's self to a notorious traitor and villain, is certainly an instance of temerity for which there is no excuse.

[r] This heinous perfidy of Alexander filled the minds of all his subjects with terror and distrust, who very much suspected, that, after so flagrant an injustice and so daring a crime, the tyrant would spare nobody, and would behave upon all occasions, and towards all sorts of people, as a man in despair, that needed no farther regard to his conduct and actions. When the news was brought to Thebes, the Thebans, incensed at so base a deed, immediately sent an army into Thessaly; and, as they were displeased with Epaminondas, whom they suspected, though without any good reason, of having been too favourable to the Lacedæmonians upon a certain occasion, they nominated other generals; so that he served in this expedition only as a private man. The love of his country and of the public good extinguished all resentment in the heart of that great man, and would not permit him, as is but too common, to abandon its service through any pique of honour or personal discontent.

The tyrant in the mean time carried Pelopidas to Pheræ, and made a show of him to all the world at first, imagining that such a treatment would humble his pride and abate his courage.

[q] Lib. viii. p. 512.
[r] Plut. *in Pelop.* p. 292, 293. Diod. l. xv. p. 382, 383.

But Pelopidas, seeing the inhabitants of Pheræ in great consternation, perpetually consoled them, advising them not to despair, and assuring them that it would not be long before the tyrant would be punished. He caused him to be told, that it was very imprudent and very unjust to torture and put to death every day so many innocent citizens, that had never done him any wrong, and to spare his life, who, he knew, would no sooner be out of his hands, than he would punish him as his crimes deserved. The tyrant, astonished at his greatness of soul, sent to ask him why he took so much pains to meet death? 'It is,' returned the illustrious prisoner, 'that thou mayst perish the sooner, by becoming still more detestable to the gods and men.'

From that time the tyrant gave orders that nobody should see or speak to him. But Thebé, his wife, the daughter of Jason, who had also been tyrant of Pheræ, having heard of the constancy and courage of Pelopidas from those who guarded him, had a curiosity to see and converse with him; and Alexander could not refuse her his permission.[8] He loved her tenderly (if indeed a tyrant may be said to love any body:) but notwithstanding that tenderness, he treated her very cruelly, and was in perpetual distrust even of her. He never went to her apartment without a slave before him with a naked sword in his hand, and having first sent some of his guard to search every coffer for concealed poniards. Wretched prince! cries Cicero, who could confide more in a slave and a barbarian, than in his own wife!

Thebé therefore desiring to see Pelopidas, found him in a melancholy condition, dressed in a poor habit, his hair and beard neglected, and void of every thing that might console him in his distress. Not being able to refrain from tears at such a sight. 'Ah, unfortunate Pelopidas,' said she, 'how I pity your poor wife!' 'No, Thebé,' replied he, 'it is you who are to be pitied, who can endure such a monster as Alexander, without being his prisoner.' Those words touched Thebé to the quick; for it was with extreme reluctance she bore the tyrant's cruelty, violence, and infamous excesses. Hence, by going often to see Pelopidas, and openly bewailing

[8] Cic. *de Offic.* l. ii. n. 25.

before him the injuries she suffered, she daily conceived new abhorrence for her husband, whilst hatred and the desire of revenge grew continually more strong in her heart.

The Theban generals, who had entered Thessaly, did nothing there of any importance, and were obliged, by their incapacity and ill conduct, to abandon the country. The tyrant pursued them in their retreat, harassed them shamefully, and killed abundance of their troops. The whole army had been defeated, if the soldiers had not obliged Epaminondas, who served as a private man amongst them, to take upon him the command. Epaminondas, at the head of the cavalry and light-armed foot, posted himself in the rear; where, sometimes sustaining the enemy's attacks and sometimes charging them in his turn, he completed the retreat with success, and preserved the Bœotians. The generals upon their return were each of them fined ten thousand drachmas,* and Epaminondas substituted in their place. As the public good was his sole view, he overlooked the injurious treatment and kind of affront which he had received, and was amply recompensed by the glory that attended so generous and disinterested a conduct.

Some days after, he marched at the head of the army into Thessaly: whither his reputation had preceded him. It had spread already both terror and joy through the whole country; terror amongst the tyrant's friends, whom the very name of Epaminondas dismayed, and joy amongst the people, from the assurance they entertained of being speedily delivered from the yoke of the tyranny, and the tyrant punished for all his crimes. But Epaminondas, preferring the safety of Pelopidas to his own glory, instead of carrying on the war with vigour, as he might have done, chose rather to protract it, from the apprehension that the tyrant, if reduced to despair, like a wild beast, would turn his whole rage upon his prisoner. For he knew the violence and brutality of his nature, which would hearken neither to reason nor justice; and that he took delight in burying men alive; that some he covered with the skins of bears and wild boars, and setting his dogs upon them caused them to be torn in pieces, or shot them to death with arrows. These were his frequent sports and diversions. In the cities

* About 225*l.* sterling.

of Melibœa and Scotusa,* which were in alliance with him, he called an assembly of the citizens, and causing them to be surrounded by his guards, he ordered the throats of all their young men to be cut in his presence.

Hearing one day a famous actor perform a part in the *Troades* of Euripides, he suddenly went out of the theatre, and sent to the actor to tell him not to be under any apprehension upon that account, for that his leaving the place was not from being displeased with him, but because he was ashamed to let the citizens see him weep at the misfortunes of Hecuba and Andromache, who had never felt any compassion for those whom he had murdered.

Though he was little susceptible of pity, he was much so of fear at this time. Amazed at the sudden arrival of Epaminondas, and dazzled with the majesty that surrounded him, he made haste to despatch persons to him with apologies for his conduct. Epaminondas could not endure that the Thebans should make either peace or alliance with so wicked a man. He only granted him a truce for thirty days; and after having got Pelopidas and Ismenias out of his hands, he retired with his troops.

[t] Fear is not a master whose lessons make any deep and lasting impression upon the mind. The tyrant of Pheræ soon returned to his natural disposition. He ruined several cities of Thessaly, and put garrisons into those of Phthia, Achæa, and Magnesia. Those cities sent deputies to Thebes to demand a succour of troops, praying that the command of them might be given to Pelopidas; which was granted. He was upon the point of setting out, when there happened a sudden eclipse of the sun, by which the city of Thebes was darkened at noonday. The dread and consternation was general. Pelopidas knew very well what to think of this accident, which was no more than natural; but he did not think it proper for him to expose seven thousand Thebans against their will, nor to compel them to march in the terror and apprehension with which he perceived they were seized. He therefore gave himself alone to the Thessalians; and taking with him three

[t] Plut. *in Pelop.* p. 295—298. Xenoph. l. vi. p. 601.

* Cities of Magnesia?

hundred horse of such Thebans and strangers as would follow him, he departed, contrary to the prohibition of the soothsayers and the opinion of the most wise and judicious.

He was personally incensed against Alexander, through resentment of the injuries he had received from him. What Thebé his wife had said, and he himself knew, of the general discontent in regard to the tyrant, gave him hopes of finding great divisions in his court, and an universal disposition to revolt. But his strongest motive was the beauty and grandeur of the action in itself. For his sole desire and ambition was, to show all Greece, that at the same time that the Lacedæmonians were sending generals and officers to Dionysius the tyrant, and the Athenians on their part were in a manner in the pay of Alexander, to whom they had erected a statue of brass, as to their benefactor, the Thebans were the only people that declared open war against tyranny, and endeavoured to exterminate from amongst the Greeks all unjust and violent government.

After having assembled his army at Pharsalus, he marched against the tyrant; who, being apprized that Pelopidas had but few Thebans, and knowing that his own infantry was twice as strong as that of the Thessalians, advanced to meet him. Pelopidas being told by somebody that Alexander was approaching with a great army: 'So much the better,' replied he, 'we shall beat the greater number.'

Near a place called Cynoscephalæ, there were very high and steep hills, which lay in the midst of the plain. Both armies were in motion to seize that post with their foot, when Pelopidas ordered his cavalry to charge that of the enemy. The horse of Pelopidas broke Alexander's; and whilst they pursued them upon the plain, Alexander appeared suddenly upon the top of the hills, having outstripped the Thessalian infantry; and charging fiercely such as endeavoured to force those heights and entrenchments, he killed the foremost, and repulsed the others, obliging them to give way. Pelopidas, seeing this, recalled his horse, and giving them orders to attack the enemy's foot, he took his buckler, and ran to those who were fighting upon the hills.

He presently made way through his infantry, and passing in

a moment from the rear to the front, revived his soldiers' vigour and courage in such a manner as made the enemies believe themselves attacked by fresh troops. They supported two or three charges with great resolution: but finding Pelopidas's infantry continually gaining ground, and that his cavalry, who were now returned from the pursuit, came to support them, they began to give way and retired slowly, still making head in their retreat. Pelopidas, seeing from the top of the hills the whole army of the enemy, which, though it was not yet actually put to flight, began to break, and was in great disorder, he stopped for some time, looking about every where for Alexander.

As soon as he perceived him upon his right wing, rallying and encouraging his mercenary soldiers, he could contain himself no longer, but, fired with the sight, and abandoning to his sole resentment the care of his life and the conduct of the battle, he got a great way before his battalions, and ran forwards with all his force, calling upon and defying Alexander. The tyrant made no answer to his defiance, and not daring to wait his coming up, withdrew to hide himself amongst his guards. The battalion standing firm for some time, Pelopidas broke the first ranks, and killed the greatest part of the guards upon the spot. The rest, continuing the fight at a distance, pierced his arms and breast at length with their javelins. The Thessalians, alarmed at the danger in which they saw him, made all the haste they could from the tops of the hills to his assistance; but he was fallen dead when they arrived. The infantry and the Theban horse, returning to the fight against the enemy's main body, put them to flight, and pursued them a great way. The plain was covered with the dead; for more than three thousand of the tyrant's troops were killed.

This action of Pelopidas, though it appears the effect of a consummate valour, is inexcusable, and has been generally condemned, because there is no true valour without wisdom and prudence. The greatest courage is cool and sedate. It spares itself where it ought, and exposes itself when occasion makes it necessary. A general ought to see every thing, and to have every thing in his thoughts. To be in a condition to apply the proper remedy on all occasions he must not precipi-

tate himself where there is the danger of his being cut off, and of causing the loss of his army by his death.

[u] Euripides, after having said in one of his pieces, that it is highly glorious for the general of an army to obtain the victory while he preserves his own life, adds, 'that if it be necessary for him to die, he ought to do so by resigning his life into the hands of virtue;' as if he wished to imply, that virtue alone, not passion, anger, or revenge, has a right over the life of a general, and that the first duty of valour is to preserve him who preserves others.

[x] It is in this sense that the saying of Timotheus is so just and amiable. When Chares was one day showing to the Athenians the wounds he had received whilst he was their general, and his shield pierced through with a pike: 'For my part,' said Timotheus, 'when I was besieging Samos, and a dart happened to fall very near me, I was much ashamed, as having exposed myself like a young man without necessity, and more than was consistent for the general of so great an army.' Hannibal certainly cannot be suspected of fear, and yet it has been observed, that in the great number of battles which he fought, he never received any wound, except only at the siege of Saguntum.

It is therefore not without reason, that Pelopidas is reproached with having sacrificed all his other virtues to his valour, by thus throwing away his life, and with having died rather for himself than his country.

Never was a captain more lamented than he. His death changed the victory so lately gained into mourning. A profound silence and universal affliction reigned throughout the whole army, as if it had been entirely defeated. When his body was carried to Thebes, from every city through which it passed, the people of all ages and sexes, the magistrates and priests, came out to meet the bier, and to march in procession before it, carrying crowns, trophies, and armour, all of gold. The Thessalians, who were at the same time highly afflicted for his death, and equally sensible of their obligations to him, made it their request, that they might be permitted to celebrate at their sole expense the obsequies

[u] Plut. *in Pelop.* p. 317. [x] Ibid. p. 278.

of a general, who had devoted himself for their preservation; and that honourable privilege could not be refused to their grateful zeal.

His funeral was magnificent, especially in the sincere affliction of the Thebans and Thessalians. For, says Plutarch, the external pomp of mourning, and those marks of sorrow, which may be imposed by the public authority upon the people, are not always certain proofs of their real sentiments. The tears which flow in private as well as public, the regret expressed equally by great and small, the praises given by the general and unanimous voice to a person who is no more, and from whom nothing farther is expected, are an evidence not to be questioned, and a homage never paid but to virtue. Such were the obsequies of Pelopidas, and, in my opinion, nothing more great and magnificent could be imagined.

Thebes was not contented with lamenting Pelopidas, but resolved to avenge him. A small army of seven thousand foot and seven hundred horse were immediately sent against Alexander. The tyrant, who had not yet recovered the terror of his defeat, was in no condition to defend himself. He was obliged to restore to the Thessalians the cities he had taken from them, and to give the Magnesians, Phthiots, and Achæans, their liberty; to withdraw his garrisons from their country; and to swear that he would always obey the Thebans, and march at their orders against all their enemies.

Such a punishment was very gentle. Nor, says Plutarch, did it appear sufficient to the gods, or proportioned to his crimes: they had reserved one for him worthy of a tyrant. Thebé, his wife, who saw with horror and detestation the cruelty and perfidy of her husband, and had not forgotten the lessons and advice which Pelopidas had given her whilst in prison, entered into a conspiracy with her three brothers to kill him. The tyrant's whole palace was full of guards, who kept watch through the whole night; but he placed little confidence in them, and as his life was in some sort in their hands, he feared them the most of all men. He lay in a high chamber, to which he ascended by a ladder that was drawn up after his entrance. Near this chamber a great dog was chained

to guard it. He was exceeding fierce, and knew nobody but his master, Thebé, and the slave who fed him.

The time pitched upon for the execution of the plot being arrived, Thebé shut up her brothers during the day-time, in an apartment near the tyrant's. When he entered his own chamber at night, as he was overcharged with meat and wine, he fell into a deep sleep immediately. Thebé went out presently after, and ordered the slave to take away the dog, that he might not disturb her husband's repose; and lest the ladder should make a noise when her brothers came up by it, she covered the steps of it with wool. All things being thus prepared she made her brothers ascend softly, armed with daggers: when they came to the door, they were seized with terror, and would go no further. Thebé, quite out of her wits, threatened to awake the tyrant if they did not proceed immediately, and to discover the plot to him. Shame and fear reanimated them: she made them enter, led them to the bed, and held the lamp herself, whilst they killed him with repeated wounds. The news of his death was immediately spread through the city. His dead body was exposed to all sorts of outrages, trampled under foot by the people, and given for a prey to the dogs and vultures; a just reward for his violent oppressions and detestable cruelties.

SECT. VII. EPAMINONDAS IS CHOSEN GENERAL OF THE THEBANS. HIS SECOND ATTEMPT AGAINST SPARTA. HIS CELEBRATED VICTORY AT MANTINEA. HIS DEATH AND EULOGY.—[y] The extraordinary prosperity of Thebes was no small subject of alarm to the neighbouring states. Every thing was at that time in motion in Greece. A new war had sprung up between the Arcadians and the Eleans, which had occasioned another between the Arcadians themselves. The people of Tegea had called in the Thebans to their aid, and those of Mantinea, the Spartans and Athenians. There were besides several other allies on each side. The former gave Epaminondas the command of their troops, who immediately entered Arcadia, and encamped at

A. M. 3641. Ant. J. C. 363.

[y] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 642—644. Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 615. Diod. p. 391, 392.

Tegea, with design to attack the Mantineans, who had quitted their alliance with Thebes to attach themselves to Sparta.

Being informed that Agesilaus had begun his march with his army, and was advancing towards Mantinea, he formed an enterprise, which, he believed, would immortalize his name, and entirely reduce the power of the enemy. He left Tegea in the night with his army, unknown to the Mantineans, and marched directly to Sparta by a different route from that of Agesilaus. He would undoubtedly have taken the city by surprise, as it had neither walls, defence, nor troops: but happily for Sparta, a Cretan having made all possible haste to apprize Agesilaus of his design, he immediately despatched one of his horse to advise the city of the danger that threatened it, and arrived there soon after in person.

He had scarce entered the town, when the Thebans were seen passing the Eurotas, and coming on against the city. Epaminondas, who perceived that his design was discovered, thought it incumbent on him not to retire without some attempt. [a] He therefore made his troops advance, and making use of valour instead of stratagem, he attacked the city in several quarters, penetrated as far as the public square, and seized that part of Sparta which lay upon the side of the river. Agesilaus made head every where, and defended himself with much more valour than could be expected from his years. He saw well, that it was not now a time, as before, to spare himself, and to act only upon the defensive; but that he had need of all his courage and daring, and to fight with all the vigour of despair; means which he had never yet used, nor placed his confidence in before, but which he employed with great success in the present dangerous emergency. For by this happy despair and prudent audacity, he in a manner snatched the city out of the hands of Epaminondas. His son Archidamus, at the head of the Spartan youth, behaved with incredible valour wherever the danger was greatest, and with his small troop stopped the enemy, and made head against them on all sides.

A young Spartan, named Isadas, distinguished himself particularly in this action. He was very handsome, perfectly well

[a] Polyb. l. ix. p. 547.

shaped, of an advantageous stature, and in the flower of his youth. He had neither armour nor clothes, his body shone with oil, and he held a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other. In this condition he rushed with impetuosity from his house, and breaking through the throng of the Spartans that were fighting, he threw himself upon the enemy, gave mortal wounds at every blow, and laid all at his feet who opposed him, without receiving any hurt himself; whether it were that the enemy were dismayed at so astonishing a sight, or whether, says Plutarch, the gods took pleasure in preserving him upon account of his extraordinary valour. It is said, the Ephori decreed him a crown after the battle, in honour of his exploits, but afterwards fined him a thousand drachmas [a] for having exposed himself to so great a danger without arms.

Epaminondas, having failed in his aim, and foreseeing that the Arcadians would certainly hasten to the relief of Sparta, and not being willing to have them with all the Lacedæmonian forces upon his hands at the same time, returned with expedition to Tegea. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians, with their allies, followed him close in the rear.

[b] That general, considering his command was upon the point of expiring, and that if he did not fight, his reputation might suffer extremely, and that immediately after his retreat, the enemy would fall upon the Theban allies, and entirely ruin them, gave orders to his troops to hold themselves in readiness for battle.

The Greeks had never fought amongst themselves with more numerous armies. That of the Lacedæmonians consisted of more than twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse; the Theban army of thirty thousand foot and near three thousand horse. Upon the right wing of the former, the Mantineans, Arcadians, and Lacedæmonians were posted in one line; the Eleans and Achæans, who were the weakest of their troops, had the centre; and the Athenians alone composed the left wing. In the other army, the Thebans and Arcadians were on the left, the Argives on the right, and the other allies in the centre. The cavalry on each side were disposed in the wings.

The Theban general marched in the same order of battle,

[a] About 25*l*.

[b] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 645—647.

in which he intended to fight, that he might not be obliged, when he came up with the enemy, to lose, in the disposition of his army, a time which cannot be too much saved in great enterprises.

He did not march directly, and with his front to the enemy, but in a column along the hills with his left wing foremost, to make them imagine that he did not intend to fight that day. When he was over-against them at a quarter of a league's distance, he made his troops halt and lay down their arms, as if he designed to encamp there. The enemy in fact were deceived by that stand, and reckoning no longer upon a battle, they quitted their arms, dispersed themselves about the camp, and suffered that ardour to extinguish which the near approach of a battle is wont to kindle in the hearts of the soldiers.

Epaminondas, however, by suddenly wheeling his troops to the right, having changed his column into a line, and having drawn out the choice troops, whom he had expressly posted in front upon his march, he made them double their files upon the front of his left wing, to add to its strength, and to put it into a condition to attack in a point the Lacedæmonian phalanx, which, by the movement he had made, faced it directly. He ordered the centre and right wing of his army to move very slow, and to halt before they came up with the enemy, that he might not hazard the event of the battle upon troops on whom he could not rely.

He expected to decide the victory by that body of chosen troops which he commanded in person, and which he had formed in a column to attack the enemy in a point like a galley, says Xenophon. He assured himself, that if he could penetrate the Lacedæmonian phalanx, in which the enemy's principal force consisted, he should not find it difficult to rout the rest of their army, by charging upon the right and left with his victorious troops.

But that he might prevent the Athenians in the left wing from coming to the support of their right against his intended attack, he made a detachment of his horse and foot advance out of the line, and posted them upon the rising ground in readiness to flank the Athenians; as well to cover his right, as to alarm them, and give them reason to apprehend being

taken in flank and rear themselves, if they advanced to sustain their right.

After having disposed his whole army in this manner, he moved on to charge the enemy with the whole weight of his column. They were strangely surprised when they saw Epaminondas advance towards them in this order, and resumed their arms, bridled their horses, and made all the haste they could to their ranks.

Whilst Epaminondas was marching against the enemy, the cavalry that covered his flank on the left, the best at that time in Greece, entirely composed of Thebans and Thessalians, had orders to attack the enemy's horse. The Theban general, whom nothing escaped, had judiciously planted bowmen, slingers, and lancers in the intervals of his horse, in order to begin the disorder of the enemy's cavalry, by a previous discharge of a shower of arrows, stones, and javelins upon them. The other army had neglected to take the same precaution, and had committed another fault, not less considerable, in giving as much depth to the squadrons as if they had been a phalanx. By this means their horse were incapable of supporting long the charge of the Thebans. After having made several ineffectual attacks with great loss, they were obliged to retire behind their infantry.

In the mean time Epaminondas, with his body of foot, had attacked the Lacedæmonian phalanx. The troops came to the charge on both sides with incredible ardour; both the Thebans and Lacedæmonians being resolved to perish rather than yield the glory of arms to their rivals. They began by fighting with the spear; and those first arms being soon broken in the fury of the combat, they charged each other sword in hand. The resistance was equally obstinate, and the slaughter very great on both sides. The troops despising danger, and desiring only to distinguish themselves by the greatness of their actions, chose rather to die in their ranks, than to lose a step of their ground.

The furious slaughter on both sides having continued a great while without the victory's inclining to either, Epaminondas, to force it to declare for him, thought it his duty to make an extraordinary effort in person, without regard to the danger

of his own life. He formed therefore a troop of the bravest and most determinate about him, and putting himself at the head of them, made a vigorous charge upon the enemy, where the battle was most warm, and wounded the general of the Lacedæmonians with the first javelin he threw. His troop, by his example, having wounded or killed all that stood in their way, broke and penetrated the phalanx. The Lacedæmonians, dismayed by the presence of Epaminondas, and overpowered by the weight of that intrepid band, were compelled to give ground. The main body of the Theban troops, animated by their general's example and success, drove back the enemy upon his right and left, and made a great slaughter of them. But some troops of the Spartans, perceiving that Epaminondas abandoned himself too much to his ardour, suddenly rallied, and returning to the fight, charged him with a shower of javelins. Whilst he kept off part of those darts, shunned some of them, warded off others, and was fighting with the most heroic valour to assure the victory to his army, a Spartan, named Callicrates, gave him a mortal wound with a javelin in the breast through his cuirass. The wood of the javelin being broken off, and the iron head continuing in the wound, the torment was insupportable, and he fell immediately. The battle began around him with new fury; the one side using their utmost endeavours to take him alive, and the other to save him. The Thebans gained their point at last, and carried him off, after having put the enemy to flight. They did not pursue them far; and returning immediately, contented themselves with remaining masters of the field and of the dead, without making any advantage of their victory, or undertaking any thing farther, as if they staid for the orders of their general.

The cavalry, dismayed by the accident of Epaminondas, whom they believed to be dead, and seeming rather vanquished than victorious, neglected to pursue their success in the same manner, and returned to their former post.

Whilst this was passing on the left wing of the Thebans, the Athenian horse attacked their cavalry on the right. But as the latter, besides the superiority of number, had the advantage of being seconded by the light infantry posted in their intervals, they charged the Athenians rudely, and having galled them

extremely with their darts, broke and obliged them to fly. After having dispersed and repulsed them in this manner, instead of pursuing them, they thought proper to turn their arms against the Athenian foot, which they took in flank, put into disorder, and pushed with great vigour. Just as they were about to take to flight, the general of the Elean cavalry, who commanded a body of reserve, seeing the danger of that phalanx, came upon the spur to its relief, charged the Theban horse, who expected nothing less, forced them to retreat, and regained from them their advantage. At the same time, the Athenian cavalry, which had been routed at first, finding they were not pursued, rallied; and instead of going to the assistance of their foot, which was roughly handled, they attacked the detachment posted by the Thebans upon the heights without the line, and put it to the sword.

After these different movements, and this alternation of losses and advantages, the troops on both sides stood still and rested upon their arms, and the trumpets of the two armies, as if by consent, sounded the retreat at the same time. Each party pretended to the victory, and erected a trophy: the Thebans, because they had defeated the right wing, and remained masters of the field of battle; the Athenians, because they had cut the detachment in pieces. And from this point of honour, both sides refused at first to ask leave to bury their dead, which, with the ancients, was confessing their defeat. The Lacedæmonians, however, first sent a herald to demand that permission; after which, the rest had no thoughts but of paying the last duties to the slain on their respective sides.

Such was the event of the famous battle of Mantinea. Xenophon, in his relation of it, which concludes his history, recommends to the reader's attention the disposition of the Theban troops, and the order of battle, which he describes as a man of knowledge and experience in the art of war. And the Chevalier Folard, who justly looks upon Epaminondas as one of the greatest generals Greece ever produced, in his description of the same battle, ventures to call it the masterpiece of that great captain.

Epaminondas had been carried into the camp. The surgeons, after having examined the wound, declared that he would

expire as soon as the head of the dart was drawn out of it. Those words gave all that were present the utmost sorrow and affliction: they were inconsolable on seeing so great a man about to die, and to die without issue. For him, the only concern he expressed was about his arms, and the success of the battle. When they showed him his shield, and assured him that the Thebans had gained the victory; turning towards his friends with a calm and serene air; 'Do not regard,' said he, 'this day as the end of my life, but as the beginning of my happiness, and the completion of my glory. I leave Thebes triumphant, proud Sparta humbled, and Greece delivered from the yoke of servitude. For the rest, I do not reckon that I die without issue; Leuctra and Mantinea are two illustrious daughters, that will not fail to keep my name alive, and to transmit it to posterity.' Having spoken to this effect, he drew the head of the javelin out of his wound, and expired.

It may truly be said, that the Theban power expired with this great man; whom Cicero* seems to rank above all the illustrious men Greece ever produced. † Justin is of the same opinion, when he says, That as a dart is no longer in a condition to wound when the point of it is blunted, so Thebes, after having lost its general, was no longer formidable to its enemies, and its power seemed to have lost its edge, and to be annihilated by the death of Epaminondas. Before him, that city was not distinguished by any memorable action; and after him, it sunk into its original obscurity; so that it saw its glory take birth and expire with this great man.

It has been ‡ doubted whether he was a more excellent captain or good man. He sought not power for himself, but for his country; and carried his disinterestedness to such a pitch, that at his death he did not leave sufficient wealth to

* Epaminondas, princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ. *Acad. Quæst.* l. i. n. 4.

† Nam sicuti telo, si primam aciem præfregeris, reliquo ferro vim nocendi sustuleris; sic illo velut mucrone teli ablato duce Thebanorum, rei quoque publicæ vires hebetatæ sunt: ut non tam illum amisisse, quam cum illo omnes interiisse viderentur. Nam neque hunc ante ducem ullum memorabile bellum gessere, nec postea virtutibus, sed cladibus, insignes fuere: ut manifestum sit, patriæ gloriam et natam et extinctam cum eo fuisse. Justin, l. vi. c. 8.

‡ Fuit incertum, vir melior an dux esset. Nam et imperium non sibi semper sed patriæ quæsivit; et pecuniæ adeò parcus fuit, ut sumptus funeri defuerit. Gloriæ quoque non cupidior, quàm pecuniæ; quippe recusanti omnia imperia ingesta sunt, honoresque ita gessit, ut ornamentum non accipere, sed dare ipsi dignitati videretur. Justin.

defray the expenses of his funeral. Truly a philosopher, and poor by inclination; he despised riches, without affecting any reputation from that contempt; and, if Justin may be believed, he coveted glory as little as he did money. It was always against his will that commands were conferred upon him; and he behaved himself in them in such a manner, as did more honour to the dignities, than the dignities to him.

Though poor himself, and without any estate, his very poverty, by drawing upon him the esteem and confidence of the rich, gave him the opportunity of doing good to others. One of his friends being in great necessity, Epaminondas sent him to a very rich citizen, with orders to ask him for a thousand crowns[c] in his name. That rich man coming to his house, to know his motives for directing his friend to him upon such an errand; [d] 'Why,' replied Epaminondas, 'it is because this honest man is in want, and you are rich.'*

He had † imbibed those generous and noble sentiments from the study of polite learning and philosophy, which he had made his usual employment and sole delight from his earliest infancy; so that it was surprising, and a question frequently asked, how, and at what time, it was possible for a man, always busy amongst books, to attain, or rather seize, the knowledge of the art military in so great a degree of perfection. Fond of leisure, which he devoted to the study of philosophy, his darling passion, he shunned public employments, and intrigued only to exclude himself from them. His moderation concealed him so well, that he lived obscure and almost unknown. His merit, however, discovered him. He was taken from his solitude by force, to be placed at the head of armies; and he demonstrated that philosophy, though generally despised by those who aspire at the glory of arms, is wonderfully well calculated to form heroes. For besides its being the greatest step towards conquering the enemy, to know how to conquer one's self, in this school ‡ anciently were taught the great maxims of true policy, the rules of every kind of duty,

[c] A talent. [d] Plut. *de præcept. reipub. ger.* p. 809.

* Ὅτι χρηστὸς, εἶπεν, οὗτος ὢν, πένης ἐστὶ· σὺ δὲ πλουτεῖς.

† Jam literarum studium, jam philosophiæ doctrina tanta, ut mirabile videretur, unde tam insignis militiæ scientia homini inter literas nato. Justin.

‡ The works of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, are proofs of this.

the motives for a due discharge of them, what we owe to our country, the right use of authority, wherein true courage consists; in a word, the qualities that form the good citizen, statesman, and great captain.

He possessed all the ornaments of the mind: he had the talent of speaking in perfection, and was well versed in the most sublime sciences. But a modest reserve threw a veil over all those excellent qualities, which still augmented their value, and he knew not what it was to be ostentatious of them. Spintharus, in giving his character, said, [o] 'That he never had met with a man, who knew more, and spoke less.'

It may be said therefore in praise of Epaminondas, that he falsified the proverb, which treated the Bœotians as boorish and stupid. This was the notion commonly entertained of them;* and it was imputed to the gross air of the country, as the Athenian delicacy of taste was attributed to the subtilty of the air they breathed. Horace says, that to judge of Alexander from his bad taste for poetry, one would swear him a true Bœotian:

> Bœotum in crasso jurares aëre natum. *Epist.* i. l. 2.
> In thick Bœotian air you'd swear him born.

When Alcibiades was reproached with having little inclination to music, he thought fit to make this excuse; 'It is for Thebans † to sing as they do, who know not how to speak.' Pindar and Plutarch, who had very little of the soil in them, and who are proofs that genius is of all nations, do themselves condemn the stupidity of their countrymen. Epaminondas did honour to his country, not only by the greatness of his military exploits, but by that sort of merit which results from elevation of genius and the study of the sciences.

I shall conclude this portrait and character with a circumstance that gives place to nothing in all his other excellencies, and which may even be preferred to them, as it indicates a good heart, and a tenderness and sensible disposition; qualities very rare amongst the great, but infinitely more estimable than

[o] Plut. *de audit.* p. 39.

* Inter locorum naturas quantum intersit, videmus—Athenis tenue cælum, ex quo acutiores etiam putantur Attici; crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani. Cic. *de Fato.* n. 7.

† They were great musicians.

all those splendid attributes which the generality of mankind commonly gaze at with admiration, and fancy almost the only objects worthy either of being imitated or envied. The victory at Leuctra had drawn the eyes and admiration of all the neighbouring states upon Epaminondas, and caused him to be looked upon as the support and restorer of Thebes, as the triumphant conqueror of Sparta, as the deliverer of all Greece; in a word, as the greatest man, and the most excellent captain, that ever was in the world. In the midst of this universal applause, so capable of intoxicating, in a manner, the general of an army, Epaminondas, little sensible to so affecting and so deserved a glory, [f] 'My joy,' said he, 'arises from my sense of that which the news of my victory will give my father and my mother.'

Nothing in history seems to me so valuable as such sentiments, which do honour to human nature, and proceed from a heart which neither false glory nor false greatness have corrupted. I confess it is with grief I see these noble sentiments daily expire amongst us, especially in persons whose birth and rank raise them above others, who, too frequently, are neither good fathers, good sons, good husbands, nor good friends; and who would think it derogatory to them to express for a father and mother the tender regard, of which we have here so fine an example from a Pagan.

Until Epaminondas's time, two cities had exercised alternately a kind of empire over all Greece. The justice and moderation of Sparta had at first acquired it a distinguished preeminence, which the pride and haughtiness of its generals, and especially of Pausanias, soon made it lose. The Athenians, until the Peloponnesian war, held the first rank; but in a manner scarce discernible in any other respect, than in their care to acquit themselves worthily, and in giving their inferiors just reason to believe themselves their equals. They judged at that time, and very justly, that the true method of commanding, and of continuing their power, was to evince their superiority only by their good offices and the benefits they conferred. Those times, so glorious for Athens, were of about forty-five years' continuance, and they retained a part of that preeminence during the twenty-seven years of the Peloponnesian war, which

[f] Plut. *in Coriol.* p. 215.

make in all the seventy-two, or seventy-three years, which Demosthenes assigns to the duration of their empire:[g] but for this latter space of time, the Greeks, disgusted by the haughtiness of Athens, received no laws from that city without reluctance. Hence the Lacedæmonians became again the arbiters of Greece, and continued so from the time Lysander made himself master of Athens, until the first war undertaken by the Athenians, after their reestablishment by Conon, to withdraw themselves and the rest of the Greeks from the tyranny of Sparta, which was now grown more insolent than ever. At length, Thebes disputed the supremacy; and by the exalted merit of a single man, saw itself at the head of all Greece. But that glorious condition was of no long continuance, and the death of Epaminondas, as we have already observed, plunged it again into the obscurity in which he found it.

Demosthenes remarks, in the passage above cited, that the preeminence granted voluntarily either to Sparta or Athens, was a preeminence of honour, not of dominion, and that the intent of Greece was to preserve a kind of equality and independence in the other cities. Hence, says he, when the governing city attempted to ascribe to itself what did not belong to it, and aimed at any innovations, contrary to the rules of justice, in established customs, all the Greeks thought themselves obliged to have recourse to arms, and without any ground of personal discontent, to espouse with ardour the cause of the injured.

I shall add here another very judicious reflection from Polybius.[h] He attributes the wise conduct of the Athenians, in the times I have spoken of, to the ability of the generals, who were then at the head of their affairs; and he makes use of a comparison, which explains, not unhappily, the character of that people. A vessel without a master, says he, is exposed to great dangers, when every one insists upon its being steered according to his opinion, and will not suffer others to guide him. If then a rude storm attacks it, the common danger conciliates and unites them; they abandon themselves to the pilot's skill, and all the rowers doing their duty, the ship is saved, and in a state of security. But if, when the tempest ceases, and the weather grows calm again, the discord of the

[g] Demost. *Philip.* iii. p. 89. [h] Polyb. vii. p. 488.

mariners revives; if they will hearken no longer to the pilot, and some are for continuing their voyage, whilst others resolve to stop in the midst of the course; if on one side they loose their sails, and furl them on the other; it often happens that, after having escaped the most violent storms, they are shipwrecked even in port. This, says Polybius, is a natural image of the Athenian republic. As long as it suffered itself to be guided by the wise counsels of an Aristides, a Themistocles, a Pericles, it came off victorious from the greatest dangers. But prosperity blinded and ruined it; following no longer any thing but its own caprice, and being become too insolent to be advised or governed, it plunged itself into the greatest misfortunes.

SECT. VIII. DEATH OF EVAGORAS KING OF SALAMIS. NICOCLES HIS SON SUCCEEDS HIM. ADMIRABLE CHARACTER OF THAT PRINCE.—[i] The third year of the 101st Olympiad, and soon after the Thebans had destroyed Platææ and Thespiæ, as has been observed before, Evagoras, king of Salamis in the isle of Cyprus, of whom much has been said in the preceding volume, was assassinated by one of his eunuchs. His son Nicocles succeeded him. He had a fine model before him in the person of his father; and he seemed to consider it as his duty to make it his study, and to tread in his steps.[k] When he took possession of the throne, he found the public treasury entirely exhausted, by the great expenses which his father had been obliged to incur in the long war which he had to maintain with the king of Persia. He knew that the generality of princes, upon like occasions, think every means just for the reestablishment of their affairs; but for his part, he acted upon different principles. In his reign there was no talk of banishment, taxes, and confiscation of estates. The public felicity was his sole object, and justice his favourite virtue. He discharged the debts of the state gradually, not by crushing the people with excessive imposts, but by retrenching all unnecessary expenses, and by using a wise economy in the administration of his revenues. [l] 'I am sure,' said he, 'that no citizen can complain that I have done him

A. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374.

[i] Diod. l. xv. p. 363. [k] Isocrat. *in Nicoc.* p. 64. [l] Ibid. p. 65, 66.

the least wrong; and I have the satisfaction to know that I have enriched many with an unsparing hand.' He believed this kind of vanity, if it be vanity, might be permitted in a prince, and that it was glorious for him to have it in his power to throw out such a defiance to his subjects.

[m] He piqued himself also in particular upon another virtue, which is the more worthy of admiration in princes, as it is very uncommon among them; I mean temperance. It is most amiable, but very difficult, in an age and a rank of life to which every thing seems to be lawful, and wherein pleasure, armed with all her arts and attractions, is continually lying in ambush for a young prince, and anticipating his desires, to make a long resistance against the violence and insinuation of her assaults. Nicocles gloried in having never known any woman besides his wife during his reign, and was amazed that all other contracts should be treated with due regard in civil society, whilst that of marriage, the most sacred and inviolable of obligations, was broken through with impunity; and that men should not blush to commit an infidelity in respect to their wives, of which, should their wives be guilty, it would throw them into the utmost anguish and despair.

What I have said of the justice and temperance of Nicocles, Isocrates puts into that prince's own mouth; and it is not probable that he would have made him speak in such a manner, if his conduct had not agreed with such sentiments. It is in a discourse, supposed to be addressed by that king to his people, wherein he describes to them the duties of subjects to their princes: love, respect, obedience, fidelity, and unbounded devotion to their service; and to engage them more effectually to the discharge of those duties, he does not disdain to give them an account of his own conduct and sentiments.

[n] In another discourse, which precedes this, Isocrates lays before Nicocles all the duties of the sovereignty, and makes excellent reflections upon that subject, of which I can repeat here only a very small part. He begins by telling him that the virtue of private persons is much better supported than his own, by the mediocrity of their condition, by the employment and cares inseparable from it, by the misfortunes to which they

[m] Isocrat. p. 64. [n] Ibid. *ad Nicoc.*

are frequently exposed, by their distance from pleasures and luxury, and particularly by the liberty which their friends and relations have of giving them advice; whereas, the generality of princes have none of these advantages. He adds, that a king, who would make himself capable of governing well, ought to avoid an idle and inactive life, should set apart a fixed time for business and the public affairs, should form his council of the most able and experienced persons in his kingdom, should endeavour to make himself as much superior to others by his merit and wisdom as he is by his dignity, and especially to acquire the love of his subjects; and for that purpose love them sincerely, and look upon himself as their common father. 'Persist,' said he, 'in the religion you have received from your forefathers, but be assured that the most grateful adoration and sacrifice that you can offer to the Divinity, is that of the heart, in rendering yourself good and just. Show, upon all occasions, so high a regard for truth, that a single word from you may be more confided in than the oath of others. Be a warrior, by your ability in military affairs, and by such a warlike provision as may intimidate your enemies; but let your inclinations be pacific, and be rigidly exact in never pretending to, or undertaking anything unjustly. The only certain proof that you have reigned well, will be the power of bearing this testimony to yourself; that your people are become both more happy and more wise under your government.'

What seems to me most remarkable in this discourse, is, that the advice which Isocrates gives the king is neither attended with praises, nor with those studied reservations and artificial turns, without which fearful and modest truth dares not venture to approach the throne. This is most worthy of applause, and it is still more to the credit of the prince than the writer. Nicocles, far from being offended at these counsels, received them with joy; and to express his gratitude to Isocrates, made him a present of twenty talents, that is to say, twenty thousand crowns.[o]

SECT. IX. ARTAXERXES MNEMON UNDERTAKES THE

[o] Plut. *in vit. Isoc.* p. 838.

REDUCTION OF EGYPT. IPHICRATES THE ATHENIAN IS APPOINTED GENERAL OF THE ATHENIAN TROOPS. THE ENTERPRISE MISCARRIES BY THE ILL-CONDUCT OF PHARNABASUS THE PERSIAN GENERAL.—[p] Artaxerxes, after having given his people an interval of relaxation for several years, had formed the design of reducing Egypt, which had shaken off the Persian yoke long before, and made great preparations for war for that purpose. Achoris, who then reigned in Egypt, and had given Evagoras powerful aid against the Persians, foreseeing the storm, raised abundance of troops of his own subjects, and took into his pay a great body of Greeks and other auxiliary soldiers, of whom Chabrias the Athenian had the command.[q] He had accepted that office of himself, and without the authority of the republic. A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377.

Pharnabasus, having been charged with this war, sent to Athens to complain that Chabrias had engaged himself to serve against his master, and threatened the republic with the king's resentment, if he was not immediately recalled. He demanded at the same time Iphicrates, another Athenian, who was looked upon as one of the most excellent captains of his time, to give him the command of the body of Greek troops in the service of his master. The Athenians, who had a great interest in the continuance of the king's friendship, recalled Chabrias, and ordered him, upon pain of death to repair to Athens by a certain day. Iphicrates was sent to the Persian army.

The preparations of the Persians went on so slowly, that two whole years elapsed before they entered upon action. [r] Achoris king of Egypt died in that time, and was succeeded by Psammuthis, who reigned but a year. Nepheritus was the next, and four months after Nectanebis, who reigned ten or twelve years.

[s] Artaxerxes, to draw some troops out of Greece, sent ambassadors thither, to declare to the several states, that the king's intent was they should all live in peace with each other, conformably to the treaty of Antalcidas, that all garrisons should be withdrawn, and all the A. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374.

[p] Diod. l. xv. p. 328, 347.
[q] Cor. Nep. *in Chab. et in Iphic.*
[r] Euseb. *in Chron.*
[s] Diod. l. xv. p. 355.

cities suffered to enjoy their liberty under their respective laws. All Greece received this declaration with pleasure, except the Thebans, who refused to conform to it.

[t] At length, every thing being in readiness for the invasion of Egypt, a camp was formed at Aco, since called Ptolemais, in Palestine, the place appointed for the general rendezvous. In a review there, the army was found to consist of two hundred thousand Persians, under the command of Pharnabasus, and twenty thousand Greeks under Iphicrates. The naval forces were in proportion to those of the land; their fleet consisting of three hundred galleys, besides two hundred vessels of thirty oars, and a prodigious number of barks to transport the necessary provisions for the fleet and army.

The army and fleet began to move at the same time; and that they might act in concert, they separated from each other as little as possible. The war was to open with the siege of Pelusium; but so much time had been given the Egyptians, that Nectanebis had rendered the approach to it impracticable, both by sea and land. The fleet, therefore, instead of making a descent, as had been projected, sailed forwards, and entered the mouth of the Nile called the Mendesian. The Nile at that time emptied itself into the sea by seven different channels, of which only two* remain at this day; and at each of these mouths there was a fort with a strong garrison to defend the entrance. The Mendesian not being so well fortified as that of Pelusium, where the enemy was expected to land, the descent was made with no great difficulty. The fort was carried sword in hand, and no quarter given to those who were found in it.

After this signal action, Iphicrates thought it advisable to sail up the Nile without loss of time, and to attack Memphis, the capital of Egypt. If that opinion had been followed before the Egyptians had had time to recover the panic, into which so formidable an invasion, and the blow already received, had thrown them, they would have found the capital without any defence, it would inevitably have fallen into their hands, and all Egypt been reconquered. But the main body of the army not

[t] Diod. l. xv. p. 358, 359.
* Damietta and Rosetta.

being arrived, Pharnabasus believed it necessary to wait its coming up, and would undertake nothing, till he had reassembled all his troops; under pretext, that they would then be invincible, and that there would be no obstacle capable of withstanding them.

Iphicrates, who knew that, in affairs of war especially, there are certain favourable and decisive moments, which it is absolutely proper to seize, judged quite differently; and in despair to see an opportunity suffered to escape, that might never be retrieved, he earnestly demanded permission to go at least with the twenty thousand men under his command. Pharnabasus refused to comply with that demand, out of abject jealousy; apprehending, that if the enterprise succeeded, the whole glory of the war would redound to Iphicrates. This delay gave the Egyptians time to look about them. They drew all their troops together into a body, put a good garrison into Memphis, and with the rest of their army kept the field, and harassed the Persians in such a manner, that they prevented their advancing farther into the country. After which came on the inundation of the Nile, which laying all Egypt under water, the Persians were obliged to return into Phœnicia, after having lost a considerable part of their troops to no purpose.

Thus this expedition, which had cost immense sums, and for which the preparations alone had given so much difficulty for upwards of two years, entirely miscarried, and produced no other effect, than an irreconcilable enmity between the two generals who had the command of it. Pharnabasus, to excuse himself, accused Iphicrates of having prevented its success; and Iphicrates, with much more reason, laid all the fault upon Pharnabasus. But well assured that that nobleman would be believed at his court in preference to him, and remembering what had happened to Conon, he determined, in order to avoid the fate of that illustrious Athenian, to retire secretly to Athens in a small vessel which he hired. Pharnabasus caused him to be accused there, of having rendered the expedition against Egypt abortive. The people of Athens made answer, that if he could be convicted of that crime he should be punished as he deserved. But his innocence was too well known at Athens to give him any disquiet upon that

account. It does not appear that he was ever called in question about it; and some time after, the Athenians declared him sole admiral of their fleet.

[u] Most of the projects of the Persian court generally miscarried by their slowness in putting them in execution. Their generals' hands were tied up, and nothing was left to their discretion. They had a plan marked out for them in their instructions, from which they did not dare to depart. If any accident happened, that had not been foreseen and provided for, they must wait for new orders from court, and before they arrived the opportunity was entirely lost. Iphicrates, having observed that Pharnabasus took his resolutions with all the presence of mind and penetration that could be desired in an accomplished general, [x] and that nevertheless they were not carried into execution, asked him one day, how it happened that he was so quick in his views and so slow in his actions? 'It is,' replied Pharnabasus, 'because my views depend only upon myself, but their execution upon my master.'

SECT. X. THE LACEDÆMONIANS SEND AGESILAUS TO THE AID OF TACHOS, WHO HAD REVOLTED FROM THE PERSIANS. THE KING OF SPARTA'S ACTIONS IN EGYPT. HIS DEATH. THE GREATEST PART OF THE PROVINCES REVOLT AGAINST ARTAXERXES.—[y] After the battle of Mantinea, both parties, equally weary of the war, had entered into a general peace with all the other states of Greece, upon the king of Persia's plan, by which the enjoyment of its laws and liberties was secured to each city; and the Messenians were included in it, notwithstanding all the opposition and intrigues of the Lacedæmonians to prevent it. Their rage upon this occasion separated them from the other Greeks. They were the only people who resolved to continue the war, from the hope of recovering the whole country of Messenia in a short time. That resolution, of which Agesilaus was the author, occasioned him to be justly regarded as a violent and obstinate man, insatiable of glory and command, who was not afraid of involving the republic again in inevitable misfortunes, from

[u] Diod. l. xv. p. 358. [x] Ibid. p. 357.
[y] Plut. *in Agesil.* p. 616—618. Diod. l. xv. p. 397—401.

the necessity to which the want of money exposed them of borrowing great sums, and of levying heavy imposts, instead of taking advantage of the favourable opportunity that now offered to conclude a peace, and put an end to all their evils.

[z] Whilst matters were thus passing in Greece, Tachos, who had ascended the throne of Egypt, drew together as many troops as he could, to defend himself against the king of Persia, who meditated a new invasion of Egypt, notwithstanding the ill success of his past endeavours to reduce that kingdom. A. M. 3641. Ant. J. C. 363.

For this purpose Tachos sent into Greece, and obtained a body of troops from the Lacedæmonians, with Agesilaus to command them, whom he promised to make generalissimo of his army. The Lacedæmonians were exasperated against Artaxerxes, from his having forced them to include the Messenians in the late peace, and were rejoiced to have this opportunity of expressing their resentment. Chabrias the Athenian went also into the service of Tachos, but of his own head, and without the republic's participation.

This commission did Agesilaus no honour. It was thought below the dignity of a king of Sparta and a great captain, who had made his name glorious throughout the world, and was then more than eighty years old, to receive the pay of an Egyptian, and to serve a barbarian who had revolted against his master.

As soon as he landed in Egypt, the king's principal generals and the great officers of his house came to his ship, to receive and make their court to him. The rest of the Egyptians were as solicitous to see him, from the great expectation which the name and renown of Agesilaus had excited in them, and came in multitudes to the shore for that purpose. But when, instead of a great and magnificent prince, according to the idea which his exploits had led them to entertain of him, they saw nothing splendid or majestic either in his person or equipage, and saw only an old man of a mean aspect and small stature, without any striking appearance, and dressed in a sorry robe of a very coarse stuff, they were seized with an immode-

[z] Xenoph. *de reg. Agesil.* p. 663. Cor. Nep. *in Agesil.* c. viii.

rate disposition to laugh, and applied the fable of the mountain in labour to him.

When he met king Tachos, and had joined his troops with those of Egypt, he was very much surprised at finding that he was not appointed general of the whole army, as he expected, but only of the foreign troops; that Chabrias was made general of the sea-forces, and that Tachos retained the command-in-chief to himself. This was not the only mortification he had to experience.

Tachos came to a resolution to march into Phœnicia, thinking it more advisable to make that country the seat of the war, than to await the enemy in Egypt. Agesilaus, who knew better, represented to him in vain, that his affairs were not sufficiently established to admit his removing out of his dominions; that he would do much better to remain in them, and content himself with acting by his generals in the enemy's country. Tachos despised this wise counsel, and expressed no less disregard for him on all other occasions. Agesilaus was so much incensed at such conduct, that he joined the Egyptians, who had taken arms against him during his absence, and had placed Nectanebus his * cousin upon the throne. Agesilaus, abandoning the king to whose aid he had been sent, and joining the rebel who had dethroned him, alleged in justification of himself, that he was sent to the assistance of the Egyptians; and that they having taken up arms against Tachos, he was not at liberty to serve against them without new orders from Sparta. He despatched expresses thither; and the instructions he received were, to act as he should judge most advantageous for his country. He immediately declared for Nectanebus. Tachos, obliged to quit Egypt, retired to Sidon, from whence he went to the court of Persia. Artaxerxes not only forgave him his fault, but even gave him the command of his troops against the rebels.

Agesilaus covered so criminal a conduct with the veil of the public utility. But, says Plutarch, let that delusive blind be removed, the most just and only true name which can be given the action, is that of perfidy and treason. It is true that the

* Diodorus calls him his son; Plutarch, his cousin.

Lacedæmonians, making the glorious and the good consist principally in the service of their country, which they idolized, knew no other justice than what tended to the augmentation of the grandeur of Sparta and the extending of its dominions. I am surprised so judicious an author as Xenophon should endeavour to palliate a conduct of this kind, by saying only, that Agesilaus attached himself to that of the two kings who seemed the best affected to Greece.

At the same time, a third prince, of the city of Mendes, set up for himself to dispute the crown with Nectanebus. This new competitor had an army of a hundred thousand men to support his pretensions. Agesilaus gave his advice to attack them before they were exercised and disciplined. Had that counsel been followed, it would have been easy to have defeated a body of people raised in haste, and without any experience in war. But Nectanebus imagined that Agesilaus only gave him this advice to betray him afterwards, as he had done Tachos. He therefore gave his enemy time to discipline his troops, who soon after reduced him to retire into a city, fortified with good walls and of very great extent. Agesilaus was obliged to follow him thither; where the Mendesian prince besieged them. Nectanebus would then have attacked the enemy before his works, which were begun in order to surround the city, were advanced, and pressed Agesilaus to that purpose; but he refused to comply at first, which extremely augmented the suspicions conceived of him. At length, when he saw the work in a sufficient forwardness, and that there remained only as much ground between the two ends of the line as the troops within the city might occupy, drawn up in battle, he told Nectanebus that it was time to attack the enemy, that their own lines would prevent their surrounding him, and that the interval between them was exactly the space he wanted, for ranging his troops in such a manner as that they might all act together effectively. The attack was executed according to Agesilaus's plan; the besiegers were beaten, and from thenceforth Agesilaus conducted all the operations of the war with so much success, that the prince their enemy was always overcome, and at last taken prisoner.

The following winter, after having firmly established Necta-

A. M. 3643. Ant. J. C. 361. nebus, he embarked to return to Lacedæmon, and was driven by contrary winds upon the coast of Africa, into a place called the port of Menelaus, where he fell sick and died, at the age of fourscore and four years. He had reigned forty-one of them at Sparta; and of those forty-one he had passed thirty with the reputation of the greatest and most powerful of all the Greeks, and had been looked upon as the leader and king of almost all Greece, till the battle of Leuctra. His latter years did not entirely support the reputation he had acquired; and Xenophon, in his eulogium of this prince, wherein he gives him the preference to all other captains, has been found to exaggerate his virtues, and extenuate his faults too much.

The body of Agesilaus was carried to Sparta. Those who were about him not having honey, with which it was the Spartan custom to cover the bodies they wished to embalm, made use of wax in its stead. His son Archidamus succeeded to the throne, which continued in his house down to Agis, who was the fifth king of the line of Agesilaus.

Towards the end of the Egyptian war, the greatest part of the provinces in subjection to Persia revolted.

Artaxerxes Mnemon had been the involuntary occasion of this defection. That prince, of himself, was good, equitable, and benevolent. He loved his people, and was beloved by them. He had abundance of mildness and sweetness of temper in his character; but that easiness degenerated into sloth and luxury, and particularly in the latter years of his life, in which he discovered a dislike for all business and application, from whence the good qualities which he otherwise possessed, as well as his beneficent intentions, became useless and without effect. The satraps and governors of provinces, abusing his favour and the infirmities of his great age, oppressed the people, treated them with insolence and cruelty, loaded them with taxes, and did every thing in their power to render the Persian yoke insupportable.

The discontent became general, and broke out, after long suffering, almost at the same time on all sides. Asia Minor, Syria, Phœnicia, and many other provinces, declared themselves openly, and took up arms. The principal leaders of the con-

spiracy were, Ariobarzanes satrap of Phrygia, Mausolus king of Caria, Orontes governor of Mysia, and Autophradates governor of Lydia. Datames, of whom mention has been made before, and who commanded in Cappadocia, was also engaged in it. By this means, half the revenues of the crown were on a sudden diverted into different channels, and the remainder would not have been sufficient for the expenses of a war against the revolters, had they acted in concert. But their union was of no long continuance; and those who had been the first and most zealous in shaking off the yoke, were also the foremost in resuming it, and in betraying the interests of the others, to make their peace with the king.

The provinces of Asia Minor, on withdrawing from their obedience, had entered into a confederacy for their mutual defence, and had chosen Orontes, governor of Mysia, for their general. They had also resolved to add twenty thousand foreign troops to those of the country, and had charged the same Orontes with the care of raising them. But when he had got the money for that service into his hands, with the addition of a year's pay, he kept it for himself, and delivered to the king the persons who had brought it from the revolted provinces.

Reomithras, another of the chiefs of Asia Minor, being sent into *Egypt to draw succours from that kingdom, committed a treachery of a like nature. Having brought from that country five hundred talents and fifty ships of war, he assembled the principal revolters at Leucas, a city of Asia Minor, under pretence of giving them an account of his negotiation, seized them all, delivered them to the king to make his peace, and kept the money he had received in Egypt for the confederacy. Thus this formidable revolt, which had brought the Persian empire to the very brink of ruin, dissolved of itself, or, to speak more properly, was suspended for some time.

SECT. XI. TROUBLES AT THE COURT OF ARTAXERXES CONCERNING HIS SUCCESSOR. DEATH OF THAT PRINCE.—[a]The end of Artaxerxes's reign abounded with cabals. The

[a] Plut. *in Artax.* p. 1024—1027. Diod. l. xv. p. 400. Justin, l. x. c. 1, 2.

* Diodorus says he was sent to Tachos, but it is more likely that it was to Nectanebus.

whole court were divided into factions in favour of one or other of his sons, who pretended to the succession. He had a hundred and fifty by his concubines, who were in number three hundred and sixty, and three by his lawful wife Atossa; Darius, Ariaspes, and Ochus. To put a stop to these intrigues, he declared Darius, the eldest, his successor. And to remove all cause of disputing that prince's right after his death, he permitted him to assume from thenceforth the title of king, and to wear the royal * tiara. But the young prince was for having something more real. Besides which, the refusal of Artaxerxes to give him one of his concubines, whom he had demanded, had extremely incensed him, and he formed a conspiracy against his father's life, wherein he engaged fifty of his brothers.

It was Tiribasus, of whom mention has been made several times in the present volume, who contributed the most to his taking so unnatural a resolution, from a like subject of discontent against the king; who, having promised to give him first one of his daughters in marriage, and then another, broke his word both times, and married them himself! Such abominable incest was permitted at that time in Persia, the religion of the nation not prohibiting it.

The number of the conspirators was already very great, and the day fixed for the execution, when an eunuch, well informed of the whole plot, discovered it to the king. Upon that information, Artaxerxes thought it would be highly imprudent to despise so great a danger, by neglecting a strict inquiry into it; but that it would be much more so, to give credit to it without certain and unquestionable proof. He assured himself of it with his own eyes. The conspirators were suffered to enter the king's apartment, and then seized. Darius and all his accomplices were punished as they deserved.

After the death of Darius, the cabals began again. Three of his brothers were competitors; Ariaspes, Ochus, and Arsames. The two former pretended to the throne in right of birth, being the sons of the queen. The third had the king's favour, who tenderly loved him, though only the son of

* This tiara was a turban, or kind of headdress, with the plume of feathers standing upright upon it. The seven counsellors had also plumes of feathers, but these they wore aslant, and before. All others wore them aslant, and behind.

a concubine. Ochus, prompted by his restless ambition, studied perpetually the means to rid himself of both his rivals. As he was equally cunning and cruel, he employed his craft and artifice against Ariaspes, and his cruelty against Arsames. Knowing the former to be extremely simple and credulous, he made the eunuchs of the palace, whom he had found means to corrupt, threaten him so terribly in the name of the king his father, that, expecting every moment to be treated as Darius had been, he poisoned himself to avoid it. After this, there remained only Arsames to give him umbrage, because his father and all the world considered that prince as most worthy of the throne, from his ability and other excellent qualities. Him he caused to be assassinated by Harpates, son of Tiribasus.

This loss, which followed close upon the other, and the exceeding wickedness with which both were attended, gave the old king a grief that proved mortal: nor is it surprising, that at his age he should not have strength enough to support so great an affliction. It overpowered him, and brought him to the grave, after a reign of forty-three years, which might have been called happy, if it had not been interrupted by many revolts. That of his successor will be no less disturbed with them. A. M. 3643. Ant. J. C 361.

SECT. XII. CAUSES OF THE FREQUENT INSURRECTIONS AND REVOLTS IN THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.—I have taken care in relating the seditions that happened in the Persian empire, to observe from time to time the abuses which occasioned them. But as these revolts were more frequent than ever in the latter years, and will be more so, especially in the succeeding reign, I thought it would be proper to unite here, under one point of view, the different causes of these insurrections, which foretell the approaching decline of the Persian empire.

I. After the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the kings of Persia abandoned themselves more and more to the charms of voluptuousness and luxury, and the delights of an indolent and inactive life. Shut up generally in their palaces, amongst women and a crowd of flatterers, they contented themselves with enjoying, in soft effeminate ease and idleness, the pleasure

of universal command, and made their grandeur consist in the splendid glare of riches and an expensive magnificence.

II. They were, besides, princes of no great talents for the conduct of affairs, of small capacity in the art of governing, and void of taste for glory. Not having a sufficient extent of mind to animate all the parts of so vast an empire, nor sufficient strength to support the weight of it, they transferred to their officers the cares of public business, the fatigues of commanding armies, and the dangers which attend the execution of great enterprises; confining their ambition to bearing alone the lofty title of the Great King, and the King of kings.

III. The great offices of the crown, the government of the provinces, the command of armies, were generally bestowed upon people without either the claim of service or merit. It was the influence of the favourites, the secret intrigues of the court, the solicitations of the women of the palace, which determined the choice of the persons who were to fill the most important posts of the empire, and appropriated the rewards due to the officers who had done the state real service, to their own creatures.

IV. These courtiers, frequently, through a base and mean jealousy of the merit that gave them umbrage and reproached their small abilities, removed their rivals from public employments, and rendered their talents useless to the state. * Sometimes they would even cause their fidelity to be suspected by false informations, bring them to trial as criminals against the state, † and force the king's most faithful servants, in order to defend themselves against their calumniators, to seek their safety in revolting, and in turning those arms against their prince, which they had so often made triumph for his glory and the service of the empire.

V. The ministers, to hold the generals in dependence, restrained them under such limited orders as obliged them to let slip the opportunities of conquering, and prevented them, by waiting for new orders, from pushing their advantages. They also often made them responsible for their bad success, after having let them want every thing necessary to conduce to it.

* Pharnabasus, Tiribasus.
† Datames, &c

VI. The kings of Persia had extremely degenerated from the frugality of Cyrus and the ancient Persians, who contented themselves with cresses and salads for their food, and water for their drink. The whole nobility had been infected with the contagion of this example. In retaining the single meal of their ancestors, they made it last during the greatest part of the day, and prolonged it far into the night by drinking to excess; and far from being ashamed of drunkenness, they made it their glory, as we have seen in the younger Cyrus.

VII. The extreme remoteness of the provinces, which extended from the Caspian and Euxine to the Red Sea and Æthiopia, and from the rivers Ganges and Indus to the Ægean Sea, was a great obstacle to the fidelity and affection of the people, who never had the satisfaction to enjoy the presence of their masters; who knew them only by the weight of their taxations, and by the pride and avarice of their satraps or governors; and who, in transporting themselves to the court, to make their demands and complaints there, could not hope to find access to princes, who believed it contributed to the majesty of their persons to make themselves inaccessible and invisible.

VIII. The multitude of the provinces in subjection to Persia did not compose an uniform empire, nor the regular body of a state whose members were united by the common ties of interest, manners, language, and religion, and animated with the same spirit of government, under the guidance of the same laws. It was rather a confused, disjointed, tumultuous, and even forced assemblage of different nations, formerly free and independent; of whom some, who were torn from their native countries and the sepulchres of their forefathers, saw themselves with grief transported into unknown regions, or amongst enemies, where they persevered in retaining their own laws and customs, and a form of government peculiar to themselves. These different nations, who not only lived without any common tie or relation between them, but with a diversity of manners and worship, and often with antipathy of characters and inclinations, desired nothing so ardently as their liberty and reestablishment in their own countries. All these people therefore were unconcerned for the preservation of an empire

which was the sole obstacle to their so warm and just desires, and could not feel any affection for a government that treated them always as strangers and subjected nations, and never gave them any share in its authority or privileges.

IX. The extent of the empire, and its remoteness from the court, made it necessary to give the viceroys of the frontier provinces a very great authority in every branch of government; to raise and pay armies; to impose tributes; to adjudge the quarrels of cities, provinces, and vassal kings; and to make treaties with the neighbouring states. A power so extensive and almost independent, in which they continued many years without being changed, and without colleagues or council to deliberate upon the affairs of their provinces, accustomed them to the pleasure of commanding absolutely, and of reigning. In consequence of which, it was with great repugnance they submitted to be removed from their governments and often endeavoured to support themselves in them by force of arms.

X. The governors of provinces, the generals of armies, and all the other officers and ministers, gloried in imitating, in their equipages, tables, furniture and dress, the pomp and splendour of the court in which they had been educated. To support so destructive a pride, and to supply expenses so much above the fortunes of private persons, they were *reduced to oppress* their subjects under their jurisdiction with exorbitant taxes, by extortions, and the shameful traffic of a public venality that set those offices to sale for money, which ought to have been granted only to merit. All that vanity lavished, or luxury exhausted, was made good by mean arts and the violent rapaciousness of an insatiable avarice.

These gross irregularities, and abundance of others which remained without remedy, and which were daily augmented by impunity, tired the people's patience, and occasioned a general discontent amongst them, the usual forerunner of the ruin of states. Their just complaints, long time despised, were followed by an open rebellion of several nations, who endeavoured to do themselves that justice by force, which was refused to their remonstrances. In such a conduct they failed in the submission and fidelity which subjects owe to their

sovereigns; but Paganism did not carry its lights so far, and was not capable of so sublime a perfection, which was reserved for a religion that teaches, that no pretext, no injustice, no vexation, can ever authorize the rebellion of a people against their prince.

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
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